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 CHAPTER 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Aristotle and practical knowledge 
Intuitively, practical knowledge can be conceived in opposition to theoreti-
cal knowledge and can be described broadly as the kind of knowledge we use 
when we perform actions: I know that I should arrive on time for this meeting; I 
know how to cross the road at a pedestrian crossing; I know that I am crossing the 
road. All these examples are instances of practical knowledge. On the contrary, 
theoretical knowledge can be conceived as being purely descriptive and as aiming 
at accounting for how things actually are. E.g. 'I know that this is a crosswalk' or 'I 
know that crosswalks are made of yellow stripes on the road'. 
In the philosophical tradition, practical knowledge has been interpreted in 
at least three different ways: 1) knowing how; 2) knowing what one is doing; 3) 
knowing what one should do.1 All these notions of practical knowledge have en-
joyed considerable success in various areas of philosophy, psychology, cognitive 
                                                      
1 Knowledge how became a philosophical topic with the work of Gilbert Ryle The Concept of 
Mind (Ryle 1949, esp. chap. 2). In that work, theoretical knowledge is expressed as 'knowing 
that something is the case' (or knowing that), practical knowledge as "knowing how to do 
something". Both notions have usually been interpreted as a relation to a proposition for the 
former, and as an ability for the latter (Hornsby 2011: 80 for the 'usual interpretation', which 
she actually challenges in her article). 
Practical knowledge as 'knowing what one is doing' was first made popular by Elizabeth 
Anscombe and has become a major topic in the philosophy of action. Anscombe speaks of it 
as "knowledge without observation" (Anscombe 1957: 13-14). 
The third understanding of practical knowledge concerns normative ethics and moral psy-
chology and can be found as early as in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft (A633/B661). It has 
a prescriptive or evaluative content and can be characterized as 'knowing what one ought to 
do' or 'knowing what is good to do'. 
There are other philosophical notions similar to something like practical knowledge. How-
ever I cannot treat them all here. An original approach worth mentionning is Bourdieu's 
concept of 'practical sense'. Practical sense according to Bourdieu is a kind of intuitive, so-
cially constructed disposition to respond to one's environment. Bourdieu compares it with 
the skill of a tennis player who knows intuitively how to move his limbs without conscious 
control over them in order to hit the ball successfully (Bourdieu 1987: 77). 
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science, education science, etc. However, the kind of practical knowledge I intend 
to focus on is closer to the third understanding of practical knowledge, namely 
'knowledge of what one should do'. More precisely, I shall restrict the scope of this 
inquiry to what I shall call 'knowledge in decision', that is, the kind of knowledge 
displayed at the moment we make a decision. Indeed, it seems that in specific situa-
tions we sometimes know what we should do and this knowledge determines our 
decisions. For instance, at the end of high school, I knew that I had to enter the Phi-
losophy Department of my home University, that it was what was best for me. 
When there is a referendum about, say, restrictions on immigration policy, as it 
occasionally happens in Switzerland, I know what I ought to vote for. I have a feel-
ing of certainty or conviction of what option I ought to choose. In such situations, 
my knowledge of what I should do is expressed in my choice. 
One could argue that speaking of such a notion of practical knowledge does 
not make a lot of sense. At the moment of decision, it rather seems that we never 
really know what we should do, but that instead we guess what the best option 
would be or that we simply opt for a course of action randomly or irrationally. 
Think of the lost person trying to find his way in a foreign city: 'I know that I should 
turn right at the next crossroad' although this person has in fact no idea of where he 
is going. The most expressive situation of this absence of certainty is the case of a 
practical dilemma: It is a typical situation where I don't know what to do and, pre-
sumably, there is no way I can come to something like knowing what I should do in 
a strong sense. Still, in some cases, it does seem reasonable to speak of knowledge. 
Confronting a conflictual situation, I can for instance weigh the pros and cons of 
various options and come to a reasoned decision by way of a process of decision-
making. My decision would then be strengthened by considerations of the various 
aspects that are conditions for me choosing this or that course of action. This sort of 
well-informed decision would then appear as the result of knowledge. I know that 
doing so and so given the present circumstances is the best thing to do.2  
In spite of the notion of practical knowledge being controversial, I shall ar-
gue that it is perfectly plausible and that it has been advocated for by none the less 
than Aristotle. Aristotle was the first philosopher to make an explicit distinction 
between a theoretical and a practical form of thinking (EN VI.1 1139a6-15). Against 
his former master Plato, he argued that the realm of practical thinking can be the 
object of rational considerations and arguments. Also, he observed that we are not 
better placed to carry out certain actions when we have theoretical knowledge of it 
(1143b24) and that in practical situations experience can be more useful than 
                                                      
2 This is what is studied by decision theory: minimizing the risks in decision-making. 
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knowledge (Meta. I.1 981a13-15; EN VI.7 1141b14-23). Correspondingly, Aristotle 
acknowledged that there must be "another kind of knowledge", distinct from theoreti-
cal knowledge (EE 1246b35-36). This other kind of knowledge should be what 
makes possible reliable intellectual procedures and evaluation concerning actions. 
The Greek term that is traditionally taken to mean the concept of practical 
knowledge in Aristotle’s work is phronêsis. Phronêsis is a virtue (aretê), i.e. an excel-
lent disposition, and is defined as a "state accompanied by reason, which is true, 
which is about the good and bad things for humans, and which is conducive to 
action" (EN 1140b4-6; 20-21). In this sense, it can be understood as a kind of wisdom 
in the domain of moral action and political deliberation.3 A fundamental feature of 
phronêsis is that it implies the ability to deliberate well on practical matters (1141b9-
10). Correspondingly, the person having phronêsis, the phronimos, or practically wise 
person, seems to be such that he is able to achieve what he sets out to do (1144a24-
27). Moreover, happiness, or success in life, depends on phronêsis, among other 
things (EE 1246b37). Phronêsis seems to be the kind of practical knowledge I look 
for, or at least, it is closely related to practical knowledge. 
But is phronêsis practical knowledge? Which features make it a kind of 
knowledge? Are these features essential to it? Or is it possible to have a share in 
them for non-phronimoi people? And if phronêsis is not practical knowledge, how 
can it be that the phronimos is better off in making the correct decision than other 
types of agent? Before addressing these questions, one needs to review the existing 
literature on Aristotle's phronêsis. 
1.2 Status quæstionis 
Phronêsis has always been a subject of particular interest among philoso-
phers, and not only among scholars of ancient philosophy. It seems that what has 
fascinated generations of readers is the ability of the phronimos to get things right in 
the practical domain. Aristotle's phronêsis has had a huge influence on 20th Century 
philosophy in various areas. German Neo-Aristotelianism has seen in phronêsis a 
description of practical knowledge that can provide a new paradigm of science of 
Humanities and social sciences (Arendt 1958; Gadamer 1960). Virtue ethics has fol-
lowed Aristotle's description of phronêsis as an intellectual virtue necessary for the 
right exercise of virtues of character (Foot 1978; Hursthouse 2012), whereas virtue 
                                                      
3 In this respect, phronêsis, or practical wisdom, is opposed to sophia, or theoretical wisdom. 
Sophia is defined as the most accurate of the sciences, which includes not only science, but 
intuition of the principles as well (EN VI.7 1141a16-20). In this sense, sophia is very much 
directed towards theoretical activities, unlike phronêsis. See also §3.2.1. 
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epistemology has developed the notion of intellectual virtue on the basis of Aristo-
tle's phronêsis in order to offer an original account of knowledge in general 
(Zagzebski 1996).  
In modern scholarship on ancient philosophy interest in phronêsis has arisen 
as early as the mid-19th century and numerous studies have been produced on the 
topic.4 Studies on phronêsis are partly motivated by the fact that it is an essential 
feature of how to reach happiness (eudaimonia).5 As happiness is defined as the "ac-
tivity of the soul according to virtue" (EN I.7 1098a16-17), phronêsis plays a central 
role in attaining it. The exercise of phronêsis can either be identified all the way with 
acting virtuously, or it can be viewed as an essential feature of virtuous action. 
Phronêsis can thus be explained for the sake of understanding Aristotle's general 
doctrine of virtue and the good. Studies on these topics have flourished throughout 
the 20th century. At the same time, a specific interest for phronêsis has also arisen. 
Scholars have attempted to better understand what kind of intellectual virtue 
phronêsis is. 
The main debate about phronêsis as an intellectual virtue has been centred on 
the question of whether or not phronêsis takes part in the acquisition of moral ends. 
This question matters because as happiness consists in the exercise of moral virtue, 
it seems that being happy presupposes some knowledge of what virtue, or the 
good, are. An influential direction of interpretation in the 20th century has been to 
ascribe only a calculative role to phronêsis, that is, to identify it with good delibera-
tion (euboulia). According to this line of interpretation, first introduced by Walter 
(Walter 1874), the rational part of the soul looks for the means to realize a certain 
end, which is already given. This entails that phronêsis doesn't take part in setting 
the end of moral action, which is the proper task of virtue of character. This posi-
tion relies on a literal reading of passages where Aristotle seems to affirm that what 
determines moral ends is not reason, but non-rational character, and the virtue 
proper to character.6 Opponents of this line of interpretation have often understood 
it as akin to Hume's sentimentalism (Sorabji 1980: 209; Taylor 2008). They consider, 
on the contrary, that phronêsis consists not only in good deliberation, but also in 
what determines moral principles. They do not agree, however, on how exactly 
                                                      
4 Before the 1950's and new openings in Aristotelian scholarship there had already been a 
large amount of contributions devoted entirely or to a wide extent to the notion of phronêsis. 
Amongst the most significant are Walter 1874; Teichmüller 1879; Burnet 1900; Loening 1903; 
Greenwood 1909; Ross 1923. 
5 On eudaimonia see note 37. 
6 Recent proponents of this position include Aubenque 1963; Hardie 1968; Natali 2001; 
Bodéüs 2004; Moss 2012. 
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phronêsis is supposed to provide moral principles. Some scholars claim that they are 
grasped in the same way as theoretical principles, i.e. by intuition or direct intellec-
tion (nous). Such an intuition would result from an inductive process from experi-
ence.7 Others claim that moral principles are discovered by dialectical discussion of 
"reputable opinions" (endoxa),8 or even by deliberation itself.9 But what matters is 
that the intellectual grasp (nous) of the principles is a part of phronêsis itself, not a 
distinct cognitive state. In English speaking countries, the latter, 'cognitivist', posi-
tion has been dominant in the past decades of Aristotelian scholarship. A recent 
book by Jessica Moss has however challenged this view. The English-speaking 
world has also received the English translation of Natali's book in 2001 (originally 
published in 1988) that defends a non-cognitivist approach. In the French-speaking 
world, however, the Humean, or rather, as I shall call it, 'desiderativist', interpreta-
tion has prevailed.10 
This line of inquiry has led scholars to produce numerous studies on 
phronêsis. In particular, the comparison of Aristotle with Hume has entailed a focus 
on issues such as practical reason and the motivation of action (i.a. Anscombe 1965; 
Nussbaum 1978, Essay 4; Dahl 1984; Charles 1984). Commentators have focused on 
phronêsis as practical knowledge insofar as they insist on its conative component.11 
They notice that Aristotle does not offer an account of practical knowledge or prac-
tical reason in terms of decision procedure, or in terms of deontic logic. Rather, 
what impresses them is the close relation Aristotle establishes with the psychology 
of the practical agent, in particular of the phronimos (Reeve 1992: 196-197). They 
retain that phronêsis does not go without character virtue and that one should stress 
the relation between reason and desire in an account of practical knowledge. For 
instance, David Charles (forthcoming) analyses practical knowledge in terms of the 
appropriateness between thought and desire. As Aristotle defines decision as de-
pending from both practical thought and desire, he goes on by showing that practi-
cal knowledge is achieved when thought and desire are in agreement. However, as 
I shall argue, the causes of error in practical thought are less the result of a disa-
greement between thought and desire than the result of the lack of appropriate jus-
tification for one's decision. Charles does not pay enough attention to the epistemic 
justification of decision. 
                                                      
7 Kenny 1979; Engberg-Pedersen 1983; Dahl 1984; Tuozzo 1991; Reeve 1992. 
8 Cooper 1975: 66-70; Irwin 1988. 
9 Wiggins 1975-1976; Broadie 1991; McDowell 1998; Bostock 2000; Price 2011. 
10 This is certainly due to Aubenque's work La prudence chez Aristote (1963), which had a 
significant influence on the next generations of scholars. 
11 Natali 2001; Richardson Lear 2004; Charles forthcoming. 
Another Kind of Knowledge. Aristotle's Phronesis from an Epistemological Point of View 
 16 
The reason for the insistence on the conative component of practical reason 
seems to reside on the comparison with Hume. Since the full Humean thesis about 
reason states that reason not only has no share in the determination of moral ends, 
but also has no motivational force, it seems then that a study of Aristotle's phronêsis 
should answer both components of the thesis. Phronêsis does indeed determine 
moral ends, and practical reason in general is sufficient to motivate our actions. Yet, 
in doing so, it seems that scholars have lost touch with the more fundamental ques-
tion of the epistemic status of phronêsis. Scholars simply presuppose that phronêsis 
has to do with knowledge without inquiring more deeply into the topic. 
A mark of this lack of interest for epistemological questions on phronêsis is 
that there has been no agreement in recent scholarship regarding the relation be-
tween phronêsis and practical knowledge. At times, commentators simply under-
stand the expression 'practical knowledge' as a way among others of referring to 
phronêsis (Aubenque 1963). In this way, the phrase 'practical knowledge' is roughly 
equivalent to the other usual translation of phronêsis, namely 'practical wisdom. 
However, scholars often understand the meaning of phronêsis as extending beyond 
what the modern reader would expect from a concept of practical knowledge. 
Scholars sometimes insist on phronêsis as practical knowledge in an existential way: 
as promoting the authenticity of human experience of the world (Heidegger 1992, 
Gadamer 1960). In the same way, phronêsis has been described as an insight of what 
one should do, which also involves "a profound insight into the whole human con-
dition" and this insight is such that it can justify the grasp of what one should do 
(Engberg-Pedersen 1983: 223). These interpretations of phronêsis correspond to a 
more substantial understanding of wisdom. Practical wisdom in these terms is not 
merely a faculty to take the correct decision, but an overarching virtue that takes an 
important part in defining the good life.  
Contrasting such views on the identity between phronêsis and practical 
knowledge, some commentators understand 'practical knowledge' as a specific as-
pect of phronêsis. Practical knowledge has been assimilated to practical intellect 
(nous praktikos). Yet this view leaves open the issue of what this 'practical intellect' 
refers to, for it has been interpreted in radically different ways, either as perception 
of particular facts (Louden 1991), or as intuition of first principles of ethics (Reeve 
1992). Other scholars focus on what is usually called "moral knowledge", i.e. 
knowledge of moral principles and values (Owens 1991). Finally, some others un-
derstand practical knowledge as the kind of knowledge displayed in a particular 
decision (Broadie 1991). This meaning is closer to the inquiry I propose. Given the 
complex nature of phronêsis in Aristotle's texts, this polysemy is not surprising. It 
seems that depending on which aspect of phronêsis one wants to highlight, the exact 
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cognitive achievement of phronêsis varies, and with it the sense one attributes to 
'practical knowledge'. 
Of course, epistemological questions about phronêsis are not totally absent 
from Aristotelian scholarship. There has been a direction of interpretation that con-
sidered phronêsis to be identical to ethical science. According to this kind of inter-
pretation, ethical treatises such as the EN are the product of practical reason or 
phronêsis itself, rather than of theoretical reason as for treatises such as the Physics or 
the Metaphysics (Hardie 1968: 30). Ethical science would then have its own princi-
ples and methods that are distinct from those of theoretical science. Similarly, there 
has been an Aristotelian Renaissance of practical knowledge in the 20th century in 
the form of German Praktische Philosophie. According to such an interpretation, 
phronêsis constitutes the paradigm of a sort of reason alternative to theoretical rea-
son. This paradigm should be used in humanities and social sciences.12 This ap-
proach of phronêsis presupposes, then, that if one questions the epistemic conditions 
of practical science one also questions those of phronêsis, and vice versa.  
There have been convincing arguments against this identity. A significant 
objection is that ethical treatises often use dialectical method, whereas phronêsis 
does not. Nowhere does Aristotle develop a 'practical method' proper to his ethics 
or other treatises of practical science (Berti 1993; Natali 2001: 31). And this putative 
practical method cannot be constructed from Aristotle's doctrine of phronêsis. Yet, 
the question about the relation between phronêsis and ethical science must be an-
swered. Is phronêsis a part of ethical science? The difficulty lies in that sometimes 
scholars focus on phronêsis as an individual disposition related to the moral behav-
iour of an agent, while at other times, phronêsis is described as identical to politics in 
the sense of legislative science (EN VI.8 1141b23-25). A convenient compromise is 
then to accept the identity of phronêsis with ethical science, only when considering 
the wide sense of phronêsis as an architectonic expertise (Anagnostopoulos 1994). In 
this sense then phronêsis shares its principles with ethical science. If this is so, then 
the epistemic status of phronêsis depends on the way these principles are acquired.  
The cognition of the first principles of practical reason has also a significant 
import for the epistemology of phronêsis. An examination of this topic leads inevi-
tably to the issue under what conditions phronêsis is true, or objective? If one opts 
for the cognitivist position, the most straightforward interpretation is that, regard-
ing its epistemic status, phronêsis depends on the cognition of moral principles by 
                                                      
12  Gadamer 1960, Bubner 1976; see Volpi 1993 for a presentation of German Neo-
Aristotelismus; for a discussion see Berti 1993. 
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the intellect (nous).13 In order to have practical knowledge, one has to possess the 
principles of this kind of knowledge. The epistemic conditions of phronêsis will then 
be expressed in terms of practical induction or dialectical discussion for establish-
ing practical principles. It is indeed a strong rationale for the cognitivist position 
that if one assumes, with the desiderativists, that moral ends of our actions are not 
somehow determined by reason, but by our character, then there is no epistemic 
basis which might secure such or such principle as being correct or true (Irwin 
1978: 256). This position also seems to consider that phronêsis uses the same princi-
ples as ethical science. An interesting exception is Cooper, who holds that moral 
ends are confirmed epistemically by dialectical discussion (Cooper 1975: 70-71). He 
seems to think that dialectical discussion is not a part of practical reason, and thus 
not a part of phronêsis (although phronêsis grasps the ends with practical nous). The 
method by which the ends are discussed rationally is not the same as practical rea-
son and this seems to involve a discrepancy between phronêsis and ethical science. 
Whatever brand of cognitivism one opts for, either cognition of principles based on 
the intellect or on dialectic, this position faces the major problem that Aristotle nev-
er adopts this position explicitly. Quite on the contrary, he repeatedly asserts that 
reason, or phronêsis, or deliberation, does not determine the ends of our moral ac-
tions (EN III.3 1112b11-16; VI.12 1144a6-9; VI.13 1145a5-6; VII.8 1151a15-19). 
On the other hand, the desiderativist brand of interpretation needs to estab-
lish the epistemic superiority of phronêsis in a different way than by a rational de-
termination of the principles. Proponents of this view insist that even though the 
rational part of the soul does not determine the principles, it nonetheless has a 
grasp of it. Yet, this does not secure the validity of the principles. According to Na-
tali, the issue of the objectivity of ethics and of practical reason is solved in the no-
tion of habituation, which includes the laws of the polis, social practices and family 
teachings (Natali 2001: 75-76). However, he does not focus on the peculiar character 
of phronêsis as knowledge and seems to leave aside the question of what makes it 
knowledge. He seems to consider that phronêsis is knowledge only in a way relative 
to moral action: someone who is practically wise does not commit blameworthy 
actions. He also seems to regard phronêsis as a kind of knowledge in that it enables 
conscious and monitored actions instead of actions decided randomly (p. 178). An-
other feature Natali highlights is that the phronimos person is someone effective, 
who actually puts his intentions into actions. His deliberation does not result in 
wishful thinking (p. 180). Yet, all these features do not characterize phronêsis as 
knowledge per se. There is no intrinsic feature of phronêsis that would account for 
                                                      
13 Reeve 1992; Taylor 2008: 215. 
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why phronêsis is knowledge, i.e. a cognitive state stronger and more reliable than 
mere belief. Moss in her recent book on the apparent good has challenged the cog-
nitivist interpretation. She goes farther than Natali, since she attempts to ground 
the cognition of the good in moral perception and moral phantasia. Her interpreta-
tion of practical perception as pleasurable or painful perception of things as good 
or bad enables her to ground moral thought on perception. According to her, there 
is no induction of practical principles in the sense of induction of first principle as 
in theoretical science. What plays that role in practical thought is habituation 
(ethismos) of one's moral character along with experience (empeiria). She argues that 
this process of habituation and learning through experience is sufficient in order to 
obtain a true belief on the good. However, in the end she is still hesitant regarding 
the character of phronêsis as knowledge (Moss 2012: 224, n. 44). 
Apart from cognitivism and desiderativism, there is a third way, which has 
been quite influential since the mid 1980's, dubbed "moral particularism". Moral 
particularism rejects the prima facie reading of Aristotle that virtue of character is 
what determines the end. According to this brand of interpretation, the end must 
be cognized and determined rationally. Yet, moral particularism is characterized by 
stressing the comparison of phronêsis with perception. Moral particularists contend 
that the basis of right action is perception. Stressing the fact that moral principles 
are not liable to strict determination, they have a deflationary interpretation of uni-
versal rules. They insist on the priority of perception of the particular circumstances 
of a situation. This kind of perception has been "trained" through correct education 
and habituation to spot the relevant features of a situation, which in turn indicate 
which action should be performed.14 For instance, Broadie distinguishes between 
two kinds of end. On the one hand, there is the 'defining end’, which is the general 
expression of what an agent is after. Health for the doctor, or living well for the 
practical agent (Broadie 1991: 195). She adds that this end is not effective in deliber-
ation because it does not help us to make decisions. On the other hand, there is the 
deliberative end, which is specific and known rationally. This end is the one that 
the agent has in view in his deliberation. This concrete end is given to us by a kind 
of perception of the circumstances. From our perception of the circumstances, a 
concrete end occurs to us as the thing to do (p. 233). In this sense, Broadie does not 
count as an intellectualist, because she does not subscribe to the idea that the agent 
needs a general account of the defining end. There is no need for a practical induc-
tion towards the end, because practical ends are immediately available to us. Con-
cerning the acquisition of the defining end, she limits her account to what Aristotle 
                                                      
14 Wiggins 1975-1976; McDowell 1979 and 1998; Nussbaum 1986; Broadie 1991; Price 2011. 
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says about virtue giving the end. It is the kind of person we are, our character, that 
determines our defining end. Thus Broadie accommodates Aristotle's disturbing 
claim that virtue and character determines the end. Consequently, she pretends that 
there is no problem with the epistemology of practical knowledge. Phronêsis works 
on the basis of perception and daily experience. Broadie has a common understand-
ing of knowledge as pieces of information we gather in our daily life (p. 228). In this 
way, she is also open to the criticism, which I addressed to Natali, that nothing dis-
tinguishes phronêsis from practical thought in general. Phronêsis seems to be just 
successful practical thought, without any intrinsic feature which makes it a kind of 
knowledge. 
This short survey of Aristotelian scholarship shows that there is work to be 
done about the epistemic status of phronêsis. In the past few years, there has been 
more interest in properly epistemological questions. This general shift of interest in 
Aristotelian studies coincides with my thesis project. Gabriel Richardson Lear 
(2004, chap. 5) has made an interesting contribution to the epistemology of phronêsis 
in offering criteria for being a kind of knowledge. According to her, phronêsis is 
knowledge by analogy with wisdom (sophia). Indeed they both have truth as their 
function, although in the practical case 'truth' consists in something different from 
truth in the theoretical one, since it involves an emotional component (see §2.4.3). 
Phronêsis shows two further points of similarity: (1) both phronêsis and sophia are 
concerned with the good; (2) both phronêsis and sophia are 'accurate' (akribês) (Rich-
ardson Lear 2004: 103-104). The latter point of similarity is especially interesting, 
since it seems to point to an intrinsic property of knowledge. Accuracy (akribeia) 
indeed characterizes something which has achieved perfection. Applied to cogni-
tive states, it seems "to amount (vaguely enough) to being of good epistemic quali-
ty".15 However, Richardson Lear does not determine more precisely what it is for 
phronêsis to be accurate. She only contrasts the lack of accuracy of phronêsis com-
pared to the accuracy of sophia. She acknowledges that phronêsis fulfils some of the 
requirements for accuracy: phronêsis depends on a small number of principles (pp. 
109-110); it involves knowledge of the reason why (p. 111). Still, these properties 
concern phronêsis rather as a kind of science or wisdom, than as a cognitive state. 
They do not inform us on what it is to know what one should do. 
A collection of articles exclusively devoted to Aristotle's moral epistemology 
is in preparation (Henry and Nielsen forthcoming). I had access to two papers from 
this collection, which have been very valuable for my purpose: Charles forthcom-
ing, already mentioned, and Allen forthcoming. Allen's main point is that in practi-
                                                      
15 Richardson Lear, quoting a phrase from Barnes (1994: 189). 
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cal reason, there is a counterpart to understanding, or theoretical knowledge 
(epistêmê), in the theoretical sphere, and this counterpart is practical knowledge. As 
in theoretical reason, the epistemic value of understanding depends on an argu-
ment Aristotle calls a sullogismos, on the practical side, the epistemic strength of 
practical thought depends on a practical argument (Allen's point is roughly in ac-
cordance with the main point of my chap. 3).  
Finally, there has been a renewed interest in the notion of experience (em-
peiria)16. Systematic studies on empeiria have increased in number in the last dec-
ade.17 Recently, two papers (Miller 2014; Jimeñez in progress) examine the role of 
empeiria in a practical context. Miller argues that knowing particulars in practical 
reasoning is not as self-evident as one might think (in particular as moral particu-
larists might have thought). Jimeñez argues that the acquisition of experience is a 
learning process distinct from that of habituation of character. She takes the distinc-
tion between the rational and the desiderative parts of the soul seriously and ar-
gues that the skills acquired through experience are not the same as those acquired 
through habituation. 
My research is part of this larger movement to engage with Aristotelian 
moral epistemology. I have developed my insights on my own, but lately I have 
benefited from the latest studies I could access. This work, then, constitutes a syn-
thesis of the latest research on these matters. But most of all, this work aims at re-
evaluating the relevancy of an epistemological analysis of phronêsis. Behind this 
inquiry lurks the all-important question of 'what secures the correctness of our 
choices'.  
1.3 Main thesis and summary of the chapters 
My point is that phronêsis should be taken seriously as a kind of knowledge 
in a strong sense. By 'knowledge in a strong sense', I mean a cognitive state which is 
accompanied by a certain conviction or certainty about its content. If I know what I 
should do in a strong sense, I am convinced of what I should do and I am somehow 
aware of this decision.18 I contend that phronêsis is the disposition for making virtu-
                                                      
16 Empeiria in Aristotle refers to a certain kind of knowledge (Meta. I.1 981a16). It arises in 
someone from a collection of memories (980b29-981a1; APo 100a5). It does not denote an 
experience in the sense of a personal contact to some fact or event as when I say 'I had a 
pleasant experience last evening'. 
17 See e.g. Frede and Striker 1996; Butler 2003; Gregorić and Grgić 2006; LaBarge 2006; 
Blackson 2006; Bronstein 2012; Jimeñez in progress. 
18 Thus, 'knowledge in a strong sense' can be opposed to 'knowledge in a weak sense' which 
amounts simply to grasping information about one's environment. 
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ous decisions and that in this respect it guarantees the correctness of one's choice. 
Moreover, I argue that a substantial part of EN VI, which is Aristotle's privileged 
account of phronêsis, is in fact devoted to answer the question of the epistemic sta-
tus of phronêsis. In order to elaborate on these claims, here is a summary of the pro-
gression of the argument chapter by chapter. 
In chapter 2, I characterize the meaning of practical knowledge I am inter-
ested in. I start from a more general notion of knowledge of practical matters, 
namely knowledge of the good, which was in use at Aristotle's time, especially in 
Plato and in the 4th century orators. I show that against this background, Aristotle 
develops a notion of knowledge which is eminently practical, because it aims not 
only at determining what is good or bad, but also at the actual performance of ac-
tions. Then, I argue that phronêsis is the disposition properly associated with this 
knowledge. Although the definition of phronêsis does not explicitly include virtuous 
decision-making, I show that it covers this function. At the end of the chapter, I 
discuss whether phronêsis is identical with practical knowledge or not. I distinguish 
between phronêsis as the disposition for practical knowledge and episodes of practi-
cal knowledge as cognitive states. In this sense, practical knowledge is not strictly 
identical to phronêsis. Phronêsis is practical knowledge as a disposition. It is an intel-
lectual disposition that enables one to make virtuous decisions. In turn, a particular 
piece of practical knowledge is an actualization of phronêsis. Thus, the sense of prac-
tical knowledge which will interest us in this work is that of a cognitive state which 
accompanies an episode of decision. 
The point of chapter 3 and 4 is to offer a framework for the conditions of 
practical knowledge. I argue that practical knowledge is achieved when decision is 
supported by a strong argument which justifies acting this way rather than other-
wise. In chapter 3, I inquire into the form of practical thought, starting from the 
background of theoretical reason. In theoretical reason, epistêmê is achieved when 
the proposition held is explained with the appropriate demonstration (apodeixis, a 
special kind of syllogism). The explanation is not appropriate when the argument 
suffers from various flaws: the middle term is not the cause of the conclusion; the 
premises are false or are not principles; the argument is not valid; etc. In short, Ar-
istotle invokes the theoretical syllogism in order to provide the epistemic condi-
tions of epistêmê. Then I contend that, similarly to theoretical reason, there is a spe-
cific kind of argument in practical reason by which practical thought is justified. A 
decision is justified morally by a practical argument that gives the reasons why the 
agent has made such or such decision. The practical argument should similarly 
fulfil specific conditions for the decision to count as virtuous. 
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Chapter 4 investigates the content of the practical argument. In this regard, 
the practical argument differs significantly from the apodeixis. One of its premises is 
particular instead of having two universal premises. Moreover the universal prem-
ise has a normative content. Consequently, decision and practical thought are eval-
uated by means of a practical argument. More precisely, the practical argument of-
fers a moral evaluation of decision. It shows whether the decision made by the agent 
is morally good or not. The moral value of decision depends indeed on both the 
universal and the particular premise. The universal component has to be correct 
and the particular one has to be appropriate to the universal one. That the major 
premise is correct means that the moral end the agent is pursuing is morally good. 
If the universal premise is morally bad, the decision will be morally bad as well. 
That the minor premise is appropriate to the major one means that the agent can 
implement his idea of the moral end into the present situation. If the particular ar-
gument is not appropriate, the outcome of practical reasoning won't be adequately 
justified. 
But there is more to the practical argument. Apart from moral evaluation, I 
argue that it provides a way to evaluate one's decision epistemically. In other words, 
the analysis of the practical argument and its components enables one to determine 
whether the agent really knows what he should do or not. The proper epistemolog-
ical inquiry into Aristotelian practical knowledge is chapter 5. The task of this chap-
ter is to account for the epistemic strength of decision. The epistemic strength of 
one's decision depends on the way the agent cognizes the components of the practi-
cal argument. The agent will have a decision that is epistemically strong, and there-
by achieve practical knowledge, if he has both knowledge of universal moral prin-
ciples and knowledge of particulars on the other. Chapter 5 is thus devoted to ex-
amining what 'knowing moral principles' and 'knowing particulars' mean. Con-
cerning knowledge of moral principles, I adopt a desiderativist position and argue 
that such knowledge depends on our character rather than on a rational cognition 
of universals. I argue against an intellectualist position about moral ends according 
to which universals in ethics are provided by a rational process of induction.19 Con-
cerning knowledge of particulars, my point is that knowing particulars is not just 
perceiving particulars, but also requires developing a sense of what is relevant in 
                                                      
19 In defending a desiderativist interpretation of Aristotle's phronêsis, I position myself in 
line with Aubenque's views. In fact, this work can be seen as a continuation of Aubenque's 
Prudence, since he precisely ends his study with considerations about the kind of knowledge 
that phronêsis is, and this is where I start my own project. Besides, the title of this disserta-
tion is a reference to Aubenque's comment of EE 1246b35-36: "Quel est donc cet « autre gen-
re » de connaissance à quoi Aristote assimile la prudence ?" (Aubenque 1963: 145). 
Another Kind of Knowledge. Aristotle's Phronesis from an Epistemological Point of View 
 24 
the situation. The strength of one's decision depends on the appropriateness of the 
relation between the universal and the particular premise. The agent ought to be 
able to spot what aspects are relevant in a situation and how they are connected to 
the moral end he is pursuing. I argue that this capacity is provided by the experi-
ence (empeiria) of the agent. The picture that is drawn from this investigation is a 
notion of practical knowledge which is grounded in how well an agent can justify 
the appropriateness of his decisions. 
The practical argument as a tool for the epistemic evaluation of one's deci-
sion enables one to determine whether the decision is well or badly justified. In the 
ideal case of chapter 5, the phronimos agent has a good justification for his decision. 
This justification is good morally as well as epistemically. In other words, the rea-
sons why the agent decides to act as he does are not only morally good, but they 
are also well established epistemically. 
Chapter 6 extends my interpretation of practical thought and practical 
knowledge to the non-virtuous cases of lack of self-control (akrasia) and self-control 
(enkrateia). I show that in this context, too, Aristotle uses the structure of practical 
thought formalized as an argument. What essentially differentiates the phronimos 
from other kinds of moral character is the conviction he has in his decision. The 
decision that results from practical reasoning can be more or less firm. The agent 
can have more or less conviction in his decision. A non-virtuous agent can very 
well arrive non-incidentally at a well-justified decision to act, yet his decision will 
not be as firm as that of the phronimos. Typically, the akratês has such a weak cogni-
tive state, which in the end is beaten by his appetite for an action opposed to what 
he thinks he should do. My claim is that the best account of the weak cognitive 
state of the akratês is given by using my interpretation of the appropriateness be-
tween the major and the minor premise. Lastly, although Aristotle remains silent 
on this matter, I argue that a sensible explanation of enkrateia can be given on the 
same model. The enkratic agent ties the relevant features of the situation to moral 
ends in a stronger way than the akratês. Consequently, he possesses a stronger justi-
fication for what he thinks he should do and is therefore able to withstand contrary 
desires and stick to his practical conclusion. 
The notion of practical knowledge I develop in this work consists therefore 
in a cognitive state which results from a process of reasoning about what one 
should do. This cognitive state takes the form of an episode of decision that the 
agent holds strongly, i.e. with conviction. This kind of strong decision occurs when 
a decision to act is supported by reasons to act. These reasons to act must be con-
sistent with one another and they must be relatively close in order to support one 
another. 
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This practical knowledge still needs to cope with objections one could make 
against knowledge in a practical domain. First, practical knowledge in decision-
making seems to involve certainty in the outcome of some situation. However, in 
practical matters, I can never be in a situation in which I know what is going to 
happen. There is no possibility of reliable predictions. Some event might occur and 
disturb the course of things as I had planned them. 
Second, if practical knowledge is the kind of knowledge which goes with 
virtuous decision, it involves some moral knowledge such as knowledge of the 
good. However, the notion of moral knowledge raises the typical issue of the objec-
tivity of morals. Knowledge is usually very closely related to truth. If someone 
knows P, then P is true. One would not attribute knowledge to someone who 
claims that P if P is false. Yet, in the practical domain, we usually agree about the 
fact that rightness or goodness are relative to a point of view and that there is no 
absolute truth. It is quite hard to affirm that such or such position on moral con-
cerns is true and another false. Quite on the contrary, some philosophers have re-
cently argued that our moral statements cannot be true. Either they claim that our 
moral statements are systematically wrong,20 or that our moral statements have 
nothing to do with being true or false; they are just expressions of our emotional 
states of mind.21 I address these issues in the conclusion.22 
Before starting the minute examination of Aristotle's texts, I need to give 
some important clarifications about the terminology. 
1.4 Terminological clarifications 
My first approximation of the notion of phronêsis requires an important re-
mark on the kind of objects practical knowledge is about. Nowadays, what we call 
'action' encompasses all kinds of conduct which have a certain effect in the world 
and whose cause is a rational agent. Aristotle, by contrast, distinguishes between 
two types of actions (or activities, energeiai). There is, on the one hand, 'production' 
(poiêsis), which is a kind of action whose result is distinct from the activity itself. For 
instance, making a bed is a production, because the result, the bed, does not belong 
to the process of production, but is distinct from it. On the other hand, there are 
                                                      
20 'Error theory', see e.g. Mackie 1977. 
21 'Expressivism', see e.g. Ayer 1936; Gibbard 1990; Blackburn 1993. 
22 Some philosophers also deny that there is such thing as practical knowledge that is genu-
inely distinct from theoretical knowledge (Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011). This 
work is not thought as an answer to them. Rather, I expect that my presentation of Aristo-
tle's position will be able to fuel the debate. 
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actions with no other result than themselves. Aristotle calls this kind of actions 
'praxis'. Moreover, an action can be instrumental, i.e. performed for the sake of a 
further goal, or it can be performed for its own sake.23 The kind of action Aristotle 
has in view when he develops his doctrine of phronêsis is action as praxis that is per-
formed for its own sake. This kind of action corresponds roughly to a notion of 
moral action, that is, an action that is morally appraisable.24 Such an action can be 
evaluated as successful, or not, for its own sake, not for the quality of its product. It 
is moreover evaluated morally as good or bad for itself, not only for the end it pro-
motes (a virtuous action must be performed for its own sake: EN II.4 1105a26-33). 
Aristotle considers moral actions done for their own sake as paradigmatic for any 
action. The account of practical knowledge I shall construct in this work will then 
hold primarily for this kind of action. Thus, actions as poiêseis and actions in gen-
eral, which are not performed for their own sake, will not be the object of this 
work.25 
Specifying the relevant meaning of an action in the context of Aristotle's eth-
ics also requires further elaboration on normative notions. In this work, I shall use 
'normative' as a generic term that comprises everything that can be evaluated. An 
action or proposition that can be evaluated as good or bad, right or wrong, pleasant 
or unpleasant, beneficial or harmful etc., is a normative action or proposition. Cor-
respondingly, 'normative' has a larger scope than 'moral', since it extends beyond 
values and principles that are properly moral. 'Normative' as a generic term can 
also be distinguished between what is prescriptive and what is properly evaluative. 
The latter term concerns propositions or actions that refer to a value, whereas the 
former concerns things that refer to prescriptions, rules, or laws. More substantive-
                                                      
23 Note that this distinction does not coincide with the former between praxis and poiêsis. A 
praxis can be done either for its own sake or for a further end, even if it does not result in an 
external product. My taking the bus in order to go to the university is instrumental, and yet 
it does not result in a product external to the activity of taking the bus. Likewise, a poiêsis 
can be done either for its own sake, artistic creation for instance, or for the sake of a further 
goal. 
24 In fact, Aristotle's notion of praxis done for its own sake is more restrictive than our moral 
action. Indeed, nowadays we admit that an instrumental action can have an intrinsic value, 
as when I steal in order to finance my vacation. Stealing in this case still has a negative mor-
al value, although it has not been done for its own sake. 
In general, in this work I understand 'moral' in a broad sense as what is concerned with 
moral values, norms and duties. Put in a nutshell, I use 'moral' in the sense of 'morally ap-
praisable', not in the sense of 'morally good' as when a 'moral action' is opposed to an 
'immoral action'. 
25 However, I believe that for Aristotle, the epistemic strength of a practical thought con-
cerned with production or with action in general can be evaluated derivatively from the 
account of phronêsis. See Conclusion. 
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ly, I regard 'prescriptive' as denoting propositions that not only express a value 
judgment but also set a norm or prescription of what one should do. By contrast, an 
evaluative proposition is less strong and merely describes states of affairs in terms 
of norms or value. One can understand the distinction roughly by saying that pre-
scriptive propositions include an 'ought' clause, as in 'I ought to call my mother for 
her birthday', while evaluative propositions refer to a value, as in 'It would be good 
to call by mother for her birthday'.26 
Finally, here are some clarifications on the psychological vocabulary I use. 
Having a 'representation' or a 'notion' of moral values refers to cognitive states, i.e. 
mental events with a representational content (Honderich 1995: 138). By contrast, 
holding such cognitive states is the result of mental processes such as deliberation. A 
cognitive process can be roughly defined as a process of connecting representation-
al contents to one another. A cognitive process can be either rational (e.g. argu-
ments, inferences) or non-rational (association of idea). Finally these kinds of men-
tal event, cognitive states and processes, may also be opposed to dispositions. A dis-
position can be described as the tendency to actualize a certain capacity in a definite 
way.27 For instance, having phronêsis disposes one to perform certain pieces of rea-
soning, which in turn result in holding cognitive states of a certain kind. Thus, in 
this work, by 'knowledge', I mean the disposition to grasp one of such representa-
tional content and by 'episode of knowledge' or 'piece of knowledge' I mean an ac-
tual instance of grasping such intellectual content.28 Similarly, by 'thought', I mean 
the disposition to actualize a process of thinking, whereas by 'thinking' or 'reason-
ing' I mean mental processes of connecting intellectual contents with one another. I 
also distinguish between 'cognitive', 'intellectual' and 'rational'. As already said, 
cognition concerns the domain of representational states in general. Thought is 
cognitive, but so is perception or phantasia.29 In this sense, 'cognitive' is opposed to 
'desiderative' (or conative) and to 'emotional'. By contrast, an intellectual state is a 
state which is held by the intellect (nous), i.e. the highest cognitive capacity in Aris-
                                                      
26 However, the interesting part is that the distinction does not strictly follow this formal 
account. Even in the proposition 'I ought to call my mother for her birthday', the subject can 
be merely considering the possibility of calling his mother, without feeling compelled of 
doing it. Whereas a prescriptive proposition would also be motivational. I leave this discus-
sion here, since I shall not speak more of this kind of issue. 
27 This is a very large definition of 'disposition', close to Aristotle's definition of the notion of 
hexis (see §2.6).  
28 Moreover, the term 'knowledge' in English may also refer to a body of knowledge orga-
nized more or less accurately as a theory. I comment on the distinction between these mean-
ings on knowledge in §3.2. 
29 On this inclusive meaning of 'cognitive', see Moss 2012: 3-4. 
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totle's psychology.30 Third, a rational state is a state which is held on the basis of 
appropriate reasons (see Honderich 1995: 744). A rational state is necessarily cogni-
tive. 'Rational' can be opposed either to 'non-rational' (a stone is irrational), or to 
'irrational' (believing in aliens is irrational). 
 
                                                      
30 Nous quite generally refers to the capacity of thinking (noein; see e.g. DA I.1 402b13; II.2 
413a23; II.3 414b18). This is what I shall call the 'common' sense of nous, by opposition to a 
technical sense of nous, developed by Aristotle himself. Indeed, in his epistemological writ-
ings, Aristotle introduces nous as a specific kind of cognitive state that grasps the first prin-
ciples of a science (APo II.19 100b5-17). On the technical sense of nous see below, §3.2.1. 
 CHAPTER 2 
2 Practical knowledge as an aspect of phronêsis 
2.1 Introduction 
At the time of Aristotle, knowledge was connected quite generally to an im-
portant issue, that of attaining the good life. The notion of knowledge for the sake 
of living well is vividly discussed in Plato and also present in the work of the ora-
tors. Yet, Aristotle states that a general notion of knowledge of the good life is not 
sufficient in order to account for excellence in action. In a few places in his ethical 
work, he carves out a notion of knowledge that is eminently practical, for its func-
tion is to implement an action that is appropriate to the situation (EN II.9 1109a20-
30; EN V.9 1137a9-17). It is not knowledge of what the good life is, or of a general 
rule of what one should do, but a kind of knowledge that adapts such general ac-
counts to the peculiarities of a situation. 
What is this other kind of knowledge? Usual Greek terms that are roughly 
equivalent to the notion of knowledge are epistêmê or gnôsis.31 Yet Aristotle has no 
notion such as 'gnôsis praktikê' or 'epistêmê praktikê’ that would refer to the kind of 
knowledge that are alluded to in these passages.32 The most obvious candidate of 
Aristotelian notions to be identified with practical knowledge is probably phronêsis, 
or 'practical wisdom'. Aristotle claims on various occasions that phronêsis involves 
knowledge (EN VI.7 1141b14-16; VI. 8 1142a1; VI.11 1143a33-34). Phronêsis is pre-
                                                      
31 In Aristotle, gnôsis has a general sense of knowledge as grasping information, whereas 
epistêmê generally has a technical sense of knowing as understanding something with its 
explanation (see Burnyeat 1981: 97-108). Epistêmê is therefore often translated as scientific 
knowledge or science. More on epistêmê at §3.2.1. On gnôsis, see note 47. 
32 True, Aristotle occasionally speaks of 'practical science' (epistêmê praktikê: EN 1094b4-5; 
Meta. 1026b4-5, 1064a10-11; Top. 145a15-16, 152b4, 157a10-11), but the phrase does not de-
note the kind of practical knowledge that accompanies action. As I shall show later (§3.2.1), 
epistêmê can mean either knowledge as a cognitive state, or knowledge as science, i.e. as an 
organized body of knowledge. Epistêmê praktikê means a kind of science, i.e. a kind of inves-
tigation or a body of knowledge which can be studied in a theoretical way. Practical science 
is composed traditionally of ethics and politics and is opposed to theoretical sciences (such 
as physics, psychology, biology, metaphysics, or mathematics), and to productive ones 
(rhetoric and poetics). 
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scriptive (epitaktikê), for the end of phronêsis is what one should do or not.33 Fur-
thermore, it is identified on two occasions with a belief, or supposition (hupolêpsis – 
1140b12-13, 1142b33)34. These characteristics remind us very much of a notion of 
practical knowledge as knowing what one should do. 
However, it is not so obvious whether phronêsis is practical knowledge. 
Phronêsis can be understood as wisdom rather than knowledge. Wisdom, in a practi-
cal sense, may refer to the general disposition of being a good person and of mak-
ing wise decisions. It concerns life as a whole and is more comprehensive than 
practical knowledge, which is knowing what one should do in a particular situa-
tion. As such it encompasses various skills such as knowledge of moral values, a 
practical sense for spotting what matters in a situation, an ability to think efficiently 
to find out the best option, etc. Practical knowledge, as I have characterized it, 
seems to be a much simpler disposition. As a kind of knowledge, it is a disposition 
to have single episodes of knowledge about a certain object.35 Moreover, Aristotle 
sometimes speaks of phronêsis as a kind of science rather than as a disposition of 
specific cognitive states. At EN VI.8 1141b23-25 he distinguishes between two sorts 
of phronêsis one of which is called 'architectonic phronêsis' and is equated to political 
science (politikê). Finally, being phronimos is something rare, whereas practical 
knowledge seems intuitively to be something that any rational being can achieve. 
Even the weak-willed person (the akratês) uses his knowledge while acting, alt-
hough his desire turns out to weigh heavier on his action. There is a need therefore 
to investigate whether the idea of practical knowledge present in the text of Aristo-
tle can indeed be identified with phronêsis, and if it is the case, one ought to clarify 
in what sense phronêsis can be 'knowledge' rather than 'wisdom'. 
This chapter is devoted to a reconstruction of Aristotle's notion of practical 
knowledge. I explore Aristotle's ethical work in order to highlight passages where 
occurrences of knowledge fulfil a practical function. Finally, I discuss whether 
phronêsis is identical with practical knowledge or not. I argue that Aristotle's con-
cept of phronêsis includes what I call practical knowledge.  
                                                      
33 EN VI.10 1143a8-9: ἡ <ὲ+ 5ὰ) >)ό+7@23 ἐ,2$"!$2!ή ἐ@$2+· $ί 5ὰ) C'ῖ ,)ά$$'2+ ἢ <ή, $ὸ 
$έ0-3 "ὐ$ῆ3 ἐ@$ί+· 
34 Hupolêpsis: supposition, or belief. It is the generic term for a cognitive state. Epistêmê, doxa, 
and phronêsis are all said to be kinds of hupolêpsis (Irwin 1985: 350). 
35 The majority of modern commentators render phronêsis as 'wisdom' (E.g. Hardie 1968; 
Gauthier and Jolif 1970; Engberg-Pedersen 1983; Broadie 1991; Reeve 1992; Bostock 2000). 
Only some of them translate phronêsis as 'practical knowledge' (Charles 1984; Natali 2001). 
Yet, they do not question the scope of phronêsis in these terms. Rather, they tend to identify 
practical knowledge with practical wisdom altogether (Natali 2001, esp. chap. 1, section 6). 
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2.2 Knowledge in a practical context 
Despite the lack of evidence that Aristotle has a notion of practical 
knowledge, there are clear signs throughout his ethical work that he had an interest 
in it. As far as the function of practical knowledge is concerned, Aristotle was in 
tune with the worries of other thinkers of his time. Early in the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle shows interest in the question of knowledge in a practical context: 
1) "So in relation to life, too, will knowing (gnôsis) it [the chief good] 
have great weight, and like archers with a target would we be 
more successful in hitting the point we need to hit <if we had the 
chief good>? If so, then one must try to grasp it at least in outline, 
that is, what it might be, and to which sort of science or faculty it 
belongs." EN I.2 1094a22-2636 
ἆ)’ -ὖ+ !"ὶ ,)ὸ3 $ὸ+ /ί-+ ἡ 5+ῶ@23 "ὐ$-ῦ <'5ά07+ ἔ9'2 ῥ-,ή+, 
!"ὶ !"&ά,') $-Nό$"2 @!-,ὸ+ ἔ9-+$'3 <ᾶ00-+ ἂ+ $859ά+-2<'+ 
$-ῦ Cέ-+$-3; 'ἰ C’ (25) -ὕ$(, ,'2)"$έ-+ $ύ,ῳ 5' ,')20"/'ῖ+ 
"ὐ$ὸ $ί ,-$’ ἐ@$ὶ !"ὶ $ί+-3 $ῶ+ ἐ,2@$7<ῶ+ ἢ C8+ά<'(+. 
Aristotle presumes that knowledge of the ultimate good (to ariston, 1094a22) 
is useful for someone who aims at success in his life. He compares such a person 
with archers, who aim at a target. For the latter, it will be easier to achieve what 
they ought to do (to deon) if they have a target (skopon). Similarly, it is easier for us 
to perform appropriate actions if we have a target with which we can direct our 
actions. In other words, to lead a good life, one needs to perform one's actions ac-
cording to the ultimate good.  
This first occurrence of knowledge in a practical context gives a good idea of 
what the worry of ancient thinkers was. The present passage shows a structure of 
living well conceived as hitting a target by way of some kind of knowledge.37 This 
                                                      
36 Translations are all mine, except when specified. For more information, see the introduc-
tory remarks in the "List of Aristotle's works" section. There I also explain my use of square 
brackets and angle brackets in the translation. 
37 The Greek notion that roughly stands for our notion of living well or happiness is eudai-
monia. It does not exactly mean the same as the English term, though. Eudaimonia is not 
happiness in the sense of an inner feeling of joy or bliss, as we often understand it. Rather, 
the Greek notion of eudaimonia is a notion that contains more aspects than a psychological 
one. Of course, happiness must include pleasure, but it must be self-sufficient as well. It 
includes therefore success in life, material goods as well as good social relations, hence the 
occasional translation of eudaimonia as 'human flourishing'. Cf. e.g. Cooper 1975: x-xi; Reeve 
2013: 40. 
Other terms that are close to eudaimonia are eupraxia (successful action) and eu zên (success-
ful life). Originally in Greek all three terms have distinct meanings. Eudaimonia involves the 
notion of daimôn and refers to one's happy destiny. Eupraxia refers to success in one's busi-
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way of conceiving moral life is a common one in the intellectual climate of the 4th 
century BCE. In particular, the archer's analogy of passage (1) can be traced back to 
Plato. Indeed, the analogy resembles Rep. VII 519c where Socrates emphasizes the 
importance of education as an art of guiding souls towards the contemplation of 
the Good: 
2) "And what about the uneducated who have no experience of 
truth? Isn’t it likely—indeed, doesn’t it follow necessarily from 
what was said before — that they will never adequately govern a 
city? [...] They would fail because they don’t have a single goal in 
life at which all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim." 
(Trans. Cooper and Hutchinson) 
Uί Cέ; $όC' -ὐ! 'ἰ!ό3, ἦ+ C’ ἐ5ώ, !"ὶ ἀ+ά5!7 ἐ! $ῶ+ 
,)-'2)7<έ+(+, <ή$' $-ὺ3 ἀ,"2C'ύ$-83 !"ὶ ἀ07&'ί"3 ἀ,'ί)-83 
ἱ!"+ῶ3 ἄ+ ,-$' ,ό02+ ἐ,2$)-,'ῦ@"2, [...], $-ὺ3 <ὲ+ ὅ$2 @!-,ὸ+ 
ἐ+ $ῷ /ίῳ -ὐ! ἔ9-8@2+ ἕ+", -ὗ @$-9"`-<έ+-83 C'ῖ ἅ,"+$" 
,)ά$$'2+ ἃ ἂ+ ,)ά$$(@2+ ἰCίᾳ $' !"ὶ C7<-@ίᾳ, 
It is to be found in Isocrates as well (Isocrates, Ad filios Jasonis, 9-10): 
3) "[9] For nothing can be intelligently accomplished unless first, 
with full forethought, you reason and deliberate how you ought to 
direct your own future, what mode of life you should choose, 
what kind of repute you should set your heart upon, and which 
kind of honours you should be contented with—those freely 
granted by your fellow-citizens or those wrung from them against 
their will; and when these principles have been determined, then 
and only then should your daily actions be considered, in order 
that they may be in conformity with the original plan. [10] If in 
this way you seriously search and study, you will take mental 
aim, as at a mark, at what is expedient for you, and will be the 
more likely to hit it. And if you have no such plan, but attempt to 
act in casual fashion, inevitably you will go astray in your purpos-
es and fail in many undertakings." (Trans. Norlin (Perseus)) 
[9] dὐCὲ+ 5ὰ) -ἷό+ $’ ἐ@$ὶ ,)"9&ῆ+"2 +-ῦ+ ἐ9ό+$(3, ἂ+ <ὴ 
$-ῦ$- ,)ῶ$-+ <'$ὰ ,-00ῆ3 ,)-+-ί"3 0-5ί@7@&' !"ὶ 
/-80'ύ@7@&', ,ῶ3 9)ὴ $ὸ+ ἐ,ί0-2,-+ 9)ό+-+ ὑ<ῶ+ "ὐ$ῶ+ 
,)-@$ῆ+"2 !"ὶ $ί+" /ί-+ ,)-'0έ@&"2 !"ὶ ,-ί"3 CόN73 
ὀ)25+7&ῆ+"2 !"ὶ ,-$έ)"3 $ῶ+ $2<ῶ+ ἀ5",ῆ@"2, $ὰ3 ,")’ 
ἑ!ό+$(+ 525+-<έ+"3 ἢ $ὰ3 ,")’ ἀ!ό+$(+ $ῶ+ ,-02$ῶ+· $"ῦ$" 
Cὲ C2-)2@"<έ+-83 $ό$’ ἤC7 $ὰ3 ,)άN'23 $ὰ3 !"&’ ἑ!ά@$7+ $ὴ+ 
ἡ<έ)"+ @!',$έ-+, ὅ,(3 @8+$'+-ῦ@2 ,)ὸ3 $ὰ3 ὑ,-&έ@'23 $ὰ3 ἐN 
ἀ)9ῆ3 5'+-<έ+"3. [10] j"ὶ $-ῦ$-+ <ὲ+ $ὸ+ $)ό,-+ `7$-ῦ+$'3 
                                                                                                                                                        
ness, whereas eu zên refers to the good life. However, at the time of Aristotle, all three ex-
pressions were considered as synonymous (Gauthier 1970: 27). 
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!"ὶ >20-@->-ῦ+$'3 ὥ@,') @!-,-ῦ !'2<έ+-8 @$-9ά@'@&' $ῇ 
m89ῇ !"ὶ <ᾶ00-+ ἐ,2$'ύN'@&' $-ῦ @8<>έ)-+$-3· ἂ+ Cὲ 
<7C'<ί"+ ,-2ή@7@&' $-2"ύ$7+ ὑ,ό&'@2+, ἀ00ὰ $ὸ ,)-@,ῖ,$-+ 
ἐ,29'2)ῆ$' ,)ά$$'2+, ἀ+"5!"ῖό+ ἐ@$2+ ὑ<ᾶ3 $"ῖ3 C2"+-ί"23 
,0"+ᾶ@&"2 !"ὶ ,-00ῶ+ C2"<")$ά+'2+ ,)"5<ά$(+. 
These passages emphasize the indispensability of having a target in order to 
achieve a successful life. Successful actions must be thought out according to a gen-
eral plan, a general idea of what constitutes the good life. And when performing 
action, one ought to keep such an idea as a goal. 
More generally, Plato conceives the same structure in his ethical thought. 
Morally good actions are compared to technical production (poiêsis). A good or suc-
cessful action is one that results in the production of a well-ordered outcome (Gor-
gias 503d-504b). Further, Plato considers that achieving order in this way requires a 
model (paradeigma) that provides a blueprint for one's actions or productions. Plato 
applied this structure in at least two specific contexts, namely the creation of the 
kosmos by a cosmic dêmiourgos (which originally means 'craftsman') and the order-
ing process at the level of the polis in virtue of good government performed by a 
political ruler, namely the philosopher-king. The cosmic dêmiourgos contemplates 
the intelligible Forms in order to create the world in which we live out of the prime 
matter (Timaeus 28a-b; 30a-c). At the level of the polis, the philosopher-king bases 
his good government of the state on the contemplation of the Forms, in particular of 
the Form of the Good (Republic 484c-d; 501b).  
Thus, at the time of Aristotle, there was a common conception of practical 
life according to which a good, or successful, way of life depends on having a tar-
get, or a benchmark on which the agent can ground his choices. A condition for 
success in one's enterprises is to have such a target (skopon echôn, skopou keimenou). 
Text (1) shows that Aristotle is in agreement with this conception. 
Moreover, in text (1), access to the target is granted by a kind of knowledge 
(gnôsis) that provides the agent with a better idea of what is required and that 
makes the agent more efficient in achieving what he intends to do (independently 
of the ontological status of what stands as a skopos). In doing so, Aristotle introduc-
es an additional notion to his model of practical life, namely a kind of knowledge 
relevant in a practical context. Again, this reference to knowledge as what provides 
access to the target is not new. We already find it in Plato with the Socratic concep-
tion of virtue as knowledge. According to Socrates – as depicted by Plato –, what 
matters the most for someone is to become virtuous, for the good life flows from 
one's virtuous character. Being virtuous is the same as being happy (eudaimôn). In-
deed, it was a common conception at that time that what is noble (kalon) is the same 
as what is good, or beneficial (agathon). If something is noble it is also beneficial. 
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The presence of such a conception is shown in the Gorgias, when both Socrates and 
Callicles refute Polus, who had attempted to show that something could be vile but 
beneficial (Gorgias 474c-475e; 483a-b; See Sauvé Meyer 2008: 12-13). And Socrates 
believes that one will not become virtuous unless one acquires knowledge or wis-
dom of how to use goods such as riches, health and other such conventional goods 
(Euthd. 278e-282a; Meno 88a-c). In other words, wisdom as knowledge of how to use 
the conventional goods is a necessary condition for happiness (see Sauvé Meyer 
2008: 15-16).38 
According to this brief survey, one can see that there was conceptual room 
at that time for a notion of knowledge that is specifically connected to practical mat-
ters like virtue and the good life. Besides, this way of introducing knowledge in 
moral or practical matters – in the form of knowledge of the good – had a successful 
reception in the philosophical discussions after Aristotle. In particular, the practical 
man as aiming at a target became a topos in the Stoic tradition in particular concern-
ing the debate on the use of moral rules and precepts (see Annas 1993: 101-102, 
Sauvé Meyer 2008: 155ff.; Inwood 1985: 204).39 By contrast, the significance of 
knowledge for our practical life had been rejected by other philosophers such as the 
Cynics or that of Pyrrho.40 
In this context, Aristotle follows his master only up to a certain point, and 
then takes an original and new direction. He introduces a notion of knowledge that 
is not only a consideration of a general target, but involves the realization of the 
target in the situation. In what follows, I want to account for practical knowledge in 
Aristotle by uncovering what I take to be its functional role. I contend that before 
the main introduction of phronêsis in EN VI Aristotle has already circumscribed the 
main features of practical knowledge. In this functional description, Aristotle dis-
                                                      
38 Seeking aretê was a common ideal in ancient Greece and this was not at all particular to 
Socrates. What Socrates did, however, was to provide a peculiar meaning to the notion of 
aretê. He elaborated aretê as a proper moral ideal of doing well that contrasted with the ar-
chaic ideal of the warrior or with the political ideal of the sophists. Thus, according to Socra-
tes, happiness can be reached only if one has knowledge of how to use the conventional 
goods, knowledge that Sauvé-Meyer has called "knowledge of the good and the bad" 
(Sauvé-Meyer 2008: 17). 
39 Of course, Plato as well as the Stoics did not distinguish between a kind of knowledge 
specifically directed at practice and a specifically theoretical notion of knowledge. Neither 
did they distinguish between a kind of knowledge specifically practical and knowledge in 
general. Knowledge of the good does not differ from knowledge in general. The distinction, 
as I shall show, is proper to Aristotle. 
40 About the Cynics, see Canto-Sperber et al. 1997: 169 on Diogenes; about Pyrrho, see 
Timo's summary of the thought of Pyrrho as reported in Eusebius' Praeparatio evangelica and 
commented on in Canto-Sperber et al. 1997: 466-470. 
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tances himself from Plato's and Socrates' conceptions of knowledge at work in prac-
tical contexts.41 
2.3 A first approximation of practical knowledge 
At the end of EE I.5, Aristotle presents Socrates' conception of the ultimate 
good (1216b3-10). He attributes to Socrates the claim that the ultimate good is 
knowledge of virtue (to ginôskein tên aretên 1216b3-4). This position is grounded by 
the intuition that virtue is rather an intellectual state: in order to be virtuous one 
has to know what virtue is. And having this knowledge on the essence of virtue 
would simultaneously entail being virtuous, as knowing what geometry is would 
simultaneously enable one to be a geometer. On this matter, Aristotle follows Socra-
tes up to a certain point (1216b10-16). It is true, he says, that some sciences, like ge-
ometry or astronomy, are nothing beyond the knowledge that they achieve. To en-
gage in astronomy just is to have knowledge of astronomical objects. However, 
Aristotle disagrees with Socrates by noting that this conception of knowledge does 
not hold for every field of inquiry.  
4) "But with the productive sciences, the goal is distinct from 
knowledge and understanding. For example, health is the goal of 
medicine, and good order or something of that sort the goal of po-
litical science. Now it is indeed a fine thing to know each fine 
thing. Nonetheless, when it comes to virtue, knowing (eidenai) 
what it is is not the most valuable point, but knowing (ginôskein) 
from which things it obtains. For we do not want to know (eidenai) 
what courage is, but to be courageous, nor to know what justice is, 
but to be just, as we want to be healthy rather than know 
(ginôskein) what being healthy is, and be in good physical condi-
tion rather than know what being in good physical condition is.42 
EE I.5 1216b16-25 
$ῶ+ Cὲ ,-27$2!ῶ+ ἐ,2@$7<ῶ+ ἕ$')-+ $ὸ $έ0-3 $ῆ3 ἐ,2@$ή<73 
!"ὶ 5+ώ@'(3, -ἷ-+ ὑ5ί'2" <ὲ+ ἰ"$)2!ῆ3, 'ὐ+-<ί" Cὲ ἤ $2 $-2-ῦ&’ 
                                                      
41 There also are major differences between Plato and Aristotle about the ontology of the 
object of knowledge in a practical context. Plato notoriously introduced the notion of intelli-
gible Forms, especially the Form of the Good, as that for the sake of which we should ulti-
mately perform our actions (Rep. 484b-d). By contrast, Aristotle did not link knowledge of 
the good to such transcendent beings (see §2.4.2 on further elements of contrast with Plato 
and §4.3 concerning the content of one's knowledge of the good which is supposed to justify 
our actions). 
42 Aristotle uses ginôskein and eidenai interchangeably in order to express either knowing 
what something is or knowing from what something obtains. This shows that these verbs 
are not related specifically to one kind of knowledge rather than to the other. 
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ἕ$')-+ $ῆ3 ,-02$2!ῆ3. !"0ὸ+ <ὲ+ -ὖ+ !"ὶ $ὸ 5+()ί`'2+ (20) 
ἕ!"@$-+ $ῶ+ !"0ῶ+· -ὐ <ὴ+ ἀ00ά 5' ,')ὶ ἀ)'$ῆ3 -ὐ $ὸ 'ἰCέ+"2 
$2<2ώ$"$-+ $ί ἐ@$ί+, ἀ00ὰ $ὸ 52+ώ@!'2+ ἐ! $ί+(+ ἐ@$ί+. -ὐ 5ὰ) 
'ἰCέ+"2 /-80ό<'&" $ί ἐ@$2+ ἀ+C)'ί", ἀ00’ 'ἶ+"2 ἀ+C)'ῖ-2, -ὐCέ $ί 
ἐ@$2 C2!"2-@ύ+7, ἀ00’ 'ἶ+"2 Cί!"2-2, !"&ά,') !"ὶ ὑ52"ί+'2+ 
<ᾶ00-+ ἢ 52+ώ@!'2+ $ί ἐ@$2 $ὸ ὑ52"ί+'2+ !"ὶ 'ὖ ἔ9'2+ $ὴ+ ἕN2+ 
<ᾶ00-+ ἢ 52+ώ@!'2+ $ί ἐ@$2 $ὸ 'ὖ ἔ9'2+. 
Some sciences, called 'productive' (poiêtikôn), such as medicine and politics, 
are not for the sake of knowing only. They have a goal which is distinct from 
knowledge about their proper objects. In the case of virtue and ethics in general, 
too, Aristotle makes clear that knowledge about ethical matters is an end distinct 
from achieving the things that ethical knowledge is about, that is, acquiring the 
virtues. Hence, what matters in ethical inquiry is not gaining knowledge about 
what the virtues are, but acquiring these virtues. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
has indeed a summarizing formula, in a passage parallel to text (4), that "it is not in 
order to acquire knowledge that we are considering what virtue is, but to become 
good people".43 
The Eudemian passage does establish that being virtuous is equivalent to a 
different form of knowledge, which Aristotle calls in this context 'to know how and 
from which things [virtue comes about]'.44 In these terms, to be, say, courageous 
just is to know how and from which things courage comes about. This claim might 
surprise the modern reader, for Aristotle's description of this kind of knowledge 
does not sound very practical. I can very well know how courage comes about or 
from which things it obtains in a mere theoretical fashion, by reflecting on what 
courage is and so on. But Aristotle's point seems clear enough. He wants to empha-
size a kind of knowledge distinct from theoretical knowledge and which is closely 
connected to the disposition of being courageous, or – more generally – virtuous. 
This way Aristotle introduces the distinction between theoretical and practical 
knowledge, i.e. between a kind of knowledge that merely states what a thing is and 
a kind of knowledge that implies practical skills. 
                                                      
43 EN II.2 1103b27-28: -ὐ 5ὰ) ἵ+" 'ἰCῶ<'+ $ί ἐ@$2+ ἡ ἀ)'$ὴ @!',$ό<'&", ἀ00’ ἵ+’ ἀ5"&-ὶ 
5'+ώ<'&". 
In the EN, Aristotle does not speak of politics as a 'productive' science, but as a practical one 
(EN VI.8 1141b26-27). However, the idea that its purpose differs from that of theoretical 
sciences is the same as in the EE. Moreover, in the EN, politics is the overarching practical 
science, which includes productive sciences as well (EN I.2 1094a24-b7). 
44 The exact phrase in passage (4) is $ὸ 52+ώ@!'2+ ἐ! $ί+(+ ἐ@$ί+, but this is a direct re-
minder of the more complete phrase of 1216b10 ",ῶ3 5ί+'$"2 !"ὶ ἐ! $ί+(+". 
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There is another passage on the necessity of knowledge in action, in the Ni-
comachean Ethics this time, which is more informative about knowledge in this con-
text. At EN II.9 1109a24-26, while concluding book II on virtue in general, Aristotle 
adds that virtue is not easy to achieve.  
5) "Enough has been said, then, to show that virtue of character is a 
mean, and in what sense it is so; that it is a mean between two vic-
es, one of excess and one of deficiency; and that it is such because 
it is the sort of thing able to hit the mean in feelings and actions. 
This is why it is quite some work to be good, because in each case 
it is hard to find the middle point; for instance, not everyone can 
find the centre of a circle, but only the person with knowledge. So 
too anyone can get angry, or give and spend money – these are 
easy; but doing them in relation to the right person, in the right 
amount, at the right time, with the right aim in view, and in the 
right way – that is not something anyone can do, nor is it easy. 
This is why excellence in these things is rare, praiseworthy and 
noble." EN II.9 1109a20-30 
(20) Ὅ$2 <ὲ+ -ὖ+ ἐ@$ὶ+ ἡ ἀ)'$ὴ ἡ ἠ&2!ὴ <'@ό$73, !"ὶ ,ῶ3, !"ὶ 
ὅ$2 <'@ό$73 Cύ- !"!2ῶ+, $ῆ3 <ὲ+ !"&’ ὑ,')/-0ὴ+ $ῆ3 Cὲ !"$’ 
ἔ00'2m2+, !"ὶ ὅ$2 $-2"ύ$7 ἐ@$ὶ C2ὰ $ὸ @$-9"@$2!ὴ $-ῦ <έ@-8 
'ἶ+"2 $-ῦ ἐ+ $-ῖ3 ,ά&'@2 !"ὶ ἐ+ $"ῖ3 ,)άN'@2+, ἱ!"+ῶ3 'ἴ)7$"2. 
C2ὸ !"ὶ ἔ)5-+ ἐ@$ὶ @,-8C"ῖ-+ 'ἶ+"2. ἐ+ ἑ!ά@$ῳ (25) 5ὰ) $ὸ 
<έ@-+ 0"/'ῖ+ ἔ)5-+, -ἷ-+ !ύ!0-8 $ὸ <έ@-+ -ὐ ,"+$ὸ3 ἀ00ὰ $-ῦ 
'ἰCό$-3· -ὕ$( Cὲ !"ὶ $ὸ <ὲ+ ὀ)52@&ῆ+"2 ,"+$ὸ3 !"ὶ ῥΏC2-+, !"ὶ 
$ὸ C-ῦ+"2 ἀ)5ύ)2-+ !"ὶ C","+ῆ@"2· $ὸ C’ ᾧ !"ὶ ὅ@-+ !"ὶ ὅ$' !"ὶ 
-ὗ ἕ+'!" !"ὶ ὥ3, -ὐ!έ$2 ,"+$ὸ3 -ὐCὲ ῥΏC2-+· C2ό,') $ὸ 'ὖ !"ὶ 
@,ά+2-+ !"ὶ ἐ,"2+'$ὸ+ !"ὶ !"0ό+. 
In EN II, Aristotle has introduced virtue as a mean (meson) between an ex-
cessive and a deficient disposition (1106b15-24). For instance, the virtue of courage 
is a mean between the deficiency of cowardice and the excess of boldness; the vir-
tue of temperance is a mean between the excess of self-indulgence and the deficien-
cy of insensibility, and so on. Now he wants to add that finding the mean is not 
easy. To hit the meson is a difficult task (ergon) because it requires an action which 
must be appropriate in different respects. Acting virtuously is not only responding 
to a situation with an action related to the situation. Rather, acting virtuously con-
sists in doing the right thing, to the right person, in the right amount, at the right 
time, with the right aim in view and in the right way. Aristotle compares such an 
achievement with the task in geometry of pointing to the centre of a circle (kuklos). 
This is certainly not an easy task and coming close to the geometrical centre of the 
circle without any tool requires some training. Besides, this comparison recalls the 
analogy of the archer in passage (1). Now, Aristotle mentions that achievements 
such as finding the mean in a practical situation and pointing to the centre of a cir-
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cle require some kind of knowledge. Only the one who 'knows' (tou eidotos) is able 
to determine the meson.45 A further passage makes a similar point. 
The end of EN V.9 is devoted to clearing up a mistaken common opinion on 
justice and injustice, namely that being just is something easy to achieve. This pas-
sage is therefore thematically close to text (5). Aristotle's answer to this belief relies 
on the distinction between action and character. Doing something unjust such as 
sleeping with one's neighbour's wife or hitting someone seems to be easy to do and 
up to us, however doing it in the corresponding state of character, i.e. on purpose, 
is not so easy (1137a4-9). Similarly, performing a just act does not involve being a just 
person. One can do something just by accident. Then, Aristotle seems to refine the 
argument. Granting that being a just person is less easy than doing a just act, one 
could argue nevertheless that at least knowing what a just act is would be easy. 
6) In the same way, people think that knowing what things are just 
and what things are unjust does not require being sophos, because 
it is not difficult to grasp what the laws say (though the laws are 
not the just things themselves, except incidentally). But knowing 
how things are to be done and distributed if they are to be just is 
more of a job than knowing what things are healthy. For, even in 
that case, knowing about honey, wine, hellebore, cautery or sur-
gery may be easy, but knowing how one should administer them 
in order to produce health, and to whom and at what time, is as 
demanding a task as it is to be a doctor." EN V.9 1137a9-17 
ὁ<-ί(3 Cὲ !"ὶ $ὸ (10) 5+ῶ+"2 $ὰ Cί!"2" !"ὶ $ὰ ἄC2!" -ὐCὲ+ 
-ἴ-+$"2 @->ὸ+ 'ἶ+"2, ὅ$2 ,')ὶ ὧ+ -ἱ +ό<-2 0έ5-8@2+ -ὐ 9"0',ὸ+ 
@8+2έ+"2 (ἀ00’ -ὐ $"ῦ$’ ἐ@$ὶ $ὰ Cί!"2" ἀ00’ ἢ !"$ὰ 
@8</'/7!ό3)· ἀ00ὰ ,ῶ3 ,)"$$ό<'+" !"ὶ ,ῶ3 +'<ό<'+" Cί!"2", 
$-ῦ$- Cὴ ,0έ-+ ἔ)5-+ ἢ $ὰ ὑ52'2+ὰ 'ἰCέ+"2· ἐ,'ὶ !ἀ!'ῖ <έ02 !"ὶ 
-ἶ+-+ !"ὶ (15) ἐ00έ/-)-+ !"ὶ !"ῦ@2+ !"ὶ $-<ὴ+ 'ἰCέ+"2 ῥΏC2-+, 
ἀ00ὰ ,ῶ3 C'ῖ +'ῖ<"2 ,)ὸ3 ὑ5ί'2"+ !"ὶ $ί+2 !"ὶ ,ό$', $-@-ῦ$-+ 
ἔ)5-+ ὅ@-+ ἰ"$)ὸ+ 'ἶ+"2. 
Proponents of the view that it is easy to exercise justice have the further ar-
gument that it is easy to know (gnônai) which things are just and which are unjust. 
The reason for that is that it is not difficult to understand (sunienai) the things the 
laws say, i.e. what the laws prescribe or forbid.46 Aristotle's reply to this argument 
                                                      
45 Some take this occurrence of eidenai in a deflationary way: tou eidotos would merely refer 
to a skilled person, without insisting on a cognitive component (see translation ad locum in 
Broadie and Rowe 2002). But the next passage I examine shows that there is indeed a cogni-
tive component in play in determining the virtuous mean. 
46 That the laws are not hard to understand can sound funny to a modern ear. However, 
Aristotle sometimes evokes the common opinion that every citizen should be familiar with 
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is very close to the previous passage of EN II.9 (text 5). What matters is knowledge 
of what one should do that is appropriate to a very specific situation. One ought to 
know how to perform a particular action in a given context. In order to make his 
point clearer, Aristotle invokes a comparison with medicine. It is not sufficient to 
know what different remedies are (honey, wine, hellebore, etc.). One could even 
add that it is not sufficient to know what these medicines are supposed to cure in 
general. Rather, what matters is to know how to prescribe these remedies, to whom 
and when. In other words, the knowledge required in such situations is knowledge 
how to deal with a particular case. The same holds for justice – and for virtue in gen-
eral, as text (5) has shown. 
This passage confirms that the exercise of virtue involves a cognitive com-
ponent. Aristotle explicitly refers to a sort of know-how for the successful exercise 
of medicine, and thereby for the successful exercise of justice.  
Thus, we find scattered in the ethical works occurrences of epistemic verbs 
that point to a notion of practical knowledge.47 Such a conception involves the fol-
lowing features: a certain type of knowledge is useful for living a successful life; 
this knowledge enables the agent to reach his purposes; the target of such 
knowledge is not knowledge itself, but something else, namely a practical goal; 
such knowledge is necessary in the exercise of virtue in order to attain the mean; 
this knowledge is not about what things are, but rather about how to do things. In 
order to better conceive how knowledge might import in practical situation, Aristo-
tle relies on the framework provided by technical expertise (technê). This framework 
enables him to specify the relation between the production of something (health in 
the case of medicine and just action in the case of justice) and the knowledge of that 
product (text 4). Yet, he shows at the same time which component one ought to 
focus on. It is one thing to know what health is, but it is another to take profit from 
this knowledge in practice (text 6). Thereby, Aristotle takes his distance from Plato. 
Plato had made the same extensive use of analogies with productive crafts, yet he 
had greatly insisted on knowledge of the model. Instead, Aristotle reverses the pri-
                                                                                                                                                        
the laws (cf. EN III.5 1113b3-1114a1). He probably means that the content of laws is not dif-
ficult to understand prima facie, without implying that one knows every implications of the-
se laws in one's every day life or in court. 
47 Note again that the terminology used by Aristotle is not relevant in order to understand 
the specificity of practical knowledge. In order to express one's grasp of the ultimate good at 
EN I.2 1094a23 (text 1), Aristotle uses the term gnôsis. Gnôsis, and its cognate gignôskein, are 
very general terms and could refer to different notions of knowledge. Aristotle uses it for 
instance to refer to Plato's knowledge of the intelligible Forms (EN 1097a6). Gnôsis also 
points to a very general meaning of knowledge when Aristotle attributes some knowledge 
to any animal, for every animal has perception (GA 731a31-33). 
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orities. He goes as far as to deflate the importance of the model ('it is not difficult to 
grasp what the laws say'), insisting on the implementation of such knowledge in 
practice. These passages also make clear that the kind of knowledge at stake in 
practice is knowledge in a strong sense, not knowing as mere grasping information. 
In particular, the comparison of practical knowledge with medicine in text (6) 
shows that a certain expertise is required in order to attain the middle term of a 
virtuous action.48 
Now, the evidence gathered concerns a few passages which are found in EN 
I, II and V, as well as in EE II. These passages occur in contexts either general or 
related to virtue of character. They all point at some notion of knowledge which 
functions as practical knowledge and which ought to complete the account of Aris-
totle's moral psychology. However, they do not take into account Aristotle's more 
general moral psychology and the way he sees the organization of the soul. Now, I 
wish to address the question of practical knowledge by examining the comprehen-
sive account of moral psychology as introduced in the EN. In particular, what will 
interest me is the rational side of this psychology, which is introduced most of all in 
book VI of the EN (book V of the EE). In this book, Aristotle offers a technical 
treatment of his notion of phronêsis as an intellectual virtue related to action. My 
aim is to assess whether phronêsis is identical with practical knowledge.  
2.4 The rational side of moral action 
Before continuing the Aristotelian account of practical knowledge, I need to 
say a few words on Aristotle's conception of virtue and virtuous action. This will 
help in understanding Aristotle's general doctrine of phronêsis and will also be use-
ful in the next chapters. 
2.4.1 The project of Nicomachean Ethics book VI 
One of the main purposes of EN VI is to give an account of practical 
knowledge. However, making sense of this project is not possible unless one steps 
                                                      
48 More generally, I distinguish knowledge in a strong sense from knowledge in a weak 
sense. Knowledge in a weak sense refers to a casual use of 'knowing' which is more or less 
equivalent to belief, as when I ask someone: 'Did you know that the Duchess of Cambridge 
has a sister?' In this case, knowing that the Duchess of Cambridge has a sister just means 
that the subject possess a particular piece of information. However, there is no questioning 
the truth of this piece of information. By contrast, knowledge in a strong sense requires a 
certain belief to be somehow warranted or justified by further elements. If I know strongly 
that the Duchess of Cambridge has a sister, it entails that necesarily the object of my 
knowledge is true and that I have good reasons to believe that it is true. 
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back a little and outlines the general conception of virtuous action in Aristotle's 
ethics. As already mentioned, Aristotle conceives moral virtue (aretê) as a mean 
between excess and deficiency. More specifically, virtue is defined as follows by 
Aristotle: 
7) "Therefore, virtue is a disposition to decide which consists in a 
mean relative to us, which mean is determined49 by reason – the 
reason, that is, by reference to which50 the practically wise person 
would determine it [i.e. the mean]." EN II.6 1106b36-1107a2 
Ἔ@$2+ ἄ)" ἡ ἀ)'$ὴ ἕN23 ,)-"2)'$2!ή, ἐ+ <'@ό$7$2 -ὖ@" (1107a.) 
$ῇ ,)ὸ3 ἡ<ᾶ3, ὡ)2@<έ+ῃ 0ό5ῳ !"ὶ ᾧ ἂ+ ὁ >)ό+2<-3 ὁ)ί@'2'+. 
I shall linger a bit on the claim that virtue consists in an intermediacy (meso-
tês). In other words, Aristotle conceives virtue as a mean (meson) between excess 
and deficiency (1106b15-24). For instance, the virtue of courage is a mean between 
the deficiency of cowardice and the excess of boldness; the virtue of temperance is a 
mean between the excess of self-indulgence and the deficiency of insensibility, and 
so on. Correspondingly, virtuous action consists in an action which achieves this 
balance and brings about a state of affairs which is neither excessive nor deficient 
(EN II.2 1104a11-b3; EE II.3 1220b21-1221b27). For instance, in the domain of con-
tracts, i.e. trade and justice, the action-type proper to an evaluation in terms of ex-
cess or deficiency is the distribution of goods. I can distribute too few goods and 
keep the exceeding part for myself; or I can distribute goods with too much largess, 
with the consequence that not enough resources are available for everyone and that 
I cannot honour my contract with my last contractors (or that there is not enough 
left for myself); or I can distribute them appropriately, that is, each receives a part 
appropriate for his needs. (See the general description of distributive justice at EN 
V.1 1129b1-11). When an action is excessive or deficient, it is bad, or at least not 
good, whereas when it corresponds to the middle, it is a good action.51  
More generally, this kind of virtue is a particular case of what Aristotle calls 
'character' (êthos). One's character is the set of propensities one has to act in a certain 
                                                      
49 Reading ὡ)2@<έ+ῃ instead of ὡ)2@<έ+7, like most of the scholars. The only recent com-
mentator I know who reads ὡ)2@<έ+7 and follows the OCT is Bodéüs. However his reading 
is motivated by his desiderativist position on the grasp of moral ends. As I shall show in the 
rest of this work, this reading is not necessary to such a position. 
50 Here I follow the OCT, along with Crisp and Irwin. Ross and Rowe read !"ὶ ὡ" ἂ+ in-
stead of !"ὶ ᾧ ἂ+, rendering "and in the way the phronimos would determine it". 
51 That the mean is 'relative to us' (pros hêmas 1107a1) means that the intermediate is not the 
same for everyone. It is not an arithmetical mean. Rather, the intermediate between excess 
and deficiency must be calculated by reference to one specific individual and cannot be 
transposed to any other without qualification (EN II.6 1106a36-b7). 
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way. Courage, softness, liberality, self-indulgence are all traits of character. Particu-
lar virtues, such as courage or temperance, just are virtuous versions of the corre-
sponding traits of character. Virtue and more generally character are dispositions 
(hexeis) to respond to situations in a determined way. The various virtues and char-
acter traits all concern domains of human activity which can be objects of moral 
evaluation (warfare, justice, spending money, etc.).52 Correspondingly, virtues and 
character traits are evaluative dispositions. An agent is said to be well or badly dis-
posed towards such or such a domain of activity. For instance, if the agent is coura-
geous, he is well disposed towards activities involving danger. By contrast, if the 
agent is self-indulgent, he is badly disposed towards activities involving bodily 
pleasures (EN II.5 1105b25-28). 
Aristotle also depicts virtue as a 'disposition to decide' (hexis proairetikê). 
What is the import of decision in the definition? More generally, the kind of re-
sponse fostered by virtue or character is a response in terms of desire and feeling. A 
disposition (hexis) is a tendency to feel a certain kind of affection (pathos) towards a 
certain kind of object. Such an affection can either be appetite (epithumia), or anger, 
fear, boldness, etc. Aristotle sums up the list of such pathê with the formula that "in 
general [pathê] are things attended by pleasure and pain" (EN II.5 1105b21-23). From 
this, one can infer that the actualization of a disposition of character, let it be virtu-
ous or not, is a desire to act in a certain way. Thus, in a virtuous case, the kind of 
desire prompted by one's reaction towards the situation will ultimately take the 
form of a decision (proairesis).53 Note that being a disposition to decide is not proper 
to virtue, because wickedness as well involves actions which are done on the basis 
of decision. By contrast, akratic (weak-willed) people do not act on the basis of de-
cision (EN zzz.2 1111b13-14; EN VII.3 1146b22-24; VII.4 1148a17; EN VII.8 1151a5–7; 
See §6.2.2). Decision is a mixed-state. It is described by Aristotle either as intellec-
tive desire or as desiderative thought (EN VI.2 1139b4-5). Aristotle's definition of 
aretê shows that a virtuous agent does not act on the basis of mere non-rational de-
sire, but on the basis of desire informed by reason (logos). In other words, in human 
beings, the gap between project and execution in one's response to one's environ-
ment is mediated by reason (McDowell 1998: 107). 
                                                      
52 Aristotle identifies a virtue proper to each domain of man's activity. Instances of such 
domains with their proper virtue are: warfare (courage), bodily pleasures (temperance), the 
domain of contracts (justice), spending money (generosity and munificence), etc. Note how 
these domains still show some similarities with the various ministerial areas in modern 
governments: defence, economy, health, leisure, trade, justice, etc. 
53 On proairesis, see note 67. 
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Aristotle locates virtues and character traits in what he calls the 'desidera-
tive part of the soul' (EN I.13 1102b30).54 This part is opposed to the rational part of 
the soul to a certain extent. Aristotle notices that certain kinds of people, namely 
self-controlled people (enkrateis) and those lacking self-control (akrateis), do exhibit 
some reason, which encourages them to do what is correct and best. However, he 
observes, there is something within them which goes against such logos (1102b13-
18). Self-controlled people are prone to feel violent non-rational desires, although 
they eventually act according to reason. By contrast, people lacking self-control are 
such that they know what the best thing to do is; yet they also feel non-rational ap-
petite and end up acting against reason (on self-control (enkrateia) and lack of self-
control (akrasia), see chap. 6). Aristotle adds that this part of the soul is not com-
pletely non-rational, because it is able to follow the prescriptions of reason. Aristo-
tle describes this as "to listen to reason as a son listens to his father" (1102b29-32; 
1103a3). Indeed, virtue when attaining the mean follows a certain norm which is 
the same as what is given by reason. According to the definition of virtue, the in-
termediacy in which the virtuous response consists is given by a logos and this logos 
is a product of the rational part of the soul. 
Thus, Aristotle makes a significant distinction in his moral psychology be-
tween two parts of the soul. One is properly rational: it is said to 'have' reason in 
the proper sense (ton logon echon kuriôs 1103a2). The other is called 'desiderative' 
and is rational only to the extent that it can listen to the properly rational one "like a 
son listens to his father".55 Correspondingly, there are two kinds of excellent state of 
                                                      
54 The exact phrasing is 'appetitive and, generally, desiderative part' (epithumêtikon kai holôs 
orektikon 1102b30). Such a part would then include the three kinds of desire distinguished 
by Aristotle: wish (boulêsis), spirit (thumos) and appetite (epithumia) (See e.g. DA 414b2; MA 
700b22; EE 1223a26-27). There is a controversy about boulêsis, though, because Aristotle also 
describes this kind of desire as rational (logistikê orexis – Rhet. I.10 1369a2; see also Top. IV.5 
126a13; DA III.10 433a23-25; MA 7 701a36-b1; Mem. 451b29-31; EE 1234b28-29). Thus boulêsis 
would not be included in the desiderative part after all. Yet, Moss has convincingly argued 
that, at least in an ethical context, boulêsis is not rational in the sense that it is a state of the 
rational part of the soul, but in the sense that it is based on rational cognition (Moss 2012: 
162). 
55 Such a distinction differs from the 'canonical' tripartition of the soul found in the De Ani-
ma. In the EN Aristotle also distinguishes between three parts. In addition to the rational 
and the desiderative parts, he mentions the nutritive part (threptikon). However, the triparti-
tion of the DA distinguishes a 'perceptual' part (aisthêtikon) instead of a desiderative one. I 
do not think that at EN I.13 Aristotle is holding a conception of the soul different from that 
of the DA, as has sometimes been held by scholars (Nuyens 1948; Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 93). 
Accordingly, then, the distinction into a rational and a desiderative part would refer to a 
real partition of the soul. The real distinction position has been contested by Hardie 1968: 
68-73 and Lefèvre 1978: 19-20. Bostock 2000: 34 considers that the reason/desire opposition 
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the soul, those pertaining to the properly rational part and those pertaining to the 
desiderative part (1103a3-7). Aristotle calls the former 'intellectual virtues' (aretai 
dianoêtikai) and the latter 'virtues of character' (aretai êthikê). 
An important consequence of this distinction is that each part does not de-
velop in the same way. They each involve a specific process in order to develop 
their respective virtue. The desiderative part develops through habituation (ethis-
mos), whereas the intellectual part through teaching (didaskalia – 1103a14-18). Ha-
bituation consists in the repetition of actions of a certain type under some guidance 
(by one's parents or teacher). Performing a given action, at an early age, ought to be 
monitored by someone who can describe reliably whether this action is courageous 
or not, temperate or not, etc. Thanks to this tutorage, the young learner is able to 
make sense of his responses, which were spontaneous and non-reflexive at the be-
ginning, and grasp them as being good or bad.56 By contrast, teaching, Aristotle 
says, takes experience and time (empeiria kai chronou). As I shall show in chapter 5, 
empeiria is an ability to recognize a particular action as an instance of a moral no-
                                                                                                                                                        
is not a real one because it is at odds with Hume's distinction between reason and passion. 
Hence, for Bostock it would merely be a distinction in account, not a real one. I consider that 
Aristotle draws a partition depending on the context and that these parts of the soul should 
not be taken as real parts. This is suggested by his rather nonchalant use of the psychologi-
cal material. Even though inquiring about the soul is useful to the political expert, the latter 
needs not study it for its own sake and in too much detail. He may rely on what Aristotle 
calls the 'discussion from outside' (exôterikos logos), which seems to refer to discussions 
about the soul which are different from the De Anima:  
"The political expert, too, should consider the soul, and should 
consider it for the sake of these things [i.e. understanding virtue], 
and to the extent which will suffice for the object of our inquiry, 
for attaining a higher degree of precision is perhaps too laborious 
for our present purpose. Some things about the soul have been 
sufficiently explained in our published works as well and we 
should make use of them." EN I.13 1102a23-27 
&'()7$έ-+ Cὴ !"ὶ $ῷ ,-02$2!ῷ ,')ὶ m89ῆ3, &'()7$έ-+ Cὲ 
$-ύ$(+ 9ά)2+, !"ὶ ἐ>’ ὅ@-+ ἱ!"+ῶ3 ἔ9'2 ,)ὸ3 $ὰ `7$-ύ<'+"· $ὸ 
5ὰ) ἐ,ὶ ,0'ῖ-+ ἐN"!)2/-ῦ+ ἐ)5(Cέ@$')-+ ἴ@(3 ἐ@$ὶ $ῶ+ 
,)-!'2<έ+(+. 0έ5'$"2 Cὲ ,')ὶ "ὐ$ῆ3 !"ὶ ἐ+ $-ῖ3 ἐN($')2!-ῖ3 
0ό5-23 ἀ)!-ύ+$(3 ἔ+2", !"ὶ 9)7@$έ-+ "ὐ$-ῖ3·  
The partition of the soul is a logical one rather than a real one. Rather than dividing the soul 
into several parts that each has a specific capacity, Aristotle rather sees the soul as a unity 
having several capacities. I contend that this way of seeing the partition of the soul is still at 
work at EN VI.1. On the various sorts of 'parts' of the soul, see Whiting 2002 esp. section 1 
and p. 184. 
56 For a careful description of habituation, see Burnyeat 1980. 
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tion. It involves a higher order conceptual apparatus. One should not deduce from 
the distinction that habituation is a totally mindless process. On the contrary, as 
Burnyeat says, "practice has cognitive powers" (Burnyeat 1980: 73). Habituation 
enables the young learner to develop a moral sensitivity and to acquire a conceptu-
al apparatus, although a limited one, to name his encounters with his surroundings. 
Nevertheless, teaching involves a different, more developed conceptual appa-
ratus.57 
Aristotle explores extensively the different virtues of character related to a 
specific domain of human activity in books II to V of the EN, as well as in books II 
to IV of the EE. Then, he devotes book VI to the inquiry of the rational side of moral 
action. Although the main endeavour of EN VI can be seen as accounting for vari-
ous virtues of the rational part of the soul58, Aristotle gives special attention to one 
crucial point. He explains his project in the first lines of book VI. 
8) "Since we have said earlier that one must choose what is interme-
diate, not excess, and not deficiency, and that what is intermediate 
is 'as the correct reason prescribes' (hôs ho orthos logos legei), let us 
delimit this. For with all the dispositions we have discussed, just 
as with everything else, there is a target (skopos), as it were, that 
the rational person has in view as he tenses and relaxes, and a 
kind of mark (horos) that determines the intermediate states, 
which we declare to be in between excess and deficiency, being as 
they are 'according to the correct reason'." EN VI.1 1138b18-25 
Ἐ,'ὶ Cὲ $859ά+-<'+ ,)ό$')-+ 'ἰ)7!ό$'3 ὅ$2 C'ῖ $ὸ <έ@-+ 
"ἱ)'ῖ@&"2, <ὴ $ὴ+ ὑ,')/-0ὴ+ <7Cὲ $ὴ+ ἔ00'2m2+, $ὸ (20) Cὲ 
<έ@-+ ἐ@$ὶ+ ὡ3 ὁ 0ό5-3 ὁ ὀ)&ὸ3 0έ5'2, $-ῦ$- C2έ0(<'+. ἐ+ 
,ά@"23 5ὰ) $"ῖ3 'ἰ)7<έ+"23 ἕN'@2, !"&ά,') !"ὶ ἐ,ὶ $ῶ+ ἄ00(+, 
ἔ@$2 $23 @!-,ὸ3 ,)ὸ3 ὃ+ ἀ,-/0έ,(+ ὁ $ὸ+ 0ό5-+ ἔ9(+ ἐ,2$'ί+'2 
!"ὶ ἀ+ί7@2+, !"ί $23 ἔ@$2+ ὅ)-3 $ῶ+ <'@-$ή$(+, ἃ3 <'$"Nύ 
>"<'+ 'ἶ+"2 $ῆ3 ὑ,')/-0ῆ3 !"ὶ $ῆ3 ἐ00'ίm'(3, -ὔ@"3 !"$ὰ $ὸ+ 
ὀ)&ὸ+ 0ό5-+.  
That the intermediate is given by a correct reason (orthos logos)59 refers to Ar-
istotle's previous definition of virtue at EN II.6 (1106b36-1107a2), where virtue as a 
                                                      
57 On the distinction between habituation and teaching as involving two distinct conceptual 
apparati, I follow Jimeñez (forthcoming). See her paper with a useful discussion of her posi-
tion against scholars who believe that habituation and teaching are two different stages of a 
single process of acquisition of a moral sense (p. 12-13, with note 8). This account of moral 
learning is a sketchy one. I deal with empeiria in a detailed way in chap. 5 and with habitua-
tion in chap. 6. 
58 For a discussion on the scope of EN VI, see Natali 2001: 18. 
59 Logos is a term with a rich polysemy in Greek. As the verbal noun of legein (to speak, to 
say), its meanings span from 'phrase, expression' to 'speech or discourse', covering 'account, 
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mean is realized following the logos given by the wise man (phronimos) (see also the 
definitions of particular virtues of courage and temperance in EN III: 1115b20; 
1119b17; 1119a20, see §4.2) One ought to take notice of the way Aristotle speaks of 
the intermediacy as a 'target' that the agent ought to hit. He uses the same vocabu-
lary as in the previous passages (1) and (5), in which attaining the mean depended 
on practical knowledge. In book VI, then, Aristotle gives special attention to the 
problem of determining the intermediate action to perform, i.e. determining what 
the 'correct reason' is and how to find it. This, I argue, is the same as looking for a 
description of practical knowledge. 
It is difficult to track down the argument of book VI about practical 
knowledge, because Aristotle is combining different issues. First he wants to make 
it clear that the practical domain is indeed an object of rational consideration, which 
had not always been fully acknowledged by his predecessors. His first concern is 
thus to introduce a practical part of the soul opposed to the theoretical one (EN VI.1 
1139a3-15). Then, he wishes to introduce the chief virtue of this practical part 
(1139a15-b13) and uses for that purpose an argument similar to the ergon argument 
of EN I.7 that led to a definition of eudaimonia for human beings (1097a22ff.). Third, 
as he collects the various intellectual dispositions which are candidates to be intel-
lectual virtues (EN VI.3-7), he introduces phronêsis. He will eventually identify it 
with the virtue of the practical part of the soul, but first he describes it according to 
the traditional views of his time (EN VI.5). In the rest of book VI, Aristotle treats in 
a more or less systematic way various intellectual dispositions which could be mi-
nor intellectual virtues or parts of phronêsis (EN VI.9: good deliberation (euboulia); 
VI.10 comprehension (sunesis); VI.11 discernment (gnômê)). Finally, he tackles a 
couple of issues which his depiction of intellectual virtues has raised and while 
doing so he investigates the relation between phronêsis and virtue of character (EN 
VI.12-13). 
This way of introducing phronêsis as the virtue of the practical part of the 
soul does not exactly match the conceptual framework set above in the books on 
the virtues. Aristotle's presentation of phronêsis might at first give the impression of 
                                                                                                                                                        
argument', 'reason, ground', 'reasoning'. It also means concepts less obviously connected to 
speaking such as 'proportion' or 'reason' as a faculty. Lately, scholars have tended to agree 
that logos at EN VI-VII, and especially in the phrase 'orthos logos', means 'account or argu-
ment' (Broadie 1991: 118, n. 2; Natali 2001: 16-17; Moss 2012: 71; Reeve 2013: 101-102; 
Charles forth., n. 1; See also Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 147 and Bénatouïl 2006: 71-77 who argues 
that the concept of logos as a faculty first occurs in Stoic thought). In particular, one should 
not understand it as the faculty of reason. Logos does not appear in Aristotle's list of states of 
the soul that say the truth (EN VI.3 1139b15-18). On the contrary, it can be true or false 
(1139a24; 1140a10). 
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falling short of the expectations of the picture I have drawn in the previous sec-
tions. However, in the rest of the current chapter, I argue that all these different 
vantage points are in agreement and that phronêsis fulfils in the end the role of prac-
tical knowledge as I have described it before. In order to do so, I want to present 
carefully the beginning of book VI. 
2.4.2 The practical/theoretical distinction 
In book VI, Aristotle starts his inquiry into intellectual virtues by making a 
division between two parts of the soul (meros tês psuchês 1139a4). This is in fact a 
subdivision of the rational part of the soul, distinguished from the desiderative one 
(EN I.13 1102b28-1103a3). So, he resumes dividing the rational soul in the following 
way: 
9) "Let us assume the parts possessing reason to be two, one by vir-
tue of which we consider (theôroumen) the sorts of things whose 
principles60 cannot be otherwise, one by virtue of which <we con-
sider> those that can be otherwise; for with things that are generi-
cally distinct, the part of the soul that stands in a natural relation-
ship to each genus will itself be generically distinct, given that 
they have cognition (gnôsis) in accordance with a certain likeness 
and affinity to their objects. Of these, let the first be called 'scien-
tific', the second 'calculative'; for deliberation and calculation are 
the same thing, and no one deliberates about things that cannot be 
otherwise. So the calculative is one distinct part of the part pos-
sessing reason." EN VI.1 1139a6-15 
!"ὶ ὑ,-!'ί@&( Cύ- $ὰ 0ό5-+ ἔ9-+$", ἓ+ <ὲ+ ᾧ &'()-ῦ<'+ $ὰ 
$-2"ῦ$" $ῶ+ ὄ+$(+ ὅ@(+ "ἱ ἀ)9"ὶ <ὴ ἐ+Cέ9-+$"2 ἄ00(3 ἔ9'2+, 
ἓ+ Cὲ ᾧ $ὰ ἐ+C'9ό<'+"· ,)ὸ3 5ὰ) $ὰ $ῷ 5έ+'2 ἕ$')" !"ὶ $ῶ+ $ῆ3 
m89ῆ3 <-)ί(+ ἕ$')-+ $ῷ (10) 5έ+'2 $ὸ ,)ὸ3 ἑ!ά$')-+ ,'>8!ό3, 
'ἴ,') !"&’ ὁ<-2ό$7$ά $2+" !"ὶ -ἰ!'2ό$7$" ἡ 5+ῶ@23 ὑ,ά)9'2 
"ὐ$-ῖ3. 0'5έ@&( Cὲ $-ύ$(+ $ὸ <ὲ+ ἐ,2@$7<-+2!ὸ+ $ὸ Cὲ 
0-52@$2!ό+· $ὸ 5ὰ) /-80'ύ'@&"2 !"ὶ 0-5ί`'@&"2 $"ὐ$ό+, -ὐC'ὶ3 
Cὲ /-80'ύ'$"2 ,')ὶ $ῶ+ <ὴ ἐ+C'9-<έ+(+ ἄ00(3 ἔ9'2+. ὥ@$' $ὸ 
0-52@$2!ό+ ἐ@$2+ (15) ἕ+ $2 <έ)-3 $-ῦ 0ό5-+ ἔ9-+$-3. 
Aristotle assumes (hupokeisthô) that there are two distinct parts of the soul 
that are both rational (logon echon). In order to make this distinction, he offers an 
                                                      
60 'Principle' translates 'archê'. Basically, archê means starting point. Yet, it sometimes has a 
more technical sense in Aristotle. It sometimes means 'cause', as the four causes in the Phys-
ics are called archai (Phys. II.3 194b16-23). An archê also can take the sense of an epistemic 
principle, i.e. if I want to understand why P, I must know the principle of P which explains 
why it is the case. For the polysemy of archê, see Meta V.1. In this work, the translation of 
archê varies between starting point and principle. 
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argument based on the objects of the soul. There are two kinds of thing: those 
whose principles cannot be otherwise as they are, and those which can be otherwise 
as they are. These correspond more or less to necessary and contingent things or 
states of affairs respectively.61 Now, the soul has a certain cognition (gnôsis) of one 
kind of object according to a certain "likeness and affinity" (homoiotêta kai oikeiotêta) 
with the objects in question. From this, Aristotle infers that to one kind of thing 
corresponds only a part in the soul. There is no overlap, for if the two kinds of thing 
are genuinely different, so are the parts of the soul.62 Thus, necessary things are 
cognized by one part of the soul which has a likeness and affinity with such objects, 
and so are contingent things. Aristotle then associates the part of the soul he calls 
'scientific' (epistêmonikon) with necessary things, and the part of the soul he calls 
'calculative' (logistikon) with contingent things.  
Aristotle seems to comply with the traditional intuition that changeable 
things cannot be the objects of science (epistêmê, that is, understanding the reason 
why P is Q; see § 3.2) for we cannot reliably determine in which state they are. Such 
a view is spelled out by Plato in the Theaetetus, where Socrates attributes it to Hera-
clitus and Empedocles (Theaetetus 152b-d). Aristotle also acknowledges that at the 
level of individual things, the world is indeterminate and contingent.63 One indi-
vidual can be F as well as ¬F. For instance Plato was short when he was a boy, but 
now that he has grown up he is tall. I cannot know in a strong sense whether Plato 
is tall, because nothing prevents the content of my belief from turning out to be 
false. However, Aristotle observes that there are regularities in the world as well. 
He understands the world as being structured by principles that determine regular 
patterns of change, for instance growth in living things. That Plato used to be small 
as a boy and is now taller is an instantiation of such a principle. Similarly, repro-
duction in living things obeys the same kind of regularity: 'A man comes from a 
man' in virtue of the form of man which the parent shares with the offspring (PA I.1 
                                                      
61 The usual definition of necessity and contingency concerns propositions. cf. De Interpreta-
tione 13 22a14ff. where Aristotle equates necessity and possibility (or contingency) with oth-
er modal quantificators, namely: ☐P ≡ ¬◊¬P and ◊P ≡ ¬☐P. At times, however, it seems that 
Aristotle does not really distinguish between real things and epistemic objects. See Reeve 
1992: 8. 
62 This argument has been criticized for its hastiness as an arbitrary 'ontological prejudice' 
(Richardson Lear 2004: 96-98). If two kinds of things ought to be cognized by two different 
parts of the soul, then how is it that there are no further divisions in the soul in order to 
cognize e.g. objects of action (praxis) on the one hand and objects of production (poiêsis) on 
the other? 
63 EN 1110b7-8: "there are a lot of differences in the particulars" (,-00"ὶ 5ὰ) C2">-)"ί 'ἰ@2+ 
ἐ+ $-ῖ3 !"&’ἕ!"@$"); EN VI.3 1139b19-23; EN X.9 1180b7-12. 
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640a25-26; EE 1222b17-18). There are even more fundamental principles, e.g. the 
principle of non-contradiction: a thing cannot bear a property and the contrary 
property at the same time (Meta. IV.3 1005b19-20), and such principles can be expe-
rienced in everyday life in relation to contingent beings. These regularities, by con-
trast to individuals, are stable and Aristotle views them as eternal and following 
some kind of necessity. Hence, they are proper objects of knowledge. The funda-
mental intuition that there are two kinds of thing relies on the epistemological con-
dition that we cannot know things that can change, but we can know things that 
remain always the same (EN VI.3 1139b19-23; see also APo I.2 71b12; I.4 73a21). 
Aristotle's association of necessary things with the epistêmonikon part is quite 
sensible and follows the tradition handed over by Plato. However, what is new in 
the distinction between parts of the soul is the way Aristotle handles the other part, 
the one that deals with contingent things.64 Plato, especially in the so-called 'middle 
dialogues', had made a distinction in the soul similar to Aristotle's, where he relates 
parts of the soul to a definite range of things in the world. In the Republic, Plato dis-
tinguishes between two 'faculties' (dunameis) that have knowledge (epistêmê) and 
opinion (doxa) as their function respectively (Rep. 477c-478b). The knowledge part is 
directed towards 'what is', that corresponds roughly to the Aristotelian 'mê en-
dechetai allôs', whereas the opinion part is directed towards 'what is and is not', 
which corresponds to the 'endechetai allôs'.65 In Plato's view, there is no knowledge 
to be gained from the consideration of contingent realities themselves. On the con-
trary, knowledge involves a grasp of the intelligible Forms and is therefore con-
cerned with eternal beings only. Plato even claims that reason should not linger on 
the particulars. Reason is concerned with the particulars in a secondary way only, 
for particulars act as reminders of eternal Forms to the reminiscent soul (Meno 81a-
d; Phaedo 74-75). Particularly in the Phaedo the realm of sensible things is described 
as a dream from which the soul will awake only at the time of death, when the soul 
is set free from the body. Therefore the philosopher must strain to contemplate 
Forms, in particular the Form of the Good, and this implies getting away from per-
ceptible things as much as possible. Therefore, contingent things cannot be the ob-
jects of reason. More generally, the realm of practice is not properly the domain of 
reason.66 
                                                      
64 I owe what follows largely to Broadie 1991: 213-214. 
65 For a discussion of the exact meaning of 'what is' and 'what is and is not', see Annas 1981: 
195ff. 
66 This interpretation of Plato – dubbed the 'two-world view' – is disputed. See especially 
Fine 1990. A recent contribution by Rowe consists in arguing that one should not under-
stand the end of Rep. V as rigorous Platonic doctrine, but rather as an argument limited in 
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In text (9), Aristotle, unlike Plato, posits a part of the soul which is specifical-
ly devoted to the contingencies of the concrete world and which is rational. Unlike 
Plato in the Phaedo, Aristotle does not restrict reason solely to necessary things. This 
part of the soul is not simply 'partaking in logos', as the desiderative part is – it lis-
tens to reason as a son to his father –, but it has reason (logon echon). Contingent re-
alities, that are the object of practice, are not the object of reason in a secondary way 
only. Aristotle admits thus of a part of reason which is specifically devoted to prac-
tice. An eloquent sign of Aristotle's move is how he names this second rational part. 
He calls it the 'calculative' part (to logistikon), which was a name that Plato used to 
refer to the rational part of the soul (Rep. 439d), the one that is responsible for 
epistêmê. Moreover, Aristotle explains logismos (calculation) by invoking a key con-
cept in his ethics, the concept of 'deliberation' (bouleusis), arguing that calculation 
and deliberation are the same thing (to gar bouleuesthai kai logizesthai tauton, EN VI.2 
1139a12). Thus, in reusing Platonic terminology while diverting its original mean-
ing, Aristotle marks a rupture from his master (Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 441; Richard-
son Lear 2004: 95, n. 6.). 
For Aristotle, reason does not pertain to the account of necessary truth only. 
Particular things do not just fall into a 'contingent mess' altogether. Rather, there 
must be some truth or knowledge in different areas than at the level of the neces-
sary. Besides, Aristotle has on many occasions in the corpus attempted to extend 
the reach of knowledge and reason to the entire domain of human activity. At the 
beginning of the Metaphysics, he does have a characterization for knowledge, which 
seems general enough: knowledge differentiates itself from mere experience or 
opinion by giving the cause of why something is the case (Meta. I.1 981a29-b6). Yet 
in doing so, he does not consider scientific knowledge only (epistêmê), but adds 
technical expertise as well (technê). The typical example Aristotle uses in order to 
make his point is medicine, which is a technê. Furthermore, Aristotle considers more 
generally that there are three kinds of area for rational activity: theoretical, practical 
and 'poetical' (Meta. 1026b4-5; 1064a17; Top. 145a15-16; 157a10-11). 
                                                                                                                                                        
its purpose (Rowe 2007, chap. 6). According to Rowe, Plato just aims at convincing people 
who have one view of their cognitive states that they should take a different view about 
them (p. 200). Thus, Plato's argument about the distinction between two kinds of beings 
related to two kinds of cognitive states would be influenced by this rhetorical purpose. Yet, 
as Rowe argues, this does not mean that we should infer conclusions about the ontology of 
the objects of each cognitive state. The argument is directed at the 'sight-lovers' of Rep. V 
474d-475a, not at the educated interlocutor (Glaucon) or the reader, who both have an idea 
that the proper objects of knowledge are the Platonic Forms (p. 205-206). 
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Thus, with the distinction between two rational parts in the soul, Aristotle 
conceptualizes the notion of practical rationality.67 This means that Aristotle intends 
to show that the realm of practice and human behaviour can be subject to rational 
explanation and expertise. From this he will be able to develop an account of ra-
tional action and above all an account of the evaluation of such an action. The next 
step in the progression of book VI is then to find out the virtue (aretê) of each ra-
tional part of the soul. 
10) "We must, then, grasp what the best disposition of each of these 
two parts is; for this will be the virtue of each, and its virtue will 
relate to its own peculiar function." EN VI.1 1139a15-17 
(15) 07,$έ-+ ἄ)’ ἑ!"$έ)-8 $-ύ$(+ $ί3 ἡ /'0$ί@$7 ἕN23· "ὕ$7 5ὰ) 
ἀ)'$ὴ ἑ!"$έ)-8, ἡ C’ ἀ)'$ὴ ,)ὸ3 $ὸ ἔ)5-+ $ὸ -ἰ!'ῖ-+. 
Finding the virtue of the rational part of the soul already belonged to Aristo-
tle's agenda. Now that he makes a distinction between two rational parts, there will 
not be one virtue of the rational side of the soul only, but two of them. Another sig-
nificant result of the account of the conceptualization of practical rationality is thus 
that there is a virtue of the practical part. In the case of the Platonic description of 
the rational soul, the doxastic part is an imperfect part. There cannot be a virtue of 
that part. True doxa is not a virtuous state. By contrast, in Aristotle, the fact that 
practical rationality is distinct from theoretical rationality entails that the former 
can be evaluated independently from the latter. What it is to be excellent for practi-
cal reason will not be the same as for theoretical reason. 
2.4.3 The function of practical reason 
At EN VI.1 1139a15-17 (text 10), Aristotle discloses the path he intends to fol-
low in order to find out the virtue of each part of the rational soul. He says that the 
virtues relate to the respective function of each part. In EN VI.2 Aristotle intends to 
                                                      
67 In passage (9), he may not refer to the freshly distinguished 'calculative' part as 'practical', 
but later in Nicomachean Ethics VI, he eventually identifies the proper object of this part, viz. 
things that allow of being otherwise, as consisting in both objects of production (poiêton) and 
objects of action (prakton) (1140a1-2), and since production is subordinate to action, as the 
latter is ultimately the goal of the former, the main function of the calculative part is praxis. 
Similarly, Aristotle first calls the other part the 'scientific' one, but later names it the theoreti-
cal part of the rational soul. In particular, a few lines after the distinction between rational 
parts of the soul, Aristotle contrasts theoretical thought (theôretikê dianoia) with practical and 
productive thought (1139a27-28). 
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deduce the virtue of each part from its function, in a similar way to how he de-
duced the definition of eudaimonia in EN I.7.68 
Aristotle eventually concludes chapter 2 by stating that the function of each 
part is truth (1139b12). However, when one looks back at the course of the chapter, 
it is clear that by 'truth' he does not mean the same thing in the practical and in the 
theoretical case. Indeed, Aristotle makes an explicit distinction between two kinds 
of truth: 
11) "So, since virtue of character is a state involving decision, and de-
cision is deliberative desire, the reason must be true and the desire 
correct, if the decision is a good one, and reason must assert the 
same things that desire pursues. This [viz. good decision],69 then, 
is practical thought and truth. In the case of theoretical thought, 
however, which is neither practical nor productive, what consti-
tute its being good or bad are truth and falsity, because truth is the 
characteristic activity of everything concerned with thought. But 
in the case of what is practical and concerned with thought, [its 
being good] consists in truth in agreement with correct desire." EN 
VI.2 1139a22-31 
ὥ@$’ ἐ,'2Cὴ ἡ ἠ&2!ὴ ἀ)'$ὴ ἕN23 ,)-"2)'$2!ή, ἡ Cὲ ,)-"ί)'@23 
ὄ)'N23 /-80'8$2!ή, C'ῖ C2ὰ $"ῦ$" <ὲ+ $ό+ $' 0ό5-+ ἀ07&ῆ 'ἶ+"2 
!"ὶ $ὴ+ ὄ)'N2+ ὀ)&ή+, (25) 'ἴ,') ἡ ,)-"ί)'@23 @,-8C"ί", !"ὶ $ὰ 
"ὐ$ὰ $ὸ+ <ὲ+ >ά+"2 $ὴ+ Cὲ C2ώ!'2+. "ὕ$7 <ὲ+ -ὖ+ ἡ C2ά+-2" !"ὶ 
ἡ ἀ0ή&'2" ,)"!$2!ή· $ῆ3 Cὲ &'()7$2!ῆ3 C2"+-ί"3 !"ὶ <ὴ 
,)"!$2!ῆ3 <7Cὲ ,-27$2!ῆ3 $ὸ 'ὖ !"ὶ !"!ῶ3 $ἀ07&έ3 ἐ@$2 !"ὶ 
m'ῦC-3 ($-ῦ$- 5ά) ἐ@$2 ,"+$ὸ3 C2"+-7$2!-ῦ ἔ)5-+)· $-ῦ Cὲ 
,)"!$2!-ῦ (30) !"ὶ C2"+-7$2!-ῦ ἀ0ή&'2" ὁ<-0ό5(3 ἔ9-8@" $ῇ 
ὀ)έN'2 $ῇ ὀ)&ῇ. 
In the case of theoretical thought, working well or badly consists merely in 
being true or false. This seems to indicate that the function of theoretical thinking is 
asserting true propositions, where 'true' refers to truth as correspondence, i.e. truth 
that consists in the agreement between what is asserted and what is the case in the 
world.70 But the notion of truth in play in the practical case is more complex. Aristo-
                                                      
68 See Richardson Lear 2004: 95, who refers to Greenwood (1909: 74) and to Kraut (1989: 58–
59). 
69 Hautê is most naturally taken to refer back to proairesis, which can be read with its com-
plement spoudaia. Pakaluk remarks in a footnote that proairesis is not a plausible relative for 
hautê, without giving any argument (Pakaluk 2010: 151, n. 17). Yet, if one conceives of deci-
sion as the bearer of practical truth, as I shall argue below, taking proairesis as the reference 
for hautê makes perfect sense. An episode of virtuous decision is an instance of practical 
thought which is true. 
70 See Aristotle's definition of truth at Meta. IV.7 1012a26-27: "To say of what is that it is not, 
or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it 
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tle elaborates a notion of practical truth, that consists roughly in the congruity of 
thought and desire. To be right in a situation of action depends not only on whether 
I entertain a true proposition regarding what is the case, but also on whether I am 
appropriately attracted to (or repulsed by) the situation. Hence, the function of the 
practical part of the soul is asserting, or achieving, practical truth. This text also 
adds another crucial element in Aristotle's moral psychology, namely the notion of 
decision (proairesis)71. Decision has been introduced as a state which reveals people's 
character more than actions, and which can thereby reveal a virtuous character (EN 
III.2 1111b5-6). Also, decision is described as being at the origin of action (archê 
1113a5-7, which is confirmed later on in EN VI at 1139a31). Decision appears as the 
state of the soul which determines a particular action, which in turn actualizes the 
state of intermediacy to which virtue tends. 
Text (11), I contend, shows that decision can be evaluated in terms of practi-
cal truth. Aristotle uses the notion of proairesis in order to formulate the notion of 
practical truth. If decision is good or correct (spoudaia), then, necessarily (dei), logos 
is true and desire is correct (orthê), and logos asserts the same thing that desire pur-
sues. This seems to imply that decision is the bearer of practical truth.72 In other 
words, a decision is 'true' or 'false' (or, for the sake of clarity, correct or incorrect), 
depending on both a cognitive and a conative component. This is confirmed by two 
further characterizations of decision. At 1139a32-33, decision is said to have desire 
and logos as its principle (archê) (the exact wording for logos is 'logos that is for the 
sake of something' – logos ho heneka tinos). Finally, at 1139b4-5, decision is called 
                                                                                                                                                        
is not, is true." ($ὸ <ὲ+ 5ὰ) 0έ5'2+ $ὸ ὂ+ <ὴ 'ἶ+"2 ἢ $ὸ <ὴ ὂ+ 'ἶ+"2 m'ῦC-3, $ὸ Cὲ $ὸ ὂ+ 
'ἶ+"2 !"ὶ $ὸ <ὴ ὂ+ <ὴ 'ἶ+"2 ἀ07&έ3). 
71 I choose to translate proairesis as 'decision', like Gauthier and Jolif, Irwin, Broadie and 
Rowe, and Inwood and Woolf. Some commentators prefer the translation of 'preferential 
choice' in order to emphasize that a decision must have been deliberated beforehand 
(Charles 1984). They claim that not all decisions we take are necessarily the result of a prior 
deliberation. However, in my view 'preferential choice' is not better at emphasizing a prior 
deliberation. The notion of 'preference' does not refer particularly to any rational considera-
tion. On the contrary, preferences seem rather to belong to the larger class of feelings. On 
the other side, 'decision' implicates sufficiently well that there must have been a prior delib-
eration. 'Decision' is the preferred term when it comes to opt for a course of action of great 
consequences: I have decided to run for the next election, I have decided to move house, etc. 
72 More precisely: decision d is true if (1) logos P is true; (2) desire o is correct; (3) P and o 
assert the same thing. I understand that Aristotle is actually giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions here and that the conditional above ought to be construed as a biconditional. 
This interpretation is not shown in the text. However, some lines later Aristotle speaks of 
logos and desire as the archê of decision, which seems to mean that decision depends on 
these two components exclusively (1139a32-33). I thank Alex Bown for making me aware of 
this difficulty. 
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either 'desiderative intellect' (orektikos nous) or 'intellectual desire' (orexis dianoêtikê). 
This confirms the mixed nature of decision as both cognition and desire and there-
by the complex way to evaluate decision as true or false practically.  
What are practical thought and practical truth? Practical thought can be un-
derstood in different ways. It can merely refer to thought (dianoia) when it is con-
cerned with objects of practice (prakta); it can refer to the kind of thought which 
causes movement; or it can refer to the kind of thought which is motivational in 
that it is accompanied by desire. I think dianoia praktikê in this context possesses all 
three properties. That it is concerned with ta prakta need not be questioned. That it 
causes movement is confirmed some lines later, when Aristotle explains that 
thought alone moves nothing, but practical thought (dianoia praktikê) moves the 
agent (EN VI.2 1139a33-34). Lastly, in my view, text (11) above precisely shows that 
practical thought is a mix of a cognitive and a conative psychic state. Practical truth, 
then, to which one should add practical falsehood, is a way to evaluate practical 
thought not only in terms of its descriptive content, but also in terms of the attitude 
of the agent towards the situation. Practical truth means that the content of decision 
is true, i.e. appropriate to the situation. In other words, practical truth means that 
the action type the agent intends to perform is the right thing to do. On the other 
hand, practical truth means that the agent is correctly attracted or repulsed by the 
situation. Summing up, S thinks that O is to be done, iff S is attracted to doing O; 
but on the contrary: S thinks that O is to be avoided iff S is repulsed by O. Practical 
truth does not refer to the content of practical thought, but to the state itself (Broad-
ie & Rowe 2002: 362). 
There is no more complexity than this in the notion of practical thought and 
practical truth. It is not possible in a single episode of decision that the cognitive 
content be positive and the conative one negative (opposed to it). It is not possible 
that they should not be oriented towards the same object in the same way. This im-
plies that even in a case such as the akratês, there is no discrepancy between what 
the akratês believes is good to do and his desire for such a thing. Rather, in the 
akratês, there is an additional desire (an appetite, epithumia), which is in competition 
with the agent's rational desire.73 I think this is confirmed by the end of the passage 
under scrutiny. Aristotle finishes this bit on practical truth by saying that in the 
practical case, its good achievement consists in truth in harmony with correct desire 
(1139a29-31). He does not say 'thought in harmony with correct desire', which 
would mean that in some other – non-virtuous – cases thought could be in conflict 
with desire. 
                                                      
73 See my account of akrasia in chap. 6. See also Moss 2012: 104-105. 
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Commentators often understand text (11) as saying that practical thought 
can be divided into four different kinds according to the correct or incorrect values 
of thought or desire. For instance, if thought is true and desire correct, this is a case 
of good decision; if thought is correct, but desire is incorrect, it is case of akrasia; if 
thought is incorrect, but desire is correct, it is a case of wickedness (kakia); and last-
ly, if thought is incorrect and desire as well is incorrect, this is a case of inability to 
act (Natali 2001: 15).74 However, the text itself does not imply such a reading. 
Against this interpretation, one can argue that the fourth case is a strange one. Why 
would Aristotle be interested in speaking of such a case? Moreover, and more im-
portantly, such an interpretation is at loss when it comes to accounting for the case 
of the enkratês. The enkratês makes a correct decision, however his desire is partly 
incorrect, because he feels appetite towards a course of action incompatible with 
what he thinks he should do. Thus, one needs to appeal to two distinct desires in 
order to account for this case. But then, it turns out that the akratic case also en-
counters such a problem. In chapter 6, I shall show that the akratês is also under the 
spell of two distinct desires, one of which is a non-rational appetite, whereas the 
other is a desire which goes with his belief about what he should do.  
Thus, if the ergon of practical reason consists in practical truth, and if practi-
cal truth obtains in a state of decision, then the ergon of practical reason is achieved 
by taking a 'practically true', i.e. correct, decision. The function of practical reason 
can therefore also be expressed as taking correct (i.e. practically true) decisions. 
Why does Aristotle not simply speak in terms of a decision being 'correct' 
(orthos), as he usually does, rather than being 'true' in such a counter-intuitive 
sense? At EN III.2 1112a5-7, for instance, decision is opposed to doxa on the basis 
that the latter is evaluated in terms of truth and falsehood, whereas the former is 
evaluated in terms of correctness and incorrectness (other occurrences of proairesis 
orthê: 1144a20; 1145a4; 1151a29-35). I assume that at EN VI.2 it is crucial that the 
function of practical reason includes a cognitive element. Aristotle has just estab-
lished the practical aspect of rationality. If it truly is a part of reason, it must be pos-
sible to speak of it in terms of truth and falsity.75 However, this also shows that the 
concept of practical truth is a difficult one even for Aristotle and that on other occa-
                                                      
74 Similar interpretations: Charles forthcoming; Pakaluk 2010: 154, although Pakaluk does 
not think that being true or false in practical cases concerns mental states. He argues that the 
bearers of practical truth are propositions. 
75 See also Taylor 2008: 206. This evolution of the notion of proairesis is also noticeable con-
cerning its psychology. In EN III, Aristotle says that decision is a sort of desire, even though 
distinct from wish and appetite. Now, he says that proairesis is in fact both: desire and 
thought at the same time. 
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sions he prefers to speak in terms of a decision being correct rather than true for the 
sake of clarity.76 
Thus, the function of the practical part of the soul is practical truth, which 
occurs in an episode of decision, and the function of the theoretical part is theoreti-
cal truth. The next task, then, is to determine what the respective virtue of each part 
of the soul is, which Aristotle does in the following chapters of EN VI (chap. 3-7). 
He proceeds by first numbering all the possible candidates, that is, states of the 
soul, "in virtue of which the soul always speaks the truth by asserting or denying".77 
These are: science (epistêmê), craft (technê), practical wisdom (phronêsis), intellect 
(nous), and wisdom (sophia) (1139b16-17). Then, after an inquiry of each of these 
cognitive states, he points out the two virtues, namely sophia for the theoretical part 
(1143b15)78, and phronêsis for the practical one (1140b25-28). 
                                                      
76 There is another issue: why is the ergon of each part of the soul expressed in terms of a 
state evaluated positively, namely truth? In the ergon argument of EN I.7, the ergon of hu-
man beings is given independently of an evaluation (1098a8-18). The function of human 
beings is activity of the soul in accordance with reason, not excellent activity, just as the 
function of the cithara player is to play cithara, not to play cithara well. By contrast, here, 
when Aristotle expresses the function of rational parts of the soul in terms of truth, he pre-
supposes that this function has a value, and indeed a positive one, as if any outcome of each 
kind of reason is good. In other words, if one compares Aristotle's definition of the function 
of both rational parts of the soul with the ergon argument of EN I.7, one would expect that 
these functions are 'asserting propositions' for the theoretical part, and 'making decisions' 
for the practical part. However, Aristotle determines that the function of the theoretical part 
is asserting true propositions, whereas the function of the practical part is taking correct (or 
practically true) decisions, as if the function of the cithara player would not simply be play-
ing the cithara, but playing it well. One could consider that Aristotle is being rash and com-
mits a slip by inferring immediately what the excellent exercise of a function is, rather than 
building his argument step by step. Thus, when saying that the ergon of each rational part of 
the soul is truth, he would actually mean the virtuous exercise of such an ergon. He actually 
seems to commit the same slip at EN I.7 when he suggests for the first time to look at the 
function of human beings in order to find their ultimate good. There he asserts that the 
good for a flute-player or a sculptor resides in their function (ἐ+ $ῷ ἔ)5ῳ C-!'ῖ $ἀ5"&ὸ+ 
'ἶ+"2 !"ὶ $ὸ 'ὖ – 1097b26-27). However, this explanation seems to presuppose that deter-
mining the virtuous exercise is possible on the basis of the mere notion of the ergon alone. 
But if one applies this way of thinking to the ergon argument of EN I.7, this seems to induce 
a naturalist fallacy, as if from the mere notion of the ergon of human beings (rational activity 
of the soul), one could discover the definition of its virtuous exercise, which in that case is 
the definition of happiness. 
77 1139b15: ἔ@$( Cὴ -ἷ3 ἀ07&'ύ'2 ἡ m89ὴ $ῷ !"$">ά+"2 ἢ ἀ,->ά+"2. 
78 The explicit statement that sophia is the virtue of the theoretical part occurs only at the end 
of EN VI.11. However, it seems already clear at EN VI.7 that this is what Aristotle means 
when he says that sophia is a combination of epistêmê and nous, with the things that are high-
est by nature as its objects (ἐ! Cὴ $ῶ+ 'ἰ)7<έ+(+ Cῆ0-+ ὅ$2 ἡ @->ί" ἐ@$ὶ !"ὶ ἐ,2@$ή<7 !"ὶ 
+-ῦ3 $ῶ+ $2<2($ά$(+ $ῇ >ύ@'2. 1141b2-3). 
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Before I turn to a proper study of phronêsis, one can already make the fol-
lowing remark. In §2.3, I have described practical knowledge as the kind of 
knowledge thanks to which one can attain the mean in action, i.e. thanks to which 
one knows how to perform courageous, just, or temperate actions and the like. Now, 
a more painstaking inquiry into Aristotle's moral psychology has revealed that the 
notion of decision (proairesis) is central in his account of moral action. Decision, or 
rather virtuous decision, is what implements the mean in which virtue consists into 
an action. This also means that the kind of knowledge I have identified as practical 
knowledge is closely related to decision. More precisely, I contend that practical 
knowledge has a substantial share in determining the content of decision. 
Since phronêsis is finally identified as the virtue of the practical part of the 
soul, it should also have as its function virtuous decision-making. Although Aristo-
tle is not explicit about that, I argue in the next section that the definition of 
phronêsis covers this function. 
2.5 Aristotle's definition of phronêsis 
In chapter 5 of EN VI, after having introduced epistêmê (EN VI.3) and technê 
(EN VI.4), Aristotle develops his account of practical wisdom (phronêsis). Aristotle's 
first approximation of phronêsis is based on the description of an individual en-
dowed with phronêsis, that is, the phronimos person. The everyday use of the term 
phronimos refers to someone who can deliberate well. Aristotle's favourite example 
of a phronimos person is the 5th century statesman Pericles (1140a25-31; 1141b8-14; 
1142b31-33). Aristotle has departed from Plato, who had a highly intellectual con-
ception of phronêsis, and bases his own on a popular or traditional picture of the 
phronimos (Burnet 1900: 261). The popular picture of the phronimos is especially clear 
in Democritus (DK 68B2) and is displayed on several occasions in the work of Isoc-
rates, who links phronêsis to the activity of the political man (In Sophistas 2; Evagoras 
41, 65, 80; Panathenaicus 196; Ad Nicoclem 10-14, 21; Nicocles 23).79 
Aristotle's next move towards a technical definition of phronêsis is to contrast 
phronêsis with epistêmê and technê. The contrast with epistêmê is made on the same 
ground as the practical/theoretical distinction between parts of the soul (cf. §2.4). 
Epistêmê relies on principles that cannot be otherwise, whereas phronêsis has starting 
points that can indeed be otherwise (hôn d'hai archai endechontai allôs echein 1140a34). 
On the other hand, the distinction between phronêsis and technê relies on a distinc-
tion between their respective activity. The proper activity of technê is production 
                                                      
79 See Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 464-467 for sources; see also Aubenque, 1963: 155-156. 
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(poiêsis)80, while that of phronêsis is praxis, and poiêsis and praxis are not of the same 
genus (allo to genos 1140b3-4). Aristotle explains this difference between poiêsis and 
praxis some lines below (b6-7): the former has its end beyond itself, whereas the 
latter is its own end. In other words, the execution of a production results in a 
product which is distinct from the activity of producing, whereas the realization of 
an action has no further end than itself. This distinction recalls a fundamental dis-
tinction at the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics between ends that are ex-
ternal to the activity which promotes them and ends that consist in the activity (see 
EN I.1 1094a3-5). 
Next, Aristotle seems to infer from this contrast the complete definition of 
phronêsis:  
12) "It remains therefore (ara) that phronêsis is a state accompanied by 
reason, which is true,81 which is about the good and bad things for 
humans, and which is conducive to action" EN VI.5 1140b4-6; 20-
21 
0'ί,'$"2 ἄ)" "ὐ$ὴ+ 'ἶ+"2 (5) ἕN2+ ἀ07&ῆ <'$ὰ 0ό5-8 ,)"!$2!ὴ+ 
,')ὶ $ὰ ἀ+&)ώ,ῳ ἀ5"&ὰ !"ὶ !"!ά. 
This definition is somewhat surprising at this stage of the argument, since 
the connection with what precedes is not obvious. The notion of deliberation does 
not appear in the definition, although Aristotle uses deliberation as a first way to 
describe the activity of the phronimos, and one does not see at once how phronêsis 
differs from epistêmê and technê. Besides, the mention of the 'things good and bad 
for human beings' seem to pop up out of nowhere. I contend that lines 1140a31-b1, 
that stand immediately before the first occurrence of the definition of phronêsis, are 
a mere recollection of opposition between phronêsis and both epistêmê and technê 
that should be clear by now. Such contrasts should not be thought as providing a 
further development. First of all, the contrast between phronêsis and epistêmê has 
already been dealt with. Indeed, epistêmê deals with necessary things, whereas con-
tingent things are related to the practical part of the soul (1139b19-23; see also 
1139a6-15 (text 9)). Concerning poiêsis, Aristotle clearly stated that contingent things 
are divided into those that can be produced (poiêta) and those that can be done 
(prakta) (EN VI.4 1140a1-2). Thus, one should not expect the definition of phronêsis 
as 1140b4-6 to complete a preceding line of argumentation, despite the logical con-
                                                      
80 Correspondingly, the definition of technê is "hexis meta logou alêthous poiêtikê": a disposition 
which follows a true reason and which results in production (EN VI.4 1140a10; a20-21). 
81 Reading alêthê at both b5 and b21, along with Bywater. I do not follow the variant of man-
uscripts Mb and  that read alêthous at b21. See explanations below. 
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nector 'ara'82. Rather, elements of the definition of phronêsis ought to be present in 
what follows the first statement of it. 
What is more important, though, is that the definition of phronêsis does not 
appear to fulfil the requirements settled in EN VI.2 concerning the function of the 
practical part of the soul. The function of this part has been described as practical 
truth, and I have interpreted it as correct decision-making. Then, at the end of EN 
VI.5, Aristotle argues that phronêsis is the virtue of the practical part of the soul. 
Consequently, it should be characterized by this function, as the virtue of practical 
truth. Yet, this feature is not obvious in the definition of phronêsis. Thus, in what 
follows, I shall show that the definition of phronêsis is fully appropriate, although 
surprising, and that it is consistent with the function of the practical part of the soul 
as laid down in EN VI.2. 
Given that one should not understand the first statement of the definition of 
phronêsis as a consequence of what precedes, some elements in the definition make 
in fact quite a lot of sense. First, that phronêsis is a hexis praktikê stresses well the con-
trast with technê, which is a hexis poiêtikê, since praxis is the counterpart of poiêsis. 
Had Aristotle made up his definition from his first approximation of phronêsis in 
terms of being able to deliberate (a 'hexis bouleutikê'), the contrast would not have 
been made so clearly. Besides, defining phronêsis as a hexis bouleutikê would not em-
phasize the effectiveness of phronêsis enough. The phronimos person is not just able 
to deliberate well, since his deliberation might remain pure wishful thinking with-
out any intention of putting one's result into practice. Speaking of a hexis praktikê 
instead underlines the fact that the phronimos is also an effective agent who is able 
to realize his projects.83 
A puzzling point of the definition of phronêsis is the 'true state' part. Speak-
ing of a hexis as true is apparently mistaken, since truth and falsity are usually at-
tributed to propositions, namely statements in which something is said of something 
else (DI 16a12-13; Meta. 1011b26-7). Passages EN VI.5 1140b4-6 and 20-21 (text 12) 
are the only ones in the whole corpus where the phrase 'true state' occurs. Moreo-
ver, when Aristotle defines the intellectual virtue of technê, he uses a similar form of 
definition, speaking of technê as a "hexis meta logou alêthous " (1140a10; 21). Hence, 
                                                      
82 Denniston notes that in Aristotle ἄ)" has become a pure connective particle (Denniston 
1954: 41). However, one could suppose that now and then Aristotle also uses this particle 
with a slightly different, and more archaic, function, namely that of denoting "the apprehen-
sion of an idea not before envisaged", especially in reported speech (Denniston 1954: 38), 
which would still be in use in Plato. 
83 On the meaning of praktikos in EN VI-VII, see §3.3.2.3. 
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for the sake of terminological coherence, many commentators have read alêthous 
instead of alêthês in the definition of phronêsis.84  
However, I do not follow this reading and consider that Aristotle does speak 
of a 'true hexis'. Indeed, Aristotle sometimes offers a non-propositional meaning of 
alêthês. He sometimes uses 'true' in the sense of 'truthful', when speaking of people: 
'true man' (ho alêthês) means 'truthful man'.85 This use of alêthês could be justified by 
Aristotle's doctrine of the plurality of attributions (to pollachôs legesthai). For in-
stance, at Metaphysics IV.2, Aristotle explains that something can be called healthy if 
it somehow relates to health. However, there are different ways to relate to it: pro-
moting health, producing health, being a sign for health, or being prone to be 
healthy, etc. (Meta. IV.2 1003a33-b1). Occurrences of 'true man' or 'false man' seem 
to follow the same idea. The subject described as alêthês is so not because it verifies 
what is the case in the world, but because it is related to truth in another way. A 
'true' man is simply a person who speaks the truth. This use of alêthês seems to hold 
for hexis at 1140b4-6 as well. A hexis of the kind of phronêsis is said to be 'true', not in 
the proper sense of 'true', but because it is a state in virtue of which one asserts the 
truth.86 This interpretation is consistent with Aristotle's earlier characterization of 
intellectual states as states "thanks to which the soul speaks the truth by asserting 
or denying".87 A 'true hexis' would therefore be a short formulation for this kind of 
state.88 
Aristotle's definition of phronêsis is not as surprising as it first looks. In fact, 
it could very well be composed of these two elements only: being praktikos and be-
ing a true state. Phronêsis would then be defined as a 'true hexis conducive to action'. 
Thus, such a definition would show a nice and clean symmetry with the definition 
                                                      
84 Alexander of Aphrodisias In Meta. ad 981b25: I.7; Eustratus (312); Robert Grosseteste, see 
Gauthier and Jolif 1970: 461. 
85 EN II.7 1108a20; EE III.7 1233b38; see also MM I.33 1193a33; Rhet. III.19 1419b14. By con-
trast, at Metaphysics V.29, he speaks of a “false man", i.e. a man who is fond of false logoi and 
who tends to deceive others (1025a1ff.). 
86 For a similar interpretation, see Gauthier and Jolif 1970: 461. 
87 1139b15-16: ἔ@$( Cὴ -ἷ3 ἀ07&'ύ'2 ἡ m89ὴ $ῷ !"$">ά+"2 ἢ ἀ,->ά+"2.  
88 Should we then see a substantial difference between $έ9+7 and >)ό+7@23, which are de-
scribed respectively as being "a state following true reason" and "true state following rea-
son"? The alêthous reading seems to suggest that the norm for decision, the orthos logos, is 
given by something other than phronêsis itself. One solution would be that $έ9+7 does not 
set its rules by itself, whereas >)ό+7@23 does (Gauthier & Jolif). Volpi (1993: 477) finds it 
significant that Aristotle does not use the same formula to define technê and phronêsis. Ac-
cording to him, Aristotle speaks of a true hexis instead of a true logos because he wants to 
insist that in the case of phronêsis what must be correct is not a logos but a state. This is an 
interesting suggestion, but it cannot be confirmed. 
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of technê, and also with that of epistêmê. Still, Aristotle is not content with these and 
feels the need to add a further element, namely the specification of the objects of 
phronêsis. Phronêsis is about the 'good and bad for human beings'.  
Here I contend that the remaining text of EN VI.5 offers two arguments of 
why this is so.89 First, Aristotle comes back to the contrast between phronêsis and 
technê.  
13) For the end of production is something distinct <from the produc-
tive process>, whereas the end of action will not be <distinct from 
the process>, for doing well (eupraxia) itself is the end. It is for this 
reason that we think that Pericles and people of that sort are 
phronimoi – because they are able to see (theôrein) what is good for 
themselves and what is good for human beings in general. And 
we think that such people are good at managing property 
(oikonomikous) and at politics (politikous). EN VI.5 1140b6-11 
$ῆ3 <ὲ+ 5ὰ) ,-2ή@'(3 ἕ$')-+ $ὸ $έ0-3, $ῆ3 Cὲ ,)άN'(3 -ὐ! ἂ+ 
'ἴ7· ἔ@$2 5ὰ) "ὐ$ὴ ἡ 'ὐ,)"Nί" $έ0-3. C2ὰ $-ῦ$- ')2!0έ" !"ὶ 
$-ὺ3 $-2-ύ$-83 >)-+ί<-83 -ἰό<'&" 'ἶ+"2, ὅ$2 $ὰ "ὑ$-ῖ3 ἀ5"&ὰ 
!"ὶ $ὰ $-ῖ3 ἀ+&)ώ,-23 Cύ+"+$"2 (10) &'()'ῖ+· 'ἶ+"2 Cὲ 
$-2-ύ$-83 ἡ5-ύ<'&" $-ὺ3 -ἰ!-+-<2!-ὺ3 !"ὶ $-ὺ3 ,-02$2!-ύ3.  
As already said, phronêsis differs from technê insofar as praxis differs from 
poiêsis, that is, they differ in the structure of their respective activity. The end of a 
process of poiêsis is something that is distinct from the process, whereas the end of a 
praxis is the activity itself. There is no further end beyond the activity. Now, Aristo-
tle specifies here that the end of phronêsis is not merely praxis but the more general 
eupraxia, i.e. doing well (which, according to Aristotle, is synonymous with eudai-
monia)90. This is a significant addition, because a particular praxis, when virtuous, is 
constitutive of eupraxia. A single instance of a virtuous action is an actualisation of 
happiness.91 So, Aristotle considers that a successful praxis is not merely successful 
in an instrumental or prudential way, but in a moral way, by promoting eudaimonia. 
When we perform a praxis, we do it both for its own sake, rather than for some fur-
ther goal (the product), and for the sake of the ultimate end, which is eupraxia, or 
eudaimonia. The example of Pericles confirms that having eupraxia as one's overarch-
ing goal involves having a grasp of things good and bad for human beings. There-
                                                      
89 I have been struck in my research by how commentators do not read the passage between 
both statements of the definition of phronêsis according to the context. Commentators often 
use this passage in order to show that phronêsis has a grasp of universals. Doing so, howev-
er, they disregard the actual point Aristotle is making. 
90 See note 37. 
91 See Natali 2001: 20, 119-120. 
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fore, the mention of eupraxia explains why the objects of phronêsis are not merely 
'things that can be done' in general (ta prakta), but things that are either good or bad 
for human beings. To say that phronêsis would be about any object of action (to prak-
ton) would not be sufficient for it to be the virtue of the practical part of the soul. 
Then, in a second argument, Aristotle makes the same point by using a 
pseudo-etymology of temperance (sôphrosunê):  14) That is also why (enthen) we give temperance (sôphrosunê) its 
name, as something that preserves phronêsis (sozei tên phronêsin). 
And it does preserve the following sort of belief (hupolêpsis). What 
is pleasant and painful does not corrupt, or distort, every sort of 
belief, – e.g. that the internal angles of a triangle do or do not add 
up to two right angles –, but only beliefs about things doable 
(prakton). For the starting points of things doable are constituted 
by the things that the things doable are for the sake of [i.e. the 
ends of ta prakta]; and to the one that has been corrupted through 
pleasure or pain, there doesn't immediately seem to be a starting 
point, nor does it seem that he should choose and do everything 
for this reason and because of this – for badness is corruptive of 
the starting points. From all this, necessarily, phronêsis is a state 
accompanied by reason which is true, which is about the good 
and bad things for humans, and which is conducive to action." EN 
VI.5 1140b11-21	  
ἔ+&'+ !"ὶ $ὴ+ @(>)-@ύ+7+ $-ύ$ῳ ,)-@"5-)'ύ-<'+ $ῷ 
ὀ+ό<"$2, ὡ3 @ῴ`-8@"+ $ὴ+ >)ό+7@2+. @ῴ`'2 Cὲ $ὴ+ $-2"ύ$7+ 
ὑ,ό07m2+. -ὐ 5ὰ) ἅ,"@"+ ὑ,ό07m2+ C2">&'ί)'2 -ὐCὲ 
C2"@$)έ>'2 $ὸ ἡCὺ !"ὶ 08,7)ό+, -ἷ-+ ὅ$2 $ὸ (15) $)ί5(+-+ Cύ- 
ὀ)&ὰ3 ἔ9'2 ἢ -ὐ! ἔ9'2, ἀ00ὰ $ὰ3 ,')ὶ $ὸ ,)"!$ό+. "ἱ <ὲ+ 5ὰ) 
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Aristotle takes the same etymology as Plato in the Cratylus (411e). Here Ar-
istotle considers a part of phronêsis, namely a certain kind of belief (hupolêpsis). That 
sôphrosunê preserves phronêsis (sôzei tên phronêsin) suggests indeed that sôphrosunê 
preserves a belief of a certain kind. Aristotle distinguishes kinds of belief that are 
affected by pleasure and pain from those that are not. It seems clear, indeed, that 
propositions about geometrical states of affairs – and probably every scientific 
claim more generally – are not affected by pleasure and pain. My belief that all hu-
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mans are mammals will similarly not be affected by my emotional state.92 By con-
trast, the kind of belief liable to get disturbed by non-rational feelings are those 
about things that can be done, that is, contingent things that are up to us (ta prakta). 
Temperance preserves my beliefs about things doable, but on the contrary, if I get 
overwhelmed by pleasure or pain, then these beliefs are not preserved. 
But Aristotle goes further. He adds remarks on the 'starting points of things 
doable' (hai archai tôn praktôn). They are characterized as being that for the sake of 
which we do the prakta, that is, they are the reasons why we do such or such actions. 
And the starting points do not appear to people that have been corrupted by pleas-
ure or pain, at least not immediately (euthus). A person so corrupted does not see 
that he should choose everything and act for the sake of such starting points. So, 
my understanding of the passage is that sôphrosunê, by preserving phronêsis, pre-
serves judgements about practical things, on the one hand, as well as one's repre-
sentation of the starting points of those things, on the other.93 Aristotle calls the 
starting points 'that for the sake of which the prakta are' (to hou heneka ta prakta), i.e. 
the ends of the things we do. Now, in Aristotle's conception of the hierarchy of ac-
tion types, the end of an action must ultimately be something valuable. Everything 
we do, we do for the sake of some good or for some apparent good. Obviously, the 
end of a virtuous action done for its own sake is a real good. Thus, in Aristotle's 
view, it is not sufficient to say that phronêsis is about the prakton, because grasping 
the prakton alone does not imply a grasp on the ends of practical reasoning.94 If 
phronêsis had only to prakton as its objects, it would not have a grasp on the starting 
point and sôphrosunê would not be significantly different from badness (kakia). 
Thus, right after he states his definition of phronêsis, Aristotle offers an ex-
planation why phronêsis is not just about any object of praxis in general, but about 
things good and bad for human beings. Besides, if the definition of phronêsis was in 
terms of being praktikê about to prakton, it would not be very informative. Note that 
the definition of phronêsis is in fact the only one which includes a mention of its ob-
ject, by contrast to the definitions of technê and epistêmê. 
To sum up, an analysis of the definition of phronêsis at 1140b4-6 shows that it 
comprises the determination of phronêsis as the state which makes virtuous deci-
sions, which results from my interpretation of the function of the practical part of 
                                                      
92 Yet, Broadie mentions the case where a scientist has his view distorted by his desire of 
fame or money; Broadie & Rowe 2002: 368. 
93 Hence, phronêsis involves both states: judgements on practical things as well as moral 
principles, see EN VI.7 1141b14-16. I shall tackle this important passage in §3.3.2.3 and §4.2. 
94 However, as I shall show in §5.2.2, this does not mean that phronêsis involves an intellectu-
al or rational grasp of the end. 
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the soul. Being a disposition about the good and the bad for human beings includes 
being about things doable. Being a truthful disposition is consistent with the re-
quirement of an intellectual virtue that always speaks the truth. Finally, being a 
hexis praktikê includes deliberation. More generally, one can characterize phronêsis as 
the virtue of excellent decision-making.95 
This interpretation of the function of phronêsis involves a restricted concep-
tion of praxis. In its widest sense, the notion of praxis does not involve deliberation. I 
can act voluntarily without having deliberated about what I should do (EN III.2 
1111b6-10). However, the notion of praxis at work in the definition of phronêsis 
should be understood in a restricted way, as an action that has been deliberated. 
Here my interpretation of the function of practical reason as being decision-making 
helps. If phronêsis is the virtue of the practical part of the soul, then it is also the dis-
position in the soul that fulfils the function of that part most excellently. This im-
plies that the kind of action Aristotle is thinking of in the definition of phronêsis 
must be decided action, and thereby deliberated action, since every decided action 
has been deliberated. According to Aristotle, the scope of decision and practical 
reason concerns primarily significant decisions in life rather than trivial questions, 
such as what I should wear today (pace Owens 1991: 145). There are some elements 
in Aristotle which show that. Aristotle notes that we do not deliberate whether this 
bread is cooked as it should be (EN III.3 1113a1). Also, the object of one's action, 
which is also the object of decision (proairesis), is always chosen for its own sake 
(1105a31-32). This excludes daily actions and worries as the object of proairesis, for 
obviously I do not choose to wear my Mickey Mouse T-shirt for its own sake, but 
rather as a means to something else (my looking good, or boasting in front of oth-
ers).  
But is this notion of phronêsis as the virtue of the practical part of the soul 
consistent with the larger requirement of Aristotle's ethics, namely the notion of 
practical knowledge? 
2.6 Is phronêsis practical knowledge? 
I have constructed an implicit notion of practical knowledge from the first 
part of the EN which is characterized by its function. Practical knowledge is a kind 
of knowledge that differs from knowing-that in that it grasps the means to be 
achieved in a situation (§2.3). In spite of this important function, Aristotle does not 
elaborate on this meaning of practical knowledge, at least not in the usual terms of 
                                                      
95 For a similar characterization of phronêsis as the disposition for virtuous choice, see also 
Engberg-Pedersen 1983: 163; Natali 2001: 19; Taylor 2008: 206. 
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gnôsis or epistêmê. Now, although he never explicitly defines phronêsis in terms of 
practical knowledge, Aristotle seems to do so implicitly. I have construed the func-
tion of phronêsis as taking virtuous decisions. Such a function corresponds indeed to 
attaining the mean, which is the function proper to practical knowledge I have out-
lined. Virtue of character consists in an intermediacy between excess and efficiency 
and is realized in actions which achieve such an intermediacy. 
However, the identification of phronêsis with practical knowledge might 
surprise us, because the description of phronêsis does not fit our usual conception of 
the form of knowledge. Nowadays, we usually conceive an episode of knowledge as 
a belief of a certain kind, that is, a cognitive state with a propositional content. Yet, 
Aristotle does not clearly introduce phronêsis in this way. It is true that on some 
occasions he assimilates phronêsis to a kind of belief (hupolêpsis – 1140b12-13; 
1142b33), but he does not explicitly mention instances of phronetic judgement that 
could be subject to epistemic evaluation as true or false. Aristotle does not speak in 
terms of 'knowing that' or 'thinking that' in the case of phronêsis. He does not use 
expressions such as 'phronein hoti' + object. Phronêsis is also related to a process of 
thinking. Aristotle holds that the phronimos achieves his ergon, his proper function, 
by deliberating well (kalôs bouleusasthai 1140a26; eu bouleusasthai 1141b9-10). Delib-
eration is an intellectual process of thinking or reasoning. By contrast, knowledge of 
what to do corresponds to a cognitive state, i.e. a mental episode which is not a pro-
cess. 
There is a need to agree about what one means by knowledge here. First of 
all, knowledge is not conceived as 'justified true belief', as the more recent – 'Carte-
sian' – tradition has it. Rather, the range of cognitive states relevant in ancient epis-
temology is wider than mere knowledge understood as justified true belief 
(Everson 1990: 5). The best known instance of a kind of knowledge which does not 
amount to our notion of knowledge is Aristotle's 'scientific knowledge' (epistêmê), 
which does not only correspond to a kind of knowledge that P, but also involves 
understanding why P.96 Phronêsis is a cognitive state close to epistêmê. As a virtue, 
phronêsis is a 'state' of the soul, a hexis (1106a11-12).  
A hexis is a state of the soul which can be subject to evaluation, by contrast 
to a mere capacity (dunamis) or a passion (pathos) (EN II.5 1105b19-28).97 At EN II.5, 
when Aristotle introduces the notion of hexis, he defines it in the following way.  
                                                      
96 On the difference between the modern knowledge as justified true belief and the ancient 
knowledge as understanding, see below, p. 81. 
97 For hexis as a state subject to evaluation, see Hutchinson 1986: 8-13. Note that having a 
value is not part of the essence of a hexis. It is rather a necessary property. I thank Susan 
Sauvé Meyer and Richard King for having made me aware of this point. 
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15) "Dispositions (hexis) are that in virtue of which we are well or bad-
ly disposed towards affections; for instance, if I tend to get angry 
either too much or too little, I am badly disposed towards anger, 
while if I tend to get angry moderately, I am well disposed" EN 
II.5 1105b25-28 
(25) ἕN'23 Cὲ !"&’ ἃ3 ,)ὸ3 $ὰ ,ά&7 ἔ9-<'+ 'ὖ ἢ !"!ῶ3, -ἷ-+ 
,)ὸ3 $ὸ ὀ)52@&ῆ+"2, 'ἰ <ὲ+ @>-C)ῶ3 ἢ ἀ+'2<έ+(3, !"!ῶ3 
ἔ9-<'+, 'ἰ Cὲ <έ@(3, 'ὖ· 
This notion of hexis is close to the notion of capacity, but it differs from the 
latter in that one can ascribe a value to it. A capacity is the mere ability to be subject 
to a certain affection. For instance, if I am capable of anger, it means that I am so 
built that I am able to feel anger. By contrast, a disposition is the feature thanks to 
which I actualize this capacity, but in a qualified way, as well or badly. To be well 
disposed towards anger – i.e. neither too much, nor too little – is to have a good 
hexis for feeling anger, which Aristotle calls mildness (praotês). In the case of intel-
lectual hexeis, it seems that they are liable to a similar sort of evaluation, yet epistem-
ic evaluation this time. Aristotle says for instance that epistêmê is always true, 
whereas doxa can be true or false (DA III.3 428a16-19). Thus, although intellectual 
states are not concerned with passions as hexeis of character are, what characterizes 
them is the ability to be evaluated in terms of truth and falsehood.98 Intellectual 
hexeis are the sorts of disposition thanks to which an agent is disposed to say true or 
false propositions. Indeed, when Aristotle starts his inquiry for the virtues of both 
rational parts of the soul, he first enumerates hexeis of the soul thanks to which we 
speak truly or falsely (EN VI.3 1139b15-16). One ought to distinguish therefore be-
tween phronêsis as a disposition and the statements which are asserted by phronêsis. 
According to my interpretation such statements are episodes of decision. Practical 
knowledge can be understood in both ways. Either it is a disposition for correct 
decision and is thereby identical to phronêsis, or it is a particular instance of cogni-
tion, which is identical to decision.99 
                                                      
98 Moreover, intellectual virtues do not consist in a mean between excess and deficiency. It is 
not possible to be excessively disposed toward truth. 
99 It might be the case that Aristotle is ambiguous about hexis, and that the term refers both 
to a disposition and to an actual instance of cognition. Indeed, epistêmê and doxa are hexeis, 
but they also are said to be subject to epistemic evaluation (epistêmê is true; doxa can be true 
or false). Similarly, phronêsis is sometimes identified with a hupolêpsis, which is true 
(1142b33). The ambiguity of the term hexis is palpable at Meta. V.20, where a hexis is defined 
both as a kind of activity (energeia 1022b4) and as a kind of 'disposition' (diathesis), in the 
sense of an arrangement of parts in a definite form (Meta. V.19 1022b1-3). 
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Speaking of phronêsis as practical knowledge also requires some clarifica-
tions for another reason. What I mean with practical knowledge can be mistaken for 
other kinds of knowledge relevant in practical or moral situations. First, phronêsis 
should not be identified with Aristotle's conception of ethical inquiry, although 
they share some common features. What I call ethical inquiry in Aristotle is the 
kind of study he does in both his Ethics. It is a methodos (1094b11) and in other 
works he refers to it as êthikoi logoi (e.g. Meta. 981b25; Pol. 1261a31; 1280a18) or êthikê 
theôria (APo 89b9). The connection between practical knowledge and ethical inquiry 
is strong. They both have the good life as an end. The aim of ethical inquiry is not 
knowledge, but being virtuous (EN II.2 1103b26-31; X.9 1179b1-5; EE 1216b19-25, 
text (4)).100 However, ethical inquiry and phronêsis do not share exactly the same 
aim. The purpose of phronêsis is actual action, whereas the aim of ethical inquiry is a 
more abstract notion of becoming virtuous and of being happy. Such an end is not 
proper to one individual or particular to a definite action, but is general and could 
be applied to any individual. Aristotle seems to be aware of this distinction of pur-
pose when he mentions 'architectonic phronêsis' at EN VI.8 1141b23-28: 
16) Political expertise and wisdom are the same disposition, but their 
being is not the same. Of the disposition as it relates to the city, the 
one wisdom as 'architectonic' is legislative expertise, while the 
other at the level of particulars is given the generic name 'political 
expertise', and this one is practical and deliberative, since a decree 
is something to be acted upon, as it is last in the process. EN VI.8 
1141b23-28 
Ἔ@$2 Cὲ !"ὶ ἡ ,-02$2!ὴ !"ὶ ἡ >)ό+7@23 ἡ "ὐ$ὴ <ὲ+ ἕN23, $ὸ 
<έ+$-2 'ἶ+"2 -ὐ $"ὐ$ὸ+ "ὐ$"ῖ3. $ῆ3 Cὲ ,')ὶ (25) ,ό02+ ἣ <ὲ+ ὡ3 
ἀ)92$'!$-+2!ὴ >)ό+7@23 +-<-&'$2!ή, ἣ Cὲ ὡ3 $ὰ !"&’ ἕ!"@$" $ὸ 
!-2+ὸ+ ἔ9'2 ὄ+-<", ,-02$2!ή· "ὕ$7 Cὲ ,)"!$2!ὴ !"ὶ /-80'8$2!ή· 
$ὸ 5ὰ) mή>2@<" ,)"!$ὸ+ ὡ3 $ὸ ἔ@9"$-+.  
One form of phronêsis is identified as the activity of legislation, whereas the 
other one is identified with decision-making, although at a political level. Then, 
clearly, even though ethical inquiry is directed towards a practical goal, it has a 
sub-goal which is descriptive, and this purpose is alien to phronêsis as mere deci-
sion-making. Moreover, ethical inquiry and phronêsis do not share the same princi-
ples. The former as a discipline has its principles in the endoxa and in this respect is 
not different from other sciences (Barnes 1980; Irwin 1981). On the contrary, 
                                                      
100 In this sense, Aristotelian ethical inquiry is also distinct from modern ethical theory, 
whose primary concerns are not practical, namely the study of the truth of ethical state-
ments. 
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phronêsis draws its principles from the agent's character and in the best case from 
his virtue (as I shall argue in chap. 5).101 What I am interested in, then, is the aspect 
of phronêsis which is centred on the moment of decision. 
Also, phronêsis is not the same as modern 'moral knowledge', i.e. knowledge 
about moral values and norms. As I intend to show (chap. 3), phronêsis includes 
such knowledge but not this alone. A crucial feature of phronêsis is the ability to 
implement a concrete action from the consideration of a general moral end. More 
generally, my description of phronêsis as practical knowledge should be distin-
guished from modern ethical theory, which is above all descriptive and which aims 
at defining moral notions such as values or moral obligations. Phronêsis as practical 
knowledge is normative in that its purpose is to perform virtuous actions. It is a 
cognitive state engaged in action, whereas ethical science today is a body of 
knowledge and none of the contents of such an ethical theory can be an immediate 
cause of virtuous action. 
2.7 Conclusion 
From a common conception of what is required for the good life, Aristotle 
develops a framework for virtuous action. Indeed, the good life is realized in virtu-
ous action. In order to perform virtuous actions, the notion of a target is required. 
And this target requires in turn some knowledge of what it is. Unlike Plato, Aristo-
tle does not see in the target some model of virtuous action which would be availa-
ble thanks to intellectual cognitions of the Forms. Rather, the target is the particular 
action itself. Consequently, the kind of knowledge required is not knowledge of 
some transcendent models, but knowledge of how to implement some action suc-
cessfully. Aristotle's conception of knowledge at work in practical matters is there-
fore eminently practical, i.e. directed at the performance of actions. Ultimately, such 
knowledge is about a particular action itself and its content is the description of 
such an action. 
I have argued that the elaboration of the notion of phronêsis is Aristotle an-
swers to the requirements of such an idea of practical knowledge. As the virtue of 
the practical part of the soul, phronêsis has virtuous decision as its function, and 
virtuous decision is precisely what enables one to 'attain the mean', i.e. to imple-
ment a virtuous action. 
Phronêsis has various aspects: it can be understood as a disposition for prac-
tical knowledge, but also as a kind of architectonic intellectual virtue by reference 
                                                      
101 On these matters, see also Anagnostopoulos 1994, §3.2-3; and Natali 2001:31. 
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to which all activities of one's life are organized. The kind of phronêsis I am interest-
ed in is phronêsis as a disposition for correct decision. I take it that practical 
knowledge consists in correct decision and is thereby the result of the activity of 
phronêsis. In this sense, Aristotle's notion of practical knowledge should not be mis-
taken with other forms of knowledge concerned with practice. It is not the same as 
Aristotelian ethical inquiry, nor is it equivalent to our modern notion of moral 
knowledge of values and norms. 
Finally, as Aristotle introduces phronêsis in a context where he has shown 
that practice is also subject to rational thinking, this leaves open the possibility for 
practical knowledge to be evaluated in terms of truth. What I propose to do in the 
rest of this work is therefore to study the epistemic conditions for practical 
knowledge. 

 CHAPTER 3 
3 The rational structure of practical knowledge 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2, I introduced practical knowledge as an aspect of phronêsis. 
Phronêsis as a hexis refers to a disposition to make correct decision. An episode of 
practical knowledge corresponds to the actualization of phronêsis. Moreover, the 
psychological state in which practical knowledge is actualized is decision 
(proairesis). A particular virtuous decision is also an instance of practical 
knowledge. Another significant aspect of this discussion of phronêsis is that Aristo-
tle makes room for rationality in the practical realm. Aristotle argues against Plato 
that the domain of contingent things is the object of rational consideration, just like 
the theoretical domain of necessary truths, and that there can be expertise and 
knowledge in this area, too. Correspondingly, phronêsis is not mere guessing or in-
tuition but a disposition for practical knowledge in a strong sense.  
If there is indeed practical knowledge, it must be possible to state the epis-
temic conditions of such knowledge. What exactly are these conditions? Aristotle 
has an extensive theory of what makes the kind of knowledge proper to the theoret-
ical realm, i.e. epistêmê. He devotes the entirety of the Posterior Analytics to the de-
scription of epistêmê. However, there is no parallel treatise about practical 
knowledge, or so it seems. Still, I contend that one can use Aristotle's account of 
epistêmê in order to elaborate an epistemology of phronêsis.102 Theoretical knowledge 
consists in syllogistic argument, the 'demonstration' (apodeixis), and the study of its 
properties enables one to understand how a given assertion can be an instance of 
epistêmê. Practical thought shows striking similarities with its theoretical counter-
part. Both the theoretical and the practical parts of the soul have truth as their func-
                                                      
102 Besides, in EN VI, Aristotle starts his search for the intellectual virtues of the practical and 
the theoretical parts of the soul with epistêmê. At 1139b27, he alludes to the Posterior Analyt-
ics, which could mean that he had already written this treatise, or at least that he already 
had substantial notes on the subject. At any rate, he already has an account of theoretical 
reason that provides him with a starting point for developing his account of practical rea-
son. 
Another Kind of Knowledge. Aristotle's Phronesis from an Epistemological Point of View 
 72 
tion, even though it is a specific kind of truth in each case (EN VI.2 1139b12, see 
§2.4.3). Practical reason is sometimes described by means of analogies with theoret-
ical reason: positing the goal of practical reason as the starting point is similar to 
positing the 'hypothesis' (hupothesis) in mathematical inquiry (EE II.10 1227a9-10; 
b28-30; EN 1151a16-17). Moreover, Aristotle uses syllogistic terminology to speak of 
practical reasoning. He sometimes speaks of sullogismos (1142b22-23; 1144a31-32), of 
practical principles (archai tôn praktôn – EN 1140b16-17; praktikai archai 1144a34-35) 
akin to the principles of a theoretical syllogism, of one premise (tês heteras protaseôs 
1143b3) and of the 'conclusion' of practical reasoning (sumperanthen EN VII.3 
1147a25-28).  
It is true that Aristotle also uses another model to speak of the structure of 
practical thought, that of deliberation (bouleusis). He describes deliberation as a 
kind of inquiry (zêtêsis, EN III.3 1112b22). Deliberation as a process of inquiry and 
demonstration as a logical argument are difficult to put together. Scholars once 
held that deliberation has a syllogistic structure,103 but this is highly controversial 
and has since been convincingly rejected by Nussbaum (1978, Essay 4, esp. p. 205). 
A more recent approach has attempted to sever Aristotle's account of practical 
thought from any connection to a syllogistic form of thought (Broadie 1991; 
Corcilius 2008a). 
Notwithstanding, I contend that Aristotle conceives the epistemic conditions 
for practical knowledge on the model of theoretical rationality. This claim relies on 
the assumption that reasoning in Aristotle can be described in two distinct ways. 
First, there is a description of reasoning as an actual process of thought, namely 
thinking proper conceived in its temporality. But there is also a formal description 
of reasoning in terms of an argument. In my view, Aristotle has two different ac-
counts of theoretical reason corresponding to this distinction. If it is true that he 
specifies the conditions of epistêmê in terms of apodeixis, he also has an account of 
theoretical knowledge as inquiry, namely as the search for the middle term. I argue 
that the same holds in the case of practical reason. On the one hand, practical 
thought is exercised in the form of deliberative thinking and its structure is similar 
to that of theoretical inquiry. On the other hand, practical reason is actualized in the 
form of practical knowledge, which is a cognitive state whose structure is modelled 
on that of theoretical knowledge, that is, of epistêmê.104 Both ways of describing rea-
son are compatible, for they do not have the same purpose. Reasoning as a process 
is the actual procedure by which one arrives at a definite claim, whereas reason as 
                                                      
103 Greenwood 1909: 50-51; Joachim 1951: 208-210; Ando 1958: 221; Mele 1981: 282. 
104 For a similar account, see Allen forthcoming: 7, who sees both kinds of reason as inquir-
ies that aim at the discovery of syllogisms. 
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argument aims at the evaluation of such a claim. In the case of theoretical reason, 
the claim arrived at can be evaluated epistemically, that is, in terms of whether the 
subject really knows what he is asserting.105 In the case of practical reason, however, 
the claim under consideration is in fact the content of a decision and is primarily 
evaluated in moral terms, i.e. in terms of the good or the bad. 
This chapter will be devoted to showing that reason in Aristotle can be de-
scribed as a process and as an argument, and that this holds for both theoretical and 
practical reason. I shall begin by introducing epistêmê as a cognitive state and de-
scribing its logical structure. Then I shall show that although he says less about it, 
Aristotle also has an account of theoretical thought as a process of investigation. 
This will help in distinguishing the relevance of speaking of theoretical thought 
respectively as a state or as a process. I shall then apply the distinction to practical 
thought. In my view, practical thought can be described from two distinct points of 
views. On the one hand, there is practical thought as a process of deliberation, i.e. a 
search for the means to the end. On the other hand, there is practical thought as an 
argument which is included in the decision to act and which is a logical representa-
tion of the agent's practical thought. 
Talking of practical reason in syllogistic terms inevitably leads to the men-
tion of the so-called 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism is a figure of Aris-
totelian philosophy which has been elaborated from Aristotle's remarks on practical 
reason, but which is not explicitly developed by Aristotle himself. The usual ac-
count of the practical syllogism draws from material as diverse as the De Motu An-
imalium and the De Anima, as well as books VI and VII of the EN. In this chapter, I 
shall restrict my inquiry to EN VI. I shall argue that in the context of the account of 
practical thought and phronêsis one may speak of a practical syllogism in a loose 
sense, that is, in terms much weaker than what has usually been attributed to Aris-
totle. The practical syllogism is an argument which justifies an agent's decision, but 
                                                      
105 Now I also should say some words on 'evaluation'. As already said, an evaluative propo-
sition is such that it asserts some value to an object. Such value can consist in being good or 
bad, right or wrong, success of failure, in short any predicate which provides an extra quali-
ty to this object, which exceeds the sum of its parts. In this work, two specific kinds of eval-
uation are especially significant. First, I shall speak of moral evaluation, that is, a value 
judgement that asserts an extra quality to an object in terms of good or bad. More specifical-
ly in the present context, the subjects of moral evaluation are decisions to act and the actions 
themselves. Thus, moral evaluation aims at answering the question: Did he make the right 
decision? Then, I shall introduce the notion of epistemic evaluation. Epistemic evaluation is 
directed towards cognitions in particular. It amounts to determine whether a subject having 
a certain cognition of an object has indeed knowledge of this object. The question answered 
in this case is the following: Does the agent count as knowing what to do? 
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it has nothing to do with the process of deliberation or with an alternative to delib-
eration. 
This chapter will also focus on questions of structure of thinking and there-
fore the discussion may seem rather abstract. However, I shall turn to the content of 
practical thought in the following chapters. In particular, in this chapter, I shall in-
sist that the evaluation of practical knowledge is made in moral terms. In the fol-
lowing chapters, especially chap. 5, I shall also argue that the practical argument 
which justifies a decision to act also constitutes a tool in order to evaluate a decision 
epistemically. 
3.2 The structure of theoretical thought 
In this section, I develop a double account of theoretical reason as an argu-
ment and as a process. I shall then apply the results of this section to practical rea-
son. 
3.2.1 Theoretical thought as epistêmê 
Epistêmê is defined in the Nicomachean Ethics as a hexis apodeiktikê, i.e. a dis-
position to demonstration (EN VI.3 1139b31). Demonstration (apodeixis) is intro-
duced in the Posterior Analytics as a particular kind of syllogism (APo I.2 71b17-18) 
which is characterized as having especially demanding conditions: its premises 
have to be “true, first to come, immediate, better known than the conclusion, prior 
to it and cause of it”.106 Two further conditions are added to this: its premises have 
to be necessary and universal (APo I.4-6). 
The cognate verb of epistêmê, epistasthai, means therefore to entertain or to 
perform a demonstration. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle presents the following 
description of what it is to epistasthai: "For when someone somehow believes some-
thing, and the principles [of this thing] are familiar to him, then he knows demon-
stratively."107 To know something demonstratively is to believe, or to be convinced 
of (pôs pisteuê), something and at the same time to be somehow acquainted (gnôri-
mos) with the principles (archai) of that thing. A similar account is found in the Pos-
terior Analytics: "We think we know something demonstratively (epistasthai) [...] 
                                                      
106 APo I.2 71b20-22: ἐN ἀ07&ῶ+ $’ 'ἶ+"2 !"ὶ ,)ώ$(+ !"ὶ ἀ<έ@(+ !"ὶ 5+()2<($έ)(+ !"ὶ 
,)-$έ)(+ !"ὶ "ἰ$ί(+ $-ῦ @8<,')ά@<"$-3. 
107 EN VI.3 1139b33-34: ὅ$"+ 5ά) ,(3 ,2@$'ύῃ !"ὶ 5+ώ)2<-2 "ὐ$ῷ ὦ@2+ "ἱ ἀ)9"ί, 
ἐ,ί@$"$"2. 
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whenever we think we know (gignôskein)108 both that the cause because of which the 
thing is [as it is] is the cause of this thing, and that it is not possible for this to be 
otherwise."109 The account of the Posterior Analytics is similar to that of the EN in an 
important respect (despite other significant differences). To know something 
demonstratively (epistasthai) involves knowing (gignôskein) the cause (aitia) of the 
object of knowledge, or being familiar (gnôrimos) with the principle (archê) of the 
object.  
The aitia or archê of the object of knowledge stands in an explanatory rela-
tion to the object it is the cause of. The principle of the known object explains why 
the latter is as it is. That is, it refers to more fundamental features of reality that ac-
count for the way the object is. For instance, the triangle is the archê of the rectangle 
(EE 1227b31ff.); the walk is the aitia of health (APo II.11 94b8-9); the ratio 2 to 1 is 
the aitia of the octave (Meta. V.1 1013a25); the archê of a man is a man (EE 1222b17-
18). Thus, 'knowing something demonstratively' does not only involve knowing 
that something is so and so, but also why it is so and so. In other words, epistêmê 
involves knowledge of a fact along with its explanation. This way of describing 
knowledge also differs in an important way from how we usually think of 
knowledge. Nowadays, we conceive of knowledge as a state that implies certainty 
about its object. If I know that P, then P is the case. Correspondingly contemporary 
analyses of knowledge have sought to account for it in terms of true belief which is 
justified or secured by a further element. They have focused on what justifies one's 
knowledge that P is true, i.e. what makes sure or warrants that our belief about an 
object is true. By contrast, Aristotle is more interested in what accounts for why the 
world appears as it is. He is interested in explanation, not in justification.110  
But Aristotle goes further than this general account of epistêmê as knowing 
the cause. Accounting for the principle or cause of something in a state of epistêmê 
involves a specific logical structure – an argument –, namely the 'demonstration' 
(apodeixis), in which the cause stands in a specific relation to the explanandum. The 
                                                      
108 Barnes translates gignôskein as 'being aware', thus giving a weaker sense to gignôskein 
than to epistasthai and avoiding circularity. 
109 APo I.2 71b9-12: ἐ,ί@$"@&"2 Cὲ -ἰό<'&᾽ ἕ!"@$-+ ... ὅ$"+ $ή+ $᾽ "ἰ$ί"+ -ἰώ<'&" 
525+ώ@!'2+ C2᾽ ἣ+ $ὀ ,)ᾶ5<ά ἐ@$2+, ὅ$2 ἐ!'ί+-8 "ἰ$ί" ἐ@$ί, !"ὶ <ὴ ἐ+Cέ9'@&"2 $-ῦ$᾽ 
ἄ00(3 ἔ9'2+. The second clause 'and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise' of the 
APo refers to the fact that epistêmê is only about necessary states of affairs. 
110 See Burnyeat 1981: 117-119; Frede 1996: 159-160. Barnes (1993) follows Burnyeat's sugges-
tion strictly by translating epistêmê 'understanding'. However, a strict distinction cannot be 
made so easily, for even if Aristotle's account of epistêmê is rather directed towards explana-
tion, he nevertheless believes that epistêmê is indeed knowledge, and not merely true belief. 
See Irwin's critique of Burnyeat 1988: 530, n. 24; Patzig 1981: 143, n. 2. 
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object of one's epistêmê has a deductive relationship to its explanatory features. In 
other words, the aitiai or archai of what is known are expressed in the premises 
(protaseis) of the demonstration. For instance, Aristotle defines a lunar eclipse as a 
sort of privation of light due to the interference (the "screening" – antiphraxis) of the 
Earth (APo II.2 90a17): the Earth blocks the light that flows from the Sun and nor-
mally lights up the Moon. To know demonstratively that there is an eclipse requires 
the insertion of this proposition into a syllogistic structure that represents the state 
of affairs 'the Moon is being eclipsed' in a deductive relationship towards its cause, 
that is, that there is a screening by the Earth. Aristotle offers the following syllogism 
(reproduced from Barnes 1993 [1975]: 219-220): 
(1) Eclipse holds of screening by the Earth 
(2) Screening by the earth holds of the Moon 
Therefore: 
(3) Eclipse holds of the Moon 
That the moon is being eclipsed is explained by a state of affairs that holds 
as a middle term in the syllogistic demonstration, namely that there is screening by 
the Earth.111 Hence, epistêmê is a cognitive state in which one holds a proposition 
about a state of affairs and at the same time one grasps the causes or reasons that 
explain this state of affairs. These causes are expressed as premises that stand in a 
deductive relationship to the proposition which is to be explained, and the deduc-
tion must be valid. 
Why does Aristotle need to introduce such a syllogistic structure in his ac-
count of science? It is because he believes in the necessity and universality of sci-
ence (cf. 1139b19-23). The deductive structure of the apodeixis ensures that a scien-
tific proposition is both universal and necessary, and that it is explained by its 
proper, non-incidental cause. 
Now, since an episode of epistêmê is explained by principles expressed in the 
premises of a scientific argument, the apodeixis, and since the principles must be 
better known and prior to the conclusion, there is a need to account for these prin-
ciples as well. The principles of the latter demonstration must also be the object of a 
demonstration. Indeed, in order to have a real scientific explanation, the premises 
must have been themselves deduced from other scientifically established premises. 
The principles from which the proposition has been deduced must be capable of 
explaining it and this will be the case only if the principles are objects of science. 
Obviously, this might lead to a regressus ad infinitum. Aristotle avoids this conse-
                                                      
111 Another Aristotelian example 'Why do plants lose their leaves?' is given at APo II.16-17, 
see Bolton 1987: 139. 
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quence by affirming that there are principles of science that are first, i.e. that are 
fundamental and from which all other propositions of a science are deduced (APo 
I.3 72b18-25). Yet, this implies that the first principles are not deduced by an apo-
deixis. Aristotle's account of epistêmê does not, in fact, include knowledge of the first 
principles. In other words, there is no knowledge of the first principles, at least no 
demonstrative knowledge.112 A different kind of knowledge is required in order to 
come to grasp these principles. Aristotle calls such a grasp 'intellection' (nous) (See 
EN VI.6 1141a3-8; APo II.19 100b5-17).113 The logic in play in the intellection of first 
principles is not deductive, but inductive. A universal notion is obtained by 'induc-
tion' (epagogê) from a collection of perceptions similar to each other (APo II.19 
99b32-100b5).114  
Hence, theoretical rationality does not consist in deductive thinking alone. 
Getting to know first principles through an inductive process is also part of theoret-
ical reason. Besides, Aristotle identifies the virtue of the theoretical part of the soul 
with a disposition which includes both epistêmê and nous and which he calls sophia 
(EN VI.7 1141a16-20). Sophia is the 'most accurate' (akribestatê) of all epistêmai and it 
involves knowledge of the principles.115 Thus, a satisfactory picture of theoretical 
rationality consists in asserting true propositions by supporting them adequately 
with first principles, and these principles are known by nous and have been estab-
lished by induction.116 
                                                      
112 It is true that at APo I.3 72b19-20 Aristotle speaks of epistêmê of the immediate principles 
(tôn amesôn) and adds that such a science is indemonstrable (anapodeikton). However, one 
should not take this phrase literally, since epistêmê was defined as a demonstrative form of 
knowledge (APo I.2 71b17; EN VI.3 1139b31-32). Aristotle probably wants to highlight that 
the grasp of the first principles must be as accurate and strong as that of epistêmê. 
113 Nous as a state which grasps the first principles of a science is distinct from the more gen-
eral sense of nous as the faculty of thinking. See note 18. 
114 How we come to have an intellection of first principles is a vexed issue. I shall say more 
about this in the next section §3.2.2, although a satisfactory account of how this process 
works is not part of my agenda. For a complete account, see Bronstein 2012, who reviews 
the literature on the subject. 
115 However, it is not clear whether sophia is a kind of overall knowledge that includes all 
other special sciences or rather an architectonic kind of knowledge that possesses the prin-
ciples of other sciences. 
116 At this point, it might seem misleading to take epistêmê as the privileged term of compari-
son in order to understand phronêsis. Instead, phronêsis as the virtue of the practical part of 
the soul ought to be put on a par with sophia, that is, theoretical wisdom. However, what I 
wish to compare is not phronêsis as virtue in general, but the cognitive state that issues from 
phronêsis. I assume that the primary function of theoretical rationality is to assert truths ob-
tained deductively, not propositions obtained by the intuition of nous, although the latter 
might seem more fundamental and intriguing. That its primary function is to obtain epistêmê 
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Now, this description of epistêmê gives rise to an ambiguity similar to that 
seen in the case of phronêsis, when I distinguished between phronêsis as a disposition 
towards practical knowledge and as ethical inquiry (p. 67). Indeed, epistêmê can be 
understood either as a cognitive state entertained by an individual, or as a disci-
pline, i.e. an organized body of knowledge, like the special sciences of biology, 
physics, and meteorology. This ambiguity is reflected in the difficulty of finding a 
suitable translation for epistêmê. As a cognitive state, epistêmê is better translated as 
'knowledge', but the latter understanding of epistêmê is not related to the psycholo-
gy of an individual and corresponds more closely to our notion of 'science'. So far, I 
have considered epistêmê as a cognitive state of an individual. When listing epistêmê 
alongside other intellectual states in the Ethics, Aristotle characterizes these as states 
by which the soul speaks the truth by asserting or denying (1139b15-16). Later, he 
also calls epistêmê a kind of hupolêpsis (1140b31; see also Top. V.2 130b16; 3 131a23; 4 
133b29). In this way, epistêmê looks very much like a cognitive state of the soul. 
However, the deductive structure of epistêmê and its description in syllogistic terms 
point at a construal of epistêmê as science, i.e. as a structured body of knowledge.  
Aristotle is aware of the ambiguity of epistêmê. He mentions it in the Physics: 
"epistêmê being on the one hand a species of belief (hupolêpsis) and on the other hand 
a genus for the various sciences (tôn epistêmôn)".117 Curiously, he makes the distinc-
tion neither in the epistemological context of the APo nor in EN VI. He seems to slip 
from considerations about cognitive states towards epistemological issues which 
are independent of the individual who has such cognitive states. Apodeixis as a kind 
of deduction holds independently of whether an actual subject is considering it or 
not. On the other hand, when one conceives an epistêmê as a state of the soul, it is 
not related to the apodeixis in the same way. Indeed, it seems bizarre to imagine that 
whenever someone is said to epistatai that P, he at the same time performs a deduc-
tion. Nevertheless, both meanings can be accommodated. Epistêmê as a cognitive 
state can indeed be conceived of as the state in which an individual entertains a 
given proposition which belongs to a special science and which is explained by the 
appropriate principles. Epistêmê as science is then the body of knowledge in which 
a subject picks a definite proposition when he epistatai. Thus, the ambivalence of 
'epistêmê' is not problematic. The word may refer both to the organized body of 
                                                                                                                                                        
is shown by the fact that Aristotle calls sophia a kind of epistêmê. As I take the primary func-
tion of practical rationality to be decision-making, it makes more sense to compare phronêsis 
with epistêmê. In this sense, as I shall show below, phronêsis as the disposition for correct 
decisions has more in common with epistêmê than with sophia or with theoretical nous. 
117 Phys. V.4 227b13-14: 'ἰ ἡ ἐ,2@$ή<7 'ἶC-3 <ὲ+ ὑ,-0ήm'(3, 5έ+-3 Cὲ $ῶ+ ἐ,2@$7<ῶ+. 
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knowledge proper to a special science as well as to the cognitive state of a subject 
when he is entertaining one item of this body of knowledge.  
3.2.2 Theoretical thought as a process of investigation 
However, this picture points at a more disturbing consequence. Epistêmê as 
science appears somewhat static. According to this account, a special science such 
as zoology is a fully formed body of knowledge ready to be used. As such, it con-
tains many propositions that can be picked out by different individuals when they 
are cognizing states of affairs proper to this science. In this sense, Aristotle's concep-
tion of science is very different from ours. He does not insist on science as a process 
of investigation that develops hypotheses about the world that ought to be con-
firmed or disproved by experience. Aristotle does not speak of science as a collec-
tion of theories which are progressively and slowly built, step by step. An Aristote-
lian science is a true theory about the world that is fully formed from the start. 
There is no story about how this body of knowledge was developed, how it was 
discovered little by little by one or many individuals who devoted their time to the 
explanation of the world. In short, there is no history of its production. In Aristotle's 
'official' account of epistêmê in the Posterior Analytics, which is also the account of the 
Ethics, we are left with a picture of science that does not portray it as a method of 
research or discovery. 
Similarly, the apodeixis is a figure expressing the content of an episode of 
epistêmê. It does not describe the actual structure of theoretical thought. Rather, it is 
a way of displaying knowledge which guarantees the scientific accuracy of such 
knowledge.118 Moreover, as the apodeixis is a syllogism with stringent conditions of 
validity, it also provides a way of evaluating the epistemic status of a proposition. 
A proposition will be an object of science if it can stand as the conclusion of an apo-
deixis. 
This picture of epistêmê is disturbing in the context of the Ethics, too. There, 
theoretical rationality is put on a par with practical rationality and both are depict-
ed as aspects of the intellectual life of a person. Moreover, in EN .7 Aristotle 
                                                      
118 Weil 1975: 99-100; Barnes 1993. That epistêmê does not represent a process of discovery 
has been convincingly argued by Barnes 1993. However, Barnes' further thesis that epistêmê 
is a method of imparting knowledge has been criticized. To think that a teacher could im-
part new contents of knowledge to a pupil by starting with fundamental principles of a 
science would be "poor pedagogy", see Burnyeat 1981: 116-119. Rather, epistêmê expresses a 
way of laying out of scientific contents together with their explanation. In this sense, the 
apodeixis is a tool that states what the formal conditions are in order to grant scientific 
knowledge to someone. In other words, the apodeixis is a tool for the justification of epistêmê. 
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claims that theôria, the activity of the theoretical part of the soul, is the most excel-
lent activity for human beings and constitutes happiness (1177a12-18). If theôria 
consists only in actual epistêmê, and if epistêmê is best understood as a body of 
knowledge organized deductively, such a description of happiness is puzzling. It 
would also be hard to apply straightforwardly this understanding of epistêmê to 
phronêsis in an attempt to outline the epistemic conditions of the latter. Since 
phronêsis is best described as a disposition to make virtuous decision, and decision 
is the outcome of deliberation, the structure of practical thought in Aristotle is best 
understood as deliberative, as we shall see below. And since deliberation is a pro-
cess of investigation, it is hard to see how the conditions for knowledge of epistêmê 
could be adapted to phronêsis.  
However, the notion of investigation in theoretical subject matters, though 
absent from the concept of epistêmê, is not alien to Aristotle. In the Aristotelian cor-
pus, one finds methodological remarks on how to engage in this kind of inquiry. 
For instance, one finds a succinct description of a method of inquiry in the Historia 
Animalium:  
17) "Afterwards, we shall inquire <into these matters with respect to 
animals> in order to grasp first of all the actual differences and the 
accidental properties (sumbebêkota) in every case. After that, we 
must attempt to discover the causes (aitias) of these. For, this is the 
natural method of procedure (methodos) – to do this only when the 
investigation (historia) of each case is complete. For from these 
steps it will become clear about which things and from which 
things the demonstration (apodeixis) must be built up." HA I.6 
491a9-14; see also PA I.1 639b8 
C2’ ἀ!)2/'ί"3 C’ ὕ@$')-+ ἐ)-ῦ<'+, ἵ+" ,)ῶ$-+ $ὰ3 ὑ,")9-ύ@"3 
(10) C2">-)ὰ3 !"ὶ $ὰ @8</'/7!ό$" ,ᾶ@2 0"</ά+(<'+. '$ὰ Cὲ 
$-ῦ$- $ὰ3 "ἰ$ί"3 $-ύ$(+ ,'2)"$έ-+ 'ὑ)'ῖ+. dὕ$( 5ὰ) !"$ὰ 
>ύ@2+ ἐ@$ὶ ,-2'ῖ@&"2 $ὴ+ <έ&-C-+, ὑ,")9-ύ@73 $ῆ3 ἱ@$-)ί"3 
$ῆ3 ,')ὶ ἕ!"@$-+· ,')ὶ ὧ+ $' 5ὰ) !"ὶ ἐN ὧ+ 'ἶ+"2 C'ῖ $ὴ+ 
ἀ,όC'2N2+, ἐ! $-ύ$(+ 5ί+'$"2 >"+')ό+. 
Aristotle's method of inquiry (historia) is based on the observation of the ac-
cidental properties (sumbebêkota) of the objects being studied and of the differences 
among these objects. Then, after these properties have been carefully described, the 
next step is to look for (eurein) the causes that explain such variance. Doing so, Aris-
totle also distinguishes the moment of demonstration (apodeixis) from the moment 
of inquiry. In other words, once inquiry has been carried out, the components of the 
demonstration (namely the area of inquiry and the causes) appear clearly and the 
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researcher can build up the appropriate demonstration of the fact he wants to estab-
lish.119  
If one grants that apodeixis is a means of exposition of scientific knowledge, 
Aristotle seems to distinguish at least three steps in this description of scientific 
inquiry. First the inquirer establishes the 'data' at his disposal. These can be empiri-
cal observations, but also common beliefs or reputable opinions (Anagnostopoulos 
2009: 111-112). He sets out the data by comparing these observations and beliefs 
and by showing the distinctive features or differences among them. Then, he grasps 
the cause which explains why the facts observed are as they are. Finally, he builds 
up a demonstration which establishes epistêmê. The apodeixis therefore comes at the 
end of a process of inquiry. 
Scientific inquiry is often thought together with the method of dialectic as 
presented in the Topics.120 Aristotle does in fact introduce dialectic as a method of 
systematically examining a claim. At Top. I.2, Aristotle provides a list of the situa-
tions in which dialectic is useful. The first two uses of dialectic are directly bound 
up with the art of debating (Top. I.2 101a28-34).121 Finally, Aristotle presents dialec-
tic as being useful for science, and this in two respects. There are two distinct mo-
ments in science where dialectic is useful. One moment requires that one goes 
through the different puzzles (aporiai)122 related to a particular subject matter (Top. 
I.2 101a34-37). It is supposed to take place at the beginning of the process of scien-
tific inquiry (Meta. III.1 995a24-28). The other moment is concerned with the first 
principles of a science (Top. I.2 101a37-b3).123 The use which is especially relevant 
                                                      
119 See also Barnes 1975: 83: "Secondly, in APo II.1-2 Aristotle plainly implies that our search-
es must precede demonstration." 
120 Le Blond 1939: 46-47; Weil 1975: 90-92. See Bolton 1987: 121, n. 4 for further references. 
121 First, dialectic is useful in the context of gumnasia, which is a specific kind of discussion 
with an agonistic spirit (See Slomkowski 1997: 12ff.). Then it is useful in a less formal con-
text where one is nonetheless brought to discussion with others (what Aristotle calls an 
enteuxis, which is sometimes translated as 'casual encounter' and which is understood as the 
kind of discussion the members of a school might have outside of the school, see Smith 
1997: 51). 
122 An aporia in the technical sense used by Aristotle means a puzzle that arises when two 
contradictory positions have been derived from a set of common beliefs (Top. 145b16, 
162a17). 
123 Aristotle does indeed hold that the truth of the first principles of a special science cannot 
be justified within this science but need to be confirmed from outside. Moreover, as we have 
already seen, Aristotle's foundationalism requires that first principles cannot be deduced 
from further principles. Hence, the role of dialectic is to establish the truth of first principles 
by showing that they cannot be wrong. A famous instance of the use of this method within 
Aristotle's own work is his treatment of the principle of non-contradiction (Meta. IV 4-8). 
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for scientific inquiry is the first one. The role of dialectical discussion consists in 
examining the reputable opinions on a given subject (ta endoxa).124 Scientific inquiry 
therefore makes use of dialectical tools and depends essentially on the dialectical 
discussions of the endoxa. Dialectic is useful in 'grasping the existing differences and 
incidental properties' of the subject matter (HA I.6 491a9-10).125 
Concerning the second stage which consists in grasping the cause, Aristotle 
does not have any systematic account. Most of the time, the process by which the 
cause is grasped is understood as one of induction (epagôgê). Epagôgê is introduced 
at APo II.19, where Aristotle describes how a universal notion is inferred from a 
collection of similar perceptions. Perception leaves an imprint in the soul which 
constitutes a memory, and from many memories of the same object experience (em-
peiria) arises (100a3-6). Then, Aristotle succinctly describes how the subject gains a 
universal account from an evidential basis that is particular and perceptual: 
18) And from experience, or from the whole universal that has come 
to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever it is 
which is one and the same in all those things), there comes a prin-
ciple of craft and of science – of craft if it deals with how things 
come about, of science if it deals with what is the case. APo. II.19 
100a6-9 
                                                                                                                                                        
Another example is the discussion of the relation between definition and demonstration in 
Book II of the APo (see Detel 2010: 259). 
124 Aristotle gives the most complete definition of endoxa at Top. I.1 100b21-23: "On the other 
hand, those opinions are reputable which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by 
the wise – i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them." 
(ἔ+C-N" Cὲ $ὰ C-!-ῦ+$" ,ᾶ@2+ ἢ $-ῖ3 ,0'ί@$-23 ἢ $-ῖ3 @->-ῖ3, !"ὶ $-ύ$-23 ἢ ,ᾶ@2+ ἢ $-ῖ3 
,0'ί@$-23 ἢ $-ῖ3 <ά02@$" 5+()ί<-23 !"ὶ ἐ+CόN-23.) 
125 However, nothing prompts us to think that these two methods are identical. The overall 
area of application of dialectic as a method is broader than that of scientific inquiry, which is 
limited to a single science (zoology, meteorology and the like). Moreover, dialectic is not 
primarily concerned with the discovery of principles and definitions, even though it consti-
tutes an indispensable preparatory work for such a discovery. Dialectic as such is not a heu-
ristic tool for finding the causes of something. It aims at testing scientific accounts rather 
than at developing such accounts. Besides, dialectic relies on the syllogism and is therefore 
not very different from apodeictic science regarding its method. In spite of these differences, 
nothing prevents dialectic from being useful in scientific inquiry when it comes to ordering 
the facts. Indeed, clearing out aporiai can be understood as a valuable way of ordering the 
data of a science. Furthermore, one could suppose that the evidential basis of dialectic is in 
fact the same as that of scientific inquiry. The former starts from considerations about ta 
endoxa, whereas the latter is concerned with the observation of facts; and in Aristotelian 
science, the evidential basis contains reputable opinions as well as empirical observations 
(Owen 1961: 85-86). 
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ἐ! C’ ἐ<,'2)ί"3 ἢ ἐ! ,"+$ὸ3 ἠ)'<ή@"+$-3 $-ῦ !"&ό0-8 ἐ+ $ῇ 
m89ῇ, $-ῦ ἑ+ὸ3 ,")ὰ $ὰ ,-00ά, ὃ ἂ+ ἐ+ ἅ,"@2+ ἓ+ ἐ+ῇ ἐ!'ί+-23 
$ὸ "ὐ$ό, $έ9+73 ἀ)9ὴ !"ὶ ἐ,2@$ή<73, ἐὰ+ <ὲ+ ,')ὶ 5έ+'@2+, 
$έ9+73, ἐὰ+ Cὲ ,')ὶ $ὸ ὄ+, ἐ,2@$ή<73. 
Again, what the exact transition between empeiria and epistêmê or technê is 
has been much debated and it is not part of my agenda to discuss this problem (see 
n. 114). It is significant, however, that Aristotle does not describe induction as a 
method of inquiry but rather as a cognitive process of inferring universal concepts 
from particular observations. It is not clear whether the process of induction is a 
part of scientific inquiry or if it is rather the result of this inquiry, which occurs au-
tomatically if the inquiry has been well conducted. Commentators tend to agree 
with the latter view. Anagnostopoulos argues that scientific inquiry is distinct from 
the method of induction. The former is more complex, since induction seems to 
obtain merely from a collection of perceptions when a universal is formed in the 
soul, whereas scientific inquiry examines the complexity of facts in the world and 
looks for the causes (Anagnostopoulos 2009: 111). Le Blond notes that intuition, i.e. 
the state which grasps first principles as a result of induction, does not involve a 
continuous effort by the subject (Le Blond 1939: 271ff.). That Aristotle's account of 
induction is not a part of the scientific method seems to be confirmed by his re-
marks on 'acumen' (agchinoia) which is "a sort of talent for hitting upon the middle 
term in an imperceptible time".126 Finding the cause or middle term appears as a 
moment in the process of inquiry which one cannot describe in terms of rules or 
procedures. It occurs, or does not occur, depending on the inquirer's own talent or 
experience with the subject matter. 
Whatever relation one grants between scientific inquiry and induction, one 
has to acknowledge that Aristotle did have a conception of a process of searching 
for explanations in the sciences. This process of discovery of causes is distinct from 
epistêmê as an organized body of knowledge and from the related cognitive state of 
epistasthai. I want to insist on this distinction between a process of investigation, 
which is temporally extended, and the formal structure of displaying a proof. Theo-
retical rationality can be described from two different points of view. Epistêmê as a 
cognitive state, i.e. as theoretical knowledge, consists in holding a proposition for 
the correct reasons, i.e. holding it together with the principles from which it is in-
ferred, having in mind the logical connection between the proposition and the prin-
ciples. Hence, theoretical reason is exemplified as an argument with propositions as 
its content, and its structure is deductive. However, the notion of epistêmê also pre-
                                                      
126 APo I.34 89b10-11: Ἡ C’ ἀ59ί+-2ά ἐ@$2+ 'ὐ@$-9ί" $23 ἐ+ ἀ@!έ,$ῳ 9)ό+ῳ $-ῦ <έ@-8. 
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supposes scientific inquiry. More precisely, epistêmê as a cognitive state is the result 
of a process of zêtêsis through which the inquirer discovers the middle term that 
explains the relevant claim (See Allen forthcoming: 5). In this way, theoretical rea-
son is actualized as a piece of reasoning with propositional attitudes as its content. 
Scientific inquiry stands within the boundaries of theoretical rationality. The objects 
of inquiry are the regularities in the world and the universal features of perceptual 
reality. Rationality in the theoretical domain therefore has a double structure: a 
structure of inquiry as well as a structure of exposition.127 
Aristotle's preferred vocabulary for speaking of the actual process of inquiry 
includes terms such as heuresis (heurein; HA I.6 491a11), historia (HA I.6 491a12), 
skepsis (e.g. GA 788b10-11; Meta. I.5 986b13; PA 653b13-15; skopein GC I.2 316a11), or 
zêtêsis (e.g. DA 411a11ff.; Cael. 293a25ff.; GA 742b17-32; GC 321a1-2). The latter is 
especially expressive since Aristotle uses it in the APo when he speaks of the four 
objects of inquiry, namely the fact itself, the reason why, whether or not something 
is, and what something is (what Aristotle calls ta zêtoumena; APo II.1 89b23-25). In 
APo II.2, he even equates these four kinds of inquiry with the search for the middle 
term (to meson). Indeed, each of these are either a search for whether or not there is a 
middle term or a search for what the middle term is (II.2 89b36-90a1). Zêtêsis is also 
the term Aristotle uses when he compares deliberation with mathematical inquiry 
(EN III.3 1112b20). But the most significant use of zêtêsis as investigation in theoreti-
cal science is found in the Metaphysics. There on many occasions, Aristotle speaks of 
the search for the cause as a zêtêsis (See i.a. 988b18-19; 992a24-25; 1003a26-27; 
1025b3; 1041a27-28; 1042a4-6).128 Hence, I shall call Aristotle's method of scientific 
inquiry the method of zêtêsis.  
One has to admit nevertheless that Aristotle's conception of theoretical ra-
tionality is dominated by scientific exposition. When looking for the intellectual 
virtue of the theoretical part of the soul in the Ethics, Aristotle focuses on the deduc-
tive structure of epistêmê and sophia. Aristotle is not very interested in the actual 
process of theoretical thinking. He is more interested in the result itself, i.e. the con-
tent of scientific discoveries and the way it is secured epistemologically. In other 
                                                      
127 This contrast has been expressed in different ways by scholars: logic of discovery vs. logic 
of proof (Schiller 1917: 235); logica inventionis vs. logica demonstratio (Weil 1975: 91). 
128 See in particular 1063b36-1064a1: "Every science seeks certain principles and causes for 
each of its objects – e.g. medicine and gymnastics and each of the other sciences, whether 
productive or mathematical." (ᾶ@" C’ ἐ,2@$ή<7 `7$'ῖ $2+ὰ3 ἀ)9ὰ3 !"ὶ "ἰ$ί"3 ,')ὶ 
ἕ!"@$-+ $ῶ+ ὑ>’ "ὑ$ὴ+ ἐ,2@$7$ῶ+, -ἷ-+ ἰ"$)2!ὴ !"ὶ 58<+"@$2!ὴ !"ὶ $ῶ+ 0-2,ῶ+ ἑ!ά@$7 
$ῶ+ ,-27$2!ῶ+ !"ὶ <"&7<"$2!ῶ+.) Trans. Ross. 
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words, he is more interested in questions such as 'What are the conditions for 
epistêmê to be true?'129  
Now, my claim is that the double structure of rationality is found in the 
practical part of the soul as well. There is both a processual structure of practical 
thought on the one hand and a formal description of it. Consequently, the descrip-
tion of practical knowledge in formal terms will be analogical to the role of epistêmê 
in theoretical reason. Since epistêmê as a cognitive state is obtained from a process of 
zêtêsis and consists in holding a proposition along with its reasons or explanation, 
we can similarly understand practical knowledge as a cognitive state obtained 
through a process of practical inquiry, viz. deliberation, and which consists in a 
('practical') proposition backed up by reasons or explanations. As I have shown in 
chapter 2, the state which actualizes the function of practical reason is decision 
(proairesis), as proairesis is the bearer of practical truth. Thus, proairesis is the actual 
state whose function in practical reason is analogous to epistêmê as a cognitive state 
in theoretical reason. 
3.3 The structure of practical thought 
3.3.1 Practical rationality as a process of inquiry: deliberation 
In §2.4.3, I argued that a correct or practically true decision is the ergon of 
practical reason. Now, according to Aristotle, decision is the typical outcome of a 
process of deliberation.130 Of course, there might be particular episodes of delibera-
tion that do not issue in decision. For instance, it might be that something prevents 
one's practical project from being realized, in which case deliberation stops without 
issuing a decision to act (1112b24-26). Still, a well-executed deliberation on the ap-
propriate subject will normally deliver a decision. Since the function of practical 
reason is decision and decision is the result of deliberative thinking, deliberative 
thinking is the proper way of reasoning in order to realize the function of the prac-
tical part of the soul. Thus, the typical structure of practical reason is deliberative 
thinking. Aristotle does indeed call the practical part of the soul 'calculative' (logis-
tikon) and identifies calculation (logizesthai) with deliberation (bouleuesthai – 
1139a11-13). Besides, whenever Aristotle wants to inquire into phronêsis, which is 
the virtue of the practical part of the soul, he links it closely with deliberation by 
                                                      
129 Of course this raises the question of how the epistemic strength of scientific principles is 
secured if their justification ultimately rely on the dialectical method. On this see Bolton 
1990. 
130 EN III.3 1112a9-12. See also EE 1226b9: C2ὸ ἐ! CόN73 /-80'8$2!ῆ3 ἐ@$2+ ἡ ,)-"ί)'@23. 
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affirming that a characteristic feature of the phronimos is to be a good deliberator 
(1140a25-31; 1141b8-14; 1142b31-33). There are manifestly other forms that practical 
reason can take such as technical reasoning or reflexion on the practical concerns of 
other people (see Richardson Lear 2004: 102). However, deliberation can be under-
stood as the form of practical thinking par excellence. 131 Another way to put it is that 
practical reason is best actualized in a deliberative form.  
So, how is deliberation similar to theoretical rationality? In order to answer 
this question, one needs first to understand how Aristotle describes the structure of 
deliberation. In the corpus, the most detailed description of how deliberation pro-
ceeds is at EN III.3. In the following passage Aristotle famously claims that deliber-
ation is a form of reasoning about the way to achieve a given end: 
19) "But we deliberate not about ends but about what promotes those 
ends. For a doctor does not deliberate about whether he'll make 
his patients healthy, nor a public speaker about whether he'll per-
suade his audience, nor a political expert about whether he'll 
bring about good government – and neither do any of the others 
deliberate about the end, but rather they posit the end and exam-
ine how and by what means it will come about; and if it appears 
as coming about by more than one means, they look to see 
through which of them it will happen most easily and best, 
whereas if it is brought to completion by one means only, they 
look to see how it will come about through this, and through what 
means that will come about, until they arrive at the first cause, 
which comes last in the process of discovery." EN III.3 1112b11-20 
/-80'8ό<'&" C’ -ὐ ,')ὶ $ῶ+ $'0ῶ+ ἀ00ὰ ,')ὶ $ῶ+ ,)ὸ3 $ὰ 
$έ07. -ὔ$' 5ὰ) ἰ"$)ὸ3 /-80'ύ'$"2 'ἰ ὑ52ά@'2, -ὔ$' ῥή$() 'ἰ 
,'ί@'2, -ὔ$' ,-02$2!ὸ3 'ἰ 'ὐ+-<ί"+ ,-2ή@'2, -ὐCὲ $ῶ+ 0-2,ῶ+ 
-ὐC'ὶ3 (15) ,')ὶ $-ῦ $έ0-83· ἀ00ὰ &έ<'+-2 $ὸ $έ0-3 $ὸ ,ῶ3 !"ὶ 
C2ὰ $ί+(+ ἔ@$"2 @!-,-ῦ@2· !"ὶ C2ὰ ,0'2ό+(+ <ὲ+ >"2+-<έ+-8 
5ί+'@&"2 C2ὰ $ί+-3 ῥᾷ@$" !"ὶ !ά002@$" ἐ,2@!-,-ῦ@2, C2’ ἑ+ὸ3 C’ 
ἐ,2$'0-8<έ+-8 ,ῶ3 C2ὰ $-ύ$-8 ἔ@$"2 !ἀ!'ῖ+- C2ὰ $ί+-3, ἕ(3 ἂ+ 
ἔ0&(@2+ ἐ,ὶ $ὸ ,)ῶ$-+ "ἴ$2-+, ὃ ἐ+ $ῇ 'ὑ)έ@'2 ἔ@9"$ό+ (20) 
ἐ@$2+. 
A given end having been posited (themenoi to telos), the deliberating person 
looks for the means of achieving this end. To illustrate his point, Aristotle borrows 
examples from the domain of technê. The end of the activity of the doctor is produc-
ing health; that of the rhetorician is persuading his listeners; that of the statesman is 
eunomia, i.e. good political order in the polis. Each expert looks for ways to bring 
                                                      
131 Broadie 1991: 211–2 accounts for why Aristotle uses deliberation as a paradigm of practi-
cal reason. She considers that not all practical logoi should be connected with deliberation, 
but that deliberation is a 'surrogate' form for all practical logoi. 
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about his respective end. Aristotle calls this 'what promotes the end' (ta pros to telos), 
which is often translated by 'means'.132 These examples are quite convenient for 
Aristotle in order to show that one does not deliberate about the end itself.133 The 
search for the means can be of two sorts. In one case, the deliberating person con-
siders various ways to achieve one and the same end. He should find out which of 
the means under consideration is best suited for the realization of the end. In the 
other case, only one way of achieving the end is considered. The job of deliberation 
will be to implement the end in a concrete situation. Indeed, an action that has been 
discovered as a possible means might not be immediately achievable, but might 
require a further means instead. If I believe that in order to be happy I should be-
come an architect, becoming an architect is not something that I can do directly. 
There will be a need for a further step, e.g. enrolling in a school of architecture, in 
order to realize the primary end. Of course, a means that is a condition for another 
means might not itself be immediately implementable. I would then need a further 
means in order to bring it about, and so on.  
Aristotle does not make much of the distinction between the two different 
functions of deliberation. Rather, the discussion on deliberation and decision in the 
rest of EN III.3 focuses on the second case, that is, on how to implement a means 
which corresponds to an action that one cannot immediately carry out. It seems 
reasonable though to assume that Aristotle distinguishes between two aspects of 
deliberation that can occur together in the process, with neither having priority 
over the other. When trying to achieve a certain end, I can first assess the relevance 
of various ways of achieving that end, and then, once I have opted for a particular 
way, I can start wondering how I shall best go about implementing this means. But 
conversely, assessing the relevance of each end might also involve deliberating on 
the feasibility of every option before I can decide for one of them. In this case, com-
parison comes first. Hence, I assume that for Aristotle deliberation involves both 
aspects combined. Deliberation is neither simply picking the right option out of 
many, nor a piece of reasoning from ends to means, but a mixture of both. 
                                                      
132 This translation can be misleading, though, for it does not imply a distinction between 
'what promotes the end' as instrumental means and as constituent of the end. See Green-
wood 1909; Wiggins 1975-1976. I shall come back to this distinction at §4.3.3. 
133 Aristotle's claim that we do not deliberate about the end has been subject of thorough 
discussion among commentators. For it seems that it prevents the agent from determining 
whether such or such an end is really what he aims for or not. I shall tackle this important 
issue at §4.3.2-4.3.3. 
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In order to make his description of deliberation clearer, Aristotle then com-
pares deliberation with a mathematical inquiry that aims at finding a way to con-
struct a geometrical figure: 
20) "For the person who deliberates seems to inquire and analyse in 
the way described as though he were dealing with a <geomet-
rical> figure (it seems that not all inquiry is deliberation – mathe-
matics, for example – but that all deliberation is inquiry), and the 
last step in the analysis seems to be the first that comes to be." EN 
III.5 1112b20-24 
(20) ὁ 5ὰ) /-80'8ό<'+-3 ἔ-2!' `7$'ῖ+ !"ὶ ἀ+"0ύ'2+ $ὸ+ 
'ἰ)7<έ+-+ $)ό,-+ ὥ@,') C2ά5)"<<" (>"ί+'$"2 C’ ἡ <ὲ+ `ή$7@23 
-ὐ ,ᾶ@" 'ἶ+"2 /-ύ0'8@23, -ἷ-+ "ἱ <"&7<"$2!"ί, ἡ Cὲ /-ύ0'8@23 
,ᾶ@" `ή$7@23), !"ὶ $ὸ ἔ@9"$-+ ἐ+ $ῇ ἀ+"0ύ@'2 ,)ῶ$-+ 'ἶ+"2 ἐ+ 
$ῇ 5'+έ@'2. 
The analogy works in the following way: in the mathematical case, the end 
in view is the construction of a certain figure. First, the mathematician has to ana-
lyse the figure into its constitutive parts until he has found a way to start the con-
struction of the figure, in other words the starting points.134 Thus, the last step in the 
investigation is at the same time the first step in the construction of the figure. Simi-
larly, the process of deliberation aims at finding out the most immediate thing one 
can do in order to achieve an end given beforehand. The deliberator presupposes 
the end to achieve and figures out how or by what means he can achieve such an 
end. Then, the first thing to do in order to achieve that end is to make use of the 
means that was found out at the end of the analysis. 
In this passage, deliberation is characterized as a kind of investigation 
(zêtêsis EN 1112b23; see also EN VI.9 1142a31–32, 15; it is also called a skepsis EE 
1226b8; 1227a12), that is, a rational process of seeking out (zêtein kai analuein 
                                                      
134 This interpretation was first proposed by Burnet 1900: xxxiv-xxxv and 324-325. There are 
two variants of interpreting the geometrical construction. Some commentators consider the 
figure to be built to be a complex figure (e.g. an irregular polygon). One first needs to ana-
lyse it into its most basic components (triangles) in order to build such a figure (Cooper 
1975: 20, Irwin 1985, Broadie and Rowe 2002). Others consider the figure to have certain 
properties: e.g. an isosceles triangle which has two equal sides. If one aims at constructing a 
triangle with two equal angles, the method of construction would be the following: one 
presupposes that such a triangle is the isosceles triangle (with two equal sides). Then, one 
should demonstrate that a triangle with two equal angles is the isosceles triangle. Once one 
has demonstrated this, it is easy to construct an isosceles triangle (Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 212, 
referring to Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, Oxford, 1949, p. 270-272). But it seems that the 
method is the same: the initial figure is presupposed, and analysed into a further figure that 
one knows how to construct. Once one has found such a basic figure, one can start the con-
struction of the more complex figure. 
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1112b20) a means to an end. This zêtêsis works recursively, by first supposing the 
end and then working out the means by which it is to be achieved. Aristotle uses 
the same terminology in order to speak of the search for the means in this context 
as when he considers the search for the cause (i.e. the middle term) in a theoretical 
context, as we saw in the previous section. Moreover, in order to elaborate on the 
recursive character of deliberation, he makes a comparison with a kind of investiga-
tion used in mathematics (analusis). 
We have observed that so far Aristotle insists that the end considered by the 
person deliberating is given beforehand. It is not a part of the deliberation. This is 
another aspect which is underlined by the comparison with mathematics. It is per-
haps not directly obvious in passages (19) and (20), but it is shown better in other 
passages in which Aristotle makes a similar point.  
21) "It follows that no one deliberates about the end; this is rather the 
starting point and postulate, just like postulates in the theoretical 
sciences (we discussed these briefly at the beginning, and in detail 
in the Analytics)." EE II.10 1227a8-11 
,')ὶ <ὲ+ $-ῦ $έ0-83 -ὐ&'ὶ3 /-80'ύ'$"2, ἀ00ὰ $-ῦ$’ ἐ@$2+ ἀ)9ὴ 
!"ὶ ὑ,ό&'@23, ὥ@,') ἐ+ $"ῖ3 &'()7$2!"ῖ3 ἐ,2@$ή<"23 
ὑ,-&έ@'23 (10) ('ἴ)7$"2 Cὲ ,')ὶ "ὐ$ῶ+ ἐ+ <ὲ+ $-ῖ3 ἐ+ ἀ)9ῇ 
/)"9έ(3, ἐ+ Cὲ $-ῖ3 ἀ+"08$2!-ῖ3 C2’ ἀ!)2/'ί"3).  
The recursive character of zêtêsis in both theoretical and practical thinking 
also implies that the starting point of the inquiry is presupposed. In order to ensure 
that the practical end is not considered in deliberation, Aristotle likens it to the 'pos-
tulates' (hupotheseis) of theoretical sciences. Practical ends are assumed in delibera-
tion, as are the hupotheseis of a theoretical investigation (see also: EN 1151a15-19; EE 
1227b28-30). Passage (21) also shows that speaking of zêtêsis and hupothesis in the 
theoretical case is not restricted to mathematics, but concerns other theoretical sci-
ences as well (en tais theôretikais epistêmais). 
Thus, deliberation has a structure similar to that of theoretical inquiry. In 
other words, the typical cognitive process of practical reason is modelled on the 
structure of theoretical inquiry. The latter works by supposing that a hypothesis is 
true and attempts to construct the demonstration that leads to it. Practical reason, 
on the other hand, supposes a practical end, a project that one wants to achieve, 
and then looks for the means that will realize this project. Of course, there are also 
differences between practical and theoretical zêtêsis. The most obvious is that they 
do not relate to the same kind of object. I shall tackle these differences in §3.4 of the 
present chapter. Before turning to these contrasts, I shall first extend the analogy 
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between theoretical and practical reason by examining the formal structure of the 
latter. 
3.3.2 Practical thinking as an argument 
I have just shown that the structure of deliberation in practical reason is 
modelled on the basis of theoretical inquiry. Now, if the analogy between both 
kinds of reason is expanded, it follows that practical thinking can also be described 
as having something like a deductive structure. Theoretical reason works on the 
basis of the apodeixis, which is a specific kind of deductive inference (sullogismos). 
Similarly, there are hints in the corpus that Aristotle's account of practical thinking 
somehow reproduces the deductive structure of epistêmê. The work of practical rea-
son is sometimes related to a sort of 'syllogism' (sullogismos) (1142b22-23; 1144a31-
32). Furthermore, practical reason relies on practical principles (hai archai tôn praktôn 
– EN 1140b16-17; praktikai archai 1144a34-35). And sometimes, Aristotle speaks of 
the premises (tês heteras protaseôs 1143b3) and 'conclusion' of practical reasoning 
(sumperanthen EN VII.3 1147a25-28). As epistêmê consists in a cognitive state stating 
a proposition deduced from premises, practical knowledge would in the same vein 
consist in a cognitive state issuing from a piece of deliberation and stating a propo-
sition deduced from premises in its own 'practical' way. 
Scholars have sometimes interpreted Aristotle's use of syllogistic terminolo-
gy in a practical context as evidence that he had the concept of a syllogism proper 
to practical reason. They claim that practical thinking itself has a deductive form, or 
even make the stronger claim that deliberation is of a deductive form (Greenwood 
1909: 50-51; Joachim 1951: 208-210; Ando 1958: 221; Mele 1981: 282). In the middle 
of the 20th century, logicians attempted to develop a deontic logic on the basis of 
the putative doctrine of the practical syllogism of Aristotle (Von Wright 1963; 
Kalinowski 1972). However, we ought to be careful regarding the interpretation of 
practical reason as a 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism is a logical device 
which has been construed out of various sources by commentators (especially EN 
VII.3 and MA 7) even though there is no clear doctrine of a practical syllogism in 
Aristotle. Recently, it has been shown that the diverse passages which accordingly 
exemplified instances of the practical syllogism were in fact treating distinct sub-
jects.135 
                                                      
135 In particular, Corcilius 2008a holds that the practical argument of EN VI has nothing to 
do with the practical syllogism of MA 7. I agree with Corcilius on the general observation, 
but I do not follow him concerning the more specific analysis he makes concerning the func-
tion of the practical argument at EN VI and at MA 7. See §6.4.1. 
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In my view, if there is something like a practical syllogism in EN VI, it rather 
stands as a formal expression or representation of practical reasoning that can be 
represented as an argument. It is not the form of practical reasoning itself, even less 
the form of deliberation.136 Moreover, nothing compels us to accept that this formal 
representation of practical thinking in EN VI is the same thing or has the same func-
tion than instances of a syllogistic-like structure in other passages of the Aristoteli-
an corpus (in particular in the De Motu Animalium). I do not consider that there is 
one unified doctrine of the practical syllogism to be reconstructed from the Aristo-
telian corpus. Rather, I contend that Aristotle has used syllogistic terminology in a 
practical context on different occasions in order to point at various features of prac-
tical reasoning.137 
In the rest of this chapter, I shall show how Aristotle introduces a descrip-
tion of practical reason as an argument. I shall also argue that this formalized ex-
pression of reasoning is not inconsistent with practical thinking as deliberation. The 
description of practical thinking as argument has a different purpose than the de-
scription of practical thinking as deliberation. These 'syllogistic' passages point at 
another feature of practical reason, namely the moral evaluation of decision. In other 
words, an episode of decision can be justified by reasons that are expressed in an 
argument. This decision can be said to be good or bad, right or wrong, according to 
the practical argument which backs up the decision.138 Thus, the analogy between 
theoretical and practical reason is complete. For both modalities of rationality, Aris-
totle has an account of reason as an argument and as a process of thought. For the 
time being I shall restrict this account of the practical argument to EN VI only, 
without deriving this account from any material external to this book. I shall look 
for a confirmation of this view elsewhere in the corpus in chap. 6. 
3.3.2.1 EN VI.9 1142b17-26 
The first passage I want to look at deals with the correctness of practical rea-
soning. At EN VI.9, Aristotle is looking for a definition of good deliberation (eu-
boulia). Euboulia is an essential component of phronêsis. Indeed, Aristotle claims that 
                                                      
136 See Cooper (1975: 46-47) for the interpretation of the practical syllogism as the 'formal 
representation' of practical thinking; compare with Natali 2001: 67. 
137 More on this in chap. 6. 
138 I have argued above that Aristotle is more interested in explanation than in justification 
when it comes to epistêmê. However, here the purpose of the practical argument is indeed 
justification, more specifically moral justification. Moral justification differs from epistemic 
justification in that its aim is to account for the goodness or appropriateness of an action 
whereas the latter aims at providing conditions for knowledge to obtain. More on this be-
low, §3.4. 
Another Kind of Knowledge. Aristotle's Phronesis from an Epistemological Point of View 
 92 
the ergon of people who are phronimoi is to deliberate well (1140a25-26; 1141b9-10). 
Good deliberation is therefore defined as technically correct deliberation that re-
sults, moreover, in a morally good outcome (1142b32-33). The following passage 
makes a significant step in the argument leading to this definition: 
22) "Since there are various kinds of correctness, it is clear that <good 
deliberation> is not every kind of correctness. For the unself-
controlled, that is, the bad person will achieve by calculation what 
he proposes as required139, so that, while he will have deliberated 
correctly, he will have gained a great evil. Having deliberated 
well, however, seems to be something good, since good delibera-
tion is the kind of correctness in deliberation (orthotês boulês) 
which achieves something good. But it is also possible to achieve 
this [i.e. something good] through false reasoning (sullogismos), 
that is, to achieve what one should do, but not through the steps 
one should, the middle term (meson horon) being false. So this [i.e. 
this kind of correctness] is not yet good deliberation, when we 
achieve what one should do, but not through the steps one 
should." EN VI.9 1142b17-26 
ἐ,'ὶ C’ ἡ ὀ)&ό$73 ,0'-+"9ῶ3, Cῆ0-+ ὅ$2 -ὐ ,ᾶ@"· ὁ 5ὰ) 
ἀ!)"$ὴ3 !"ὶ ὁ >"ῦ0-3 ὃ ,)-$ί&'$"2 C'ῖ+ ἐ! $-ῦ 0-52@<-ῦ 
$'ύN'$"2, ὥ@$' ὀ)&ῶ3 ἔ@$"2 (20) /'/-80'8<έ+-3, !"!ὸ+ Cὲ <έ5" 
'ἰ07>ώ3. C-!'ῖ C’ ἀ5"&ό+ $2 $ὸ 'ὖ /'/-80'ῦ@&"2· ἡ 5ὰ) $-2"ύ$7 
ὀ)&ό$73 /-80ῆ3 'ὐ/-80ί", ἡ ἀ5"&-ῦ $'8!$2!ή. ἀ00’ ἔ@$2 !"ὶ 
$-ύ$-8 m'8C'ῖ @800-52@<ῷ $89'ῖ+, !"ὶ ὃ <ὲ+ C'ῖ ,-2ῆ@"2 $89'ῖ+, 
C2’ -ὗ C’ -ὔ, ἀ00ὰ m'8Cῆ $ὸ+ <έ@-+ ὅ)-+ 'ἶ+"2· ὥ@$’ -ὐC’ (25) 
                                                      
139 Reading "ὃ ,)-$ί&'$"2 $%ῖ' ἐ! $-ῦ 0-52@<-ῦ". I follow Jackson, Burnet and Gauthier by 
reading dein, and so do Crisp and Broadie & Rowe. This version is attested in some manu-
scripts. Bodéüs criticizes this kind of solution because it involves saying that the akratês 
would achieve what he intends to do. This goes precisely against Aristotle's characterization 
of the akratês as someone that does not manage to achieve what he intends to do but ends up 
following his desire instead (see e.g. EN VII.4 1148a4-11). However, as I argue in the follow-
ing footnote (n. 140) I do not think that one ought to presuppose Aristotle's technical con-
ception of the akratês in this passage. Some manuscripts have "ὃ ,)-$ί&'$"2 ἰ$%ῖ' ἐ! $-ῦ 
0-52@<-ῦ", which renders "For the akratês or/and the phaulos will achieve by calculation 
what he intends to see" But this solution is puzzling because of its meaning. Bodéüs retains 
the main version, but connects 'idein' with 'teuxetai' instead of 'protithetai', thus rendering: 
"they manage to see what they intend" (Bodéüs 2004: 325, n. 1). This reading seems gram-
matically correct, but its meaning for the argument is of no help. How would euboulia not be 
achieved if the agent manages to see what he intends to do? Kenny and Inwood & Woolf, 
following Ross' emendation, have 'ei deinos', thus translating 'For he will, if he is clever, attain 
his objective on the basis of reasoning'. However, I contend that Burnet and Gauthier's solu-
tion is better. It is attested in some manuscripts; it is more economical; it does not introduce 
the concept of deinotês, which is introduced in chapter 12 only; and, as Gauthier notes, it 
insists on the normativity of the moral claims the agents are attending to (Gauthier & Jolif 
1970: 516). 
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"ὕ$7 ,( 'ὐ/-80ί", !"&’ ἣ+ -ὗ C'ῖ <ὲ+ $859ά+'2, -ὐ <έ+$-2 C2’ -ὗ 
ἔC'2. 
In this passage, Aristotle notes that euboulia is not identical with every kind 
of correctness in deliberating (orthotês boulês). In order to make his point, he makes 
a first distinction between euboulia and a case of correct deliberation by invoking 
the case of the man lacking self-control (akratês), or rather with the bad or vicious 
man (phaulos).140 This kind of person is said to deliberate correctly, for he achieves 
what he intends to do. However, his case does not count as a case of euboulia, be-
cause euboulia is conceived not only as technically good, but also as morally good. 
The correct deliberation of the phaulos however results in a great evil (kakon de 
mega). Aristotle does not elaborate further the kind of mistake that this individual 
commits. A plausible assumption is that he considers the wrong starting points, in 
particular, the wrong universal starting points about what is good or beneficial to 
do. More on this below. 
Aristotle then draws a second distinction. He points at occasions when 
someone ends up doing a good action, although he has not reasoned correctly. In 
                                                      
140 Here I believe that Aristotle is referring to one person only. The mention of the akratês 
should not be understood as a reference to Aristotle's technical treatment of akrasia of EN 
VII. Rather, Aristotle is probably being loose when speaking of the 'akratês kai phaulos' char-
acter. At this point of the EN, Aristotle has not yet given an in-depth account of flawed 
characters such as the akratês or the akolastos. He will do so only in book VII. In the EN, there 
is no occurrence of akrasia before book VII where Aristotle is specific enough with his lan-
guage to show that he means akrasia in a technical sense. Here, Aristotle tends rather to as-
similate akrasia to other flaws without distinguishing them thoroughly. Even at the begin-
ning of EN VII, Aristotle seems to be unsure about the nature of akrasia. He speaks of it as 
'belonging to things base and blameworthy' (tôn phaulôn kai psektôn 1145b9). Only in the 
course of book VII will Aristotle provide an account of akrasia specific enough in order to 
show that the agent is doing what he does in a reluctant way, although he wishes he had 
done something else and regrets his deed afterwards. At 1151a24-25, concluding the chap-
ters on akrasia, Aristotle concludes at last that the akratês character is not the same as the self-
indulgent person (akolastos) by asserting that the former is better than the latter and 'not 
base unqualifiedly' (oude phaulos haplôs). That akrasia is not meant in a technical sense, apart 
from in book VII of the EN, holds of the EE as well. At EE 1223a37, in a passage where Aris-
totle discusses whether acting out of epithumia is voluntary or not, akrasia is simply assimi-
lated to a kind of wickedness (mochthêria), while the akratês is described as someone who 
acts against his reason (logismos), following his desire (epithumia). Such a characterization 
does not involve specifying whether or not the akratês is acting according to his intention. At 
1145b15-17 Aristotle mentions a current opinion that akrasia is nothing beyond akolasia, even 
though he also notes that this opinion is not shared by everyone. Thus, at 1142b18-19, one 
ought to understand the phrase 'ὁ 5ὰ) ἀ!)"$ὴ3 !"ὶ ὁ >"ῦ0-3' with an epexegetical kai, as 
meaning 'the akratês, or rather the bad person'. Aristotle seems merely to be using these 
terms loosely, in order to refer to non-virtuous people deprived of euboulia. 
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such cases, the agent has not reasoned 'through the steps one should' (di'ou d'ou). 
Aristotle refers to such a situation as 'achieving a good thing through wrong sul-
logismos' (pseudei sullogismô). Let us call this the 'simple deliberator' case, because it 
seems that we are dealing with someone who has failed in his deliberation. Com-
pared to the case of the phaulos, this is, so to speak, the opposite situation. The sim-
ple deliberator achieves something good, whereas the phaulos does not, but the lat-
ter has deliberated correctly, in contrast to the former. Aristotle elaborates on the 
case of the simple deliberator by explaining that the 'middle term' is wrong (pseudê 
ton meson horon einai). That such a deliberation does not constitute euboulia is clear 
enough. Although it results in a morally good outcome, there was a mistake in the 
deliberation process itself (see also EE 1247b34ff.). 
The simple deliberator does something good, but makes a mistake. What 
does this mistake consist in? Whether he began from a good starting point or not is 
irrelevant here. The action in question was apparently done incidentally (tuchein) 
and does thereby not reveal the character of the agent. If the agent was wicked and 
intended to cause harm, his deliberation was mistaken and he opted for an action 
that eventually turned out to be something good. If, on the contrary, the agent was 
a good person, he considered a good moral end as a starting point in his delibera-
tion and intended to do something good as well. What might happen in both cases 
is that because of mistaken deliberation, the agent ends up performing an action 
which promotes a result which does not match with what he had in mind, but 
which is nevertheless a good thing. Alternatively, the agent might end up doing 
what he intended but through mistaken reasoning, that is, through an inconsistent 
piece of reasoning. The agent would then justify his good action invoking reasons 
that do in fact not promote the end intended.141 I think all these scenarios are possi-
ble and the textual material at our disposal does not favour one interpretation over 
the other. What matters is that the mistaken element in the agent's deliberation does 
not concern either the starting point, or the actual result but what comes in-
between, the 'middle term' (meson horon). 
The terminology employed here reminds one very much of logical termi-
nology. The simple deliberator carries out a false 'syllogism' (sullogismos). Moreo-
ver, 'meson horon' is the term Aristotle uses in order to refer to the middle term of a 
syllogism (APr 25b35). This has incited commentators to see a hint at the practical 
syllogism (i.a. Allan 1955: 336). On this view, Aristotle means to say that the delib-
                                                      
141 For a similar interpretation, see Allen (forthcoming: 17), who speaks of 'a true conclusion 
from false premises'. 
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erating person would be mistaken about the middle term to use in his deliberation, 
thereby confirming that the kind of deliberation at stake here is syllogistic in form.  
There has been a debate as to what the meson horon refers to. Scholars who 
wanted to deflate the bearing of the practical syllogism have attempted to show 
that the meson horon refers not to a step in the reasoning process, but to the actual 
means to the end, i.e. what the agent actually does in order to bring about the in-
tended end.142 Indeed, meson horon basically means 'middle term' without implying 
any further specific reference to the middle term of a syllogism. However, this in-
terpretation does not consider the context adequately. The purpose of the passage is 
to state the conditions of correctness of good deliberation. If the meson horon is the 
means to the end, it is also the outcome of deliberation. But if the means that result 
from deliberation is 'false', as the text states, then the process of deliberation is alto-
gether wrong and the text does not add any specific feature in stating the condi-
tions of correctness of deliberation (see also Allen forthcoming: 16). Moreover, if 
meson horon here stands for the means to an end, the means being 'false' would 
mean either (1) that the chosen means is not conducive to the intended end, or (2) 
that the means is morally wrong. Yet if this is the case, then (1) implies that the end 
is eventually not achieved and thus that deliberation cannot be called 'correct' in 
any sense, which goes against the hypothesis (Hardie 1968: 242-242). The second 
case (2) implies that meson refers only to instrumental means, i.e. means whose ac-
tualization is external to the end intended, and that constitutive means are exclud-
ed. Otherwise, if meson also referred to constitutive means, the case would be in-
consistent with the hypothesis. However, many performed actions that are means to 
a further end are in fact constitutive means, whose actualization is at the same time 
the actualization of the end in view. For instance, if the end I pursue is 'being just 
with my friends' and I am in a situation of sharing food with my friends, there is no 
way I can perform a wrong action in order to achieve a virtuous end. Sharing the 
food in equal parts is constitutive of my being just and this end cannot but be actu-
alized by a virtuous means.143 
On the other hand, the meson horon could refer to a step in the reasoning 
process. In this respect it has been interpreted as referring to the middle term of a 
practical syllogism. However, this reading is not compelling. The fact that Aristotle 
                                                      
142 Corcilius 2008a: 257, who groups other accounts with him: Allan 1955: 336; Gauthier & 
Jolif 1970: 516; Broadie 1991: 225-232. 
143 More generally, a virtuous action must be chosen for its own sake (EN II.4 1105a31-32), 
which tends to show that most of our significant decided actions are in fact constitutive 
means rather than instrumental ones. More on the constitutive/instrumental distinction at 
§4.3.3. 
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is using a term borrowed from the technical vocabulary of syllogistic reasoning 
does not commit him to importing the whole structure of something like a practical 
syllogism. The meson horon could also very well refer to a step in the deliberative 
inquiry.144 Nor does the occurrence of 'sullogismos' commit us to a strong reading in 
terms of practical syllogism. 'Sullogismos' can mean 'reasoning' in general without 
referring specifically to the syllogistic structure as developed in the Prior Analytics 
(See e.g. Hardie 1968, 243; Corcilius 2008a: 261) 
For the time being, I shall leave it open as to how strictly one should under-
stand Aristotle's use of syllogistic terminology in text (22).145 The point I wish to 
make is rather that Aristotle seems to allude to something like a practical syllogism 
in a context where he is providing ways of evaluating practical reasoning. Once the 
action is accomplished, the agent can justify why he has done such and such a 
thing. Thus we can understand if there was something wrong in his action and 
what it was. In the case of the deliberation of a phaulos man, we shall understand 
that what the agent intends (protithetai), i.e. the end this person considers bringing 
about, is not something good. We could for instance confront a Callicles-like person 
who believes that happiness consists in being the strongest. If we ask him: 'why did 
you humiliate Socrates?', he would perhaps answer something like: 'because hap-
piness consists in dominating others'. This proposition is the mistaken starting 
point which explains the wickedness of the person's action and the flaw in his de-
liberation. In the case of a simple deliberator, by contrast, the error consists in that a 
step in his deliberation towards the achievement of a good action is incorrect. Con-
sider a case where I want to be good to dogs, but some people have told me that 
dogs love beating, so that I believe this, albeit mistakenly. When I beat my dog, it 
happens that I am quite weak and that consequently my dog feels petted rather 
than beaten. Thus, I actually realize the end I intended by the correct means. How-
ever, my deliberation was wrong, because one of its premises is wrong. 
I believe that, along these lines, Aristotle is developing a structure of evalua-
tion of practical reason, and in particular of practical knowledge. He spots the ele-
ments in practical reason that enable us to determine the virtuous or flawed charac-
ter of the agent. These elements are in fact pieces of practical reasoning that might 
be construed as an argument in order to justify the agent's decision or action. This 
                                                      
144 This seems to be Inwood & Woolfe's reading of the passage; see also Allen forthcoming: 
15-16. 
145 More precisely, I believe that Aristotle only makes an allusive reference to something like 
the practical syllogism, because he has not thought all the way through the problem of what 
this structure should look like, and most importantly, whether it is the same logical struc-
ture as that of MA 7. I shall propose a definitive answer to this matter at §6.4. 
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argument might be assimilated to a sort of 'practical syllogism' and Aristotle does 
in fact call this structure 'sullogismos'. However, this does not commit him to pro-
jecting the more elaborate logical structure of the syllogism of the Analytics onto the 
ethical case. Aristotle could be making a mere analogy between the logical syllo-
gism and the practical argument, insisting only on some features, without transpos-
ing the whole structure. 
Now if this interpretation is correct, there is an interesting parallel between 
the structure of theoretical and practical reason. I want to anticipate a little bit the 
final results of this chapter. We have seen that theoretical reason is best exemplified 
in states of epistêmê, i.e. in states of knowledge containing a proposition along with 
its explanatory principles. However, I have also shown that such states obtain at the 
end of a heuristic process of inquiry, zêtêsis or skepsis. Epistêmê is not the method by 
which one discovers scientific claims. It is rather a way to uncover and structure 
scientific knowledge in an organized way, which accounts for the truth and necessi-
ty of the relevant claims. Similarly, we find both ways of describing practical rea-
son. Practical thinking consists in a process of inquiry which Aristotle calls deliber-
ation (bouleusis) and which is an inquiry into the right means to a given end. Now, 
my reading of text (22) shows that practical thinking can be described in another 
way. Practical thinking can be evaluated in the form of a practical argument. One 
can account for the outcome of one's practical thinking by referring to the reasons 
why one has done such and such an action. Practical reason can therefore be con-
strued as an argument, which enables one to evaluate the correctness of one's deci-
sion. 
Before I can argue properly for this result, I would like to elaborate the no-
tion of 'practical argument' a little bit. There are two other passages in EN VI that 
help completing my interpretation and thereby confirm it. 
3.3.2.2 EN VI.12 1144a31-b1 
The other passage of the EN where the term 'sullogismos' is found is in EN 
VI.12. This passage occurs in a context where Aristotle wants to show that one can-
not be phronimos unless one is at the same time virtuous in character (and he will 
argue for the converse as well in EN VI.13).146 In order to make his point, Aristotle 
imagines a faculty akin to phronêsis, which he calls deinotês. The person gifted with 
deinotês, the deinos, is similar to the phronimos in the sense that he is able to achieve 
                                                      
146 I offer an extensive reading of the whole argument at §4.4.2. 
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whatever goal he has set for himself.147 However, the deinos agent differs from the 
phronimos in that the nature of the goal is indifferent to him. He can follow whatev-
er goal he likes. This makes the phronimos look like a deinos person who aims at the 
good. There is also a vile counterpart of the phronimos, whom Aristotle calls panour-
gos (villainous, unscrupulous) and who is a deinos person following evil purposes. 
Aristotle's subsequent argument for the necessity of virtue for the phronimos runs as 
follows:  
23) "And the proper condition of this eye of the soul [i.e. phronêsis] 
does not obtain without virtue, as has been said and as is clear. 
For syllogisms concerned with practical things have a principle 
(archê): 'Since the end or what is best is such-and-such', whatever it 
is (let it be anything you like (to tuchon) for the sake of argument). 
And this is not apparent, except to the good person, since wicked-
ness distorts a person and causes him to be deceived about the 
principles of actions. Manifestly, then, it is impossible to be 
phronimos without being good." EN VI.12 1144a29-b1 
ἡ C’ ἕN23 $ῷ (30) ὄ<<"$2 $-ύ$ῳ 5ί+'$"2 $ῆ3 m89ῆ3 -ὐ! ἄ+'8 
ἀ)'$ῆ3, ὡ3 'ἴ)7$"ί $' !"ὶ ἔ@$2 Cῆ0-+· -ἱ 5ὰ) @800-52@<-ὶ $ῶ+ 
,)"!$ῶ+ ἀ)9ὴ+ ἔ9-+$έ3 'ἰ@2+, ἐ,'2Cὴ $-2ό+C' $ὸ $έ0-3 !"ὶ $ὸ 
ἄ)2@$-+, ὁ$2Cή,-$' ὄ+ (ἔ@$( 5ὰ) 0ό5-8 9ά)2+ $ὸ $89ό+)· $-ῦ$- 
C’ 'ἰ <ὴ $ῷ ἀ5"&ῷ, -ὐ >"ί+'$"2· C2"@$)έ>'2 5ὰ) ἡ (35) <-9&7)ί" 
!"ὶ C2"m'ύC'@&"2 ,-2'ῖ ,')ὶ $ὰ3 ,)"!$2!ὰ3 ἀ)9ά3. ὥ@$' 
>"+')ὸ+ ὅ$2 ἀCύ+"$-+ >)ό+2<-+ 'ἶ+"2 <ὴ ὄ+$" (1144b) ἀ5"&ό+. 
The 'proper condition' (hexis) of phronêsis involves performing good actions 
non-incidentally, as stated in the definition of phronêsis (1140b4-6, text 12), which 
implies taking good decisions. Thus, phronêsis aims at good ends (unlike deinotês), 
since an action that has been decided on depends on a certain end. However, good 
ends are apparent to the good person (ho agathos) alone, i.e. to the one with charac-
ter virtue. Hence phronêsis involves character virtue.148 While developing his argu-
ment, Aristotle is careful to use a syllogistic terminology in order to describe the 
end in play in practical reasoning. He refers to the end of practical reason as the 
archê of "syllogisms concerned with practical things" (hoi sullogismoi tôn praktôn). He 
elaborates on what this archê consists in by providing an example: "since the end or 
what is best is such-and-such". The pronoun toionde stands for a qualitative proper-
                                                      
147 1144a24-25: $ὰ ,)ὸ3 $ὸ+ ὑ,-$'&έ+$" @!-,ὸ+ @8+$'ί+-+$" Cύ+"@&"2 $"ῦ$" ,)ά$$'2+ 
!"ὶ $859ά+'2+ "ὐ$-ῦ. 
148 This is a crucial implication of Aristotle's moral psychology. What enables the good per-
son to see the correct end is not his intellectual abilities but his moral character (see EN III.4; 
VI.5 1140b16-21). Of course, there is much to say about this assertion (I shall come back to it 
at §4.3.2), but for the time being I want to point out another feature of the text. 
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ty. It is usually taken to refer to an action type expressed propositionally.149 The 
kind of proposition supplying the archê would then be 'since the end/what is best is 
'being nice to my friends', or 'sharing equally', etc.' In other words, in order to ex-
press what the goal of the person is, Aristotle invokes logical terminology and even 
provides an exemplification of the end in a propositional form. 
Now, I contend that this passage is very much like the case of the phaulos de-
liberator we have seen in passage (22). It is obvious that by the 'archê' of such pieces 
of reasoning Aristotle is referring to the same thing as when he spoke of "what [the 
agent] proposes as appropriate" (ho protithetai dein). In passage (22), the phronimos 
differs from the phaulos by the fact that he aims only at morally right principles, 
whereas the latter tends towards things that are morally wrong. And in passage 
(23), the phronimos differs from the deinos and the panourgos because he has access to 
the correct starting points, whereas the others have distorted moral insights. Aristo-
tle is making the same point but for a different purpose. In passage (22), he uses the 
difference between the phronimos and the phaulos in order to show the specificity of 
euboulia, whereas in passage (23), he wants to show that the virtue of the practical, 
rational part of the soul depends on the virtue of the desiderative, non-rational, part 
of the soul. This passage confirms therefore that when referring to occurrences of 
moral ends as part of a kind of sullogismos Aristotle is in fact assuming a framework 
for the evaluation of practical thinking. The agent uses as starting point a proposi-
tion of the form 'since the end, i.e. what is best is such-and-such'. When applied to 
the panourgos of EN VI.12, this reveals the moral nature of his action. The panourgos 
holds a proposition of the form: 'If the end, i.e. what is best is making as much 
money as possible', and uses it as a starting point. In his deliberation, he probably 
goes on with something like 'I ought to steal from people'. 
Again, the occurrence of syllogistic vocabulary in passage (23) has caused a 
great deal of puzzlement, especially because the sullogismoi tôn praktôn is the phrase 
of the whole Aristotelian corpus that most closely resembles 'practical syllogism'. 
Greenwood identifies the phrase without hesitation as referring to the practical 
syllogism (Greenwood 1909: 9-10). However, as in the case of the previous occur-
rence of sullogismos, there is not enough material in order to infer that Aristotle has 
in mind a precise concept such as that of the practical syllogism. 
The interpretation of texts (22) and (23) as providing conditions for the eval-
uation of practical thought is also confirmed in EN VI.7-8. In my view, these chap-
ters in fact contain Aristotle's central account of the conditions for the good exercise 
                                                      
149 See e.g. Natali 2001: 69; Broadie & Rowe 2002: 382; Moss 2012: 195; 224, n. 41. Moreover, 
toionde stands for a specific end, not for a general one (pace Kenny 1979: 150). I shall com-
ment more on this at §4.3.3. 
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of practical thought. In other words, Aristotle develops a framework for the evalua-
tion of practical reason. 
3.3.2.3 EN VI.7-8 (Bekker EN VI.8-9) 
At the end of EN VI.7, after he has introduced sophia as the theoretical virtue 
of the rational soul, Aristotle comes back to his account of phronêsis by contrasting it 
with sophia (1141b8 onwards). The first lines of this section are a restatement of 
points made earlier about a common approximation of phronêsis, namely that 
phronêsis involves good deliberation and that it is concerned by contingent things 
only (1141b8-14). Then, Aristotle carries on with an in-depth account of phronêsis. 
24) " Nor is phronêsis about universals only; one should also know the 
particulars. For phronêsis is practical (praktikê) and action (praxis) is 
about particulars. That is why some people who do not have 
<universal> knowledge are more effective (praktikôteroi) than oth-
ers who have knowledge – something that holds especially of ex-
perienced people. If someone knows that light meats are easily di-
gestible and so healthy, but not what sorts of meat are light, then 
he will not produce health, but the one who knows that meat from 
birds is light150 and so healthy will produce health more. And 
since phronêsis is practical, one needs both <kinds of knowledge>, 
but especially this one" EN VI.7 1141b14-23 
-ὐC’ ἐ@$ὶ+ ἡ >)ό+7@23 $ῶ+ (15) !"&ό0-8 <ό+-+, ἀ00ὰ C'ῖ !"ὶ $ὰ 
!"&’ ἕ!"@$" 5+()ί`'2+· ,)"!$2!ὴ 5ά), ἡ Cὲ ,)ᾶN23 ,')ὶ $ὰ !"&’ 
ἕ!"@$". C2ὸ !"ὶ ἔ+2-2 -ὐ! 'ἰCό$'3 ἑ$έ)(+ 'ἰCό$(+ 
,)"!$2!ώ$')-2, !"ὶ ἐ+ $-ῖ3 ἄ00-23 -ἱ ἔ<,'2)-2· 'ἰ 5ὰ) 'ἰC'ί7 ὅ$2 
$ὰ !-ῦ>" 'ὔ,',$" !)έ" !"ὶ ὑ52'2+ά, ,-ῖ" Cὲ !-ῦ>" ἀ5+--ῖ, -ὐ 
,-2ή@'2 ὑ5ί(20) '2"+, ἀ00’ ὁ 'ἰCὼ3 ὅ$2 $ὰ ὀ)+ί&'2" [!-ῦ>" !"ὶ] 
ὑ52'2+ὰ ,-2ή@'2 <ᾶ00-+. ἡ Cὲ >)ό+7@23 ,)"!$2!ή· ὥ@$' C'ῖ 
ἄ<>( ἔ9'2+, ἢ $"ύ$7+ <ᾶ00-+. 
This passage occurs at the end of chapter 7 of book VI, at least if one follows 
Zell's division into chapters. But according to Bekker's way of dividing the books of 
the Nicomachean Ethics, it constitutes the beginning of chapter 8. I tend to prefer this 
division here, because of the thematic unity it provides with Bekker's chapter 9 (alt-
hough in itself the division into chapters, being a late addition to the text, is not 
                                                      
150 Bywater in the OCT has emended !-ῦ>" !"ὶ following Trendelenburg and Rassow be-
cause they thought that Aristotle is here giving an example of the practical syllogism (For a 
complete explanation, see Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 497). This reading is not accepted nowa-
days and I follow the mainstream reading, seeing no reason to emend the text. 
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significant).151 This assumption about the organization of the text provides a key to 
understanding its argumentative structure. Essential parts of Bekker's chapters 8 
and 9 concern points of contrast between sophia and phronêsis. More specifically, an 
opposition is drawn between phronêsis and both components of sophia, namely 
epistêmê and nous (see 1141a18-20). First, Aristotle tackles the contrast between 
phronêsis and epistêmê (1141b14-1142a25)152, and then he turns to that of phronêsis 
and nous (1142a25-30) (See Engberg Pedersen 1983: 204).153 
The features contrasting phronêsis and epistêmê are all based on the special 
connection of phronêsis with the particulars. First, contrary to epistêmê, phronêsis in-
volves not only knowledge of universals, but also a sort of knowledge of particulars 
(1141b14-16). Aristotle then elaborates on the concept of experience (empeiria) 
(1142a11-20 Zell's chap. 8/Bekker's chap. 9). Phronêsis depends on experience when 
it comes to the acquisition of knowledge of the particulars mentioned at 1141b18. 
Theoretical science is not concerned with particulars, or at least not in the same 
way.154 Next, Aristotle shows that phronêsis also differs from epistêmê in that it can 
be wrong in a further aspect than its theoretical counterpart. Error might consist 
either in the universal or in the particular (1142a20-23). Finally, Aristotle concludes 
the confrontation between phronêsis and epistêmê: 
25) "Thus, that phronêsis is not the same as epistêmê is obvious. For 
phronêsis is concerned with what comes last (to eschaton), as has 
been said.155 For the object of action is such [i.e. something that 
comes last]" EN VI.8 1142a23-25 
ὅ$2 C’ ἡ >)ό+7@23 -ὐ! ἐ,2@$ή<7, >"+')ό+· $-ῦ 5ὰ) ἐ@9ά$-8 
ἐ@$ί+, ὥ@,') 'ἴ)7$"2· (25) $ὸ 5ὰ) ,)"!$ὸ+ $-2-ῦ$-+. 
                                                      
151 On the two ways to divide the books of the EN into chapters, see my introductory note, p. 
14. 
152 There is an extra bit of text that cuts in the progression between 1141b22 and 1142a11; see 
text (16). Aristotle seems to reorient the discussion on a political level. However commenta-
tors generally agree that 1142a11 follows thematically 1141b22 (see Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 
502). 
153 I shall come back to the contrast between phronêsis and nous at §5.2.2. 
154 There is a difference between sciences whose objects are accessible through abstraction 
(di'aphaireseôs a18), like mathematics, and sciences whose objects are known through experi-
ence, like physics. Yet, this feature of empirical theoretical science is different from the rela-
tion of phronêsis to the particulars. What physics acquire through experience are the starting 
points (archai), not the particular. Roughly speaking, phronêsis is not engaged with experi-
ence the way theoretical sciences are, when they are. For a more detailed discussion of this 
passage, see §5.3.1. 
155 'What comes last' (to eschaton) in this context is identical with the particular (kath'hekaston) 
pace Cooper 1975: 37. Aristotle's clarification that phronêsis is concerned with to eschaton, as 
has been said, refers to 1141b14-16, where he was speaking of the particular. 
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Thus, in my view, EN VI.7 1141b14-23 (text 24), which, according to Bekker, 
constitutes the beginning of chapter 8, introduces a fundamental difference be-
tween theoretical and practical thought, namely the connection of the latter with 
particulars. According to Bekker's division into chapters, the rest of EN VI.8-9 is a 
list of comments on this crucial distinction. 
I shall come back to a more careful reading of text (24) in chap. 4, especially 
as regards the assertion that knowledge of particulars makes one 'more practical' 
(§4.4.2). The relation between phronêsis and experience will occupy a good deal of 
chapter 5. The point I am interested in here is that, according to Aristotle, practical 
thought can be evaluated in terms of an argument. On this reading of chapters 8-9 
(following Bekker's division), the point of contrast between phronêsis and epistêmê 
relevant for my concern is the third one, namely the specification of the conditions 
of error with respect to deliberation:  
26) "Also, error in deliberation can be either about the universal or 
about the particular; for example, in holding either that all sam-
ples of heavy water are bad, or that this [i.e. this sample of water] 
is heavy." 1142a20-23 
(20) ἔ$2 ἡ ἁ<")$ί" ἢ ,')ὶ $ὸ !"&ό0-8 ἐ+ $ῷ /-80'ύ@"@&"2 ἢ 
,')ὶ $ὸ !"&’ ἕ!"@$-+· ἢ 5ὰ) ὅ$2 ,ά+$" $ὰ /")ύ@$"&<" ὕC"$" 
>"ῦ0", ἢ ὅ$2 $-Cὶ /")ύ@$"&<-+. 
It seems clear that Aristotle is referring here to the kinds of knowledge of 
universals and particulars he identified at 1141b14-16.156 From the latter passage, we 
know that displaying phronimos behaviour implies to be endowed with two distinct 
types of knowledge. One is about something universal and the other about some-
thing particular. Now, passage (26) tells us that one may be mistaken according to 
either of these kinds of knowledge. Even more, Aristotle bothers to signal that these 
are conditions of error in deliberation (en tô bouleusasthai) when he is referring to 
kinds of knowledge that are required for phronêsis. This seems to confirm that prac-
tical thought can be described in two distinct ways: as deliberation or in a formal 
way. Phronêsis depends on both kinds of knowledge and mistakes about these 
might occur within a process of deliberation. 
It is also hard to resist the temptation to connect this passage with EN VI.9 
1142b17-26 (text 22), on the kind of correctness of euboulia. As we have already seen, 
correctness in good deliberation depends on two components which seem to refer 
                                                      
156 It is so obvious that Ramsauer and Susemihl thought that text (26) makes the same point 
than 1141b14-16; See Gauthier 1970: 503. Natali implicitly agrees that the terms universal 
and particular refer to the same thing in both passages (Natali 2001: 84). 
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to kinds of knowledge bearing on universals and particulars. On the one hand, one 
ought to pursue a morally good end; on the other hand, one also go through the 
correct steps when deliberating. These two components would then be equivalent 
to a universal and a particular content of practical reasoning respectively. This 
reading has been accepted by scholars who suppose that practical thinking, or even 
deliberation, has a syllogistic form.157 It allegedly shows that deliberation is com-
posed of a universal premise and of a particular one. However, once again, nothing 
justifies this strong association with the practical syllogism. By contrast, my reading 
dissociates deliberation as the main form of practical thinking from the practical 
argument as a formal representation of practical thought, the purpose of which is 
precisely to evaluate the correctness of deliberation. In the rest of this section, I shall 
sketch out how knowledge or ignorance of each component of practical thought 
matters for the evaluation of decision. In chap. 4 and 5, I shall argue in more detail 
for these points. 
In the case of knowledge of universals, the equivalence between texts (22) 
and (26) seems to be pretty straightforward. The deliberator of text (22) considers a 
moral end he ought to achieve. This moral end can be wrong, for instance in the 
case of the villain (phaulos), who pursues bad purposes. This end is described as a 
universal evaluative proposition 'since the end, i.e. what is best is such and such' 
(text 23). I assume that in text (26) Aristotle refers to the same kind of proposition, 
namely universal evaluative proposition that expresses the moral end which the 
agent is pursuing. Thus, text (26) tells us that this kind of universal normative prin-
ciple can be 'false', i.e. morally wrong. What the phaulos proposes as appropriate 
corresponds to a false proposition exemplifying a universal content. I shall come 
back to the correspondence between one's knowledge of moral ends and universal 
propositions at §4.3. 
In the case of knowledge about particulars, we need to elaborate the equiva-
lence a little bit. Being mistaken about the particular would mean the same as 'hav-
ing the false middle term' (text 22). Considering Aristotle's own examples might 
help in making sense of such an equivalence. At 1141b14-23, when he argues that 
phronêsis involves both knowledge of universals and particulars, he considers as an 
example of a universal proposition 'light meats are easily digestible and so healthy', 
and as an example of a particular proposition 'meat from birds is light'.158 Aristotle 
                                                      
157 Greenwood 1909: 50-51; Joachim 1951: 208-210; Ando 1958: 221; Mele 1981: 282. 
158 Note that the 'particular' proposition is not even particular in form. Aristotle seems to 
correct this problem in the next example 'this is heavy' at 1142a22-23. However this shows 
that the meaning of kath'hekaston is not clear in this context. My position is that what counts 
as a 'particular' is a proposition that is connected with the particular situation of the agent. 
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does not offer any instance of practical reasoning in this context. However one can 
construct the following case. Suppose that I am feeling weak, and I am working out 
a way to strengthen my body. Among other considerations in my deliberation, I 
come to the conclusion that I should eat chicken. Thus, I can reformulate my delib-
eration in the following way: 
Light meat is healthy 
Poultry is light meat 
I should eat poultry  
The conclusion of my deliberation is a decision (proairesis), and on the basis 
of it I can engage in the action described, namely eating poultry. Note that strictly 
speaking the argument is invalid. The conclusion that follows logically from the 
premises is 'poultry is healthy', not 'I should eat poultry'. In order to have the 
wished for conclusion, one ought to supply further premises, and moreover prem-
ises that at some point import a prescriptive element (e.g. 'I should eat something 
healthy'). Furthermore, even if one grants the wished for conclusion, it still does not 
amount to a particular decision such as 'I should do this here and now'. The wished 
for conclusion is rather a general prompting towards a type of action. However, I 
contend that these formal aspects are not relevant for the point Aristotle is making 
here. He is not concerned with developing a consistent account of practical reason-
ing that ought to explain practical logic and the causation of action. Rather, what 
matters here is merely the evaluation of practical thought in cognitive terms. The 
argument constructed here, although invalid, is relevant because it provides suffi-
cient justification for a decision. If someone were to ask me why I have eaten, say, 
chicken, or why I have decided to eat chicken, answering 'because poultry is light 
meat', or 'because light meat is healthy' would be a perfectly sound justification.159 
Now suppose that someone provides me with further information by telling 
me that deep fried turkey is poultry. I shall then be able to pursue my deliberation. 
The argument will thus go: 
Poultry is healthy 
Deep fried turkey is poultry 
I should eat deep fried turkey 
                                                                                                                                                        
Yet this kath'hekaston can be either universal or particular in form. I defend this position at 
§4.4.2. 
159 The question of the validity of a practical argument will be raised in chap. 6 concerning 
the case of akrasia. There I shall argue that an akratic agent has a valid argument justifying 
what he thinks he should do, yet this argument is not strong enough, because it lacks sup-
porting premises between the major premise and the conclusion. 
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Even in the loose logical framework I am considering here, it seems obvious 
that the above argument is invalid in a different way than the previous one. The 
argument is not valid because the term 'poultry' in each premise does not refer to 
the same set of items. In the universal premise, 'poultry' refers to general poultry 
meat, whereas in the particular premise, 'poultry' refers to a more specific set of 
items, that of poultry meat cooked in a specific way. Thus, the conclusion does not 
follow because the middle term 'poultry' in each premise does not have the same 
reference. Another way to look at it is to consider the major premise as a general 
rule. However this rule holds only for the most part. Poultry is in general healthy. 
The minor constitutes in fact an exception to the rule. A whole turkey that has been 
deep-fried is not healthy. 
This is how I understand Aristotle when he speaks of being mistaken about 
the middle term. Being mistaken about the middle term is expressed as the mistak-
en proposition that attributes 'healthy' to 'fried turkey'. What matters here is that 
the particular proposition is false, because what is meant in the universal premise is 
not the same as in the particular one. The agent was not able to apply the middle 
term correctly. 
In order to make this point better, let us consider a moral example. Think of 
Socrates in the Gorgias who enjoins Polus to punish himself or his friends if he or 
they have committed an unjust deed (Gorgias 480c). Common sense would rather 
have it that one should treat one's friends justly. Plato's reasoning could then be 
formulated as follows: 
One should be just with one's friends 
Punishing is being just 
I should punish my friends 
If Polus accepts this argument, he will commit a mistake in identifying 'pun-
ishing' as an instance of being just. It might be the case that in some circumstances 
the conclusion is true. However, most of the time, the meaning of 'just' in the major 
and in the minor are not the same. In this situation, Polus was not able to identify 
the relevant particular correctly. In other words, his grasp of the particular is 
wrong. 
Thus, practical reason depends on two main conditions for its correctness. 
First the universal principle followed must be 'true', i.e. must be morally good. The 
phaulos, on the contrary, does not deliberate well because he is not attending a mor-
ally good principle. Second, the particulars considered in the course of deliberation 
must be true. The simple deliberator achieves a good end, but does not do so by 
considering relevant features of the situation. 
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To sum up, in book VI, Aristotle describes the conditions for correct practi-
cal thinking. Practical thinking consists in a deliberative process that aims at find-
ing out the means towards a given end. Practical thinking results in a decision to 
act, the content of which represents the action to be performed (the means), as well 
as the end for the sake of which the action is done. Once a decision has been 
reached, it is also possible to evaluate it morally. The content of a decision can be 
formalized as an argument (for a similar interpretation, see Natali 2001: 66-67). Ar-
istotle shows this by using logical terminology and by calling this argument a 'sul-
logismos' twice. This confirms that there is a parallel structure between theoretical 
and practical reason. Theoretical knowledge, that is – in this case – epistêmê, is a 
cognitive state which presupposes a deductive argument. Coming to the assertion 
of knowledge in this form requires a process of inquiry which searches for the miss-
ing link, the cause, that explains the belief asserted in the episode of epistêmê. Simi-
larly, practical knowledge consists in a cognitive state whose content is a virtuous 
decision that has been reached through a process of deliberation. Such a state pre-
supposes that the person deciding is connecting it with reasons, i.e. that he has 
formed a kind of argument that justifies the decision taken. 
If my claim about EN VI.8-9 (following Bekker's division) is right, namely 
that these chapters contain a theory on the evaluation of practical reason, it should 
then provide a framework which is pretty much complete, i.e. able to account for a 
variety of flaws in practical reason.160 This framework seems to account in a satis-
                                                      
160 That this account is complete seems to be confirmed by a text from the Politics:  
"There are two things in which all well-being consists: one of them 
is in positing correctly the goal and end of actions, and the other 
in discovering the actions which are conducive of the end; for 
these things may agree or disagree with one another. For 
sometimes the goal is finely set up, but in acting they fail to 
achieve it; in other cases they succeed in all the things conducive 
to the end, but the end they have posited was bad; and sometimes 
they fail in both." Pol. 1331b26-34 
ἐ,'ὶ Cὲ Cύ’ ἐ@$ὶ+ ἐ+ -ἷ3 5ί5+'$"2 $ὸ 'ὖ ,ᾶ@2, $-ύ$-2+ C’ ἐ@$ὶ+ ἓ+ 
<ὲ+ ἐ+ $ῷ $ὸ+ @!-,ὸ+ !'ῖ@&"2 !"ὶ $ὸ $έ0-3 $ῶ+ ,)άN'(+ 
ὀ)&ῶ3, ἓ+ Cὲ $ὰ3 ,)ὸ3 $ὸ $έ0-3 >')-ύ@"3 ,)άN'23 'ὑ)ί@!'2+· 
ἐ+Cέ9'$"2 5ὰ) $"ῦ$" !"ὶ C2">(+'ῖ+ ἀ00ή0-23 !"ὶ @8<>(+'ῖ+· 
ἐ+ί-$' 5ὰ) ὁ <ὲ+ @!-,ὸ3 ἔ!!'2$"2 !"0ῶ3, ἐ+ Cὲ $ῷ ,)ά$$'2+ $-ῦ 
$89'ῖ+ "ὐ$-ῦ C2"<")$ά+-8@2+, ὁ$ὲ Cὲ $ῶ+ <ὲ+ ,)ὸ3 $ὸ $έ0-3 
,ά+$(+ ἐ,2$859ά+-8@2+, ἀ00ὰ $ὸ $έ0-3 ἔ&'+$- >"ῦ0-+, ὁ$ὲ Cὲ 
ἑ!"$έ)-8 C2"<")$ά+-8@2+. 
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factory way for defaults such as moral wickedness (mochthêria) and simple-
mindedness.161 
A further appeal of this reading of EN VI.8-9 (following Bekker's division) is 
that it provides a coherent structure to the second part of book VI of the Common 
Books. The second part of EN VI often gives the impression of being a collection of 
remarks that have been randomly put together.162 On the contrary, the hypothesis 
that practical knowledge is an argument that accompanies proairesis provides a 
backbone for the rest of the book, until EN VI.12-13 where Aristotle tackles other 
issues. 
3.4 Structural differences between practical and theoretical thought 
So far, I have insisted a lot on the similarities between the two kinds of 
thought, especially concerning their respective structures. I have characterized the 
relationship between phronêsis and deliberation as analogical to the relationship 
between epistêmê and scientific inquiry. In both kinds of thought, we can distin-
guish two ways of describing their activity. Either one focuses on reasoning as an 
actual process in the soul, which is typically scientific inquiry in the case of theoret-
ical thinking, and deliberation in the practical case, or one focuses on the outcome 
of each kind of thinking. In the theoretical case, the outcome of theoretical thinking 
is epistêmê, i.e. the exposition of a scientific claim explained by its proper cause, 
while in the practical case, the outcome is a decision to act in a certain way, which is 
backed up by reasons. 
In doing so, I have presupposed the most obvious differences between theo-
retical and practical thought. First, there is a difference of object. As has been men-
tioned at § 2.4.2, theoretical investigation has universal regularities as its proper 
object, whereas practical deliberation has contingent, particular states of affairs as 
its object. There is of course a difference in function: theoretical reason aims at 
theôria, whereas practical reason aims at action, i.e. at changing the way the world 
is. There also is obviously a difference in psychological basis, as was implied when 
the notion of practical truth was introduced. Theoretical thought is evaluated in 
terms of being true or false in a simple sense, namely when what is asserted is con-
firmed or informed by what is the case. By contrast, practical thought is evaluated 
                                                      
161 What is missing in this account is a more complete explanation on the relationship be-
tween universal and the particular premise. I shall tackle this question in my account of 
akrasia and enkrateia in chap. 6. 
162 Allan 1952: 182-183; Hardie 1968: 212; according to Natali 2014: 184, the apparent lack of 
structure in book VI is especially perceptible at the end of EN VI.8. 
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along two axes. First, practical thought can be true or false in the same, cognitive, 
sense as theoretical knowledge, but it is also correct or incorrect in terms of desires. 
While these differences are significant and deserve an in-depth treatment, I shall 
leave them aside in order to discuss a further contrast. 
This contrast consists in a difference in structure between practical and theo-
retical thought. Although both scientific inquiry and deliberation are kinds of 
zêtêsis, their structure is different. In deliberation, the agent seeks a way to imple-
ment the end in the present situation. He starts his inquiry from the starting point 
(i.e. the practical goal he aims at) and by confronting it to an actual situation, he 
comes to a conclusion which takes the form of a decision to act. To put it in the logi-
cal terms of the practical argument, the premises are already known and what is 
looked for is the conclusion. Thus, the agent is looking for how to achieve the end. 
What is presupposed in this case, i.e. the hypothesis, is the end. By contrast, theoreti-
cal inquiry aims at answering the question 'why?' The theoretical thinker starts with 
a definite state of affairs he wishes to explain and then looks for its cause. The 
hupothesis here is the conclusion, whereas the inquirer searches for the middle term 
and thus attempts to spell out the premises of a demonstration (See Broadie 1991: 
228). That both structures are different is also clear when one tries to apply scien-
tific inquiry to a practical case, as is shown by Natali: "analysis in the theoretical 
case would consist in positing a given good and looking for showing that this good 
is indeed good by invoking a starting points or a superior good whose goodness is 
already known (mathematical analysis by Pappus)" (Natali 2001: 82). By contrast, 
deliberation posits a good as an end and then looks for a specification of it which is 
immediately achievable (the how). Take the statement 'I ought to honour my par-
ents' as a starting points. The deliberator is looking for something which will enable 
him to honour his parents. This can take various forms. He can go buy them flow-
ers or give a speech in their honour. What he does not look for in his deliberation is 
an explanation of why he ought to honour his parents. 
Thus the theoretical thinker starts with the proposition he wants to explain, 
i.e. the hupothesis is the conclusion. He presupposes the result and arrives at an ex-
planation of this state of affairs. The cause enters into a deductive relationship with 
the explanandum. The deliberator starts with his own hupothesis of an end he wants 
to achieve. The end is presupposed and he discovers means by which this end is to 
be achieved. 
This difference in structure has led some scholars to think that deliberation 
has nothing to do with the practical syllogism. Broadie claims that her version of 
the practical argument, which is non-deductive, sums up deliberation: 
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"[seeing a choice] concludes the deliberation by installing that 
action (the concept of it) into position in the first premiss of a 
causal argument whose conclusion represents the once 
problematic starting points. For the practical inquirer is now in 
possession of this: 'Since (because) I will do A (or: by doing A), I 
shall realise Q in E, and therefore P in D, and therefore O in C. [...] 
the practical argument premises a cause in the sense of the 'How?' 
of a state of affairs not yet in existence." (Broadie 1991: 229) 
Corcilius has a similar account. According to him, the structure of delibera-
tive thinking is hypothetical. He founds his claim on the fact that Aristotle's exam-
ples of practical thinking have the form of a hypothetical necessity (Corcilius 2008a: 
252-255). Hence, my claim that decision contains a moral justification of an action in 
terms of reasons to act would be mistaken. Deliberation would be directed at find-
ing out the correct decision, but not at providing reasons to act. 
I think that this opposition to an interpretation of the practical argument as 
the moral justification of decision is actually directed against the deductive form of 
practical thinking.  Opponents of a deductive argument want to deny any relevance 
of the practical syllogism in this area of Aristotle's moral psychology. They certain-
ly fear an assimilation of deliberation to a deductive process of thinking. Conse-
quently, they hold that the practical syllogism is rather associated with the question 
of the causation of action (Corcilius 2008a). Aristotle's description of deliberation at 
EN III.3 seems to support their claim. I agree with them to the extent that the struc-
ture of deliberation as a process of thinking is not deductive in form. Natali argues 
convincingly that the logical structure of deliberation is not the same as that of the 
justification of an action (Natali 2001: 46-48). Moral justification takes the form of a 
teleological explanation by invoking the final cause: 'Why did you do >?' – 'In order 
to realize end E.' What the agent is looking for is a middle term (nevertheless, this 
kind of investigation is still not scientific inquiry, because it does not account for 
the action in terms of a non-accidental higher cause). By contrast, deliberation is a 
search for the how. 
However, one should not infer from this point that the practical argument as 
a justification of decision has nothing to do with practical thought. Here the com-
parison with theoretical reason is useful again. Even though epistêmê depends on a 
deductive argument, this does not mean that theoretical thought is deductive in 
form. The distinction between a process of inquiry and a form of exposition is clear. 
The zêtêsis which is a search for the cause has no definite logical form. It is rather an 
inquiry that operates on the basis of trial and error, making hypotheses and looking 
for a way to confirm or deny them. Once the correct answer has been found, the 
process of zêtêsis also provides the reasons why the fact to explain is so and so. The 
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investigation uncovers the causes, which then enter into the deductive structure of 
the apodeixis. I believe that the same must be true in the practical case. Even though 
deliberation is not deductive in form and need not be identified with the practical 
syllogism, it reveals the reasons why the agent ends up deciding to do such and 
such an action. Once the correct decision has been reached, the agent is able to ac-
count for it in an appropriate way (if his deliberation was a good one, of course). 
I believe that using an argument akin to a deduction makes sense in the con-
text of practical knowledge, because of the framework it provides for the moral 
evaluation of decision. My view is that the subject matter of EN VI.7-9 is not the 
same as deliberation in EN III.3. What interests Aristotle in EN VI is not the process 
of finding out how, but the question of the correctness of decision, that is, of deter-
mining when a piece of practical reasoning is right or wrong, and thus virtuous or 
not. Aristotle is interested in the question why because he states the conditions of 
correctness of practical reason. He is interested in phronêsis because it is the virtue 
which enables one to make the morally right decision. And the phronimos knows 
that what he is doing is the best thing to do, because he has reasons that justify his 
decision. He knows how, but he also knows why. Acting virtuously requires us not 
only to perform an action with virtuous consequences, it also requires us to do it 
with the right disposition, i.e. it requires us to understand why the action is virtu-
ous and to do it for its own sake (see EN II.4 1105a26-33). Furthermore, as I shall 
show in the next chapter, the content of decision includes a description of the end 
(EE II.10 1226a7-13). The outcome of deliberation is not merely the description of a 
particular action which states how the agent is going to achieve a given end. The 
decision involves a description of the end, and this means that the agent has a no-
tion of why he plans to perform such and such an action. 
If practical thought were to consist solely in deliberation, which has a non-
deductive form, and presumably a hypothetical form, and if its function were only 
a search for the how, then it would not be able to fulfil the requirements of practical 
reason. The structure of deliberation as hypothetical reasoning is as follows: 'if I 
intend to bring about A, I ought to do >'. E.g. If I want to protect the city, I should 
hold my ground in battle. The latter part of the hypothetical proposition expresses 
the how. How am I to realize the intended end (protecting the city)? By holding my 
ground. However, such an argument is not directly related to virtuous behaviour. 
Rather such a question would be addressed to a craftsman, if he were to be asked 
how he performs his art. One can overlook this and suppose that the hypothetical 
argument provides a justification for action. Why did you hold your ground? Be-
cause I wanted to protect the city. But then it seems that this way of using the hypo-
thetical argument collapses into the practical argument as I have described it in the 
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previous section. 
Again, it is true that practical thought as a process brings about a state that 
provides an answer the question 'how': 'How can I bring about the end in view, i.e. 
the good?'; 'How can I implement the end 'honouring one's parents' in this situa-
tion?' But practical thought as an argument provides simultaneously a justification of 
my decision or action, i.e. an answer to the question 'why?'. In other words, the el-
ements of justification of an action are discovered during the process of delibera-
tion. 'I visited my mother at the hospital because one ought to honour one's parents, 
and my mother broke her leg. The right thing to do is to visit her at the hospital, 
tonight, with a bunch of flowers'. After having deliberated, I come to the decision 
that I ought to visit her, and my decision is backed up by reasons for doing so. In 
answering the question how, i.e. 'what should I do?', I come up with reasons why I 
should do so and so. The voluntary agent who acts for the sake of his decision has 
arrived at this decision through deliberation and is thereby in a position to justify it. 
Nothing other than his deliberation is required for him to justify his action. If a 
search for justification were additionally to be required, then the agent would not 
have acted for the sake of his decision since he would be looking for an excuse for 
what he has done. 
3.5 Conclusion 
From this study of theoretical and practical reason, an important distinction 
comes to be made between reason as a structure of thinking and reasoning as a pro-
cess. With respect to theoretical thought, there is theoretical reason, which is formal-
ized in a syllogistic form and which finds its most adequate expression in the apo-
deixis, but there is also theoretical inquiry (zêtêsis), which is a process of looking for 
causes and principles. Thus, an episode of theoretical knowledge (epistêmê) obtains 
from an inquiry, when the correct cause of the claim under scrutiny has been found. 
This epistêmê consists in a deduction from premises which are universal and prior to 
the conclusion and which are non-incidentally the cause of the conclusion. The apo-
deixis provides the conditions for the appropriate explanation of a scientific claim. 
Similarly, in the case of practical thought, there is deliberation, which is the 
practical counterpart of theoretical zêtêsis, on the one hand, and there is practical 
reason, which can be formalized as an argument and which represents the content of 
a decision (proairesis). Practical reason is also similar to theoretical reason in that the 
rational state that issues from deliberation can be accounted for by supporting rea-
sons. In the case of theoretical reason, an episode of epistêmê is backed up by a mid-
dle term, whereas in the case of practical reason, an episode of proairesis is support-
ed by reasons for acting. 
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On this interpretation, there is a parallel structure between theoretical and 
practical reason. Both are exercised according to a structure of inquiry and both can 
be formalized as an argument when the solution to their respective problem has 
been reached. When I epistamai that P, I know that P together with the cause of P. 
Similarly, when I proairoumai that I should do >, I entertain my decision together 
with the appropriate reasons for >-ing.  
However, the fact that practical reason can be formalized as an argument 
does not yet provide sufficient conditions for practical knowledge. The way in which 
I have formalized the content of decision does indeed account for how a decision is 
justified, and whether this decision is a virtuous one. Yet, it does not say anything 
about whether the agent knows that his decision is the virtuous one, or whether the 
agent is justified in believing that his decision is the virtuous one. Actually, the 
same thing can be seen in the case of theoretical knowledge. The fact that an apo-
deixis explains why P is the case is logically distinct from the fact that it justifies that 
P is true. I can have an explanation of why there is thunder. The explanation is that 
thunder comes from the extinction of fire in the clouds (APo II.8 93b8-9). However, 
this explanation is not necessarily true. This explanation must also be justified. Ar-
istotle identifies the epistemic conditions for scientific knowledge when he devel-
ops the nature of the appropriate premises in an apodeixis as well as their relation-
ship to each other (the explanation must be non-incidental, kath'auto). Eventually, 
the truth of the immediate premises must rely on the truth of first principles of a 
science, which are indemonstrable. In the same way, I want to inquire into the epis-
temic justification of proairesis. My view is that a sufficient account of phronêsis de-
pends on these epistemic conditions as well. I shall then argue for a further claim in 
the next chapters of this work, namely that in EN VI-VII Aristotle explores the rela-
tionship between the premises of a practical argument not only in order to justify a 
decision morally, but also to justify it epistemically. 
 CHAPTER 4 
4 The content of decision 
4.1 Introduction 
So far practical knowledge has been described as the cognitive state which 
accompanies an episode of decision. The content of decision is expressed in the 
form of a practical argument similar to a theoretical deduction (apodeixis), but with 
significant differences. The apodeixis consists of two premises, which are both uni-
versal in form and which are causes of the conclusion, and of a conclusion which is 
inferred non-incidentally from the premises. By contrast, the practical argument is 
composed of a universal major premise and of a particular minor one. The conclu-
sion inferred from both premises is a decision which in turn leads to an action. If 
one agrees that the apodeixis serves the explanation of a scientific claim by provid-
ing its cause, one can make up a similar function for the practical argument. The 
function of the practical argument is to provide a moral justification of the rightness 
of one's decision. 
Still, a justified decision does not amount to practical knowledge. I may de-
cide, on the basis of an apparently appropriate deliberation, that I ought to >, but 
why wouldn't it be better to m instead? How do I know that the best thing to do in 
the current circumstances is >-ing instead of m-ing? As already seen (p. 79), Aristo-
tle explains at EN VI.7 1141b14-16 that the phronimos requires two kinds of 
knowledge. He makes an explicit distinction between knowledge at the level of the 
universal and knowledge at the level of the particular, insisting on the importance 
of the particular kind.  
27) " Nor is phronêsis about universals only; one should also know the 
particulars. For phronêsis is practical (praktikê) and action (praxis) is 
about particulars. EN VI.7 1141b14-16 
-ὐC’ ἐ@$ὶ+ ἡ >)ό+7@23 $ῶ+ (15) !"&ό0-8 <ό+-+, ἀ00ὰ C'ῖ !"ὶ $ὰ 
!"&’ ἕ!"@$" 5+()ί`'2+· ,)"!$2!ὴ 5ά), ἡ Cὲ ,)ᾶN23 ,')ὶ $ὰ !"&’ 
ἕ!"@$".  
The content of decision must then be determined by both knowledge of uni-
versals and knowledge of the particulars. It is true that here Aristotle insists on the 
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importance of knowledge of particulars. It is the first passage in book VI when Aris-
totle mentions knowledge of particulars. In doing so, Aristotle presupposes none-
theless knowledge of universals. In chapter 5, I shall inquire into the content of the 
practical argument in order to show what in one's moral justification ensures that a 
given episode of decision is the best thing to do, and thus corresponds to an in-
stance of practical knowledge. An important result of this work will be that the 
practical argument also provides a structure for the epistemic evaluation of one's 
decision. However, in order to understand how epistemic evaluation works, I first 
need to introduce the components of the practical argument. The present chapter 
consists in a discussion about these components. 
In chap. 3, I have presupposed the content of practical knowledge according 
to Aristotle's examples in EN VI. The universals in practical knowledge were illus-
trated by evaluative propositions such as 'since the end, i.e. what is best, is such and 
such' (1144a32-33) or by prescriptive ones 'what the agent proposes as required' 
(1142b18-19). Concrete examples of knowledge of universals were 'light meats are 
easily digestible and so healthy' (1141b18-19) and 'all samples of heavy water are 
bad' (1142a22-23), although these examples are not moral examples. Thus, I have 
presupposed that the content of knowledge of universals is of the form of a univer-
sal proposition which is prescriptive or evaluative. Concerning knowledge of par-
ticulars, there are no generic descriptions of the corresponding content. Aristotle's 
examples are 'meat from birds is light' (1141b20) and 'this (sample of water) is 
heavy' (1142a22-23). In the sketch I have offered of the justification of moral action, 
I have overlooked the status of the particular premise, considering propositions 
such as 'meat from birds is light'. 
However, the exact form of the content of decision is not obvious. The ex-
amples above already show the ambiguity of the kind of proposition entering in 
moral justification. Concerning knowledge of universals, there is an ambiguity 
whether it is evaluative or prescriptive. Concerning knowledge of particulars 
(kath'hekaston), Aristotle seems at times to consider that the kath'hekaston does not 
refer to individuals, but to subtypes. 
First, I shall elaborate Aristotle's conception of the content of decision. In my 
view, a generic description of this content can be reconstructed from the various 
definitions of the particular virtues of books III and IV of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Second, I shall turn to the universal component of the practical argument. I argue 
that the content of knowledge of universals in a practical context essentially de-
pends on the agent's moral character. The moral principle which the agent holds is 
merely a specification of a non-rational impulse given by the agent's character. 
Thus, practical knowledge depends on one's acquaintance with moral principles 
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and therefore on how one has come to know them. Finally, I shall focus on the par-
ticular component of practical knowledge. In my view, the content of this compo-
nent consists in the salient features of a particular situation.  
4.2 The content of decision: the orthos logos 
The epistemic evaluation of decision depends on knowledge of universals 
and knowledge of particulars. Yet, the content of each component is not clear. A 
useful starting point is the content of decision. 
In chap. 2 we have seen that practical knowledge is a necessary condition 
for virtuous action (see in particular §2.4.3). Practical knowledge is an actualization 
of the intellectual virtue of phronêsis (practical wisdom). The agent gifted with 
phronêsis displays practical knowledge when he deliberates about what to do and 
makes decisions. The practical knowledge of the agent occurs then in an episode of 
virtuous decision, and virtuous decision typically causes virtuous action (not al-
ways, though; a virtuous decision can be a decision not to act). The content of a vir-
tuous action consists in an intermediacy (mesotês, or meson) between excess and de-
ficiency, and this intermediacy is spelled out by what Aristotle calls the 'correct 
reason' or 'correct ratio' (ho orthos logos): "The mean (meson) is as the correct ratio 
spells out".163 Virtuous action is thus determined by a logos which states what one 
should do (see §2.4.1 and text 8). Yet, such a description of virtuous action consist-
ing in the orthos logos is pretty abstract and does not say much about the content of 
practical knowledge. 
Nonetheless, Aristotle has a detailed description of what the orthos logos pre-
scribes. In the chapters of the EN discussing the particular virtues of character one 
by one (i.a. courage, temperance, magnanimity, mildness, etc.), Aristotle recurrently 
gives definitions of such virtues mentioning the kinds of action they dispose us to 
carry out. Generically, these kinds of action can be summed up as "doing the right 
thing as one should". See for instance courage (andreia): 
28) “So the person who withstands and fears the things one should 
and for the end one should, and in the way and when one should, 
and is bold in a similar way, is courageous; for the courageous 
person feels and acts as the occasion merits, and according to the 
<correct> reason.” EN III.7 1115b17-20 
ὁ <ὲ+ -ὖ+ ἃ C'ῖ !"ὶ -ὗ ἕ+'!" ὑ,-<έ+(+ !"ὶ >-/-ύ<'+-3, !"ὶ ὡ3 
C'ῖ !"ὶ ὅ$', ὁ<-ί(3 Cὲ !"ὶ &"))ῶ+, ἀ+C)'ῖ-3· !"$’ ἀNί"+ 5ά), 
!"ὶ ὡ3 ἂ+ ὁ 0ό5-3, (20) ,ά@9'2 !"ὶ ,)ά$$'2 ὁ ἀ+C)'ῖ-3. 
                                                      
163 EN VI.1 1138b18-34: $ὸ Cὲ <έ@-+ ἐ@$ὶ+ ὡ3 ὁ 0ό5-3 ὁ ὀ)&ὸ3 0έ5'2.  
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The other particular virtues follow the same definitional pattern. Temper-
ance is proper to people who have appetite for the things one should, in the way 
one should, and when one should (EN 1119b15-18); open-handedness or generosity 
(eleutheriotês) concerns those who give to the people one should, as much as one 
should, and when one should (EN 1120a24-27); munificence, or magnificence (mega-
loprepeia) is a virtue to spend large amounts of money relative to the person con-
cerned, to the context and the object of the expense (pros auton, kai en hô kai peri ho 
1122a25-26); the anonymous virtue concerned with small honours characterizes 
someone whose character trait is to have desire for honour that is neither more nor 
less than one should, from the sources one should and in the way one should 
(1125b6-8); mildness is proper to someone who gets angry or stays mild in the cir-
cumstances one should, at the people one should, in the way one should, when one 
should, and how long one should (1125b31-33); the minor social virtues of amiabil-
ity and wit also conform to the pattern (1126b16-20 and 1127b33-1128a1).164 
Moreover, the pattern clearly shows the role of logos, most of all in the case 
of courage and temperance. In both cases, to act – or react, or feel – as one should, 
towards the object one should etc. corresponds to what the orthos logos commands 
(see 1115b20 above, but also 1119b17; 1119a20). More precisely, as the example of 
courage shows, the courageous man fears and resists the things one should, for the 
end one should, in the way and when because (gar) he feels and acts how logos pre-
scribes. This way of describing virtuous action is summed up especially clearly in 
the EE passage on liberality:  
29) "By 'as one should', in this case as in the others, I mean 'as the cor-
rect ratio says'" EE III.4 1231b32-34 
$-ῦ$- Cὲ 0έ5( $ὸ ὡ3 C'ῖ, !"ὶ ἐ,ὶ $-ύ$(+ !"ὶ ἐ,ὶ $ῶ+ ἄ00(+, $ὸ 
ὡ3 ὁ 0ό5-3 ὁ ὀ)&ό3  
                                                      
164 For an overview, see the Annex: Types of circumstance in EN III.6-12 and EN IV. This 
pattern is not always clearly observed. The definition of magnanimity, that is greatness of 
soul, (megalopsuchia) does not follow it. Nor does the minor virtue of truthfulness. This cer-
tainly reveals that Aristotle had no intention of a systematic pattern of virtuous action. 
Shame does not follow the pattern at all. This is not surprising though, as Aristotle does not 
treat it as a hexis. Shame depends more on the age of the subject who feels it than on the 
context. 
Let us note moreover that the definition of virtues using adverbial phrases is less present in 
the Eudemian Ethics. The only clear use of adverbial phrases is the definition of praotês (EE 
1231b21-24). (This could be taken as evidence that in the EE Aristotle has not fully cleared 
out the structure of the orthos logos, and thus, possibly, that the EE is earlier than the EN.) 
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Thus, the orthos logos prescribes an action which can be described generically 
as follows: 
I should do > to object O, at time t, in the way X, etc. 
The various parameters of the description may vary. The object can be a 
person, and other features can be added or removed.  
My claim is that this generic description is the content of an episode of 
proairesis. Correspondingly, the content of decision must be genuinely particular as 
well as normative. It must essentially consist in an enumeration of relevant circum-
stances of the situation, and of a normative aspect of what should be done. Passages 
EN II.9 1109a20-30 (text 5) and EN V.9 1137a9-17 (text 6), commented at §2.3, con-
firm that the content of decision is particular. In text (5), the person who wants to 
find the mean in his response to a situation needs to know such things as what he 
should do, to which person he should do it, at what time, in what way, and so 
forth. Then, text (6) exhibits a contrast between abstract knowledge of universals 
and practical knowledge of particulars. The kind of knowledge in play in the exer-
cise of virtue is not a general knowledge about, say, what the laws prescribe. That 
is, it is not a universal prescription that could be more or less adequately applied to 
various situations. Rather, the kind of knowledge at stake is a specific state whose 
content is determined by the situation itself. I do not mean that universal normative 
propositions are not related to the kind of practical knowledge I wish to describe 
here. The content of practical knowledge is certainly determined partly by these 
universal considerations, too. What I mean is that when Aristotle is talking about 
knowing in a situation of action, he means a particular piece of knowledge that has a 
specific content. 
An additional point to keep in mind is that the content of decision does not 
include only one description of a particular state of affairs. On the contrary, it in-
cludes a multiplicity of such descriptions. The agent when making his decision is 
aware of various circumstances such as the object of his action, the manner or the 
instrument he uses in order to implement his goal, the person to whom he does it, 
etc. This aspect will be of great importance when it comes to the epistemic evalua-
tion of decision. Finally, a last feature of the content of decision is its normativity.  
In an episode of decision, the agent knows or believes that he ought to perform such 
and such an action.  
I shall start with an inquiry into the universal component of the practical ar-
gument. 
Another Kind of Knowledge. Aristotle's Phronesis from an Epistemological Point of View 
 118 
4.3 Knowledge of universals in the Ethics 
What is knowledge of universals, then? 'Knowledge of universals' translates 
the phrase gnôsis tôn katholou ('knowledge of things universal'). Aristotle never fully 
spells out what it consists in and what its function in his moral epistemology is. A 
first point to clarify is that by 'universals' I do not mean universals in a metaphysi-
cal sense, that is, a kind of being by reference to which we name perceptual, con-
crete beings. For the time being, I consider universals to be what constitute the con-
tent of some kind of knowledge. Also, in spite of the term 'universal', one should 
keep in mind that in the practical realm, universal rules do not hold absolutely, but 
only 'for the most part' (hôs epi to polu). Aristotle is aware that general statements in 
the practical realm might sometimes be infirmed: good things, e.g. wealth, can 
sometimes be damaging (EN I.3 1094b14-22) Thus, concerning ethics, what is said 
universally lacks in precision (EN II.2 1103b34-1104a7). 
In chapter 2 and 3, I have assumed that universals in ethics are moral prin-
ciples that are propositional in form (see for instance p. 102). Universals involve 
'what the agent should do' (ho dein 1142b23), the starting point (archê) of delibera-
tion, i.e. the end, or what is best (1144a32-33). However, Aristotle in his ethical writ-
ings insists on the importance of one's moral ends in life. He regards moral agents 
as possessing a view of what is good for the most part. On the basis of this view, 
they can ground their choices and actions. Aristotle even clearly states that having 
such a view is a necessary condition for rational behaviour. 
30) Focusing our attention on these matters, everyone capable of liv-
ing by their own decision ought to lay down165 some aim for living 
finely, be it honour or reputation or wealth or education, which 
they will look to in the performance of all their actions (since not 
organizing one's life in relation to some goal is a mark of great 
foolishness). EE I.2 1214b6-11 
,')ὶ Cὴ $-ύ$(+ ἐ,2@$ή@"+$"3, ἅ,"+$" $ὸ+ C8+ά<'+-+ `ῆ+ 
!"$ὰ $ὴ+ "ὑ$-ῦ ,)-"ί)'@2+ C'ῖ &έ@&"2 $2+ὰ @!-,ὸ+ $-ῦ !"0ῶ3 
`ῆ+, ἤ$-2 $2<ὴ+ ἢ CόN"+ ἢ ,0-ῦ$-+ ἢ ,"2C'ί"+, ,)ὸ3 ὃ+ 
ἀ,-/0έ,(+ ,-2ή@'$"2 ,ά@"3 $ὰ3 ,)άN'23 (ὡ3 $ό 5' (10) <ὴ 
@8+$'$ά9&"2 $ὸ+ /ί-+ ,)ό3 $2 $έ0-3 ἀ>)-@ύ+73 ,-00ῆ3 
@7<'ῖ-+ ἐ@$ί+) 
A rational action requires some purpose. The aim might take several forms. 
Here Aristotle mentions honour, reputation, wealth or education, whereas a few 
lines earlier he was considering values such as wisdom (phronêsis, not necessarily in 
the technical sense of EN VI, see Décarie 1978:62, n.20), virtue (aretê) or pleasure (EE 
                                                      
165 Reading dei thesthai instead of thesthai along with Décarie and Inwood & Woolf. 
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I.1 1214b2-4). This is also spelled out in EE II.10 1226a7-13 (text 33), where Aristotle 
gives 'being happy' as an example of what the end of deliberation is. According to 
these passages, the end seems to be general considerations about goodness or hap-
piness. Aristotle makes similar remarks at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
Aristotle seems to hold – in conformity with his doctrine of eudaimonia in the first 
book of the EN – that doing well (eupraxia) is the general end of all human ac-
tions.166 The kind of end the agent has in view is 'doing well', 'being happy', or 'the 
good' in general.167 
It is not obvious whether the 'universals' Aristotle has in mind when he 
speaks of gnôrizein tôn katholou are moral principles or moral ends. There are at least 
two reasons why one might not identify moral principles with moral ends. The 
main problem is that Aristotle repeatedly asserts that the end is not given by reason 
(EN VI.12 1144a6-9; VI.13 1145a4-6; VII.8 1151a15-19; EE II.11 1227b22-25). Indeed, 
that my deliberation involves considerations about the pleasure related to food 
does not depend on anything rational but can simply be determined by my desire 
to taste delightful food. By contrast, the way I have introduced knowledge of moral 
principles suggests that an agent has a rational, or intellectual, conception of the 
end. But even if one comes to an agreement on this point, there remains the second 
problem, namely what form knowledge of universals has. I have assumed that the 
kind of universal relevant in moral matters has the form of a universal normative 
proposition, whereas the intuitive form of a moral end is rather expressed as a val-
ue such as the good, riches, honours, pleasure, etc. I shall first tackle the issue of the 
form of the universal and come back to the question of its rationality in the next 
section. 
4.3.1 The form of knowledge of universals 
Aristotle's notion of katholou is a contraction of 'kath'holou' and can be trans-
lated literally as 'according to every part'. The origin of this phrase seems therefore 
to come from a predicative use of the term. Something can be predicated kath'holou 
of something else. For instance 'animal' can be predicated universally of 'man', thus 
meaning that every man is an animal (DI 7 17a38-b3). Thus, having knowledge of 
universals (gnôrizein tôn katholou) means knowing a certain kind of proposition, 
namely universal ones. 
                                                      
166 Aristotle indeed identifies 'happiness' (eudaimonia) with 'doing well' (eupraxia) and even 
with 'living well' (euzein); EN z.4 1095a19-20; I.8 1098b20-21. 
167 EN 1095a17ff. (See Price 2011: 201-202). See also 1104b29ff., where Aristotle considers 
three values which lead to decision: the good, the useful and the pleasant. 
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In the ethical corpus, we find at least two different kinds of proposition 
which are universal in form and which concern the explanation of moral facts. (1) 
First, there are propositions that have the form of moral rules or norms. For in-
stance, "A son never ought to disown his father"; "In general, one ought to reim-
burse one's debt"; "We think he shouldn't do anything that incurs shame in the first 
place".168 (2) Apart from this kind of belief, there are general propositions of ethical 
science. Ethical science, i.e. Aristotle's epistêmê praktikê, concerns general truths about 
moral matters (see §2.6). An instance of universal proposition of this kind is "the 
object of desire and wish is either the good or the apparent good". Another instance 
is "[virtue] is a mean between two bad states, one involving excess and the other 
deficiency".169 
The first kind differs from the other in being explicitly prescriptive. Indeed, 
my belief that ‘I ought to honour my parents’ does matter in my life on a different 
level than my belief that 'virtue is a state consisting in an mean between excess and 
deficiency', because only the former provides me with immediate guidance of what 
I should do or not do. On the other hand, the latter seems to be limited to a descrip-
tion of a moral notion. Propositions of ethical science are more akin to general 
propositions taken from the special theoretical sciences like psychology or meta-
physics.170 At first sight, one could then consider universals in ethics as moral rules. 
They seem to fulfil a moral role more properly. However, if one is to match univer-
sals with moral ends, it seems that they cannot have the form of moral principles. 
Aristotle's conception of the ultimate end pertains rather to kind (2) than kind (1). 
The definition of eudaimonia, which is supposedly the proposition that explicate 
one's notion of the ultimate end, goes as follows: "the human good turns out to be 
activity of soul in accordance with excellence (and if there are more excellences 
                                                      
168 1163b19: -ὐ! ἐN'ῖ+"2 8ἱῷ ,"$έ)" ἀ,'ί,"@&"2; 1165a2-3: !"&ό0-8 <ὲ+ $ὸ ὀ>'ί07<" 
ἀ,-C-$έ-+; 1128b20-21: -ὐCὲ+ 5ὰ) -ἰό<'&" C'ῖ+ "ὐ$ὸ+ ,)ά$$'2+ ἐ>’ -ἷ3 ἐ@$ὶ+ "ἰ@9ύ+7; 
see also Sharples 2005: 286, n. 21 for other examples of such moral principles. Note again 
that these rules hold only for the most part. 
169 EE 1235b25-26: 0"/-ῦ@2+ ἀ)9ὴ+ $ή+C'. $ὸ 5ὰ) ὀ)'!$ὸ+ !"ὶ /-807 $ὸ+ ἢ $ὸ ἀ5"&ὸ+ ἢ 
$ὸ >"2+ό<'+-+ ἀ5"&ό+; 1107a2-3: <'@ό$73 Cὲ Cύ- !"!2ῶ+, $ῆ3 <ὲ+ !"&’ ὑ,')/-0ὴ+ $ῆ3 
Cὲ !"$’ ἔ00'2m2+; see also i.a. 1220b25 and 1227b5. 
170 Such propositions can also be useful in the elaboration of an ethical theory. Aristotle 
holds for instance that in order to understand moral matters, the political expert must know 
how things concerned with the soul are disposed (EN I.13 1102a19). This kind of knowledge 
may even be useful in deliberation, even though we do not deliberate on it as such. For in-
stance, it might matter a great deal to know that the kind of food one eats has an influence 
on character (Pol. I.8 1256a19–30) in order to decide whether or not I should administer 
chicken meat to my patient. Yet, this kind of proposition will not tell me what kind of action 
I ought to do. 
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than one, in accordance with the best and the most complete)".171 Obviously, the 
definition of eudaimonia belongs to the second kind of universal proposition, for it 
does not state any rule and has not a prescriptive form. Yet, it would be hard to 
deny that it bears heavily on our lives. 
So we need to settle the questions of the determination of the end as well as 
that of the form of the universals. I contend that general moral rules are expressions 
or specifications of general moral ends. If I hold that respect is a very important 
value to me and that I do everything I do with regard to respecting others, I shall 
have such beliefs as 'I should honour my parents', or 'I should repay my debts'. 
These general rules are expressions or specifications of a more general end, namely, 
in this very case, 'respect' (McDowell 1998: 110). In fact, as will become clear, this 
interpretation answers both difficulties of the form and of the rationality of 
knowledge of universals. Its form is not fixed once and for all, but can either be a 
general moral end or a rational specification of that end in the form of a moral prin-
ciple. Also, a moral principle is specified by deliberation and is therefore the ration-
al expression of the end, although the end itself is given by character (êthos), which 
is non-rational for Aristotle. 
In order to have a better glimpse of the end of practical reasoning, I need to 
make a small excursus into the structure of deliberation. From this, a solution of the 
problem of the rationality of the end will appear and will also provide an argument 
for my claim that moral principles are rational specifications of one's grasp of moral 
ends. 
4.3.2 Virtue gives the end 
As seen at §3.3.1, a crucial implication of the notion of deliberation is that it 
is not about the ends of action, but about that which leads to the ends (peri tôn pros 
ta telê). Aristotle gives various examples which illustrate this: the doctor does not 
deliberate whether he should cure or not, the rhetorician whether he should per-
suade or not, the politician whether he should work for the well being of the state 
(See 1112b12-15; text 19).  
These examples have often struck scholars as inappropriate. All are tech-
nical examples in which the result pursued is clear and uncontroversial. Delibera-
tion in these cases consists merely in figuring out the best way to realize something 
which has not been discussed beforehand and which does probably not need to be 
discussed at all. This conception of decision as being the result of a prior delibera-
                                                      
171 1098a16-18: $ὸ ἀ+&)ώ,2+-+ ἀ5"&ὸ+ m89ῆ3 ἐ+έ)5'2" 5ί+'$"2 !"$’ ἀ)'$ή+, 'ἰ Cὲ ,0'ί-83 
"ἱ ἀ)'$"ί, !"$ὰ $ὴ+ ἀ)ί@$7+ !"ὶ $'0'2-$ά$7+. 
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tion seems irrelevant in the case of moral actions. It seems that what is chosen pri-
marily in the case of morality is not the best means to achieve some ends, but the 
moral ends themselves, that one sets out to achieve or not. One would therefore 
expect rather the reverse model: first the agent deliberates about what is the best 
thing to do; once he has made his mind up about it (i.e. he has decided what to do), 
he works out the best means to realize it.172 
In spite of this, Aristotle offers an alternative conception of moral choice, 
motivated by a different intuition. According to him, what determines the end is 
virtue, or more generally, character (êthos). See for instance EE II.11:  
31) "Which one does virtue make <correct>173, the goal, or the things 
toward the goal? We affirm it is the goal, because there is no rea-
soning or logos about it. Rather let us suppose the goal as a starting 
point". EE II.11 1227b22-25 
,ό$')-+ C’ ἡ ἀ)'$ὴ ,-2'ῖ $ὸ+ @!-,ὸ+ ἢ $ὰ ,)ὸ3 $ὸ+ @!-,ό+; 
$2&έ<'&" Cὴ ὅ$2 $ὸ+ @!-,ό+, C2ό$2 $-ύ$-8 -ὐ! ἔ@$2 @800-52@<ὸ3 
-ὐCὲ (25) 0ό5-3. ἀ00ὰ Cὴ ὥ@,') ἀ)9ὴ $-ῦ$- ὑ,-!'ί@&(. 
One should bear in mind that by 'virtue gives the end' Aristotle does not 
mean that only the virtuous man has access to the end thanks to his virtue, whereas 
non-virtuous agents have access to their own end in a different way. Aristotle has 
on one occasion a more general formula that states more generally that we tend to 
certain ends according to our character.  
32) "For virtue and vice respectively preserves the starting point and 
corrupt it. And in the case of actions, the starting point is that for 
the sake of which, just as in mathematics it is the hypotheses. Nei-
ther in that case [i.e. in mathematics] it is reason that teaches the 
starting points, nor it is here [i.e. in the case of actions]. Rather, it 
is virtue, either natural or habituated, which is responsible for cor-
rect belief about the starting point. EN VII.8 1151a15-19 
(15) ἡ 5ὰ) ἀ)'$ὴ !"ὶ <-9&7)ί" $ὴ+ ἀ)9ὴ+ ἣ <ὲ+ >&'ί)'2 ἣ Cὲ 
@ῴ`'2, ἐ+ Cὲ $"ῖ3 ,)άN'@2 $ὸ -ὗ ἕ+'!" ἀ)9ή, ὥ@,') ἐ+ $-ῖ3 
<"&7<"$2!-ῖ3 "ἱ ὑ,-&έ@'23· -ὔ$' Cὴ ἐ!'ῖ ὁ 0ό5-3 C2C"@!"02!ὸ3 
$ῶ+ ἀ)9ῶ+ -ὔ$' ἐ+$"ῦ&", ἀ00’ ἀ)'$ὴ ἢ >8@2!ὴ ἢ ἐ&2@$ὴ $-ῦ 
ὀ)&-C-N'ῖ+ ,')ὶ $ὴ+ ἀ)9ή+. 
Here Aristotle calls the end 'starting point' (archê), because it is from consid-
erations about the end that practical reasoning proceeds. Virtue preserves the cor-
                                                      
172 Anscombe 1965: 146 seems to construe this model from her interpretation of EN VI. For a 
convincing objection of Anscombe's interpretation, see Hardie 1968: 1968. 
173 At the beginning of EE II.11, Aristotle states explicitly that aretê might make the end cor-
rect. I therefore supply it here, following Woods and Inwood and Woolf. 
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rect archê of action, whereas badness corrupts the archê (See EN VI.5 1140b4-21; text 
14). Not only virtuous people have their moral ends determined by a non-rational 
disposition, but also non-virtuous people pursue certain ends in virtue of disposi-
tions of the non-rational part of the soul – in this case, badness (mochthêria). Aristo-
tle seems therefore to hold that it is character (êthos), as a general tendency to re-
spond to one's environment (EE II.1 1220a39-b6), that directs the agent towards a 
certain end. Someone with an excellent character is a virtuous person and the moral 
ends he aims at are 'healthy', i.e. morally good, whereas someone with a perverted 
character will pursue corrupted moral ends. Aristotle affirms moreover in a strong 
way that reason does not take part in determining the end.174 
Aristotle wants to stress that the things we yearn for are not simply deter-
mined by a rational calculus, but are the result of the affective impulses of the de-
siderative part of the soul. Things I conceive as desirable or good seem to me to be 
this way because of my character, that is, because of the kind of person I am. It is in 
virtue of our moral character that we tend to value certain things more than others. 
Someone having the tendency to be easily frightened – a coward (deilos) – will be 
prone to value such things as security or absence of anguish as good, or at least as 
desirable; the intemperate person will tend to value sensual pleasures of drinking, 
eating and sex. In general, people tend to be attracted towards the kinds of thing 
they have become accustomed to enjoy. 
This way of conceiving of deliberation and the determination of the end 
sounds legitimate. Still, this model has to face other issues. A traditional concern 
about this conception of deliberation is that it could fall in the opposite extreme: 
that moral ends are determined by our impulses alone, reason being a mere in-
strumental disposition working out the means to realize our non-rational desires.175 
This consequence of Aristotle's conception of deliberation has often struck com-
mentators as unbearable (for a review of some reactions of the commentators, see 
Moss 2012: 157). According to them, reason must take part in the determination of 
the end. This position has given rise to one of the most famous controversy about 
Aristotle's ethics in the 20th century known as the mean-end controversy.176 
But scholars (i.a. Wiggins 1975-1976: 30-31) have also pointed out that Aris-
totle's restriction of the scope of deliberation to the means was problematic for a 
                                                      
174 See also VI.12 1144a6-9 as well as VI.13 1145a4-6 for a contrast between virtue and the 
intellectual virtue of the practical part of the rational soul, phronêsis. 
175 The so-called Humeanism of Aristotle, emphasized by Sorabji 1980 1973-1974: 118; see 
also Allan 1953: 122, who gives a doxography of Aristotle's Humeanism since Walter 1874. 
176 See Allan 1953 for a review of older scholars and Moss 2012: 155-158 concerning the re-
cent literature; see Price 2011: 209-230 for a discussion of the latest contributions. 
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further reason. For Aristotle, a crucial claim is that the moral character of a person 
is revealed by his decisions to perform such or such an action (1111b6-7; EE II.11 
1227b38-1228a4). The action alone is not a reliable way to tell whether someone is a 
good person or not. Someone might carry out an apparently virtuous action for ill-
intended motives. Or an action without further intention at first might turn out to 
be extremely beneficial for someone else. On the contrary, the agent's decision re-
veals the intention or reasons to act of the agent. However, since deliberation is 
only about the means and what is decided on is the object of deliberation, then the 
object of decision is also restricted to the means. But it seems that choosing the best 
means to some given end is insufficient to be a mark of virtuous character. In the 
terms of the medicine example, the doctor will not deliberate whether curing this 
patient is the right thing to do or not. He will not question this end, but take it for 
granted and work out the best means to cure the patient. If one maintains the anal-
ogy then, one should hold that the agent's decision expresses his character, while 
the agent chooses a means to an end given beforehand and which is not discussed. 
Yet, how could the agent's character possibly be expressed according to such a 
model? It seems that what expresses one's character is rather one's moral purposes, 
i.e. the end one is after.177  
However, Aristotle states explicitly that the content of decision includes a 
mention of the end. The Eudemian text that proairesis is neither wish nor doxa is 
similar to its Nicomachean counterpart, but for one important detail. At EE II.10, 
when invoking the argument of the object of each state, Aristotle specifies that the 
object of decision is not the means alone, but the means for the sake of the pursued 
end. 
33) "For no one decides on an end, but rather on what promotes the 
end. I mean, for instance, that no one decides to be healthy; what 
one decides is to take a walk, or to sit down, for the sake of being 
healthy. Again, no one decides to be happy; one decides to go into 
business, or to run a risk, for the sake of happiness. In general, 
someone who decides something manifests what he decides to do, and that 
for the sake of which he decides to do it. The latter is something for the 
sake of which one decides to do another thing, while the former is 
                                                      
177 Relying on this issue Aubenque has inferred that Aristotle has two distinct notions of 
proairesis. One would be in play in book III of the EN and amounts to implementing a given 
end, whereas the other would be in play in book VI and mean rather 'preference' when re-
ferring to one's way of life. From this he infers that Aristotle has changed his notion of deci-
sion from book III to book VI of the EN (Aubenque 1963: 119-120). See also Ross 2005: 209-
210. However, as Wiggins has argued, the tension about the notion of proairesis is already 
internal to book III and cannot therefore be imputed to a change in the conception of 
proairesis from one book to another (Wiggins 1975-1976: 30-32). 
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what one decides to do for the sake of another thing." EE II.10 
1226a7-13; my emphasis.  
-ὐ&'ὶ3 5ὰ) $έ0-3 -ὐCὲ+ ,)-"2)'ῖ$"2, ἀ00ὰ $ὰ ,)ὸ3 $ὸ $έ0-3· 
0έ5( C’ -ἷ-+ -ὐ&'ὶ3 ὑ52"ί+'2+ ,)-"2)'ῖ$"2, ἀ00ὰ ,')2,"$'ῖ+ ἢ 
!"&ῆ@&"2 $-ῦ ὑ52"ί+'2+ ἕ+'!'+, -ὐC’ 'ὐC"2(10) <-+'ῖ+, ἀ00ὰ 
9)7<"$ί`'@&"2 ἢ !2+C8+'ύ'2+ $-ῦ 'ὐC"2<-+'ῖ+ ἕ+'!"· !"ὶ ὅ0(3 
C70-ῖ ἀ'ὶ ,)-"2)-ύ<'+-3 <$23> $ί $' !"ὶ $ί+-3 ἕ+'!" 
,)-"2)'ῖ$"2, ἔ@$2 Cὲ $ὸ <ὲ+ $ί+-3, -ὗ ἕ+'!" ,)-"2)'ῖ$"2 ἄ00-, $ὸ 
Cὲ $ί, ὃ ,)-"2)'ῖ$"2 ἕ+'!" ἄ00-8. 
Aristotle seems to say here that the object of decision is not the means alone, 
i.e. what is towards the end, but the means insofar as it is directed at a certain end. 
The description of the end is included in the content of decision. Decision is not 
about the end in the sense that its proper function is to determine the end as a gen-
eral action-type or a general value. Rather, decision is about the means insofar as its 
function is to choose to perform a certain action for the sake of a further end. In 
doing so, the agent expresses the end he has in view. In this sense, decision is what 
shows the character of the agent.178 This description of the object of decision solves 
the problem pointed out by Wiggins. Decision is a privileged mark of virtuous 
character, although it is primarily about the means, because its content includes a 
description of the end. 
Still, this interpretation, if it solves Wiggins' problem, does not lessen con-
cerns about the Humeanism of Aristotle. That a description of the end is included 
in the content of one's decision does not say anything about the origin of the deter-
mination of the end. One could still hold that the overall determination of the end is 
due to desire. Yet, this interpretation considerably lightens up the Humean picture 
of Aristotle's moral psychology. Indeed, if decision involves a view on the end, this 
implies that deliberation, too, must somehow keep an eye on the end. Even though 
deliberation is not about the end as such, a consideration of the end should also be 
included while working out the means to the end. This consequence is important, 
for it shows that Aristotle does not conceive deliberation as a mere instrumental 
process, in which the only relation between means and ends would be a relation of 
efficient causality. Rather, if the agent always keeps an eye on the end in his delib-
eration, this shows that he also has considerations for the nature of the possible 
means envisaged. In other words, such an agent will not adhere to the claim that 
                                                      
178 See Natali 2001: 42-43; Lorenz 2009: 184–92. Broadie (1991: 179-180) comes to the same 
result although she does not rely on the relevant passage of the EE. In her interpretation of 
proairesis as a reason for action, she includes a mention of the end. Decision is about X for 
the sake of Y.  
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any means can be tolerated as long as the end in view is achieved (in other words, 
'the end justifies the means'). 
Deliberation involves a rational grasp of the end. Again, it is not clear what 
one should understand by such an 'end'. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, 
speaking of the 'end' of practical reasoning seems to refer to the doctrine of eudai-
monia. In this vein, an influential interpretation has it that the end is a rational con-
ception of the good life, which is a general end that includes a set of detailed de-
scriptions of what the good life is in various circumstances. This interpretation has 
been dubbed the Grand End view (the phrase is from Cooper 1975: 59). According 
to the Grand End view an agent has an overall picture of what the good life consists 
in, which can serve as a 'blueprint' for his next actions. A Grand End would have to 
be complete enough in order to offer guiding rules to the agent with which the lat-
ter would be able to cope with various circumstances. Particular decisions would be 
inferred from relevant aspects of the Grand End while taking the circumstances 
into account. The Grand End view is a strong rationalist position, for it assumes that 
the end has been determined due to a rational capacity. 
However, when reflecting on particular examples of what the end of such or 
such action is, it seems that the kind of end at stake is a particular concrete end, 
such as a particular object of thought or of desire ('I want this drink') or a particular 
action that the agent has in view (drinking). Especially, if decision involves a de-
scription of the end, it seems that this end should be immediately achievable 
through deliberation. If the content of my decision were to include a general de-
scription of the end, then my decision would not express my character and would 
not be sensible altogether: e.g. in battle, a decision to 'confront the enemy in order 
to be happy' is not very informative. A sensible rational choice needs a more specif-
ic description of the end such as 'confront the enemy in order to save the City', 'sav-
ing the city' being an expression of or a means towards happiness. Even if I were to 
possess a fully articulated conception of happiness, which states that happiness 
consists in the exercise of virtue and which includes a theory of the particular vir-
tues, taking a particular decision would require the mention of a specific end. Even 
when Aristotle describes the process of deliberation at EN zzz.3 1112b11-20 (text 19), 
he uses examples of determined ends to make his point. Technical activities (medi-
cine, rhetoric, politics) have ends which are determined according to their respec-
tive area of activity.179 
                                                      
179 Similarly, at EN VI.1 Aristotle argues that general prescriptions to act are useless. While 
he acknowledges the truth of general advice such as to act as the correct prescription (orthos 
logos) prescribes, or to apply oneself neither too much nor too little, he observes that one 
cannot rely on general indications in order to act correctly. Moreover, in order to make this 
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Should we understand then that in Aristotle's account of rational action de-
cision is about the means for the sake of a particular, specific end or for the sake of a 
general, vague one? The mention of a presumed Humeanism of Aristotle also en-
riches the debate as the end of practical thinking can be either general or specific 
and can be either determined by reason or by a desiderative faculty. 
4.3.3 Deliberation and specification of the end 
First of all, the technical examples should not mislead us. These examples 
give the impression that the end is a unitary and general task which has been fixed 
once and for all. However, it is far from sure that these kinds of determinate end 
proper to technical activities also concern moral actions. In a particular situation, 
the end which the agent is considering seems proper to the situation. It seems to be 
given through a certain representation or idea of what the present situation re-
quires, but not through a moment or institution that would posit the end. 
Also, one ought to be careful when speaking of 'means'. In fact, Aristotle 
speaks of 'what is in view of the end' (peri tôn pros ta telê 1112b12) and this phrase 
includes more than mere instrumental means. Deliberation is not merely instru-
mental thinking by which a chosen means leads to an end that is external to it. Pro-
duction (poiêsis), as a matter of fact, works like that. In a production process, the 
end in view is external to the process itself. In order to cure this patient, I need this 
medicine, which is external to health. But Aristotle has shown that every human 
activity has not necessarily an end external to itself. The ends of some activities are 
the activities themselves.180 'What is in view of the end' must therefore include not 
only instrumental means, but what I shall call 'constitutive means' as well, i.e. an 
activity whose execution is constitutive of the realization of a more general activi-
                                                                                                                                                        
clear, Aristotle invokes the medical example. When I need to choose the correct remedy to 
cure a specific disease in a particular patient, knowing that the correct remedy is the one 
which medical science would prescribe does not make me better at choosing the correct 
remedy (EN VI.1 1138b25-34). 
180 EN I.1 1094a3-5: "For the end of production is something distinct from the productive 
process, whereas that of action will not be; here, doing well itself serves as end" (see also 
1176b2-10; 1140b6-7). One should not conclude too quickly that poiêsis is correlated with 
instrumental means and praxis with constitutive means. If it is true of poiêsis, it is not of prax-
is. In a loose sense of praxis, an action is not necessarily for the sake of itself. Some actions 
can be merely instrumental as when a non-virtuous person performs a good action for the 
sake of a further, non-virtuous, motive. 
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ty.181 An example of a constitutive means concerns the highest end of all, namely 
happiness. Someone might come to believe that being an architect will enable him 
to live a happy life. In this sense, being an architect is a means to being happy. 
However, being an architect is not an external means to happiness, but is instead 
constitutive of it. For this person living a happy life consists precisely in working as 
an architect (I borrow the example from Annas 1993: 88).  
The notion of constitutive means reveals that the end at stake in practical 
reasoning is not fixed once and for all. Rather, it is specified from a general idea of 
what to do into a specific, directly achievable end.182 When I find out that becoming 
an architect will bring about a happy life for me, the end I am considering in my 
deliberation is no longer happiness in general. Such a general end becomes the 
more precise determination of the end 'being an architect'. In turn, such an end may 
be specified through my deliberation in the more specific 'enrolling in an architec-
tural school', and so on. The notion of constitutive means also explains how Aristo-
tle can say on the one hand that every human activity is for the sake of happiness 
(1094a1-2), and on the other hand that a virtuous act is done for its own sake 
(1105a31-32). The performance of a virtuous act is constitutive of happiness. By con-
trast, a mere instrumental means does not constitute a realization of the further 
end. Taking the bus to the architectural school (for the sake of enrolling in the 
school) does not constitute a realization of being an architect, nor of happiness. At 
best, it is an external cause which brings about my becoming an architect.  
To sum up, the agent begins with an undetermined conception of the end, 
which is specified gradually while he is deliberating about a means to achieve such 
an end. An example of the idea of the specification of the end seems to occur in the 
following passage: 
34) "The end of every activity is the one which is according to the dis-
position. And to the courageous man courage is something noble, 
and such [i.e. noble] is also the end. For each thing is determined 
by its end. So it is for the sake of the noble that the courageous 
man resists and does actions according to courage."183 EN III.7 
1115b20-24 
                                                      
181 The first to make the distinction between those two senses of 'to pros to telos' was Green-
wood (1909: 46-47), who speaks of 'component'; the term 'constitutive' comes from Wiggins 
(1975-1976: 32-33). 
182 Cf. among others Höffe 1971: 135; Wiggins 1975-1976: 38; Engberg Pedersen 1983: 173; 
Hutchinson 1986: 100; McDowell 1998: 109-110; Natali 2001: 47; Taylor 2008: 212. 
183 At least, the reconstitution of the passage in the OCT suggests the idea of a gradual speci-
fication of the end, although the text itself has not been transmitted to us reliably. 
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(20) $έ0-3 Cὲ ,ά@73 ἐ+')5'ί"3 ἐ@$ὶ $ὸ !"$ὰ $ὴ+ ἕN2+. †!"ὶ $ῷ 
ἀ+C)'ίῳ Cὴ ἡ <C'> ἀ+C)'ί" !"0ό+† $-2-ῦ$-+ Cὴ !"ὶ $ὸ $έ0-3· 
ὁ)ί`'$"2 5ὰ) ἕ!"@$-+ $ῷ $έ0'2. !"0-ῦ Cὴ ἕ+'!" ὁ ἀ+C)'ῖ-3 
ὑ,-<έ+'2 !"ὶ ,)ά$$'2 $ὰ !"$ὰ $ὴ+ ἀ+C)'ί"+. 
In the present case, the agent aims at the noble (kalon), which is specified as 
courage. The disposition of being courageous specifies which form the noble is to 
take in this context of, say, battle. But behaving courageously is moreover specified 
as standing firm (hupomenei) as the definition of courage has it (EN III.7 1115b17-20 
(text 28); EE III.1 1230a30).  
Thus, the exact content of the end is not fixed once and for all. Depending 
on the stage of deliberation which the agent has reached, the end considered is 
more or less specific. This is what Aristotle seems to mean in the following quote: 
"The end of the action is [set] according to the occasion".184 The notion of specifica-
tion of the end allows for both accounts of the end as a general ultimate goal and as 
a specific principle proper to a situation to be compatible. The content of the end in 
view does change through the process of deliberation. In practical thought, I first 
consider a general end such as 'courage is something noble', and then in the course 
of the deliberation I come to hold 'I ought to protect the city' as an expression of 
courage. 
Specification of the end has been offered as a way to answer the threat of a 
Humean account of the determination of the end. Accordingly, one ought to distin-
guish between the ultimate end, namely eudaimonia, and intermediary ends, which 
are those useful in actual occurrences of deliberation. That one does not deliberate 
about the end would hold stricto sensu of the ultimate end only, not of intermediary 
ends. The idea is that since an intermediate end is itself a means to the ultimate end 
(as generalship is a means to politics), one can deliberate about intermediate ends, 
insofar as they are considered as means to a further end.185 Aristotle conceived of a 
certain hierarchy of activities. Some activities are higher than others in the sense 
that the ends of lower activities are included in the ends of the higher ones. Lower 
activities are performed for the sake of higher activities. For instance, bridle-making 
is for the sake of horsemanship, whereas horsemanship is for the sake of general-
ship (1094a10ff.). So, while it is true that the bridle maker will not discuss the end 
he is pursuing, i.e. making bridles, the user of bridles, or more generally, the gen-
eral will deliberate about what is useful for his cavalry and thereby what the bridle 
maker is to make. The same reasoning can then be applied to the case of a single 
                                                      
184 EN III.1 1110a13–14: $ὸ Cὲ $έ0-3 $ῆ3 ,)άN'(3 !"$ὰ $ὸ+ !"2)ό+ ἐ@$2+. 
185 See e.g. Wiggins 1975-1976: 34-35; Cooper 1975: 15f.; Engberg-Pedersen 1983: 212; Reeve 
1992: 84. 
Another Kind of Knowledge. Aristotle's Phronesis from an Epistemological Point of View 
 130 
man's life. Aristotle acknowledges indeed that some activities, while they are done 
for their own sake are also done for the sake of a higher end, namely happiness: 
"while as for honour, and pleasure, and intelligence, and every excellence, we do 
choose them because of themselves (since if nothing resulted from them, we would 
still choose each of them), but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, sup-
posing that we shall be happy through them."186 Hence, if it is true that in a particu-
lar situation one does not deliberate about the end, this does not mean that in an-
other situation the activity which was previously the end appears as a mean to a 
further end, in which case one is to deliberate about it. In the end, the only end 
about which there is absolutely no deliberation is the highest of all, namely happi-
ness.  
This line of argumentation is disputable. At EN III.3, Aristotle does not men-
tion the notion of ultimate end. He rather speaks of ends generally. An end, any 
end, is not an object of deliberation (Natali 2001: 45). All in all, such a position 
leaves open the question whether reason takes part in determining the ultimate 
goal, happiness. If deliberation goes with a process of specification of the end, what 
is crucial for the decision made at the outcome of the process is the original impulse 
that came with the ultimate end. 
The relation between a general end and a specific end should then be re-
fined. An important feature of specification of the end is that it does not imply an 
explicit conception of the ultimate end. We do not have in every single episode of 
moral action an explicit conception of what happiness is. Rather, it seems that the 
end we are pursuing is not consciously present in our mind. It might happen in 
some cases that the end at stake is a clear representation of what happiness is. For 
instance, in cases of a life-defining decision such as accepting a job offer or getting 
married. However, in other situations we consider a single principle or rule to ap-
ply or achieve, whose content is not a general conception of happiness. In still other 
cases, it seems that we do not even have a specific notion of an end. Rather, the end 
is a blurred view on what is valuable. Confronted to a situation which appeals to an 
action, we do not necessarily entertain a grand conception of the good, nor a specif-
ic principle to apply. On the contrary, the idea of what one should do, or what 
would be good to do gradually arises in the course of our deliberation.187 
                                                      
186 EN I.7 1097b2-5: $2<ὴ+ Cὲ !"ὶ ἡC-+ὴ+ !"ὶ +-ῦ+ !"ὶ ,ᾶ@"+ ἀ)'$ὴ+ "ἱ)-ύ<'&" <ὲ+ !"ὶ 
C2’ "ὐ$ά (<7&'+ὸ3 5ὰ) ἀ,-/"ί+-+$-3 ἑ0-ί<'&’ ἂ+ ἕ!"@$-+ "ὐ$ῶ+), "ἱ)-ύ<'&" Cὲ !"ὶ $ῆ3 
'ὐC"2<-+ί"3 9ά)2+, C2ὰ $-ύ$(+ ὑ,-0"</ά+-+$'3 'ὐC"2<-+ή@'2+ 
187 This aspect of the end in deliberation has been noted by Broadie 1991: 195; McDowell 
1979: 342-344; see also Price 2011: 216. Broadie argues that at the starting point of a particu-
lar deliberation there is already a specified end, a 'guiding end' as she says, and opposes it 
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Now, I believe that the idea of a specification of the end is compatible with 
the fact that character determines the end and that it helps in obtaining a satisfying 
interpretation of Aristotle's Humeanism. When the agent is confronted with a situa-
tion which demands a response, the immediate response is a non-rational and im-
plicit feeling of what to do, a vague idea of the kind of response required. Second, 
this implicit notion of the end is then progressively refined in an explicit determina-
tion of the end. This process of making the end explicit is carried through by delib-
eration. However, specification of the end does not amount to rational deliberation 
about what general end one is pursuing. Even if deliberation helps in specifying 
what kind of good one is after in a particular situation so that one can come to a 
decision to perform a concrete action, this does not mean that deliberation deter-
mines the end. The general impulse still depends on some other disposition in the 
soul, namely character (êthos; see §5.2.3). Another way to put it is to say that reason 
does not determine what ultimately counts as the correct end or not.  
More precisely, I think that there are two aspects that do not pertain to rea-
son. First, the overall direction of specification of the end is not determined by de-
liberation. It is rather suggested by character. By 'overall direction of specification', I 
mean the overall kind of life the agent values, what his conception of the good life 
is. One can understand this as how people 'interpret', or makes sense of, what hap-
piness is. Some people have a character such that they tend to value riches; others 
are inclined to pleasurable activities, others still to virtuous actions, etc. Corre-
spondingly, the ultimate end they see as achieving happiness will be respectively 
the possession of riches, the experience of pleasure, the performance of virtuous 
actions, etc. Of course, Aristotle sees happiness as virtuous life as the only true un-
derstanding of happiness. Yet, this does not exclude that other people have a differ-
ent view on what counts as a happy life (EN I.4 1095a22-28). This first direction of 
interpretation of what the good is provides a general content to the end the agent is 
pursuing. Confronted with a situation which calls for a response, the agent will 
tend to consider a general end in a specific area of values.  
Secondly, character warrants that the specified end is truly constitutive of 
one's idea of the good life. Although deliberation is of the end in the sense that it 
specifies an implicit notion of the end into an explicit formulation, it is character 
                                                                                                                                                        
to a 'defining end' which defines an activity or practice, like health defines medicine, per-
suasion defines rhetoric etc.; see Broadie 1991: 195. Segvic argues in a similar way that the 
specific end must have been determined rationally. According to her, assuming an end in a 
process of deliberation is a technical requisite for deliberation. Without positing an end, no 
deliberation is possible in the same way as in theoretical thinking no research is possible 
without having posited a hupothesis (Segvic 2011: 169-170). 
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that guides the specification according to the situation. What determines that enrol-
ling in an architectural school is constitutive of my own idea of happiness is war-
ranted by my character.188 It is the way I feel about life that tells me that being an 
architect exemplifies being happy. By contrast, another person might understand 
enrolling in the army as leading to a happy life. Let us consider the example of 
dangerous situations. If my first impulse in such a situation is to react virtuously, 
i.e. being courageous, the kind of realization I give to this general impulse still de-
pends on my character. In a situation where the enemy have invaded the city, I 
could come to the view that acting courageously is confronting the enemy by en-
gaging in combat. Or I could come to the view that the right courageous act to do is 
to flee and taking my family with me (like Aeneas!). More generally, spelling out 
the end through a process of deliberation may be compared to a process of associa-
tion of ideas. While deliberating on what he ought to do, the agent comes to a more 
specific idea of the kind of action-type he values, and this idea of the end arises 
from association of ideas. What explains the connection between a general idea of 
the good and a specific end is not reason but character. 
The position I want to argue for is therefore a refined brand of Humeanism. 
It contrasts cognitivism insofar as it holds that one never deliberates about the end 
per se. The determination of the specific content of the end is not the result of delib-
eration, but rather a by-product of it. Deliberation can spell out the indeterminate 
end into a more determinate, achievable end. At some point in the deliberative pro-
cess, the agent has a rational grasp of the end, which Aristotle calls a hupothesis. 
However, the specific content of this hupothesis has not been warranted rationally, 
but by the desiderative propensities of the agent.189 My position is not a radical 
Humeanist position either, according to which reason is a slave of the passions. In 
my view, an agent actually deliberates about the end, yet not the end qua end, but 
as an intermediate end which is a mean to a more general one. There is a rational 
manipulation of the end. By contrast other Humeanists hold that one simply cog-
nizes the end in virtue of a non-rational cognitive faculty (Natali 2001: 182; Bodéüs 
2004: 116, n. 2; 326-327 n. 4).190 
                                                      
188 This interpretation of the role of character is close to McDowell's notion of 'supplementa-
tion' (McDowell 1979: 344-345). However, McDowell does not accept that what guides the 
process of specification of the end is character rather than reason. My interpretation is closer 
to that of Broadie (see for instance Broadie and Rowe 2002: 49-50). For a comparison be-
tween McDowell's and Broadie's positions, see Price 2011: 230-235. 
189 I shall argue properly against the intellectualist interpretation of the intellect determining 
the end at §5.2. 
190 According to Irwin: "to be a complete Humean [one] needs to accept both the nonmotivi-
ty of reason alone and also Hume's inference, that reason is irrelevant to the choice of ulti-
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Such an interpretation provides a sensible reading of the following quote: 
"In every situation, the mean relative to us is best, for it is as science and reason 
(logos) command."191 One should not understand from this that the orthos logos itself 
determines the behavioural response that ought to be exemplified by the desidera-
tive part of the soul. This would amount to a purely rational determination of mor-
al actions and would conflict with Aristotle's claim that what provides the end of 
moral action is not reason but virtue (EE II.11 1227b22-25; EN VII.8 1151a15-19). The 
specification of the action is made at the level of the particular, not at the level of 
the general orientation of the end. Then, what the orthos logos determines is not the 
overall moral tenor of the action, but the specification of the action which is actually 
performed. 
Another passage in the Eudemian Ethics could be taken as undermining my 
interpretation: "There is no reasoning (sullogismos) or reason (logos) of the goal 
(skopos). Rather one is to assume it as a principle."192 In this passage, Aristotle ap-
parently asserts that the end is not the object of reasoning (sullogismos), or the end 
of any rational account (logos). One can easily account for sullogismos, as it refers to 
an articulate piece of reasoning. The end of practical reasoning is not inferred or 
deduced in any way. It seems harder to account for the mention of logos. True, logos 
can also mean 'argument', but as it stands in contrast to sullogismos, its meaning is 
probably that of 'proposition'. This would mean that there is no propositional ex-
pression of the end in any case. However, Aristotle opposes this with hupokeisthô, 
which seems to involve a hupothesis. A hupothesis is a propositional statement. It 
seems therefore that there is some propositional grasp of the end. It might not be 
rational, but it still can be expressed propositionally. 
To conclude with deliberation, the picture now seems to be this: the agent 
considering a moral end given beforehand by character works out the best means in 
order to realize such an end. When he has come to an appropriate result, i.e. when 
he has found an appropriate means to that end, he has reached a decision to act in a 
certain way. His decision contains a specification of what the end is. Deliberation 
consists partly of specification, however, determining what the end is or should be 
is not the same as specifying the intended end. Thus, the end, in a specific situation, 
                                                                                                                                                        
mate ends" (Irwin 1975: 568). I subscribe to the second clause of this description, but not to 
the first. I do not think that Aristotle believes cognition to be totally inert. Rather, decision, 
which is the efficient cause of action, is a mix of both reason and desire. 
191 EE 1220b27-28: ἐ+ ,ᾶ@2 Cὲ $ὸ <έ@-+ $ὸ ,)ὸ3 ἡ<ᾶ3 /έ0$2@$-+· $-ῦ$- 5ά) ἐ@$2+ ὡ3 ἡ 
ἐ,2@$ή<7 !'0'ύ'2 !"ὶ ὁ 0ό5-3. See also 1229a1-11. 
192 EE II.11 1227b24-25: $-ύ$-8 -ὐ! ἔ@$2 @800-52@<ὸ3 -ὐCὲ 0ό5-3. ἀ00ὰ Cὴ ὥ@,') ἀ)9ὴ 
$-ῦ$- ὑ,-!'ί@&(. 
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takes the form of a moral rule or general proposition on what to do. My interpreta-
tion answers the intuition we usually have of the structure of moral action that we 
work out what end to pursue, as Anscombe points out. Yet, working out the end 
does not depend on a process of deliberation itself, but is the result of a process of 
specification, which is a by-product of the former and which is warranted by a dif-
ferent, non-rational, disposition, namely character. 
 
Now, back to the issue of knowledge of universals. The content of 
knowledge of universals involves a moral end, i.e. an end which is valuable for it-
self, which one seeks for itself. This content can be more or less specific. But at the 
moment of decision, the end has necessarily been interpreted in a specific way. The 
content is somehow both desiderative and rational. The ultimate end, since given 
by character, stems from a non-rational impulse. Then, as it is specified throughout 
the process of deliberation, it is expressed rationally. Concerning their form, uni-
versals may therefore be expressed both as prescriptive propositions stating a mor-
al principle and as general moral values expressing a moral end. Knowledge of 
universals, as a grasp of a moral end, is knowledge of a moral value. However, the 
end when specified in deliberation takes the form of a prescriptive proposition 
('one ought to >').193 This conception of universals in ethics implies that in a practi-
cal context the agent is able, or knows how, to derive moral rules from his idea of 
what the moral end is. The evaluation of practical knowledge as knowledge should 
be based on this competency. Knowing in a strong sense that I should > depends 
on my acquaintance and knowledge of moral values and on how I can formulate 
them into moral rules. But how do I know moral values? What makes me proficient 
in dealing with them? I shall tackle the epistemic evaluation of moral universals in 
the next chapter (§5.2). Now, I shall discuss the other component of practical 
knowledge, namely knowledge of particulars. 
4.4 Knowledge of the particulars 
As already mentioned, knowledge of universals is not sufficient for 
phronêsis. There is a need for knowledge of particulars (gnôrizein ta kath'hekasta 
1141b14-16). Why is knowledge of the particulars required? Some answers found 
directly in Aristotle's work are that, first, knowledge of particulars is necessary for 
voluntary action (missing knowledge of particulars entails involuntary action – EN 
                                                      
193 It seems that Aristotle has no problem with switching from values to norms. If O is good, 
then I should do x for the sake of O. 
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1110b31-33), and, second, it leaves one more able to achieve one's actions, i.e. it 
makes one 'more practical' (praktikôteros 1141b16-18).  
Particulars in Aristotle are usually understood as particular instances of 
some kind, i.e. as individuals.194 Particular propositions are thus propositions in 
which a predicate is attributed to a term referring to such an individual (See DI 
17a38-b3). Moreover, particular propositions are usually taken to involve a very 
basic predicate e.g. 'Socrates is white', because they are closely associated with 
sense-perception. Indeed, in the DA, Aristotle links perception with particulars as 
opposed to the association between epistêmê and universals (417b22-23) and percep-
tion is often described as having fairly simple objects: instances of immediately ob-
servable individual properties such as colours, sounds, tangible surfaces, shapes, 
motions etc. (DA II.6 418a7-20).195 Thus, ta kath'hekasta in the ethics would be propo-
sitions about concrete individuals with their perceptual property instances, exclud-
ing abstract relations and normative properties. This seems to be what Aristotle has 
in mind at EN VI.8 1142a20-23 (text 26) when he says that error about the kath'hekas-
ton concerns a proposition such as 'this sample of water is heavy'. The use of the 
demonstrative pronoun seems to refer to a particular instance of heavy water and 
the property of 'being heavy' is immediately perceptible, unlike the relational prop-
erty 'being harmful to x'. This way of construing ta kath'hekasta focuses on the indi-
viduality of the object. 
However, according to EN VI.7 1141b14-23 (text 27), where knowledge of 
particulars is introduced, Aristotle seems to consider that ta kath'hekasta are not in-
dividual instances of some general types, but rather more specific types, i.e. sub-
types of more general types. Indeed, the example in text (27) of a kath'hekaston is that 
'bird meat is light and healthy' (1141b20), which looks like a specification of the 
                                                      
194 See e.g. Meta. III.4 999b34-1000a1 "For we mean by "particular" what is numerically one, 
and by "universal" what holds of these." (-ὕ$( 5ὰ) 0έ5-<'+ $ὸ !"&’ ἕ!"@$-+, $ὸ ἀ)2&<ῷ 
ἕ+, !"&ό0-8 Cὲ $ὸ ἐ,ὶ $-ύ$(+). 
195 In other words, these are property instances, which we would nowadays call 'tropes'. 
These are what Aristotle calls 'perceptibles in themselves' (kath'auton), i.e. who are essential-
ly perceptibles. Aristotle distinguishes such perceptible qualities into two groups: the prop-
er perceptibles, on the one hand, which are perceptible by one sense only (colours with 
sight, sounds with ear, etc.), and the common perceptibles, on the other, which are percepti-
ble by two senses or more (shapes, motions, sizes, etc.). One should notice, however, that 
Aristotle also distinguishes what he calls 'incidental perceptibles'. These denote the sub-
stances to which the proper perceptibles belong to. For instance, when perceiving this 
white, I incidentally perceive the son of Diares (DA II.6 418a20-25; III.1 425a24-27). Inci-
dental perceptibles have sometimes been interpreted as the object of practical perception as 
when at EN VI.8 1142a25-30 Aristotle is comparing phronêsis with perception of mathemati-
cal objects (see e.g. Cashdollar 1973: 172-174). I shall not follow this line of thought here. 
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more general 'light meats are easily digestible and so healthy' (1141b18-19). Accord-
ing to this example, ta kath'hekasta in a practical context are not concrete individuals 
or particular property instances, but rather subtypes which are kath'hekaston insofar 
as they are less general than the katholou statements (See Cooper 1975: 29; Broadie 
1991: 243-244; Natali 2001: 208-209, n. 48).196 
However, this way of accounting for ta kath'hekasta loses touch with the 
meaning of kath'hekaston as particular instances. Yet, it is also undeniable that at 
1142a20-23 Aristotle refers to a genuine particular rather than to a subtype. One 
way to make sense of the ambiguity of 'kath'hekaston' is to take it not in the restric-
tive sense of 'what cannot be said of many', but rather in a more common sense. 
Literally, 'kath'hekaston' means 'according to each' or 'one after the other'. In this 
sense, kath'hekaston can accommodate both meanings as particulars and as sub-
types. If one consider a universal type as consisting of all the instances of that type, 
then considering it kath'hekaston, i.e. 'according to each part', amounts to enumerat-
ing the instances one by one. However, a universal can also be identified with the 
sum of all its subtypes. In this sense, then, considering the type kath'hekaston 
amounts to enumerating the subtypes which make up this more general type. 
However, this distinction does not account for the unitary use of kath'hekaston. We 
need an additional element which explains why we can use kath'hekaston indiffer-
ently to denote particular instances and subtypes. 
One could also suggest that the decisive feature of being 'particular' in a 
practical context is that knowing this kind of object makes the agent 'more practical' 
(praktikôteros). The main reason why Aristotle insists on knowledge of particulars is 
precisely that it makes the agent more efficient in action (EN VI.7 1141b16-18 – text 
27). If you know that bird meat (i.e. poultry) is light and healthy, you will 'produce 
health more'. One can understand this in the following way. For instance, a doctor 
would be able to 'produce health in his patient', i.e. to make him healthier, by pre-
scribing him poultry. Accordingly, then, this piece of knowledge would be more 
effective than a more general one such as 'I know I ought to prescribe light meat' to 
this person, because in the latter case the agent does not know which specific kind 
of meat is light. In this case, 'Chicken meat is light' would count as a particular, not 
in virtue of its form, but because knowing it makes the agent more practical. 
                                                      
196 Cooper even infers from this that the content of practical perception is always a subtype 
and that the job of deliberation is not the implementation of an action-type in an actual ac-
tion, but the specification of the subtype (Cooper 1975: 33-34 and Appendix). However, 
Cooper has been convincingly refuted by Engberg-Pedersen, who notes that some instances 
of 'kath'hekaston' do refer to genuine particulars: 1141b20 and 1143b4 (1983: 199-200, n. 5). 
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However, this argument is not satisfactory. Does knowing that 'chicken 
meat is light' really helps in practical situations? If one considers that kath'hekaston 
refers to a genuine particular, the practicality of knowledge of particulars seems to 
work. If I entertain the belief that 'I should eat light meat', then when I see a piece of 
chicken meat and I think 'this is light meat', this latter belief certainly helps to de-
cide that I should eat it. However, it seems that one cannot use the same case with 
kath'hekasta as subtypes. In the same situation when believing that 'I should eat 
light meat', thinking additionally that 'chicken meat is light meat' brings me no 
nearer to action. Knowing that 'chicken meat is light' is not specific enough and it 
does not help making a particular decision. This way of reasoning can be extended. 
If I further consider that 'chicken meat makes digestion easier', which is even a 
more specific proposition, this still does not help in making a decision. It seems that 
unless I entertain a genuine particular proposition, i.e. which refers to a concrete 
individual, I will not be able to make a decision. 
This way of thinking presupposes that by praktikos Aristotle means 'being 
able to act' in the sense that I am praktikos when I am in a position to act immediate-
ly, when nothing else is required. However, it is possible that praktikos also has a 
different meaning. Thus, this section will be devoted to clarifying what Aristotle 
means by kath'hekaston, and a definitive answer to this issue will require that one 
specifies what being praktikos means. 
4.4.1 Particulars as the circumstances of the situation 
In Book III, chapter 1, Aristotle concludes his discussion on voluntary action 
by offering a definition of it: 
35) "The involuntary being done under constraint or because of igno-
rance, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the origin is 
in oneself, when one knows the particulars in which the action 
takes place." EN III.1 1111a22-24 
Ὄ+$-3 C’ ἀ!-8@ί-8 $-ῦ /ίᾳ !"ὶ C2’ ἄ5+-2"+, $ὸ ἑ!-ύ@2-+ CόN'2'+ 
ἂ+ 'ἶ+"2 -ὗ ἡ ἀ)9ὴ ἐ+ "ὐ$ῷ 'ἰCό$2 $ὰ !"&’ ἕ!"@$" ἐ+ -ἷ3 ἡ 
,)ᾶN23. 
The first condition, which concerns the 'origin' (archê) of the action, sums up 
the discussion of EN III.1 1110a2-b17 about problematic cases of acting under con-
straint. The second one solves cases of ignorance, as discussed at 1110b18-1111a21, 
for ignorance of some particular features of a situation may lead to an action one 
later regrets. If the agent had known the relevant features, he would not have acted 
as he actually did. In the actual case, his action counts as involuntary. Aristotle 
enumerates those circumstances: 
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36) "Perhaps, then, it is no bad thing to determine what these <partic-
ular factors> are, and how many they are. So: there is the matter of 
who is acting, what he is doing, about what or in what it resides, 
sometimes also with what (as for example with a tool), what the 
action is for (e.g. saving someone), and how it is done (e.g. gently 
or vigorously)." EN III.1 1111a3-6 
ἴ@(3 -ὖ+ -ὐ 9'ῖ)-+ C2-)ί@"2 "ὐ$ά, $ί+" !"ὶ ,ό@" ἐ@$ί, $ί3 $' Cὴ 
!"ὶ $ί !"ὶ ,')ὶ $ί ἢ ἐ+ $ί+2 ,)ά$$'2, ἐ+ί-$' Cὲ !"ὶ (5) $ί+2, -ἷ-+ 
ὀ)5ά+ῳ, !"ὶ ἕ+'!" $ί+-3, -ἷ-+ @($7)ί"3, !"ὶ ,ῶ3, -ἷ-+ ἠ)έ<" ἢ 
@>όC)". 
Aristotle provides us with a list of characteristics that the agent should 
know if he is to act voluntarily. He does not only mentions that the agent should 
know some particular features in order to act voluntarily, but he specifies those fea-
tures by giving a classification of them. In order to have a better overview, I have 
listed these features in the table below: 
1. tis Who is acting The agent 
2. ti What the agent is doing The action 
3. peri ti/en tini What the action is about or what 
its domain is 
The object or the situation197 
4. tini What the agent is acting with The instrument 
5. heneka tinos What the action is for The end (or consequence)198 
6. pôs How it is done The manner 
 
In order to make this list of circumstances more explicit, Aristotle gives ex-
amples such as the case of Queen Merope (1111a11), who mistook her own son for 
an enemy and ordered her soldiers to kill him, as is related in Euripides' lost trage-
dy Cresphontes. If the queen had known who this person really was, she wouldn't 
                                                      
197 The meaning of this (or these) circumstance(s) is not immediately obvious. Translators 
often give their own version of peri ti ê en tini, without agreeing on its meaning. Gauthier 
and Jolif note that there are two main tendencies to understanding this group of circum-
stances: “what thing or who is object of action” vs. “object and situation of an action” and 
they take up the second interpretation (Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 185; see also Taylor 2006: 146). 
I follow this trend here.  
198 The treating of the hou heneka, i.e. the end, of an action as a mere particular circumstance 
of it is striking. Knowledge of the end is a central feature in decision-making and as such 
seems to have a more important role to play than to insure voluntariness of the action. Igno-
rance of the end entails the non-virtuousness of the agent. Moreover, the intended end of an 
action is accordingly not a particular circumstance but rather a general statement (to pro-
vide wealth to one’s family). The hou heneka here perhaps merely refers to the outcome or 
consequence of the action, i.e. an "end" without any moral connotation, and the agent can be 
mistaken about it. The distinction between intended end and actual end could be placed in 
this framework. 
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have given such an order. She would probably have had a party set up in his hon-
our. This example illustrates the 'about what/whom' type of circumstance.199 An-
other expressive example features someone giving medicine ("give something to 
drink" - pisas) to a patient and ending up killing him (1111a13). In this case, the pre-
sumed doctor did not know that the medicine was not appropriate. Maybe he did 
not know that the medicine was too strong or he was unaware of some important 
detail in his patient's physiology. This example is related to the 'for the sake of 
what' type of circumstance. The chosen medicine is supposed to cure such and such 
a disease in patients of such and such a physiology. The unskilled doctor was igno-
rant of its effect. In both examples, the agent is not judged as acting voluntarily, 
because he is unaware of some aspects of the situation. Consequently, the intended 
action does not correspond with the action that is actually carried out. 
Ever since Anscombe's Intention, it is commonly acknowledged that actions 
can be described in various ways and that it is possible that one knows what one is 
doing under a certain description but not under another (Anscombe 1957: 23-24, 
§6). It seems that this way of conceptualizing actions can be applied here.200 In Eu-
ripides' tragedy, the queen's intended action is "ordering the execution of this indi-
vidual", whereas as soon as one ascribes that "this individual is my son" to her de-
scription of the action, one cannot expect her to maintain her intention of killing 
this individual. The above table shows Aristotle's attempt to give a systematic 
structure in order to specify the content of an action. Of course, the wish for sys-
tematization does not carry on throughout. The list is neither exhaustive nor firmly 
established, as the mention of other such lists of circumstances shows (EN V.10 
1135a25 ff.; EE II.9 1225b2-8). Aristotle provides nevertheless a list of types of cir-
cumstances which are instantiated as particular circumstances in the description of 
an action. 
The content of an action is therefore specified by my knowledge of the par-
ticular circumstances that circumscribe the action. That I perform this very action 
willingly, under this specific description, depends on my knowledge of these cir-
cumstances particular to the present situation. This is indeed Aristotle second con-
dition for voluntary action. The agent is supposed to know the particular circum-
stances, otherwise the description of the action he intends to carry out is not identi-
cal with the description of the action he actually does carry out.  
                                                      
199 I follow Bodéüs concerning the distribution of examples to types of circumstances. Ex-
amples are in fact somewhat hard to match with the list of the types of circumstances. 
200 Taylor 2006: 132ff. For a similar application of the notion of 'knowing under a description' 
on Plato, see Santas, who refers explicitly to Anscombe (Santas 1964: 154-155). 
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It might sound surprising to claim that the voluntary agent knows all the 
particular circumstances that go with the action. True, there is no definite set of 
circumstances surrounding the acting agent; the amount of circumstances is unde-
termined. Moreover, not every circumstance is relevant for the agent. Besides, it 
might seem hard to imagine that the agent is actively considering all these various 
circumstances at the very moment of action. However, my interpretation does not 
require such stringent conditions as exhaustiveness of circumstances or active con-
sideration of them. Rather, a more plausible picture is that we do not consciously 
have all the relevant features of an action in mind while performing it. By 
knowledge of the particular circumstances, I mean a diffuse awareness of these cir-
cumstances at the moment of action that is sufficient in order to have a definite de-
scription of the action, i.e. to call the action voluntary. This is an a posteriori criteri-
on, according to which the agent has to account for his doing and his reasons to act 
after he has performed the action (ex post justification). One has to ask the agent rea-
sons for his behaviour, i.e. a more or less complete explanation of his action in 
which he will list the relevant circumstances that justify it. In a nutshell, the agent 
only has a vague awareness of the particular circumstances at the very moment of 
action, and this awareness is sufficient in order to give an appropriate justification 
of the action.201 
Now, it is undeniable that the particular circumstances Aristotle enumerates 
in his discussion on voluntary action are also found in the various definitions of 
particular virtues referred to in section 4.2. Aristotle uses the same descriptive tool 
in order to outline both voluntary and particular virtuous actions. For instance, in 
the definition of courage, the relevant circumstances which the agent should take 
into account are the object of his fear, the consequence, the manner and the mo-
ment.202 In the case of mildness, the relevant circumstances are the patient of one's 
anger; the subject matter; the manner, the moment and the duration (or quantity).203 
                                                      
201 Of course, such an account of voluntary action might entail the possibility of 'retroactive' 
voluntary action. First, I act without reason, and then when I am asked to account for my 
action, I find out the right set of reasons. However, in my view, this account of knowledge 
of the circumstances as vague awareness is sufficient for voluntary action. The reasons the 
agent invokes in his justification ex post are already included in his awareness of the circum-
stances while performing the action. When the time comes to justify his deed, the agent 
simply expresses what he already knew implicitly. Of course, this case describes an ideal 
agent. By contrast, social psychology nowadays is interested in the discrepancy there is 
between the way actual agents accounts for their decisions and the actual reasons why they 
made these decisions. I thank Patrice Soom for drawing my attention to this point. 
202 ἁ C'ῖ; -ὑ ἑ+'!" C'ῖ; ὧ3 C'ῖ; ὅ$' C'ῖ. See EN III.7 1115b17-20 (text 28). 
203 -ἷ3 C'ῖ; ἐ>'-ἷ3 C'ῖ; ὧ3 C'ῖ; ὅ$' C'ῖ; ὅ@-+ C'ῖ. See EN IV.5 1125b31-33. 
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Yet, virtuous actions in play in the definition of virtues involve a normative aspect 
which is not present in the description of voluntary actions. A typical virtuous ac-
tion is not merely doing > to object x at time t in the way w, etc. as in the case of 
voluntary action, but doing > as one should, to the object one should, at the time one 
should in the way one should, etc. It seems that Aristotle reuses his description of 
voluntary action in order to conceptualize virtuous action. Doing so, he adds a 
normative component in the description. 
This implies that the virtuous agent, performing a virtuous action as de-
scribed by the orthos logos also possesses knowledge of (an undetermined amount 
of) particular circumstances of the action. My view is that, when Aristotle speaks 
about 'knowledge of particulars' at 1141b14-16 (text 27), this kind of knowledge 
does not simply amount to a single statement such as 'this is sweet' or 'chicken meat 
is light', but contains a set of particular circumstances of the situation such as the 
object of action, the time of action, the manner, etc. Knowledge of particulars is that 
in virtue of which I have not only a certain knowledge of what I am doing, but rather 
a wider spectrum of associated information relevant to the situation which consti-
tutes a framework describing an intended action. The agent knows what he is doing 
as well as that he is doing it for the sake of someone, with the help of a certain thing, 
in a certain manner, etc. One can thus describe knowledge of particulars as an 
awareness of the action directed at multiple features of the situation. The kath'hekas-
ta Aristotle speaks about are in fact the various features of a practical situation in 
which the agent is engaged. This situation is particular in a genuine sense because it 
occurs only once.204  
So, what are the kath'hekasta that phronêsis needs to know? Obviously, the 
kath'hekasta include genuine particular propositions gained from the observation of 
the situation. In the chicken meat case, it is necessary to know that 'this is chicken' 
for the agent to make a voluntary decision. However, the examples chosen by Aris-
totle in the passage on voluntary action show that the kath'hekasta are not limited to 
observational statements. Circumstances such as the effect of some drug, or such as 
'this individual is my son' are not knowable by observing the situation. Some addi-
tional knowledge must be required for the agent to be in a position to know these 
circumstances, even though they are necessary for virtuous decision-making. This 
kind of circumstances denotes abstract relational properties. One could even allow 
normative properties to enter the class of particular circumstances of a situation. 
Chapters on the particular virtues show that when acting, the virtuous agent is 
                                                      
204 The idea of grouping a multiplicity of considerations in knowledge of particulars has 
already been offered by Wiggins 1975-1976: 45 and McDowell 1979: 344. 
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somehow aware of normative states of affairs. When a better informed Queen 
Merope acknowledges that the individual in front of her is her son, one could at-
tribute her the belief that 'this individual here is to be petted'. More generally, the 
agent knows things expressed in propositions like 'this object x is such that I ought 
to >'.  
Now, it seems that this extended interpretation of kath'hekaston thanks to the 
notion of circumstance of the action makes it possible to accommodate the use of 
kath'hekaston for subtypes, as in the proposition 'chicken meat is healthy'. In the 
chicken meat case, the situation is that of a dietician who intends to prescribe 
healthy food to his patient, say, Socrates. The notion of circumstance of the action 
entails that when the dietician writes up his prescription he must have in mind 
multiple data about the present situation. A relevant feature for the doctor to know 
is Socrates bodily constitution. He might also need to know the previous diet of 
Socrates, how many times a day he has meals, what kind of food would be appro-
priate, etc. Following the framework of the particular circumstances, the doctor's 
prescription would take the form: 'I need to prescribe chicken meat to Socrates who 
is presently suffering from stomach-ache.' In this case, chicken meat appears to be 
the instrument of the decision.  
That Socrates is short is a particular fact in the sense of an individual prop-
erty. By contrast, knowing that chicken meat is healthy is not a particular fact. 
However, that such a proposition is kath'hekaston or not does not primarily depend 
on its form, but on its connection to the situation. When asserting  such a proposi-
tion, the dietician does insert it within a collection of beliefs which are related to a 
particular situation. 'Being healthy' is a relative property. A type of food is healthy 
to a certain kind of being. For lions, healthy food is raw meat, for mice healthy food 
is (presumably) cheese, whereas for human beings, healthy food is light meat. 
Moreover, being healthy relates not only to species, but also to individuals within 
this species. Chicken meat might be healthy for Socrates. It might also be good to 
Callias. However, in the case of a strong-built athlete, chicken meat would perhaps 
not be appropriate. His strong body would rather benefit from red meat. Poultry 
would cause his organism to weaken instead.205 That 'chicken meat is healthy' is not 
                                                      
205 Compare this with Aristotle's remark on the correct mean relative to us (pros hêmas) at EN 
II.6 1106a36-b7. There Aristotle observes that the mean relative to us should be proportional 
to the agent. The example he invokes is that of eating the right amount of food. Even if ten 
minae (about a pound) is a lot to eat and two is few, the dietician ought to prescribe an 
amount appropriate to the subject. In the case of a strong athlete like the wrestler Milo, who 
was famous for his appetite, the right amount would not be the arithmetic mean but should 
be proportional to his size and constitution. 
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true simpliciter but only insofar as it is related to Socrates as a particular individual. 
Correspondingly, the circumstance considered by the dietician is not merely 'chick-
en meat is healthy', but the circumstance connected to the actual situation 'chicken 
meat is healthy to Socrates'. In that sense, that chicken meat is healthy is a particu-
lar circumstance when it comes to curing Socrates. One should even go further and 
add that the property 'being healthy' is relative not only to a particular individual, 
but to a particular situation. A sick Socrates will not benefit from any kind of food 
in the same way as a healthy Socrates. For instance, if Socrates suffers from diar-
rhoea, he should not consume orange juice, although orange juice is usually known 
as being healthy. From this discussion, it appears that the object of the agent's belief 
on particulars is not merely a subtype, but a subtype connected to a particular situ-
ation. What the dietician knows as a particular circumstance when he prescribes 
chicken meat to Socrates is not that 'chicken meat is healthy', but the more specific 
'chicken meat is healthy for Socrates now'. 
A significant consequence of this account of the particular circumstances is 
that when Aristotle speaks of being kath'hekaston in a practical context, what mat-
ters is not whether a circumstance is an individual event occurring once or a sub-
types specifying a more general type in a particular situation. The term kath'hekas-
ton can accommodate both kinds of thing. Rather, that the object of knowledge of 
particulars is a circumstance entails that it can be either an individual event as a part 
of the situation, or a subtype relevant to the situation. The 'particulars' that the 
agent needs to know are the relevant features of a particular situation. They are 
'particular' (kath'hekaston) insofar as they are related to the situation.206 The proposi-
tion 'chicken meat is healthy' is particular in virtue of being part of a particular sit-
uation. As already said, the exact particular known by the dietician is 'chicken meat 
is healthy for Socrates in this present condition'. The more general content 'light 
meat is healthy' by contrast is not particular because when holding such a belief, we 
do not have the related information 'light for whom?' or 'healthy for whom?’207 
As it was the case with knowledge of universals, whose object has been 
identified as a specification of a moral end, I have interpreted knowledge of the 
particulars as closely related to the evaluation of decision (see p. 103). According to 
this reading, knowledge of the particulars are connected to finding out the correct 
mean (meson). Ultimately, the question will be 'what is it to know what one should 
                                                      
206 For a similar interpretation, see Devereux 1986: 489. 
207 It seems that 'light meat is healthy' is true without any reference to particular individuals. 
By contrast, 'chicken meat is healthy' must refer to a relative subject. The proposition 'chick-
en meat is healthy' alone is neither true nor false. One must add the relative subject 'for Soc-
rates' for the proposition to take a truth-value. 
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do?' Correspondingly, I shall ask what it is to know the particulars. This will be the 
object of chap. 5. Yet, concerning the content of decision, there is still a further as-
pect to inquire into. Aristotle holds that knowing particulars makes one more able 
to act. What is it in the particulars which enables the agent to be better able to act? 
In what follows, I shall inquire what it is to be praktikos and to be praktikôteros. Aris-
totle offers the longest development on the question at EN VI.12-13, when he raises 
the aporia of the usefulness of phronêsis, and of sophia. Knowing what being praktikos 
means will inform us on the aspect of knowledge of particulars which interests us. 
4.4.2 Particular knowledge makes the agent praktikôteros  
At the end of book VI, Aristotle addresses an objection (diaporêseie 1143b18) 
to himself concerning the practicability of knowledge. He takes notice of a reproach 
one could make of his own notion of phronêsis. Does it really make us praktikôteroi, 
i.e. better able to act? Aristotle deals with this problem at EN VI.12-13. 
37) "Since phronêsis is the <disposition>208 about just and fine and 
good things for man, and these are the things that the good man 
typically does, by knowing these things we shall not be more able 
to do them, since the virtues are dispositions. Similarly, with the 
things related to health or to physical fitness (those that are said 
'healthy' or 'fit' not because of producing, but because they come 
from the disposition), for we shall not be more able to produce 
them by having <science or art of> medicine and gymnastics." EN 
VI.12 1143b21-28 
'ἴ,') ἡ <ὲ+ >)ό+7@ί3 ἐ@$2+ ἡ ,')ὶ $ὰ Cί!"2" !"ὶ !"0ὰ !"ὶ 
ἀ5"&ὰ ἀ+&)ώ,ῳ, $"ῦ$" C’ ἐ@$ὶ+ ἃ $-ῦ ἀ5"&-ῦ ἐ@$ὶ+ ἀ+C)ὸ3 
,)ά$$'2+, -ὐCὲ+ Cὲ ,)"!$2!ώ$')-2 $ῷ 'ἰCέ+"2 "ὐ$ά ἐ@<'+, 'ἴ,') 
ἕN'23 (25) "ἱ ἀ)'$"ί 'ἰ@2+, ὥ@,') -ὐCὲ $ὰ ὑ52'2+ὰ -ὐCὲ $ὰ 
'ὐ'!$2!ά, ὅ@" <ὴ $ῷ ,-2'ῖ+ ἀ00ὰ $ῷ ἀ,ὸ $ῆ3 ἕN'(3 'ἶ+"2 
0έ5'$"2· -ὐ&ὲ+ 5ὰ) ,)"!$2!ώ$')-2 $ῷ ἔ9'2+ $ὴ+ ἰ"$)2!ὴ+ !"ὶ 
58<+"@$2!ή+ ἐ@<'+. 
The main argument can be paraphrased in the following way: Knowing the 
things concerning the just, the fine and the good for humans does not make us 
more ‘practical’, i.e. able to achieve these things (praktikôteroi); phronêsis is 
knowledge of these things – by definition; therefore phronêsis does not make us 
praktikôteroi and is thereby not useful. This objection recalls the one he had ad-
dressed to Plato concerning the practicability of the form of the Good (EN I.6 
1096b31-1097a13). How is it that knowing such things as the just, the fine and the 
                                                      
208 Here I follow the OCT, along with Inwood & Woolf and Irwin. Rowe as well as Crisp 
omit the hê following manuscript Lb. 
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good does not make us more practical? The reason is that dispositions by them-
selves can be seen as sufficient in order to implement actions. The idea seems to be 
that when you have the disposition, then the correct actions result from having the 
disposition. In order to make his point, Aristotle compares the situation with health 
and physical fitness. Knowledge on health and physical fitness does not make us 
healthier or fitter. Rather, it is having the disposition of being healthy or being fit 
which results in being healthy or fit. Similarly, then, knowing what the just, the fine 
and the good are is not useful. The agent should already be just, fine or good.209 
Aristotle answers this aporia on the practicability of phronêsis at 1144a11 on-
ward, (after having dealt with another issue concerning the usefulness of sophia). 
38) "Concerning the objection that we are not more able to perform 
(praktikôterous) fine and just things thanks to phronêsis, we need to 
start a little bit from above,210 taking the following starting point." 
EN VI.12 1144a11-13 
,')ὶ Cὲ $-ῦ <7&ὲ+ 'ἶ+"2 ,)"!$2!($έ)-83 C2ὰ $ὴ+ >)ό+7@2+ $ῶ+ 
!"0ῶ+ !"ὶ C2!"ί(+, <2!)ὸ+ ἄ+(&'+ ἀ)!$έ-+, 0"/ό+$"3 ἀ)9ὴ+ 
$"ύ$7+.  
Answering that puzzle will entail a long development. The final answer to 
the aporia will be given at the end of EN VI.13, at 1145a3ff. At that point, Aristotle 
will clarify that phronêsis is indeed useful. Here is a summary of the steps leading to 
his solution. First Aristotle introduces the division of labour between virtue of 
character and phronêsis (although he does not name phronêsis at once): virtue of 
character gives the end, while phronêsis is in charge of the means to the end (See 
§4.3.2). Then, he introduces deinotês (cleverness, or astuteness) as a faculty special-
                                                      
209 A way to avoid the above objection would be to shift slightly the point of the usefulness 
of phronêsis. Aristotle considers the view that even if phronêsis is not useful to perform virtu-
ous action, it could be useful in order to become virtuous (1143b28-33). But even in this case, 
it turns out that being phronimos is not useful. Either one is already virtuous and does not 
need phronêsis, or one is not virtuous but does not have to be phronimos oneself in order to 
act virtuously; one can merely follow the phronimos' advice. The detail of this argument is 
not clear; however clearing it out is not necessary because this objection is not answered. 
Indeed, as Aristotle succeeds in answering the first objection, it becomes useless to cope 
with this one. 
210 The reference of mikron anôthen at 1144a13 is not clear. Burnet (1900: 283) refers back to 
1139b14; Gauthier (1970: 548) refers to 1144a6-9; Dirlmeier (1963: 469) to 1134a16-23 and 
1135a16-19. Greenwood translates the phrase "we must go a little deeper into the question", 
thereby avoiding any reference to a previous passage in the text. Younger scholars do not 
mention the phrase (e.g. Natali 2001; Dahl 1984; Reeve 2013). I contend that here Aristotle is 
merely referring to lines 1143b18-28, which contain the first statement of the aporia on the 
usefulness of phronêsis. 
Another Kind of Knowledge. Aristotle's Phronesis from an Epistemological Point of View 
 146 
ized in succeeding to achieve any proposed goal, whatever the end at stake is. 
Phronêsis is then introduced as a kind of deinotês. In passing, Aristotle establishes 
the necessity of virtue for phronêsis: without virtue, there is no phronêsis, only dein-
otês. Then Aristotle introduces a parallel relation: virtue can also occur as a natural 
trait of character called 'natural virtue' (phusikê aretê). This way, he can show why 
phronêsis is useful (and even indispensable): phronêsis secures that we are not simply 
naturally virtuous, but virtuous in its full sense. Then, Aristotle concludes the ar-
gument with a famous formula on the reciprocity of phronêsis and virtue: virtue is 
necessary for phronêsis and phronêsis is necessary for virtue, that is, for virtue in its 
full sense (1144b14-17). In the rest of chapter 13, Aristotle deals with a couple of 
extra points which were objects of debate at the time. Whether virtue itself is a form 
of knowledge, as Socrates held (1144b17-30), or whether it is possible to possess one 
particular virtue alone, without the others (1144b32-1145a2). While these matters 
are very interesting as well, I shall not elaborate on them. Let us now come back to 
the argument on the usefulness of phronêsis more carefully. 
The 'starting point' (archê) mentioned at 1144a13 amounts to distinguishing 
between performing a good action and performing a good action out of a virtuous 
disposition. 
39) "Just as we say that concerning just actions, too, some people who 
act justly are not themselves just, for instance those who make 
what is ordered by the laws, or those who act involuntarily, or out 
of ignorance or for any other reason, but who do not act for the 
sake of the action itself (even though they perform the things one 
should do and all the things the spoudaios must do), similarly it 
seems that there is performing each things while being in such a 
disposition of being actually good. I mean, for instance, when one 
acts out of decision and for the sake of the things themselves one 
is doing." EN VI.12 1144a13-20 
ὥ@,') 5ὰ) !"ὶ $ὰ Cί!"2" 0έ5-<'+ ,)ά$$-+$ά3 $2+"3 -ὔ,( 
C2!"ί-83 'ἶ+"2, -ἷ-+ (15) $-ὺ3 $ὰ ὑ,ὸ $ῶ+ +ό<(+ $'$"5<έ+" 
,-2-ῦ+$"3 ἢ ἄ!-+$"3 ἢ C2’ ἄ5+-2"+ ἢ C2’ ἕ$')ό+ $2 !"ὶ <ὴ C2’ 
"ὐ$ά (!"ί$-2 ,)ά$$-8@ί 5' ἃ C'ῖ !"ὶ ὅ@" 9)ὴ $ὸ+ @,-8C"ῖ-+), 
-ὕ$(3, ὡ3 ἔ-2!'+, ἔ@$2 $ὸ ,ῶ3 ἔ9-+$" ,)ά$$'2+ ἕ!"@$" ὥ@$’ 
'ἶ+"2 ἀ5"&ό+, 0έ5( C’ -ἷ-+ C2ὰ ,)-"ί)'@2+ !"ὶ "ὐ$ῶ+ ἕ+'!" 
$ῶ+ (20) ,)"$$-<έ+(+.  
Here Aristotle is recalling one kind of possible failure in action. It is possible 
to perform a good action without being in a virtuous disposition (pôs echonta 
hôst'einai agathon). Cases are when one simply follows the laws or by luck, when 
acting involuntarily. It is a frequent observation Aristotle makes. Similar cases are 
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raised at EN II.4 1105a17-26; V.9 1137a4-9; EE 1247b25.211 This observation points at 
the function of virtue of character. Being disposed virtuously is what distinguishes 
an agent performing a genuinely good action from an agent performing a good 
action accidentally. This way, Aristotle can restate the contribution of virtue as 
marking off the genuinely virtuous action.  
Yet, doing so, he distinguishes another aspect of moral agency. The discrep-
ancy between genuinely virtuous action and good action by luck also corresponds 
to what I have called the case of the 'simple deliberator' at EN VI.9 1142b17-26 (§ 
3.3.2.1, text 22). In this case, the agent ends up performing a good action, although 
he does not do it for the right reasons. Therefore, successful moral action does not 
only rely on the correctness of decision but also on the success of its implementa-
tion in action. 
40) "Thus, virtue makes the decision correct. However, doing all what 
happens to be for the sake of decision does not belong to virtue, 
but to another faculty. But we must focus on these matters and 
make a clearer statement." EN VI.12 1144a20-22 
(20) $ὴ+ <ὲ+ -ὖ+ ,)-"ί)'@2+ ὀ)&ὴ+ ,-2'ῖ ἡ ἀ)'$ή, $ὸ C’ ὅ@" 
ἐ!'ί+73 ἕ+'!" ,έ>8!' ,)ά$$'@&"2 -ὐ! ἔ@$2 $ῆ3 ἀ)'$ῆ3 ἀ00’ 
ἑ$έ)"3 C8+ά<'(3. 0'!$έ-+ C’ ἐ,2@$ή@"@2 @">έ@$')-+ ,')ὶ 
"ὐ$ῶ+. 
The division of labour is thus introduced as consisting in that virtue makes 
the decision correct, while something else determines what is for the sake of deci-
sion.212 It will be clear later that the 'other faculty' is in fact phronêsis.213  
                                                      
211 In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle even describes the lucky person whose behaviour is not 
grounded on rational considerations in the same way as virtuous agents. At EE 1247b25, the 
lucky person is said to "desire the thing one should, in the way one should and when one 
should" (ἐ,2&8<-ῦ@2 !"ὶ $-ύ$-8 !"ὶ $ό$' !"ὶ -ὕ$(3 ὡ3 C'ῖ !"ὶ -ὗ C'ῖ !"ὶ ὅ$'). We find an 
adverbial description of the non-rational state of the lucky person that corresponds to the 
description of the orthos logos in the chapters on particular virtues, although the lucky per-
son does not have any logos that goes together with the relevant desire. 
212 Here the job of virtue is not determining the end as was previously the case (§4.3.2), but 
making decision correct. In fact, that virtue makes decision correct does not occur earlier in 
the EN. However, it is to be found in the EE, where Aristotle reproduces the definition of 
virtue as a hexis proairetikê (1227b8). Then virtue is said to make the decision error-free: (ἡ 
ἀ)'$ὴ ἀ+"<ά)$7$-+ ,-2'ῖ $ὴ+ ,)-"ί)'@2+ !"ὶ $ὸ $έ0-3 ὀ)&ό+ 1227b12-13), and especially 
later " Virtue is what causes the end of one's decision to be correct" ($-ῦ Cὲ $ὸ $έ0-3 ὀ)&ὸ+ 
'ἶ+"2 $ῆ3 ,)-"2)έ@'(3 [-ὗ] ἡ ἀ)'$ὴ "ἰ$ί". 1228a1-2). Concerning the EN, decision is pre-
sent in the definition of virtue: virtue as hexis proairetikê can be understood as a disposition 
that makes the decision correct (see also 1139a22-23). At 1111b5-6, Aristotle associates virtue 
and decision by saying that decision seems most proper to virtue (-ἰ!'2ό$"$-+ 5ὰ) 'ἶ+"2 
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In order to account for the specificity of phronêsis, Aristotle first introduces 
another disposition: deinotês. This is a faculty which enables the person gifted with 
it to achieve any proposed goal. Why does Aristotle not introduce phronêsis directly, 
avoiding the detour through deinotês? Introducing deinotês first is useful, for Aristo-
tle can then insist on the 'technical' aspect of practical reason, which is the applica-
tion of moral principles. The function Aristotle is straining to capture is that in vir-
tue of which we are able to implement a given general end into an actual action. 
However, doing so, Aristotle is careful not to describe phronêsis as a mere instru-
mental disposition. Deinotês is a faculty indifferent to the end. If the end is good, 
then deinotês becomes phronêsis, but if the end is bad, then deinotês is mere unscru-
pulousness (panourgia 1144a23-29). Phronêsis is not such a morally neutral disposi-
tion. If it were nothing over and above deinotês, it would be detached from the end 
aimed at and would not be different from technê, having ends external to its activi-
ty. Also, if phronêsis were merely instrumental, its usefulness would not exceed the 
application of a rule of action and Aristotle would not answer the objection at stake, 
namely that phronêsis is not useful. A virtuous person would owe his moral excel-
lence on his character alone. Phronêsis would not help to achieve good and just ac-
tions better. It would merely help the agent to implement actions with no regard for 
the intended end. Thus, in order to have phronêsis, virtue of character is necessary 
(1144a29-b1). Phronêsis appears as an intellectual virtue which includes a view on 
the end. The argument is basically that virtue keeps the starting points healthy, i.e. 
ensures that the agent follows the correct moral principle (See EN VI.12 1144a29-b1 
– text 23). 
This argument is important in the progression, because it shows that there is 
an aspect of moral agency which does not pertain to character-virtue, but to a ra-
tional disposition. It also suggests that this rational disposition cannot be merely 
instrumental and detached from the exercise of character virtue, but its function 
must be subtler. Then, Aristotle undertakes outlining what the function of phronêsis 
must be. But instead of introducing this function directly, he uses a counterfactual 
again. 
At the beginning of chap. 13, Aristotle turns back to virtue and observes that 
there is a distinction to be made within character-virtue similar to the one between 
phronêsis and deinotês:  
41) "We need to inquire virtue again. For virtue is disposed in a simi-
lar way: as phronêsis stands to deinotês – not identical, but similar, 
                                                                                                                                                        
C-!'ῖ $ῇ ἀ)'$ῇ). Thus, it is reasonable to think that Aristotle is speaking about the same 
issue as when he is concerned with determining the end. 
213 Pace Irwin ( 1978: 268, n. 17), who claims that the 'other capacity' is in fact deinotês. 
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so natural virtue stands to virtue in the full sense." EN VI.13 
1144b1-4 
!',$έ-+ Cὴ ,ά02+ !"ὶ ,')ὶ ἀ)'$ῆ3· !"ὶ 5ὰ) ἡ ἀ)'$ὴ 
,")",07@ί(3 ἔ9'2 ὡ3 ἡ >)ό+7@23 ,)ὸ3 $ὴ+ C'2+ό$7$" – -ὐ 
$"ὐ$ὸ <έ+, ὅ<-2-+ Cέ – -ὕ$( !"ὶ ἡ >8@2!ὴ ἀ)'$ὴ ,)ὸ3 $ὴ+ 
!8)ί"+. 
One ought to distinguish between 'natural virtue' (phusikê aretê) and 'virtue 
in the full sense' (kuria aretê). Natural virtue is a counterpart to deinotês concerning 
virtue of character. As deinotês is somehow incomplete compared to phronêsis, so is 
natural virtue. Hence the counterfactual argument: if there would not be phronêsis, 
virtue of character would be mere natural virtue. The incompleteness of natural 
virtue is the following: 
42) "For it seems that each of the character traits is somehow present 
by nature in everyone. For we are just and temperate and coura-
geous directly from birth and have the other virtues. However, we 
look for something else to be the good in the full sense, and such 
character traits to be present in a different way. For the natural 
dispositions are present in children and beasts as well, but with-
out intellect (nous) they seem to be harmful. So much seems to be a 
matter of observation: just as a powerful body when moving 
without sight will fall with powerful impact because of its sight-
lessness, so in this case too; but if one acquires intellect, it makes a 
difference to his actions. And the disposition being similar to this 
will then be virtue in the full sense." 1144b4-14 
,ᾶ@2 5ὰ) C-!'ῖ ἕ!"@$" $ῶ+ ἠ&ῶ+ ὑ,ά)9'2+ (5) >ύ@'2 ,(3· !"ὶ 
5ὰ) Cί!"2-2 !"ὶ @(>)-+2!-ὶ !"ὶ ἀ+C)'ῖ-2 !"ὶ $ἆ00" ἔ9-<'+ 
'ὐ&ὺ3 ἐ! 5'+'$ῆ3· ἀ00’ ὅ<(3 `7$-ῦ<'+ ἕ$')ό+ $2 $ὸ !8)ί(3 
ἀ5"&ὸ+ !"ὶ $ὰ $-2"ῦ$" ἄ00-+ $)ό,-+ ὑ,ά)9'2+. !"ὶ 5ὰ) ,"2@ὶ 
!"ὶ &7)ί-23 "ἱ >8@2!"ὶ ὑ,ά)9-8@2+ ἕN'23, ἀ00’ ἄ+'8 +-ῦ 
/0"/')"ὶ >"ί+-+$"2 -ὖ@"2. (10) ,0ὴ+ $-@-ῦ$-+ ἔ-2!'+ ὁ)ᾶ@&"2, 
ὅ$2 ὥ@,') @ώ<"$2 ἰ@98)ῷ ἄ+'8 ὄm'(3 !2+-8<έ+ῳ @8</"ί+'2 
@>ά00'@&"2 ἰ@98)ῶ3 C2ὰ $ὸ <ὴ ἔ9'2+ ὄm2+, -ὕ$( !"ὶ ἐ+$"ῦ&"· 
ἐὰ+ Cὲ 0ά/ῃ +-ῦ+, ἐ+ $ῷ ,)ά$$'2+ C2">έ)'2· ἡ C’ ἕN23 ὁ<-ί" 
-ὖ@" $ό$’ ἔ@$"2 !8)ί(3 ἀ)'$ή.  
Aristotle observes that in a way, we all possess virtues naturally.214 The 
point is that when we speak of being virtuous in the full sense, we mean something 
different than these innate virtues. The sign that natural virtues are not virtues in 
                                                      
214 He says 'we', which is a little surprising, because this would imply that naturally all peo-
ple are courageous, just and temperate, which is far from being the case... We could under-
stand that by 'we' Aristotle understands his audience and himself, i.e. the social and intellec-
tual elite of Athens at that time. 
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the full sense is that they might be harmful to us, whereas a genuine virtue cannot 
be but beneficial for its possessor. In order to make his point clearer, Aristotle 
makes an analogy with the body. He introduces the figure of someone having a 
strong body, but who is deprived of sight. Because of his lack of sight, his strong 
body will lead him to fall even more heavily. Aristotle does not complete the analo-
gy by returning to the case of the virtues, but we can reconstruct the idea. Someone 
with natural virtue lacking in intellect (nous) will tend to react in an excessive 
way.215 The naturally courageous might act boldly, the naturally temperate might 
turn out to react in a way too insensitive (probably), whereas the naturally just, 
might tend to favour one side unjustly. Here the fault is not due to excess in itself, 
i.e. to a mistake concerning the end pursued. As the notion of natural virtue im-
plies, the agent has the right disposition. Rather, the mistake resides in the actual-
ization of his disposition. There is a need for a disposition to channel the impulse of 
the naturally virtuous agent. 
I assume that the flaw Aristotle is pointing at is a default in practicality, i.e. a 
lack of knowledge of the relevant particulars.216 As the strong but blind person fails 
to notice some obstacles on his path, which causes his fall, the young person de-
prived of 'nous' fails to notice relevant features of the situation. Consequently, he is 
not able to judge the situation adequately and his response to it is not appropriate. 
He fails to discover the mean (meson) between excess and deficiency. In other words, 
the young person lacks of moral sensibility. Here comes phronêsis into play. If virtue 
of character were deprived of phronêsis, it would be mere natural virtue, i.e. a dis-
position which would aim at the right end, yet unreliably.217 
                                                      
215 I understand that nous here should not be given the technical meaning of the state grasp-
ing first principles. It rather means intelligence in general (see n.18). A few lines earlier, 
another occurrence of nous just has the same meaning (EN VI.11 1143a27). For a defence of 
this reading, see §5.2.2.2. 
216 By contrast, Reeve reads this passage assuming a technical meaning of nous. According to 
him, what distinguishes the naturally virtuous person from the fully virtuous one is that the 
latter has a correct conception of the ultimate end, namely eudaimonia (Reeve 1992: 86). 
217 One could object to this interpretation that the aporia of EN VI.12-13 about the usefulness 
of phronêsis is a new development in Aristotle's account and does not directly draw on ma-
terial of the earlier chapters, i.e. on the being praktikôteros of EN VI.7. True, at EN VI.7 
1141b14-23, Aristotle has been more specific by arguing that only one aspect of phronêsis 
makes us praktikôteroi, namely knowledge of particulars. By contrast, the aporia at EN VI.12 
1143b24 addresses phronêsis as a whole, not only on its component of knowledge of particu-
lars. However, the objection against the practicality of phronêsis appears as a direct attack on 
Aristotle's claim of EN VI.7 1141b14-16 that knowledge of particulars included in phronêsis 
makes us praktikôteroi. In his reply to the objection, Aristotle summons precisely the relevant 
kind of knowledge of particulars: what is crucial in the contribution of phronêsis is the ability 
of the agent to assess the relevancy of particular features of the situation in order to find his 
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Phronêsis appears as a disposition thanks to which the agent is better off at 
finding the mean, because he is better at judging the relevancy of the particular 
circumstances of the action. Indeed, phronêsis involves knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of the situation. Having such knowledge makes one more 'practical' 
because it provides a refined notion of what is going on and of what one should do. 
The agent armed with such knowledge will therefore be better at attaining the 
mean in his decision. Hence, phronêsis is practical in the sense of being efficient be-
cause it is a disposition which involves such knowledge of the particulars. It is not 
simply deinotês which applies the end without regard for its appropriateness to the 
situation, but it is a disposition which is able to reassess the end with regard to the 
relevant features of the situation. 
I shall come back to this feature of the phronimos and expand upon the ar-
gument on the kind of knowledge required for the phronimos. For the time being, I 
want to summarize what this passage teaches about the particulars in practical 
thought. It is worth noting that contrary to the man with a strong body, the natural-
ly virtuous person is not literally blind. The naturally virtuous agent possesses 
some information on his surroundings and this information certainly takes the form 
of beliefs about particular features about the situation. He might even possess some 
idea of a moral end to pursue or of general statements helping him in his delibera-
tion. What distinguishes him from the fully virtuous person is that the information 
he has about the situation is not appropriate. He does not consider the relevant cir-
cumstances in order to make a virtuous decision. By contrast, the fully virtuous 
agent entertains beliefs about the relevant circumstances. 
This suggests a distinction to be made between perceived circumstances and 
relevant circumstances. What first appears as prominent to the agent is not neces-
sarily what is the most relevant for decision-making. Consider a fully virtuous and 
a naturally virtuous agent confronted to similar situation. Both are followers of the 
claim introduced at the end of chap. 3 that injustice ought to be punished. They 
both have a friend who has borrowed money from them. One day, they meet this 
friend incidentally on the market place. They both require their friend that he pays 
back his debts, yet the friend does not accede their demand. What are the reactions 
of both proponents of justice? The view presented at the beginning of EN VI.13 ar-
gues that they will not react in the same way, and that this difference can be ex-
pressed in terms of practicality. The naturally virtuous agent will indeed hold the 
correct moral starting point, namely that one ought to punish unjust people. He 
                                                                                                                                                        
way out. Moreover, the analogy of the strong blind person uses terminology that has al-
ready appeared, in particular in passages where Aristotle compares phronêsis with empeiria 
(EN VI.8 1142a11-20; VI.11 1143b11-14; see chap. 5). 
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will also be aware that his friend has not paid him back, which turns out to be an 
instance of injustice. His decision, therefore, will be an instance of punishing (a 
blow in the face, having his friend arrested, robbing him, etc.) By contrast, the fully 
virtuous agent will react differently, because he is more praktikos. In other words, he 
has better knowledge of the particulars. In the present case, he also knows an addi-
tional fact, namely that his friend is going through a hard time. Maybe he knows 
that from an external source, but maybe he also understands it from the look of his 
friend. This belief that his friend is having a hard time should also go with a further 
belief that he needs understanding concerning money matters. Consequently, the 
fully virtuous agent will not mistreat his friend as his naturally virtuous companion 
does. The outcome of this comparison is that the naturally virtuous agent and the 
fully virtuous one are not sensitive to the same facts.  
I shall argue in chap. 5 that what explains the difference of their behaviour is 
the lack of experience (empeiria) of the naturally virtuous agent. What matters for 
the time being is the result that the particulars which must be known by the 
phronimos agent are not necessarily identical with perceptible particulars, but are 
more elaborated facts. The agent needs experience of this kind of facts if he is to 
cognize them. What Aristotle calls knowledge of particulars, then, cannot be mere 
perception of any particular features of a given situation. Rather, the agent must 
consider features which are relevant for decision-making.218 
4.5 Conclusion 
In chapter 3, I have argued that practical thought can be formalized as an 
argument. Such an argument consists of a major premise, of a minor one, and of a 
conclusion, whose content is a decision to act. Correspondingly, chapter 4 has 
shown that the content of the decision depends on the respective content of both 
premises. First, the agent must hold a universal proposition which describes an 
action-type which should be applied to a situation. Second, he also must hold a 
particular proposition which states a fact particular to the present situation. 
The major premise consists in a prescriptive proposition about an action-
type ('I ought to '). However, as I have attempted to show, this proposition is in 
fact the result of a specification process which started from a non-rational represen-
tation of a moral value. From an undetermined feeling of what is valuable, the 
                                                      
218 In a recent article, Dana Miller illustrates very well how empirical knowledge of particulars 
is different from perceptual awareness of particulars. According to her, experience (empeiria) 
of particulars is not just a collection of particular observations, but an ordered set of particu-
lars (Miller 2014: 129-130). I develop these aspects in chap. 5. 
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agent derives an explicit rational description of what he should do. Concerning the 
minor premise, my reading of the chapters on the particular virtues has shown that 
in a particular situation, the knowledge of particulars one attributes to the agent 
does not consist in a single statement only, but rather on a collection of various be-
liefs about the situation itself or about related states of affairs. Knowledge of partic-
ulars in this context amounts to a general representation of the situation. What mat-
ters for the agent to make a virtuous decision is this collection of statements. The 
minor premise of a practical syllogism is then only one of these propositions, which 
has been singled out for the purpose of moral justification. 
This description of the content of decision provides conditions under which 
one can affirm that the agent genuinely knows what he should do. Knowing what 
one should do depends on both these kinds of knowledge. The epistemic evalua-
tion of decision will therefore depend on the acquaintance of the agent with moral 
values and moral principles, i.e. his awareness of what one should do in general, on 
the on hand, and his acquaintance with particulars, i.e. the specific features that 
matter in the present situation, on the other. Knowing moral principles enables the 
agent to direct his intention to act correctly, towards the right action-type, whereas 
knowing particular features will enable him to implement his intention efficiently 
and in a non-incidentally virtuous way. On the contrary, if an agent lacks proper 
knowledge of one of these aspects, one cannot attribute practical knowledge to him. 
On the side of knowledge of universals, one who is deprived of a correct notion of 
what kind of actions are right or wrong in general is either brainless or wicked. On 
the side of particular knowledge, someone with a mistaken perception of what is 
relevant in a situation will either fail to implement the end he intends to carry out, 
or he will lack knowledge of the appropriate way to achieve it (he misses the 
mean). Thus, it is possible to evaluate an agent's decision epistemically, i.e. accord-
ing to his knowledge or acquaintance of what he should do. 
Moreover, in my view, analysing each premises of the practical argument is 
not sufficient in order to account for the epistemic strength of decision. What mat-
ters in practical knowledge is how I can relate specific features with my knowledge 
of universal principle. Practical knowledge depends on my awareness of the partic-
ular situation and how I can relate its features to moral principles. The next chapter 
is devoted to an investigation on the epistemology of each kind of premise, as well 
as on their relation. 

 CHAPTER 5 
5 The epistemic basis of practical knowledge 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3, I have argued that the content of decision can be formalized as 
an argument consisting in a major premise and a minor one. Chapter 4 has cleared 
up what each kind of premise is about. The major premise consists in a moral rule 
which is the expression of a moral end. The minor premise, on the other hand, is 
about a moral fact, which I call a circumstance of the action, and that the agent ob-
serves immediately among a multiplicity of other such facts. On the basis of this 
framework, I now want to offer an account of the epistemic evaluation of practical 
thought. Under which conditions does an agent fully know what he should do? I 
assume that the formal structure of practical thought provides a useful guide for 
that purpose. As the content of decision can be formalized as an argument, its epis-
temic evaluation depends on the components of the argument. Indeed, we have 
seen in the previous chapter that phronêsis requires knowledge of universals as well 
as knowledge of particulars (EN VI.7 1141b14-23). The epistemic evaluation of prac-
tical thought would thus depend on the kind of cognition the agent has of universal 
moral principles, on the one hand, and of the particular circumstances of the action, 
on the other. 
Concerning cognition of universals, I have argued at § 4.3 that our grasp of 
moral goals is both desiderative and rational. Moral ends are given by our character 
insofar as this is the kind of person we are which determines the kind of things we 
value. This kind of determination is general and is not necessarily explicit. I can 
merely feel that I desire such and such a thing without expressing it in words. Nev-
ertheless, moral ends can also be the objects of a propositional description. In prac-
tical reasoning about what things I should do, I might come to express the kind of 
ends I value in a rational formulation, as a rule or value I follow. I might also come 
to express such principles in the moral justification of my action, i.e. whether what I 
have done is right or wrong. This formulation of what I believe as good, or right, is 
the object of my cognition of universals in practical thought. In the case of a virtu-
ous action, this belief would then amount to knowledge of universals. It would 
then make sense to evaluate one's practical knowledge in decision upon one's 
knowledge of universal moral notions such as the good, the just or the virtuous. 
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Scholars have often considered that the epistemic superiority of the phroni-
mos depends on his better grasp of moral notions, i.e. on his knowledge of univer-
sals. Some have attempted to found the universal component of practical 
knowledge on a kind of practical intuition, or intellection, that is always true (the 
so-called 'practical nous').219 The true intellectual grasp of moral principles would 
then be a necessary condition for the phronimos' decision to be correct, i.e. practical-
ly true. However, in the first part of this chapter, I shall argue that this position is 
not Aristotle's. There is no occurrence of a practical nous of ethical principles in a 
sense similar to nous of the first principles of a science. On the contrary, occurrences 
of nous in the crucial pages of EN VI show that the focus concerning practical 
knowledge is not so much about knowledge of universals, but on the moment of 
decision (EN VI.8 1142a25-30; VI.11 1143a35-b5). I shall argue that one's cognitive 
access to moral principles does not rely on a higher-order capacity like nous but on 
a lower-order one, namely phantasia.220 
Regarding the particulars, it seems that the epistemic evaluation of cogni-
tion of the circumstances is not so informative. Indeed, knowledge of particulars 
amounts to knowledge of basic facts such as 'this is bread' or 'chicken is light'. This 
might lead one to identify knowledge of particulars with perception. If one con-
flates knowledge of particulars with perception, the conditions for such knowledge 
are identical with those of perception. It seems that stating the conditions in which 
the agent really knows the particulars does not really matter, because the conditions 
for perception to be true are not mysterious for Aristotle. Perceptual knowledge 
depends on the causal effect of the object of perception on the observer's senses. 
Aristotle does not worry about some sceptical doubt one could have about percep-
tual knowledge (Taylor 1990: 116-117). Besides, wondering about the truth or relia-
bility of knowledge of facts would not be proper to practical knowledge, but would 
be common to a general study of knowledge. However, in the second part of this 
chapter, I shall argue that what really matters in practical cases is not whether my 
perception of such and such a fact is true, but whether the circumstances I perceive 
are those relevant for virtuous decision-making. 
Thus, I contend that Aristotle has a way to describe practical knowledge as 
knowledge in a strong sense, by contrast to an approximate belief of what to do. 
This way of knowing moral matters is quite different from what we usually call 
knowledge. The crucial aspect of practical knowledge is not knowing moral values 
                                                      
219 Kenny 1979: 151–2; Engberg-Pedersen 1983: 211–19; Dahl 1984: 41–5; Reeve 1992: 99; Tay-
lor 2008. 
220 Such a view has been advocated for by Burnet 1900: 64-68, esp. 67; Natali 2002: 182; 
Achtenberg 2002; Bodéüs 2004: 116, n. 2; Moss 2012 chap. 7. 
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or principles, but being able to tie such values and principles to a particular situa-
tion by recognizing particulars as instances of these. In this respect, the crucial dis-
position in play in practical reason is not some putative intellection of principles 
like nous, but experience of moral matters. Indeed, I argue that according to Aristotle 
experience (empeiria) is this disposition that recognizes particulars as instances of 
universals. 
In what follows, I shall first develop this deflationary account of knowledge 
of the good and universal moral notions. This will include a discussion and rejec-
tion of the intellectualist position that knowledge of the good depends on a higher 
cognitive capacity such as nous. In the second half of this chapter, I shall turn to 
knowledge of particulars and show how experience matters in the process of deci-
sion-making. 
5.2 Knowledge of the end 
At 1141b14-23 (text 27), it appears that knowing moral universals, along 
with knowledge of particulars, is a necessary condition for being virtuous, i.e. being 
disposed to act virtuously. In what sense can someone be said to have knowledge 
of universals? Is it knowledge in a strong sense as having intellection (nous) of theo-
retical first principles? Is it just knowledge in a weaker sense? One could indeed 
hold that moral properties such as being good, or being just cannot be known relia-
bly and are only the object of belief. A way to tackle the question is to follow Aristo-
tle's account of how one acquires virtue. In chap. 4, I have argued that we should 
take Aristotle literally when he says that virtue gives the end, or more generally 
character (and thus reason, or more specifically phronêsis, takes part in positing the 
end only insofar as it helps in the process of spelling out an explicit moral principle; 
§4.3). Thus, once one has an account of how to become virtuous, one should have a 
better idea of the kind of knowledge that goes along with being virtuous. 
5.2.1 Habituation and knowing the end 
In chapter 2, I have shown Aristotle's conception of moral action as a re-
sponse to a situation qualified in a certain way. This response can be excessive, de-
ficient, or appropriate. In a given domain of human activity (warfare, justice, trade, 
etc.), I can respond to a situation either excessively, or too little, or appropriately. 
Actions which are excessive and deficient responses will be qualified as bad, 
whereas actions which are appropriate responses will be qualified as good (EN II.2 
1104a11-27). This is the basis of Aristotle's conception of virtue as a mean (meson) 
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between excess and deficiency, and of each particular virtue as a mean in its respec-
tive domain of activity (See §2.4). 
The fundamental feature of Aristotle's conception of moral education is that 
character (ethos) is forged according to the kind of actions one performs. If I tend to 
perform excessive actions in the domain of justice, I shall end up being an unjust 
person, valuing excessive (or deficient) distribution of goods. If on the contrary I 
have got used to always share equally, this kind of behaviour will become part of 
myself. I shall become a just person and tend to always share things equally (or at 
least try to). This is what Aristotle calls habituation (ethismos). Habituation is the 
process that leads to the acquisition of definite character traits, and in particular to 
virtuous character traits, through the repetition of actions of the same moral ten-
or.221 
The most significant feature of character for my current purpose is that it 
disposes us to respond to situations in a definite way. If performing actions of a 
certain moral type will confirm my character, in return my character disposes me to 
perform actions of the same moral type than my character. Aristotle describes this 
process in the case of virtue. A particular virtue disposes us to perform virtuous 
actions of the corresponding type. 
43) "But not only the becoming and growth as well as the destruction 
<of the virtues> do come from the same things and are due to the 
same things, but the activities too will consist in the same things. 
For this also holds in other cases which are more obvious, as for 
instance with bodily strength. For strength comes about from tak-
ing a lot of food and from withstanding repeated exertion, and the 
one most able to do such things would be the strong man. So it 
goes with the virtues as well. For from staying away from the 
pleasures we become temperate, and once we have become so we 
are most able to stay away from these. And similarly, too, with 
courage: by getting used to think slightly and to withstand fright-
ful things we become courageous, and once we have become so 
we shall be most able to withstand frightful things." EN II.2 
1104a27-b3 
                                                      
221 Habituation works on the basis of feeling pleasure or pain. Basically, I tend to desire 
what is pleasant and to avoid what is painful. By performing many times an action of a 
certain nature, I get to take pleasure in it. Thus, correct habituation brings about that I learn 
to take pleasure in noble activities and noble things. This account is essential in order to 
understand the nature of morality in Aristotle. However, I am not directly interested in the 
process of becoming virtuous, but in the epistemic evaluation of practical reason. I shall 
then not speak of that issue further. For illuminating accounts on the question, see Burnyeat 
1980; Sherman 1989 chap. 5, Moss 2012 chap. 4. 
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Virtue is described as a disposition to respond to a given situation in a con-
sistent way, i.e. by performing a virtuous action. The temperate person tends to 
respond in a temperate way to situations where bodily pleasures are in play; the 
courageous person tends to respond in a courageous way to dangerous of frighten-
ing situations, and so on with the other virtues. This account of virtue can be wid-
ened to non-virtuous character traits. Indeed, character traits other than virtues (e.g. 
vices) are also kinds of hexis, i.e. dispositions to respond to a situation which can be 
evaluated (EN II.5 1105b19-28; cf. p. 65). More generally, then, character groups 
various dispositions to respond to different kinds of situation (situations involving 
danger, pleasures, contracts, etc.), and these dispositions are character features 
which dispose the agent to respond to these situations in a consistent way. Thus, 
character ensures a relative reliability of our moral responses. A given character 
trait, even if not virtuous, is a reliable disposition to respond to a practical situation. 
In particular, virtue is a reliable disposition to respond to a moral problem appro-
priately, or 'correctly'. E.g. in situations of danger, the virtuous agent will tend to 
react courageously.  
In this sense, one can assert that virtue and, more generally, character give 
the end. Indeed, the kind of end in view in such situations is internalized in the 
agent's character. That the agent is courageous precisely means that he is disposed 
to follow courageous behaviour as an end. That the agent is a just person means 
that he is disposed to do the kind of actions that promotes justice. More generally 
with virtue, the virtuous agent is of such a character that he tends to act for the sake 
of the good, or of eudaimonia. 
Now, accounting for the grasp of the correct end in terms of habituation, vir-
tue, and the appropriateness of the response seems to point at a purely desidera-
tive, mindless process of the soul, devoid of any representational content. In such 
case, it is hard to speak of 'knowledge' of the end, for the state that grasps the end is 
not rational. Besides, such an account is at odds with EN VI.12-13 where Aristotle 
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makes clear that a rational element, which he calls nous, is necessary for the exercise 
of virtue in the full sense (1144b9 see text 42). The process I have described so far 
would rather correspond to the kind of behaviour displayed by someone who is 
'naturally virtuous', i.e. someone who has been properly raised and who spontane-
ously tends to perform good intended actions. This person would lack a personal 
representation of what he is doing and of the corresponding end. There would 
therefore be a need for an additional component in the agent's soul which would be 
able to provide a cognitive grasp of the end. 
Such a portrait of the well-habituated person, however, is excessive and 
does not include the representational capacities of the agent. Indeed, when distin-
guishing between parts of the soul at EN I.13, Aristotle introduces a part which he 
calls 'appetitive or desiderative' (epithumêtikon kai holôs orektikon) and which has 
virtue of character as its excellence (1102b13-1103a6). This part is non-rational inso-
far as it opposes reason. However, Aristotle also calls it 'rational' since it somehow 
takes part in reason (logou de kai touto phainetai metechein 1102b25-26). For instance in 
the virtuous person this part listens to reason as a child listens to his father, that is, 
desires are in accordance with reason. This description shows that the desiderative 
part, which contains character dispositions, desires and emotional responses, also 
has certain cognitions222. Thus, someone who is acting on the basis of his character 
alone still has cognitions of what he does and what for. This cognition is maybe not 
a rational one, i.e. not determined by reason, yet it still is cognition of the end (See 
the distinction between cognitive and rational at §1.4 p. 27).  
Aristotle offers a view close to this at EN III.4. There he asserts that the vir-
tuous man has a correct representation (phantasia) of the good, whereas the vile one 
has a wrong representation of the good. 
44) "Therefore, we should say that the good is without qualification 
and in truth the object of wish, whereas the object of wish for each 
person is the apparent good. We shall then be saying that for the 
virtuous person the object of wish is something which is truly 
good, whereas for the bad person it is any chance thing" 1113a23-
26223 
                                                      
222 In the case of the vicious agent, the psychology is the same. The vicious agent also has a 
certain cognition of the end, even if it is a morally wrong one. The desiderative part of the 
vicious agent is also liable to listen to reason, although it does not. In fact, as I shall show in 
§6.2.2 on the difference between the akratês and the intemperate person (akolastos), the akolas-
tos is precisely characterized in that his appetite has a rather sophisticated content. The vi-
cious person does not differ from the virtuous one in that it has no articulate cognition of the 
end, but in that its representation of the end is mistaken. 
223 I shall give a full account of this passage later, see text (47). 
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The object of wish for each person, which is also the moral end pursued 
(1113a15; see also EN I.8 1098b18-20), is the apparent good (phainomenon agathon). 
What appears good to the virtuous person is in fact good, whereas what appears 
good to the vile person is not and could be anything.224 A few lines later, Aristotle 
adds: "in every things, what is true appears to the virtuous person" (kai en hekastois 
talêthes autô phainetai 1113a30-31). Hence, the virtuous person has a phantasia of the 
good that turns out to match the actual good, whereas the vile person has a wrong 
phantasia of the good. This passage seems to show that a non-rational cognitive ac-
cess to the good is sufficient for virtuous behaviour, and for rational action more 
generally. 
That habituation is not a mindless process is also due to a second aspect of 
the agent's moral psychology. In chapter 4, I have shown that although the agent 
does not deliberate on moral ends for their own sake, moral ends are nevertheless 
included in his deliberation (cf. p. 132). In the process of decision-making, moral 
ends even receive a specific content which eventually takes the form of a prescrip-
tive proposition that can in turn stand as the major premise of a practical argument. 
One needs thus to make an important distinction between two ways of 
speaking of moral ends. There are on the one hand general, vague ends, which are 
not determinate and which do not have a structured content. On the other hand, 
there are concrete ends, which pertain to a definite situation. Broadie calls them 
'defining' and 'deliberative' ends, respectively (Broadie 1991: 195). Defining ends 
are very general and abstract ends such as 'happiness', 'virtue', or 'justice'. They are 
not directly applicable to a situation. I contend that these kind of ends is properly 
given by character and that there is no need for reason to taking part in their de-
                                                      
224 This reading implies that one reads phainomenon literally as meaning 'being cognized by 
phantasia'. This reading has been contested, though. There is a debate about the nature of the 
grasp of the end by the virtuous person. Indeed, phainesthai can either mean 'to appear' or 'to 
believe', as in English when I say 'it seems to me that P', I can mean either 'it literally ap-
pears to me that P, or 'I believe that P' (see Moss 2012: 70). If one takes the 'appearance' of 
the good in a representative sense, it means that the good merely appears to the virtuous 
person. In other words, the agent has a phantasia of the good and this cognitive state does 
not involve reason. On the other hand, if one takes phainesthai in its doxastic sense, then that 
the object of wish appears as good to the virtuous man in fact means that the object of wish 
seems to be good to the virtuous man. In this case, the agent believes that the good is so and 
so, and this involves rational discrimination of the object. I shall offer a full defence of the 
representationalist – or 'phantastic' – interpretation below at §5.2.3. 
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termination. By contrast, deliberative ends are concrete ends which have a determi-
nate content and which play a role in our deliberation. As such, they are deter-
mined rationally. They also are the result of the process of specification that starts 
from the defining end and goes all the way to an end that is specific to a situation 
and that is directly applicable to it. 
The view I defended in chap. 4 states that by 'virtue (or character) gives the 
end' Aristotle means that character provides the general orientation of the moral 
ends we value. It does not prevent that we reflect rationally on concrete moral goals 
in particular pieces of deliberation. However, it also includes the point that at the 
moment of giving a more specific content to a moral end, character is prevalent 
over reason. In difficult cases, in which it is hard to decide how to realize a general 
goal, what ultimately determines the moral principle I follow is character. For in-
stance, if my goal in life is happiness and I come to a point where I have to choose 
between accepting a good position abroad or staying with my family, if I have good 
reasons for both options and none of these is decisive, what will ultimately moti-
vate my choice will be non-rational preferences for a kind of life over the other. 
According to this reading, 'knowing universals' amounts to having the cor-
rect moral end. The end is provided by character. It also has a rational content, 
since the end is specified through a process of deliberation, but character is decisive 
with regard to this specification. This position is obviously not the only one in Aris-
totelian scholarship. There has also been an influent interpretation according to 
which reason has an essential share in providing the ends of practical reason. I shall 
now examine this interpretation and argue against it before giving a full defence of 
my own view. 
5.2.2 Practical nous 
Commentators have argued against the apparent mindlessness of the grasp 
of the end by claiming that it is in fact grasped by a higher cognitive capacity than 
phantasia. They hold that reason takes part in the determination of the end. A fun-
damental intuition that justifies this view is that we want our ends because we think 
they are good.225 Unless an agent has a rational conception of the good, his desires 
have no object. 
The most straightforward way to attribute the determination of moral ends 
to reason is the position I shall call 'intellectualism'. Proponents of intellectualism 
suppose that Aristotle conceived of an intuitive component of phronêsis, namely 
                                                      
225 Wiggins 1975-1976: 41, referring back to Allan 1953: 124, himself reformulating a position 
first presented by Loening 1903. 
Chapter 5. The epistemic basis of practical knowledge 
 163 
practical intellect (nous praktikê). Practical nous would be a counterpart to the theo-
retical nous of the first principle of theoretical sciences. It would come about from a 
kind of practical induction, which would be a counterpart to the theoretical induc-
tion of the first principles of APo II.19.226 However, there is strong evidence at EN VI 
that intellectualism cannot be Aristotle's position. Intellectualism is at odds with 
many occurrences where Aristotle is clear that reason, in the form either of deliber-
ation or of phronêsis, does not set the end (EN III.3 1112b11-16; VI.12 1144a6-9; VI.13 
1145a5-6; VII.8 1151a15-19). Intellectualists rely on a few passages of EN VI in order 
to argue for the moral role of intellect (1141b12-14; VI.9 1142b31-33; VI.11 1143a35-
b5). In these passages, Aristotle mentions nous as having a certain role in practical 
thinking. One could then infer from these that there is something like a 'practical 
nous' which determines moral ends. These passages, in particular 1143a35-b5, are 
difficult and it is true that one might misunderstand them as promoting nous as 
determining the end. I should then offer my own reading of these passages.  
Although intellectualism is not the only option that favours a strong partici-
pation of reason in setting the end, I shall focus on this kind of interpretation here. 
Indeed, it is crucial for my purpose that the phrase 'practical intellect' be clearly 
examined. Aristotle has something similar to practical intellect, but which has noth-
ing to do with the intellectualist interpretation. Rather, as I shall show in the second 
part of this chapter, practical intellect is the ability to spot the relevant circumstanc-
es in a situation in order to come to the correct decision. It has therefore more to do 
with knowledge of particulars than with knowledge of the end. For the time being, 
I want to show that intellectualism is misleading and to give my own interpretation 
of the cognition of moral ends. 
5.2.2.1 EN VI.8 1142a25-30 
A first piece of evidence that nous does not intervene in the cognition of 
practical principles lies in the strong opposition Aristotle sees between nous and 
phronêsis. In EN VI.8, Aristotle opposes phronêsis to intellect (nous) as it was intro-
duced in EN VI.6, that is, in its technical sense of an intellectual grasp of the princi-
ples of science: 
45) "Phronêsis is opposed to intellect. For intellect is of the terms of 
which there is no logos, whereas phronêsis is of what is last, of 
which there is no demonstrative knowledge, but perception. 
                                                      
226 For a sketch of Aristotle's notion of induction (epagôgê), see §3.2.2. Proponents of practical 
induction as the method to a truthful grasp of the end are among others Kenny 1979: 151–2; 
Engberg-Pedersen 1983: 211–19; Dahl 1984: 41–5; Tuozzo 1991; Reeve 1992; Bostock 2000: 
88–96; Taylor 2008. 
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However not perception of proper sensibles, but perception 
thanks to which we perceive that what is last is a triangle. For it 
will stop here too. But this one [i.e. perception in mathematics] is 
rather perception than phronêsis227, but of another genus than that 
one (perception of proper sensibles)." EN VI.8 1142a25-30 
(25) ἀ+$ί!'2$"2 <ὲ+ Cὴ $ῷ +ῷ· ὁ <ὲ+ 5ὰ) +-ῦ3 $ῶ+ ὅ)(+, ὧ+ -ὐ! 
ἔ@$2 0ό5-3, ἣ Cὲ $-ῦ ἐ@9ά$-8, -ὗ -ὐ! ἔ@$2+ ἐ,2@$ή<7 ἀ00’ 
"ἴ@&7@23, -ὐ9 ἡ $ῶ+ ἰCί(+, ἀ00’ -ἵᾳ "ἰ@&"+ό<'&" ὅ$2 $ὸ [ἐ+ $-ῖ3 
<"&7<"$2!-ῖ3] ἔ@9"$-+ $)ί5(+-+· @$ή@'$"2 5ὰ) !ἀ!'ῖ. ἀ00’ 
"ὕ$7 <ᾶ00-+ (30) "ἴ@&7@23 ἢ >)ό+7@23, ἐ!'ί+73 C’ ἄ00- 'ἶC-3. 
From the context of EN VI.7-8 (or more exactly, EN VI.8 according to Bek-
ker's division into chapters), Aristotle is contrasting phronêsis with the intellectual 
states proper to the theoretical part of the soul, namely epistêmê and nous (see 
§3.3.2.3). While phronêsis is opposed to epistêmê insofar as it takes its content partly 
from the particulars (EN VI.8 1142a23-25), it is 'antithetical' to nous. It is clear that 
here Aristotle is contrasting phronêsis with the technical sense of nous of APo II.19 
and not with a broader use of nous as 'thought' in general. The last occurrence of 
nous before this passage had the technical sense (EN VI.7 1141b2). Moreover, in this 
context, Aristotle has associated nous with epistêmê in order to define theoretical 
wisdom (sophia). Then, after he has introduced phronêsis in opposition to sophia 
(1141b8-23), Aristotle has contrasted phronêsis with epistêmê extensively (EN VI.8 
1142a11-25). Obviously, the meaning of nous he turns to now is nous in its technical 
sense. 
How is phronêsis 'antithetical' to nous? Aristotle shows that the function of 
phronêsis he is pointing at in the practical case is somehow equivalent to that of nous 
in the theoretical case. The objects of nous are described as 'the terms of which there 
is no logos'. Aristotle seems to refer to the first principles of a science, which are not 
deduced from prior principles. By contrast, phronêsis is about 'what comes last' (to 
eschaton). Thus, both dispositions are somehow similar concerning their respective 
object for they each are about the extremes in their respective area. This is con-
firmed later at EN VI.11 when Aristotle speaks of 'the ultimate terms in both direc-
tion' (ta eschata ep'amphotera 1143a35-36) when he is comparing again nous in the 
theoretical case with the discriminative function of phronêsis (which he then calls 
                                                      
227 Here I follow Rowe and Inwood & Woolf (Ms Kb) rather than the version of Ms Lb, Mb 
and  (ἀ00’ "ὕ$7 <ᾶ00-+ "ἴ@&7@23 ἡ >)ό+7@23, ἐ!'ί+73 C’ ἄ00- 'ἶC-3: "but phronêsis is 
rather perception, whereas that one is of another genus.") or the correction by Burnet fol-
lowed by Ross and Gauthier (ἀ00’ "ὕ$7 <ᾶ00-+ "ἴ@&7@23 ἢ ἡ >)ό+7@23, ἐ!'ί+73 C’ ἄ00- 
'ἶC-3. "But this one is perception more than phronêsis is, whereas phronêsis is of another ge-
nus.) 
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nous as well, but with a different meaning as a nous of principles, as I shall argue 
below, text 46). 
Now, the meaning of to eschaton could mean two different things. Either to 
eschaton refers to 'what comes last in deliberation' and is therefore a decision or an 
element of the content of decision (an action-type, or the means to an end, see 
Cooper 1975: 183), or it refers to a particular (kath'hekaston). The context seems 
clearly to point at the second interpretation. Indeed, a few lines earlier Aristotle 
sums up his discussion of the contrast between epistêmê and phronêsis by emphasiz-
ing that the latter is 'of what comes last, as has been said' (tou eschatou hôsper eirêtai 
1142a24). And as I have already argued, the whole contrast between epistêmê and 
phronêsis relies on the special connexion phronêsis bears with particulars (ta 
kath'hekasta). It would therefore really be astonishing if to eschaton at 1142a26 – only 
two lines below – would refer to something else than the particulars. Thus, even 
though similar to a certain extent, nous and phronêsis are also opposed because nous 
has the first principles as its objects, whereas phronêsis has particular states of af-
fairs. First principles are universal, necessary and eternal, whereas the particulars 
cognized by phronêsis are contingent and particulars.228 
The function of the theoretical part of the soul is to find the causes of scien-
tific claims (see §3.2.1). Theoretical thought is therefore directed towards the prin-
ciples that are prior and 'better known' than the claim one has started with. By con-
trast, the practical part of the soul is directed towards finding what to do, i.e. per-
forming a given action. It seeks to determine a particular decision to act in a partic-
ular case. If one assumes that in the theoretical case 'nous' is the ultimate cognitive 
step that achieves the finding of the principles, then the function of nous is analo-
gous to the function of phronêsis in the practical one, namely finding out the ulti-
mate step. However, both states are opposed in that they deal with radically differ-
ent kinds of objects. 
In this passage, Aristotle compares the activity of phronêsis to perception 
(aisthêsis). Commentators have spent a lot of ink on finding out what he means with 
the comparison with perception of proper sensibles (the kind of objects which are 
proper to one sense and only one, like colours for sight) and with 'perception in 
mathematics'. I contend that this way of describing the activity of phronêsis is not 
very informative and that it is not worth lingering on it for too long. Aristotle simp-
ly wants to qualify his comparison between phronêsis and aisthêsis, the former being 
not identical to the most basic form of perception, but being a more sophisticated 
                                                      
228 According to the Liddell-Scott-Jones, antikeisthai can mean 'to be opposed to' or 'to corre-
spond to, to be a counterpart'. The ambiguity is palpable in the relation between phronêsis 
and nous. 
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kind. Aristotle describes the object of phronêsis in different ways on other occasions, 
which are more informative and foster a better understanding on what he means, 
as I have shown in chap. 4. The description of particulars relevant in a practical 
context is best understood as the notion of circumstances of the action (§4.4.1). 
In conclusion, whereas Aristotle could have emphasized for the first time 
that there is such a thing as a nous of practical principles, he adopts instead a view 
radically opposed to that. There is indeed an aspect of phronêsis that is analogous to 
nous of first principles in a theoretical case. However this is not an analogy concern-
ing the objects of each state, but rather their respective function. They are analogical 
in that they both deal with what is ultimate in their respective area. However, what 
is ultimate in theoretical thought (first principles) has nothing to do with what is 
ultimate in the practical case (particulars). 
The next passage I want to dwell upon is another one infamous for its textu-
al difficulties. In this case, Aristotle seems to assert the exact contrary to what he 
has just said in text (45). Indeed, Aristotle opposed strongly the perceptual aspect of 
phronêsis and the theoretical nous of first principles, in spite of their functional simil-
itude. But in the next passage, Aristotle seems to consider that there is indeed an 
intellection of first principles in the practical realm. At least this is how intellectual-
ists have understood this passage. I want to show on the contrary that this reading 
is misleading and that a proper interpretation of it rather confirms the position as-
serted in the previous passage. 
5.2.2.2 EN VI.11 1143a35–b5 
The following passage is part of the conclusion of the main discussion of EN 
book VI, namely the inquiry on the virtues of the rational part of the soul. This con-
clusion starts at 1143a25, that is, after the treatment of discernment (gnômê), which 
is correct judgment of what is equitable (1143a20). Aristotle lists the various intel-
lectual virtues he has mentioned in book VI, in connection with the practical part of 
the soul: discernment (gnômê), comprehension (sunesis), phronêsis and intellect 
(nous) (euboulia is missing, whereas nous unexpectedly appears). In this passage 
Aristotle wants to make sense of a reputable opinion (endoxon) about these states: 
"we attribute these states to the same people" (1143a26).229 The reason he offers for 
this endoxon is that these states are all concerned with particulars (ta eschata kai 
kath'hekasta 1143a28-29). In the next chunk of the text, Aristotle explains how gnômê, 
                                                      
229 This endoxon is in fact a confirmation of the results about the intellectual virtues by way 
of turning back to a dialectical discussion on the various intellectual dispositions of the 
practical part of the soul. 
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sunesis and phronêsis are concerned with particulars. Then Aristotle tackles the case 
of nous and shows how it is also concerned with particulars.  
Given the way he has treated nous in EN VI so far (especially EN VI.6), it is 
puzzling that he mentions it now as being concerned with particulars. Why would 
Aristotle mention the disposition for scientific principles in a context where he is 
obviously dealing with practical dispositions? Moreover why would he claim that 
nous is concerned with particulars, while he has so far insisted that nous is about 
principles that are universals? Natali rightly suggests that Aristotle wants to make 
sense of the phrase 'noun echein', which is a common expression meaning 'to be sen-
sible', or 'to behave sensibly' (Natali 2001: 73-74). In this context, nous should thus 
not be understood in its technical sense of intellectual grasp of first principles, but 
in its general sense of the faculty of thinking. Given the way Aristotle has treated 
nous so far, the passage at stake here should be taken as the answer to a possible 
objection that nous is not concerned with the particular. Aristotle would now be 
claiming that nous is the disposition of first principles, but that in a different sense, 
it can also be understood as having particulars as its objects. 
46) "And the intellect is of the ultimate terms in both directions. That 
is, of the first terms as well as of the last there is intellect (nous) but 
no account (logos). And one intellect is at work in the demonstra-
tions and is of the terms that are unchanging and first, while the 
other is found in practical [thoughts] (en tais praktikais) and is of 
what is ultimate and contingent (endechomenou), and is of the other 
proposition.230 For these are the starting points (archai) of that for 
the sake of which. For universals are from the particulars. There-
fore, one must have perception of these, and this perception is in-
tellect." EN VI.11 1143a35-b5 
(35) !"ὶ ὁ +-ῦ3 $ῶ+ ἐ@9ά$(+ ἐ,’ ἀ<>ό$')"· !"ὶ 5ὰ) $ῶ+ 
,)ώ$(+ ὅ)(+ !"ὶ $ῶ+ ἐ@9ά$(+ (1143b) +-ῦ3 ἐ@$ὶ !"ὶ -ὐ 0ό5-3, 
!"ὶ ὁ <ὲ+ !"$ὰ $ὰ3 ἀ,-C'ίN'23 $ῶ+ ἀ!2+ή$(+ ὅ)(+ !"ὶ ,)ώ$(+, 
ὁ C’ ἐ+ $"ῖ3 ,)"!$2!"ῖ3 $-ῦ ἐ@9ά$-8 !"ὶ ἐ+C'9-<έ+-8 !"ὶ $ῆ3 
ἑ$έ)"3 ,)-$ά@'(3· ἀ)9"ὶ 5ὰ) $-ῦ -ὗ ἕ+'!" "ὗ$"2· ἐ! $ῶ+ !"&’ 
ἕ!"@$" 5ὰ) (5) $ὰ !"&ό0-8· $-ύ$(+ -ὖ+ ἔ9'2+ C'ῖ "ἴ@&7@2+, 
"ὕ$7 C’ ἐ@$ὶ +-ῦ3. 
The first part of the passage is rather unequivocal. Aristotle makes a distinc-
tion between two meanings of nous. On the one hand, there is intellect of the 'first 
                                                      
230 Sometimes, protasis is taken as meaning 'premise' in order to insist on the practical syllo-
gism. Yet, nothing compels to this understanding. Protasis can merely mean 'proposition' 
and protasis as premise is merely a more specific use of a proposition within a syllogistic 
context: see Charles 2009 Appendix I. I follow this more neutral translation, although I ulti-
mately admit something like the practical syllogism here. 
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terms' (tôn prôtôn), that is of first principles of a demonstration. This is the usual 
technical sense of nous that Aristotle has manipulated so far in EN VI. Nous is the 
state that grasps the first principles (EN VI.6 1141a7-8); apodeixis is the privileged 
kind of reasoning of epistêmê, and epistêmê is about what is unchangeable (1139b19-
23). Aristotle calls first principles 'last' because they are the ultimate terms of a the-
oretical inquiry. It is not possible to find more fundamental principles beyond 
them. On the other hand, he introduces a different use of the term nous: there is a 
nous that concerns what is practical (en tais praktikais).231 That kind of nous is about 
the ultimate terms in the 'other direction'. Apparently, Aristotle means that con-
cerning practical thought, nous is concerned with particulars. Indeed, this kind of 
nous is of 'the ultimate and contingent kind of things' (tou eschatou kai endechomenou) 
and is of the 'other proposition' (tês heteras protaseôs). 
'Last' in this case denotes the particulars, by opposition to the first principles 
of a science which are 'last' in the other direction. In this context, eschaton also de-
notes the object of theoretical nous, namely first principles of a science but the use of 
the participle endechomenon reminds Aristotle's characterization of the object of the 
practical part of the soul, namely what allows of being otherwise as it is (to en-
dechomenon [allôs echein] 1139a8, see also EN III.3 1112b27). Finally, since the things 
referred to by these terms are ultimate in the other direction, such things cannot be 
the first principles of practical science. Then, Aristotle adds that the other kind of 
intellect is about the 'other proposition'.232 
                                                      
231 What does en tais praktikais refer to? According to Burnet 1900: 280, one should read en 
tais praktikais protasesin. A comparison with EN 1147a29 apparently confirms Burnet's opin-
ion (See Natali 2002: 73, n. 44; Dahl 1984). Another possibility suggested by Dahl is 'duname-
sin' (faculties), referring back to 'dunameis' at 1143a38. Both protasis and dunamis allow tais 
praktikais to be an inductive form of practical reasoning of the sort suggested at 1143b3-5. 
However, protasis occurs right after this phrase (1143b3) and seems to have a different 
meaning than in the above phrase. Besides, at 1147a29, the phrase is not en tais praktikais, but 
en tais poiêtikais. The referent of poiêtikais is implicit and has often been taken to be protasis, 
but this has also been contested (Charles 2009). The phrase poêtikê protasis occurs explicitly 
at MA 701a23, where Aristotle seems to mean the same as praktikê protasis. Gauthier under-
stands "demonstrations" but the phrase 'practical apodeixis' is a contradiction (Dahl 1984). 
Joachim understands 'opinions' (en tais praktikais doxais). I would rather suggest dianoiai, 
following Kenny (1978 : 170-173). All in all, scholars agree that in this context Aristotle 
speaks of an opposition between theoretical and practical thought. The exact reference of en 
tais praktikais is therefore not needed when the passage is considered on its own. However, 
the reference becomes crucial in a wider context, because this passage is very close to anoth-
er one at EN VII.3 1147a29 (see note 299). 
232 Here I follow Dahl and take to eschaton kai endechomenon as denoting the same thing than 
tês heteras protaseôs (See Dahl 1984: 279-281, n. 14; contra Kenny 1978 and Cooper 1975). 
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The 'other proposition' stands for the minor premise of a practical argu-
ment.233 My position is that the objects of this practical nous are particular in the 
sense I have developed in my §4.4. Consistently with what I have argued in chap. 4, 
the class of object of the minor premise can be very broad. The proper objects of the 
minor premise cover a wide variety of things: states of affairs, general statements 
(chicken is light). The common characteristic they share is that they are uniquely 
connected to a particular situation. 
What does Aristotle mean with this 'nous of the particulars'? The mention of 
aisthêsis suggests that the role conferred to the nous of particulars in this context is 
the same as that of phronêsis in the previous passage 1142a25-30 (text 45). The role of 
phronêsis in that passage was compared to a kind of perception, namely the percep-
tion of what one should do. I contend that in this passage Aristotle uses the term 
'nous' in order to denote the same disposition (See Natali 2001: 74). 
However, the last lines in the passage seem to allude to a different function 
of nous. "For these (hautai) are the starting points (archai) of that for the sake of 
which. For universals are from the particulars." (1143b4-5). The pronoun hautai 
stands for the aforementioned object of the practical nous, namely what is 'last, con-
tingent, and of the other proposition' (tou eschatou kai endechomenou kai tês heteras 
protaseôs)234. Apparently, then, particulars are called "archai of that for the sake of 
which", in other words they are the starting points of the end. And then Aristotle 
writes that 'universals are from the particulars'. This phrase has sometimes been so 
understood that Aristotle is here referring to a piece of inductive inference of uni-
versals from the particulars. This is indeed the way Ross understands it. In his 
translation, the 'other premise' which is about particular facts is the starting point 
for the "apprehension" of the end. Thus, Aristotle here would compare the work of 
the practical intellect to that of the theoretical one. Intellectualist commentators of-
ten agree to this interpretation. Aristotle would suggest that in practical cases, first 
                                                      
233 Dahl understands that such 'particulars' are not facts nor actual actions, but the 'things-
to-be-done', i.e. the action to be performed here and now and which I discover at the end of 
my deliberation (Dahl 1984: 231; followed by Woods 1986: 155-156). Then, he argues, the 
'other proposition' cannot be the minor premise of a practical syllogism. If the 'other propo-
sition' is about a description of an action that is to be done (e.g. this F is to be done), it can-
not be the minor premise, but must rather stand the place of the conclusion. I do not follow 
Dahl on the point that to eschaton kai endechomenon should be understood as 'what is to be 
done'. At EN VII.3 1147a25, Aristotle clearly refers to the minor premise of a practical syllo-
gism using heteras with protaseôs as the implicit subject. 
234 That the pronoun hautai has a plural form can be explained by its connection with archai, 
while it still refers to a singular. See Dahl 1984: 280, n. 14. 
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principles are known in the same way than the principles of theoretical sciences, 
namely through induction.235 
If this reading were correct, the passage would then contain two very differ-
ent assertions concerning the so-called practical nous. On the one hand there is 
something in practical thinking called 'nous' and which is a kind of perception of 
the particulars. It is called nous in virtue of the function it has of spotting the last 
term in a process of thinking. In this respect, its function is analogical to that of the 
theoretical nous which is last in scientific understanding. Yet, both kinds of intellect 
are distinct because they are not active at the same stage of a thinking process and 
they are not related to the same kinds of object. On the other hand, however, Aris-
totle apparently makes the claim that in the practical context, just as in the theoreti-
cal one, first principles are known through a process of induction from the particu-
lars. This would amount to admit that the same occurence of 'nous' has two very 
different meanings. How is one to find a way out of this incompatibility? 
An alternative to the intellectualist interpretation of lines 1143b4-5 is possi-
ble. Aristotle could also be making the point that nous in this context is the activity 
of spotting the features of the situation relevant for the realization of the end in 
view. The explanatory clause 'for universals come from particulars' has no depend-
ency relation with the former assertion that the objects of practical nous (viz. the 
archai) are the starting points of the end.236 Nothing in the text compels us to accept 
that the particulars are starting points of the universals in the sense that the appre-
hension of universals depends on the apprehension of particulars. Thus, rather than 
seeing a dependency relation according to which the starting points are starting 
points of an induction towards the universals, which is the end, another possible 
reading would be that the end is secured by the starting points, just as the universal 
is secured by the particular. Archai here would be taken in a constitutive way: par-
ticulars are the archai of the end in the sense that they are constitutive of the end: 
the end is brought about when I perform a particular action. In this sense, archai 
would have the same meaning as 'constitutive means'.237 It is true that, whereas the 
usual sense of the 'other premise' is the minor premise of a practical argument, 
what realizes the end is not the minor premise, but the action (or the content of de-
                                                      
235 See e.g. Sorabji 1980: 214-16; Dahl 1984: 227-236. Other rationalist interpreters, however, 
do not agree with this interpretation(see Broadie 1991: 265, n. 76; Bostock 2000: 91-93). Be-
sides, that there is such an induction of first principles of science is also debated even in the 
case of theoretical reason. For a review of the debate, see Bronstein 2012: 30-31. 
236 Dahl 1984: 229 on a suggestion by Barnes. In the end Dahl rejects this interpretation. 
237 For a similar interpretation, see Cooper 1975: 42, n. 52; Woods 1986: 160; Broadie 1991: 
254-6; Moss 2012 189-190. 
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cision). However, my claim is that Aristotle wants to emphasize the particular cir-
cumstances of the situation, i.e. the kath'hekasta I have described at § 4.4.2. The par-
ticulars at stake in a process of practical thinking include various observations 
about the situation, abstract properties not immediately observable, as well as pos-
sible actions. 
Now we are in a position where one ought to choose between emphasizing 
the allusion to a putative practical induction of principles and emphasizing the ref-
erence to nous of particulars as another way of speaking of perception of what to 
do. An important remark to draw from the context is that this passage does not 
constitute a part of the core account of practical thought. Rather, it is part of a dia-
lectical discussion and should thereby weigh less in the reconstruction of Aristotle's 
doctrine. There are also two other reasons not to take this passage too seriously. 
First the passage as a whole does not have a clear argumentative structure. Lines 
1143b9-11 seem to go with lines 1143a35-b5, but the progression is cut off by a small 
passage which is obviously not related to the whole. Second, Aristotle uses many 
puzzling expressions: 'en tais praktikais', 'tês heteras protaseôs', etc. These phrases 
seem inconsistent with the former mention of nous where Aristotle was opposing 
phronêsis as proper to the practical realm with nous proper to the theoretical. These 
elements also seem to show that Aristotle's account here is not accomplished and he 
might have wanted to revise this account and express it in a clearer way. 
On the face of it, I contend that we have better reasons to emphasize the 
perceptive aspect. It has already been clearly shown earlier at 1142a25-30, in a con-
text where Aristotle is developing his core account on phronêsis. Practical nous, if 
there is, is concerned with making the correct decision. There is no nous of practical 
principles in this passage, and no other evidence for anything like a practical intel-
lection of moral principles in Aristotle's corpus whatsoever. This 'nous of particu-
lars' of 1143b35-b5 denotes the same disposition as that Aristotle is alluding to at 
1144b4-14, when he compares an agent deprived of phronêsis as a strong body de-
prived of sight (text 42). 
Let us come back to the question of knowledge of the end. Nowhere does 
Aristotle hint at an intellectual grasp of moral principles. It seems that if there is 
something like a cognitive grasp of such principles, it will not be a strong kind of 
knowledge. I want to defend the view that the end is cognized in some way, even 
though it is not determined by reason. Specifying the end through deliberation al-
lows that there is a cognitive grasp of the end. The agent is able to consider the end 
intellectually and to insert it in a process of thinking. However, this does not in-
volve a strong cognition of the end, which would also determine what the end is, i.e. 
the correct conception of the good. 
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5.2.3 Phantasia and knowing the end 
Even though intellectualism cannot be attributed to Aristotle, there has been 
other rationalist positions according to which moral ends must ultimately be de-
termined by reason. Some have it that what determines the end is deliberation 
(Wiggins 1975; Broadie 1991; McDowell 1998). Others agree with intellectualists 
that practical principles are given by nous but reject the inductive account. In their 
view, nous of practical principles is attained through dialectical thinking (Cooper 
1975: 66-70; Irwin 1988: 336-338). All in all, it seems that what unites these rational-
ist interpretations is the conviction that what ultimately determines our moral ends 
must be reason, not desire. 
There are various reasons for promoting a rationalist account of the acquisi-
tion of moral ends: First of all, if desire has a given content, it is propositional in its 
structure. Desire itself cannot provide its own content. Thus, there must be a certain 
rational state providing such a content, distinct from the desiderative state itself.238 
One could grant that there is non-rational cognition which provides a content to 
desire, namely phantasia. But rationalists could then reply that such a non-rational 
cognition is not sufficient for a truthful account of the good (see Moss 2012: 160). 
Rationalists can also invoke the role of wish in the determination of the end, as is 
presented at EN III.4 1113a23-26 (text 44). If wish is rational desire (as is sometimes 
thought to be the case), its object must be given by rational thinking rather than by 
evaluative phantasia. Moreover, this reading is apparently supported by recurrent 
assertions that "no one wishes for what he does not think to be good".239  
At the same time, rationalist scholars admit that the determination of the 
end cannot rely on the rational part of the soul alone. This would be profoundly 
non-Aristotelian, as Aristotle insists so much about the prevalence of virtue and 
character when it comes to determining the end. Even intellectualists are aware that 
moral ends are not determined by reason exclusively. Most of them acknowledge 
that there is a share of the non-rational part of the soul in the process of acquiring 
moral ends. Thus Taylor (2008: 212): 
"Rather we must conceive of the process of habituation, not as a 
conditioning of ‘blind’ appetites, but as a ‘twin-track’ process in 
which the appetitive responses are progressively refined under 
                                                      
238 This seems to be Taylor's implicit argument in favour of a rational determination of the 
end; Taylor 2008: 207. See also Allan 1953: 124. 
239 -ὔ$' 5ὰ) /-ύ0'$"2 -ὐC'ὶ3 ὃ <ὴ -ἴ'$"2 'ἶ+"2 @,-8C"ῖ-+ EN 1136b7-8; EE 1223b7, 32-33; 
Rhet. 1369a3. In these passages, proponents of a high-level cognition of moral principles 
understand oietai as think, although this verb can also have the weaker sense of 'believe', 
'reckon'. 
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the guidance of the intellect which is itself undergoing a parallel 
process of refinement or rather enlightenment; the clearer the 
insight the intellect has of ethical principles, the more precise the 
instructions it can issue to the desires." 
In other words, habituation has a cognitive aspect (Woods 1986: 159). How-
ever, intellectualist commentators contend that cognitive capacities such as the 
practical intellect are necessary for the correct orientation of our character (Taylor 
2008: 217). They seem to hold the view that what ultimately justifies our moral ends 
is reason. In other words, the moral ends that we pursue in our deliberation can be 
rationally justified. This does not necessarily involve a foundationalist account. In-
terpretations that put forward the role of dialectic and the discussion of the endoxa 
about moral matters rather argue for a coherentist scheme (Taylor 2008: 214). Still, 
this kind of position involves that the justification of our knowledge of moral ends 
is ultimately rational. 
I also endorse the twin-track process interpretation. As I have argued in 
§4.3, the content of the major premise of the practical argument is specified along-
side deliberation. In the process, a vague, general end given by character receives a 
specific, rational content relative to the particular circumstances of the action. How-
ever, my view contrasts the rationalist account in that even though the specific end 
proper to a particular process of decision-making has been reached through a ra-
tional process, what ultimately justifies such an end is the more general end which 
depends on character and the kind of person one is. And this general 'defining' end 
cannot be justified by reason. As I have argued in §4.3, the direction of specification 
of the end as well as what grants the correctness or consistency of the deliberative 
end is not reason, but character (see p. 132). In other words, there is no fully ration-
al justification of moral ends. There is only phantasia of the general end and a partly 
rational justification of the deliberative end.  
In what follows, I shall argue in more details in favour of phantasia as the 
cognitive power providing the end. At the end of this section, I shall answer the 
various motivations for a rationalist position by showing that my interpretation can 
also deal with them. 
That our cognition of general, defining, ends is not rational but pertains to 
the desiderative part of the soul is shown at EN III.4. In my view, this passage fos-
ters the best evidence for the position I favour. Here, Aristotle affirms that the end 
is cognized by phantasia and that this non-rational grasp of the end is sufficient for 
virtuous behaviour. 
Chapter 4 of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics tackles the question whether 
what we wish for is the good or the apparent good. In this chapter, Aristotle raises 
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a problem about the nature of the end of practical reasoning. In the preceding chap-
ter, EN III.3 on deliberation, he has claimed that deliberation is not of the end and 
that it is wish that is rather for the end.240 Yet, there is a debate on what the end is. 
Some argue that the end is the good, whereas for others it is the apparent good. 
There are sensible intuitions for both positions. On the one hand, that we always 
wish for the good follows Socrates' claim that we never wish to do something bad 
knowingly (cf. Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 206-207). On the other hand, holding that 
things we wish are relative to the person who wishes these things corresponds to 
the subjectivity of the good. Each position is unsatisfactory. The Socratic position 
ends up in the aporia that the person who makes voluntarily a vicious decision has a 
boulêton which is both good (ex hypothesi) and bad (from the rule that decision is for 
the sake of what we wish). The subjectivist position, however, entails that there is 
no measure for the good and that every conception of the good from one individual 
to the other is worth the same. 
In the following passage, partly quoted earlier (text 44), Aristotle gives his 
own answer to the problem by making a synthesis of both intuitions. According to 
him, when speaking without qualification, the object of wish is the good, but the 
object a particular person is wishing for is what appears good to him.  
47) "But if, then, we are not content with these views, we should say 
that the good is without qualification and in truth the object of 
wish, whereas the object of wish for each person is the apparent 
good. We shall then be saying that for the virtuous person the ob-
ject of wish is something which is truly good, whereas for the bad 
person it is any chance thing, just as with the body too the things 
that are truly healthful are healthful for people in good condition, 
whereas for diseased people other things are healthful; and simi-
larly too with bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, and every other sort of 
thing" 1113a22-29 
'ἰ Cὲ Cὴ $"ῦ$" <ὴ ἀ)έ@!'2, ἆ)" >"$έ-+ ἁ,0ῶ3 <ὲ+ !"ὶ !"$’ 
ἀ0ή&'2"+ /-807$ὸ+ 'ἶ+"2 $ἀ5"&ό+, ἑ!ά@$ῳ Cὲ $ὸ >"2+ό<'+-+; 
(25) $ῷ <ὲ+ -ὖ+ @,-8C"ίῳ $ὸ !"$’ ἀ0ή&'2"+ 'ἶ+"2, $ῷ Cὲ >"ύ0ῳ 
$ὸ $89ό+, ὥ@,') !"ὶ ἐ,ὶ $ῶ+ @(<ά$(+ $-ῖ3 <ὲ+ 'ὖ C2"!'2<έ+-23 
ὑ52'2+ά ἐ@$2 $ὰ !"$’ ἀ0ή&'2"+ $-2"ῦ$" ὄ+$", $-ῖ3 C’ ἐ,2+ό@-23 
ἕ$')", ὁ<-ί(3 Cὲ !"ὶ ,2!)ὰ !"ὶ 508!έ" !"ὶ &')<ὰ !"ὶ /")έ" !"ὶ 
$ῶ+ ἄ00(+ ἕ!"@$"·  
It seems that here Aristotle is answering both aporiai one after the other. The 
first assertion accounts for the Socratic intuition as well as provides an answer to 
the first aporia. Speaking without qualification, wish is for the good. But in a partic-
                                                      
240 EN III.2 1111b26: ἔ$2 C’ ἡ <ὲ+ /-ύ07@23 $-ῦ $έ0-83 ἐ@$ὶ <ᾶ00-+. 
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ular, actual case, what one wishes is the apparent good (see EE II.10 1227a28-30).241 
That wish is for the good is at first only given as a general rule of the relation of the 
subject towards its object from a first person point of view. This is how I under-
stand 'haplôs' (I shall speak later of the meaning of the kat'alêtheian clause). This way 
Aristotle accounts both for the intuition that nobody wishes something harmful or 
wrong, at least not for himself, and for the fact that someone who makes a wrong 
decision does not aim at the real good, but only at the apparent good. Then Aristo-
tle answers the second aporia by adding a fresh point: when the subject is virtuous 
(spoudaios), then the object of his wish is in fact the real good, whereas when the 
subject is vicious (phaulos), what he wishes can be anything (to tuchon). In other 
words, the phaulos wishes an apparent good that can turn out to be anything. Thus, 
from a third person point of view, the object of wish is the apparent good. This 
claim has a normative aspect: the measure of what counts as an actual good is given 
by the virtuous person. This answers the argument against the subjectivity of the 
good. There is a norm of what truly counts as good, and the virtuous person's wish 
gives this norm. One can still maintain that being good is a subjective property, 
while agreeing that there is a norm of what counts as the real good. Even though 
the object of boulêsis is in both cases the apparent good, there is one case, namely 
the virtuous case, in which the apparent good turns out to correspond to the real 
good. 
A consequence of the first point, that in a particular case the boulêton is the 
apparent good, is that the object of boulêsis is the apparent good in every particular 
case, let it be in the case of the virtuous as well as in the case of the phaulos man (cf. 
Labarrière 2008: 155-157). Even though the virtuous person has a grasp of the real 
good, he merely wishes what appears to him. In other words, that the object of wish 
for the virtuous man is good is true only extensionally, not intensionally, for the 
subject does not have access to what the object of his wish really is. This also makes 
sense of the vicious person, or the non-virtuous agent altogether, for such an agent 
does not wish what he intends to do under the description 'vile' or unjust, but un-
der the description 'good' or 'advantageous' (See Sharples 2005: 291). Such a reading 
seems then to show that a low-order cognitive power such as phantasia is sufficient 
for a grasp of the good. The cognitive access to the good is not provided by a so-
phisticated intellectual faculty such as nous. 
However, there is a question here about the virtuous person's access to the 
good. Up to now, I have assumed that the virtuous person does not have privileged 
                                                      
241 I agree with Broadie (Broadie & Rowe 2002: 318) that haplôs kai kat'alêtheian qualifies the 
whole proposition 'the object of wish is the good'. One should not read the clause as qualify-
ing only the tagathon (understanding 'the object of wish is the good without qualification'). 
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access to the moral end. The actual object of wish is not the good itself, but the ap-
parent good for both the virtuous and the non-virtuous person. They both wish for 
what appears to them to be good and 'luckily' the virtuous man is so disposed that 
what appears to him as good is in fact really so. Still, in the case of the virtuous 
man, it could make sense that he really knows that what he wishes is the real good. 
One could very well argue that the spoudaios has in fact a cognitive superiority over 
the phaulos because of some rational understanding of the good that the phaulos 
lacks. Otherwise, without privileged access to the real good, what would account 
for his prescriptive authority? In virtue of what would he be the measure of what 
counts as good? Correspondingly, one could understand that only the phaulos man 
wishes for the apparent good, whereas the virtuous man has a direct grasp of the 
real good. After all, the boulêton is the good without qualification and in truth. This 
could mean that when one's grasp of something as good is true, one is not con-
cerned with the apparent good, but with the real good directly. 'Apparent' 
(phainomenon) in this case would not refer to the subjectivity of the good (phantastic 
reading), but to the mistaken character of one's grasp of the good (doxastic read-
ing).242 Consequently, the virtuous person would wish for the real good, whereas 
the non-virtuous person would wish for the apparent good (in the sense of 'deceiv-
ing'). This interpretation would be supported by the repetition of the 'kat'alêtheian' 
phrase: 'in truth, the boulêton is the good' and some lines later: 'the boulêton to the 
spoudaios is the good kat'alêtheian' (1113a27).243 Such an interpretation entails there-
fore the cognitive superiority of the virtuous over other moral agents. The virtuous 
man would access to a notion of the good through a more sophisticated cognitive 
state than phantasia. 
As already mentioned at §5.2.1, I don't follow this doxastic interpretation. It 
seems to me that it does not distinguish both aporia carefully enough. Proponents of 
such an interpretation tend to read the men oun at 1113a25 as denoting a restate-
ment of the first claim. Accordingly, then, the two statements – that the object of 
wish for the virtuous person is the real good and that the object of wish for the non-
virtuous is any chance thing – are simply consequences of the first statement, name-
ly that without qualification and in truth the object of wish is the good and that the 
                                                      
242 I borrow the phrases 'doxastic' and 'phantastic' from Moss 2012: 70ff. The doxastic rea-
ding of phainesthai involves a belief (doxa), whereas the phantastic reading involves nothing 
more than phantasia. This use of 'doxastic' should not be confused with another use found in 
scholarship on ancient skepticism that opposes doxastic with 'epistemic' or 'dianoetic'. 
243 This seems to be Broadie's interpretation when she writes: " The good person's object of 
wish is the good, and the good is, without qualification, an object of wish; whereas the bad 
one's object of wish is the apparent good, and this is an object of wish in a qualified way, i.e. 
in relation to himself." (Broadie & Rowe 2002: 318). 
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object of wish for someone is the apparent good for him. Yet, as I have tried to 
show in my analysis of 1113a22-29, both claims do not involve each other. That the 
object of wish for the virtuous man is the apparent good for him does not involve 
that the object of wish for the virtuous man is the real good. The phantastic reading 
of phainesthai involves that the virtuous man does indeed wish for the real good, 
but he does not know in any intellectual way that the object of his wish is in fact the 
real good. 
Against the doxastic interpretation which grounds the moral superiority of 
the virtuous man on his cognitive superiority, the rest of text (47) offers a powerful 
argument. In order to explain his point better, Aristotle offers an analogy with the 
body. Truly healthful are things healthful to people in good conditions, whereas 
things healthful to diseased people can be other things. Aristotle offers another 
analogy with the senses: what is truly sweet is what is sweet to people in good con-
dition, whereas what is sweet to diseased people are other things (depending on 
their condition), and so on with other sensible properties (bitter, hot, heavy, etc.).  
One should be careful with the analogy. In my view, it concerns only the se-
cond aporia on the relativity of goodness. It is useful only in order to make the point 
that normality in the case of moral properties is on the side of virtuous people, as 
normality in the case of health is on the side of healthy people. But the analogy is of 
no help to answer the first aporia whether the object of wish is the real good or the 
apparent good. Indeed, if we try to apply the analogy to the first proposition, name-
ly that what appears to the virtuous man is the real good, whereas what appears to 
the vicious man is any chance thing, we obtain inconsistent results. In the case of 
health, a given object counts as truly good as soon as it is in relation with the ap-
propriate particular individual (and one could add, in these particular circumstanc-
es). This way, something which is harmful haplôs, i.e. that would normally be harm-
ful to healthy people can in fact be good to an ill person, and can in fact be good for 
such an individual in its consequences. I assume that Aristotle would not accept 
this with being good. He cannot grant that something which is bad haplôs is in fact 
good, i.e. beneficial for the bad person (here the phaulos). By contrast, the case of 
sensible properties seems closer to that of being good or bad. Apparently, what the 
healthy person feels as sweet really is sweet from a third person point of view, even 
though the sick person perceives it as bitter. Because of this discrepancy between 
both examples, it is not possible to argue on the basis of the analogy for the inter-
pretation of the passage according to which the virtuous man has privileged access 
to the good. The analogy is useful only in order to show that what counts as a norm 
for the real good is the response of the virtuous person, but it does not say anything 
on the cognitive access of the virtuous person to the good. 
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The rest of the chapter seems to confirm that the cognitive state of the virtu-
ous man is not more sophisticated than that of the non-virtuous one. 
48) For the good person discriminates correctly in every set of circum-
stances, and in every set of circumstances what is true is apparent 
to him. For each disposition has its own corresponding range of 
fine things and pleasant things, and presumably what most dis-
tinguishes the good person is his ability to see what is true in eve-
ry set of circumstances, being like a carpenter's rule or measure for 
them. But most people are deceived, and the deception seems to 
come about because of pleasure; for it appears a good thing when 
it is not. So they choose what is pleasant as something good, and 
they avoid pain as something bad. EN III.4 1113a29-b2 
ὁ @,-8C"ῖ-3 5ὰ) (30) ἕ!"@$" !)ί+'2 ὀ)&ῶ3, !"ὶ ἐ+ ἑ!ά@$-23 
$ἀ07&ὲ3 "ὐ$ῷ >"ί+'$"2. !"&’ ἑ!ά@$7+ 5ὰ) ἕN2+ ἴC2ά ἐ@$2 !"0ὰ 
!"ὶ ἡCέ", !"ὶ C2">έ)'2 ,0'ῖ@$-+ ἴ@(3 ὁ @,-8C"ῖ-3 $ῷ $ἀ07&ὲ3 
ἐ+ ἑ!ά@$-23 ὁ)ᾶ+, ὥ@,') !"+ὼ+ !"ὶ <έ$)-+ "ὐ$ῶ+ ὤ+. ἐ+ $-ῖ3 
,-00-ῖ3 Cὲ ἡ ἀ,ά$7 C2ὰ $ὴ+ ἡC-+ὴ+ ἔ-2!' 5ί+'@&"2· -ὐ 5ὰ) 
-ὖ@" (1113b) ἀ5"&ὸ+ >"ί+'$"2. "ἱ)-ῦ+$"2 -ὖ+ $ὸ ἡCὺ ὡ3 
ἀ5"&ό+, $ὴ+ Cὲ 0ύ,7+ ὡ3 !"!ὸ+ >'ύ5-8@2+. 
The cognitive privilege of the virtuous person seems to consist simply in his 
ability to judge correctly (krinei orthôs) in a particular situation. Judging (krinein) is 
the activity to discriminate among things. According to Aristotle, different cogni-
tive powers such as perception, phantasia and nous are all forms of krinein (MA 6 
700b19-21; DA III.3 427a17-22). It seems clear here that krinein does not refer to a 
higher cognitive faculty, because the next sentence recalls the same cognitive access 
of the virtuous person: in every situation, the truth appears to him. This proposition 
seems to be explicative of the first one: the virtuous discerns well, that is to say, the 
truth appears to him. Besides, other occurrences of the verb krinein in similar con-
texts show that Aristotle associates this verb with perceptual, or at least lower or-
der, cognitive faculties, in particular when it comes to the ability of the virtuous 
person to discriminate among particulars (1109b23; 1114b7; 1126b4).244 
Another passage makes the point of the moral superiority of the virtuous 
person without cognitive superiority even clearer. In the next chapter, EN III.5, Ar-
istotle tackles the question of the extent of our responsibility for our actions. At 
some point, he considers the position that human beings are not responsible for 
certain bad actions because these actions depend on the kind of person they are. 
Allegedly, one could not reproach to the coward for running away from danger, 
                                                      
244 For a similar reading, see Moss 2012: 159-160, although I am not committed to Moss' in-
terpretation of evaluative phantasia here. 
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since as a coward, he is driven to do so by his character. After having refuted this 
position, Aristotle goes further by envisaging a refinement of this position. 
49) "Suppose someone said that while every one of us aims at what 
appears to us good, we are not in control of the appearance, but 
rather the sort of person each of us is, whatever that may be, de-
termines how the end, too, appears to him. Well, if each of us is 
himself somehow responsible for causing his disposition in him-
self, he will also be somehow responsible for the appearance in 
question." EN III.5 1114a31-b3 
'ἰ Cέ $23 0έ5-2 ὅ$2 ,ά+$'3 ἐ>ί'+$"2 $-ῦ >"2+-<έ+-8 ἀ5"&-ῦ, $ῆ3 
Cὲ >"+$"@ί"3 -ὐ !ύ)2-2, ἀ00’ ὁ,-ῖό3 (1114b) ,-&’ ἕ!"@$ό3 ἐ@$2, 
$-2-ῦ$- !"ὶ $ὸ $έ0-3 >"ί+'$"2 "ὐ$ῷ· 'ἰ <ὲ+ -ὖ+ ἕ!"@$-3 ἑ"8$ῷ 
$ῆ3 ἕN'ώ3 ἐ@$ί ,(3 "ἴ$2-3, !"ὶ $ῆ3 >"+$"@ί"3 ἔ@$"2 ,(3 "ὐ$ὸ3 
"ἴ$2-3· 
One might say against Aristotle's responsibilism that even though someone 
was responsible for becoming the kind of person he has become because one's char-
acter depends on one's actions, and one is responsible for one's actions, there is still 
an extra element which one cannot be responsible for. Performing such and such an 
action depends on what kind of moral end one is pursuing, i.e. what conception of 
the good one has, and, the argument goes, one is not responsible for one's represen-
tation (phantasia) of the good. In other words, one is not responsible for how the 
good appears to one. Against this argument Aristotle answers that this does not 
make any difference because if one is somehow responsible for one's character, one 
is also responsible for one's representation of the good. 
Aristotle's answer seems to imply that one's notion of the good one is fol-
lowing in order to perform actions is proper to the non-rational part of the soul, i.e. 
pertains to character. Indeed, one can ask Aristotle's detractor how it can be that 
one is not responsible for one's view of the good. It seems obvious at first sight that 
I understand the difference between what is good and what is bad, and that I can 
elaborate a conception of the good, or even of happiness, according to which I as-
sess my actions. Then, either my idea of the good depends on my understanding 
and thus I am in control of it, or it does depend on the other part of the soul, name-
ly the desiderative part. Here, the only way out for Aristotle's detractor is to assume 
that one's view of the good does not depend on understanding. By doing so, he 
must admit that one's view of the good depends on the kind of person one is, that 
is, on one's character (hopoios). This way, Aristotle's detractor has to go back to Aris-
totle's previous view that one is responsible for having become that kind of person 
one is.  
Another Kind of Knowledge. Aristotle's Phronesis from an Epistemological Point of View 
 180 
Hence, Aristotle's argument shows that one's view on the good is not due to 
a higher order cognitive capacity, but to one's character. If he would believe that we 
access the real good thanks to a higher-order cognitive capacity like nous, the pre-
sent argument would not make sense, because Aristotle would merely have to ar-
gue that we are responsible for one's grasp of the good, since we are in control of 
our thoughts. On the contrary, in order to refute his detractor, Aristotle follows him 
on the ground that one's representation of the good is due to our desiderative part 
of the soul. Then, Aristotle's terminology shows clearly that one's view on the good 
is provided by phantasia, which is a capacity of the non-rational, desiderative part of 
the soul. 
Therefore, chapters EN III.4 and 5 both show that, according to Aristotle, 
one's notion of the good in a practical context is provided by phantasia and that at 
no point a more sophisticated cognitive capacity is required. 
One passage of EN VI could be taken as an objection to my interpretation 
that the end is provided by phantasia. However, a correct reading of this passage in 
fact supports my claim that the virtuous agent's cognitive grasp of the good is not a 
sophisticated one. This short passage, which is at the very end of EN VI.9 on eu-
boulia delivers a definition of euboulia, namely correct reasoning about the means to 
the end. How such a correctness should be understood has been discussed in 
§3.3.2.1. It involves a virtuous end and a means to implement that end which is not 
incidental. Then, the definition of euboulia goes as follows: 
50) "If then to have deliberated well is a mark of phronimoi people, 
good deliberation will be correctness regarding what is useful to 
the end, of what phronêsis is a true belief." EN VI.9 1142b31-33 
'ἰ Cὴ $ῶ+ >)-+ί<(+ $ὸ 'ὖ /'/-80'ῦ@&"2, ἡ 'ὐ/-80ί" 'ἴ7 ἂ+ 
ὀ)&ό$73 ἡ !"$ὰ $ὸ @8<>έ)-+ ,)ὸ3 $ὸ $έ0-3, -ὗ ἡ >)ό+7@23 
ἀ07&ὴ3 ὑ,ό07mί3 ἐ@$2+. 
This passage, together with 1140b11-21 (text 14), is one of the few occurrenc-
es where Aristotle comes close to saying that phronêsis determines the end of practi-
cal reasoning. Indeed, phronêsis is dubbed a 'true hupolêpsis of the end'. The text is 
ambiguous, for the pronoun hou could also refer to sumpheron, which is what con-
duces to the end. According to this reading the text would actually be consistent 
with the desiderativist reading I have advocated for. Phronêsis would be a 'true be-
lief about what promotes the end'.245 However, scholars have opposed that this 
                                                      
245 The manuscripts are not univocal and most of them do not read to telos, but ti telos in-
stead. If this version is the correct one, the most natural antecedent for -ὗ will be 'what con-
duces to the end' (Moss 2012: 180, n. 62). But Gauthier (Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 518-519) ar-
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reading is less natural than the one that considers telos as the antecedent. Indeed, 
Aristotle has clearly stated that in euboulia the end must be the correct one.246 Intel-
lectualists consider thus that reason in the form of phronêsis ought to take part in the 
determination of the end.247 
However that phronêsis is a grasp of the end does not amount to saying that 
it determines what the end is. Alternatively, one could understand that even 
though phronêsis provides a cognitive grasp of the end, the end is determined by 
virtue. This grasp is true, because phronêsis gets right what is indicated by virtue. 
Still it does not determine it by itself. "[True] 'supposition of the end' [...] means not 
the thought that goes into identifying the end, but rather the grasping of the end qua 
end, i.e. the using of the end to guide deliberation" (Moss 2012: 182). This is also 
how I understand EN VI.5 1140b11-21 (text 14) in which Aristotle says that 
sôphrosunê preserves phronêsis (cf. p. 63). Preserving phronêsis amounts to preserving 
beliefs (hupolêpseis) about the starting points of action. Taken at face value, this as-
sertion exactly means that phronêsis is limited to asserting such beliefs, but does not 
determine their content. Allan has argued in favour of the contrary claim, namely 
that virtue is incapable of determining such a content because it is not an intellectu-
al state and cannot thereby have any content independently of phronêsis (Allan 
1953: 77). However, if one assumes that the notion of the good that one follows de-
pends not on intellect but on phantasia, Allan's argument does not hold. 
 
What are the results concerning the epistemic evaluation of cognition of 
moral notions, then? Cognition of moral notions depends ultimately on the moral 
correctness of one's character. Moral notions are acquired by the process of habitua-
tion (ethismos). This process is not mindless, because the habituation of one's charac-
ter still involves that the agent has a phantasia of the end. Moreover, one's concep-
tion of a specific, deliberative end in the process of deliberation is obtained thanks 
to rational thinking. However, when it comes to the ultimate justification of the 
correctness of one's end, character is decisive. It is character, not reason, which 
gives an orientation to the specification of the defining end into a deliberative end. 
                                                                                                                                                        
gues that Bywater's emendation is correct for Aristotle would not want to define euboulia 
using a reference to any old end, while he has argued clearly that the end matters when 
speaking of euboulia. 
246 See especially 1142b28-31 where Aristotle makes a distinction between euboulia haplôs, 
which is in relation with the end haplôs, and other kinds of deliberation, which are in rela-
tion to any ends; see also 1142b17-22; see Gauthier and Jolif 1959: 518–19; Müller 1982: 267–
8. 
247 Allan 1953: 77; Cooper 1975: 63-64; Dahl 1984: 39-40. Curiously, Sorabji 1980, Engberg 
Pedersen 1983 and Reeve 1992 do not make a big case of that passage. 
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This also entails that one cannot have a fully rational justification of one's moral 
end. At some point there is necessarily a reference to a desiderative element in the 
agent's justification of his decision, even in the case of the phronimos. 
We can now reply to the motivations for the rationalist position (see p. 172). 
First, there was the requirement that the content of desire is provided by some cog-
nitive power. On my interpretation, this cognitive power is phantasia, rather than 
nous, and phantasia is a kind of non-rational cognition. Secondly, there was the criti-
cism against phantasia that it is not sufficient in order to warrant the correctness of 
the conception of the end of the virtuous agent. Against this claim, I answer that in 
fact in the practical realm no rational justification of the good is possible in gen-
eral.248 Finally, rationalism relies on the various occurrences of the phrase 'we wish 
only what we think (oietai) is good' (EN 1136b7-8; EE 1223b7, 32-33; Rhet. 1369a3). 
However, this phrase does not constitute evidence for the rationalist view. It can 
very well be interpreted in a weak sense as 'If we believe O, then we wish O'. Thus, 
knowledge of moral universals in a strong sense is not required. 
These results are highly controversial. They imply that the worries of the ra-
tionalists for the necessity of rational cognition for the correctness of the conception 
of the good of the virtuous person are not founded. In fact, a fully correct account 
of the good based on rational considerations is not possible. I will discuss these 
matters in more details in the final conclusion of this work. For the moment, I want 
to tackle the second aspect of epistemic evaluation of practical knowledge, namely 
knowledge of particulars.  
5.3 Knowledge of particulars and empeiria 
As already said in the introduction of this chapter, knowledge of particulars 
cannot merely be identified with perceiving particulars. If knowing particulars 
were just a matter of perceiving them, the conditions for such knowledge would 
not be different than those in play in perceptual knowledge in general. Aristotle has 
a reliabilist account of perceptual knowledge. If perception occurs in standard con-
ditions of observation, then perception is necessarily true (see Bolton 1996: 309-310). 
In practical situations, knowing particulars is a matter of trained perception, of dis-
cerning relevant circumstances from non-relevant others. And this is not an easy 
task to do, as Aristotle says on some occasions (EN II.9 1109a20-30; EN V.9 1137a9-
                                                      
248 The third motivation was that if wish (boulêsis) is a rational kind of desire, its content 
cannot be provided by phantasia but must come from rational cognition. I have not ad-
dressed this claim directly. I refer to Moss (2012: 162) who argues convincingly that boulêsis 
is in fact a non-rational kind of desire. 
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17, i.e. text (5) and (6) of the present dissertation). What matters, then, is to deter-
mine how the agent comes to learn how to discern relevant circumstances from 
non-relevant ones. In this respect, the crucial disposition is experience (empeiria) in 
moral notions. 
The role of experience in practical thought is mentioned on several occa-
sions. For instance, at EN VI.11, after passage 1143a35-b5 (text 46), Aristotle con-
cludes the chapter with some remarks on practically wise people (phronimoi). 
51) "Hence, one ought to be attentive to the undemonstrated sayings 
and opinions of experienced people, that is,249 the ancients and the 
practically wise people, not less than to demonstrations. For they 
see correctly in virtue of their having an eye from experience." EN 
VI.11 1143b11-14 
ὥ@$' C'ῖ ,)-@έ9'2+ $ῶ+ ἐ<,'ί)(+ !"ὶ ,)'@/8$έ)(+ ἢ 
>)-+ί<(+ $"ῖ3 ἀ+",-C'ί!$-23 >ά@'@2 !"ὶ CόN"23 -ὐ9 ἧ$$-+ $ῶ+ 
ἀ,-C'ίN'(+· C2ὰ 5ὰ) $ὸ ἔ9'2+ ἐ! $ῆ3 ἐ<,'2)ί"3 ὄ<<" ὁ)ῶ@2+ 
ὀ)&ῶ3. 
Phronimoi people are compared to experienced as well as to old people in 
that they all share an ability to 'see things correctly' in practical matters (horôsin or-
thôs). Hence one ought to pay attention to what they say. The reference to the sense 
of sight as well as to the age of such people reminds us of EN VI.13 1144b4-14 (text 
42). There beings having merely natural virtue and lacking full virtue, such as chil-
dren and animals, were compared to strong bodies deprived of sight (1144b8-12), 
while here the old person is precisely gifted with sight. Empeiria is associated with 
age in this case, whereas elsewhere it is denied to young people (1095a2-3; 1142a15). 
This suggests that the kind of sight which children lack because they have only 
natural virtue is the same as that associated with empeiria. Moreover, phronêsis has 
been dubbed the 'eye of the soul' (1144a30). Thus, phronêsis is closely related to em-
peiria. This was already emphasized at EN VI.7 1141b14-23 (text 27): experienced 
people, having knowledge of the particulars, are more effective (praktikôteroi) than 
others who have knowledge of universals. What kind of thing this 'seeing correctly' 
is remains to be stated, though. It seems that such an ability has been acquired by 
experience (empeiria). 
                                                      
249 The text is not clear concerning the relation between the three terms 'experienced men', 
'old men' and 'phronimoi'. Most translators take the series as a conjunction. But if kai is epex-
egetical, it could be distributive. This would entail that experienced people are either old or 
phronimoi. This would also mean that being experienced is a property of being phronimos. 
Burnet rejects the addendum ê phronimôn because it sounds inacceptable that phronêsis natu-
rally come with age. I would be more moderate about that. 
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Before I come to this point, I need to discuss a further worry brought to you 
by intellectualists. The mention of empeiria has encouraged intellectualists in their 
interpretation. Indeed, in a theoretical context, empeiria is a stage between non-
rational representation and rational intellection of a notion (see APo II.19 100a6-9 
(text 18), already treated at §3.2.2). Hence some have seen in the connection of em-
peiria with phronêsis a sign that there is practical intellection of moral principles (So-
rabji 1980: 216; Dahl 1984: 43-44). They think that empeiria bears the same relation 
towards nous in the practical case than in the theoretical case. However, in what 
follows I argue that the role of empeiria in practical thought is not the same as in 
theoretical thought. 
5.3.1 The two jobs of empeiria 
There is one passage in EN VI, where Aristotle refers to empeiria both in a 
practical as well as in a theoretical context. At the end of EN VI.7, he has insisted 
that phronêsis requires not only knowledge of universals but also knowledge of par-
ticulars (text 27). Then, some lines below, in chap. 8, he adds an argument that sup-
ports the indispensability of knowledge of particulars.  
52) "A sign of what has been said250 is also that young people can be-
come geometers, mathematicians or people skilled in such 
things251, but they seem not to become phronimos. The cause of this 
is that phronêsis is also of the particulars, and particulars become 
known (gnôrima) through experience, while a young person is not 
experienced. For experience arises after many years. EN VI.8 
1142a11-16 
@7<'ῖ-+ C’ ἐ@$ὶ $-ῦ 'ἰ)7<έ+-8 !"ὶ C2ό$2 5'(<'$)2!-ὶ <ὲ+ +έ-2 
!"ὶ <"&7<"$2!-ὶ 5ί+-+$"2 !"ὶ @->-ὶ $ὰ $-2"ῦ$", >)ό+2<-3 C’ -ὐ 
C-!'ῖ 5ί+'@&"2. "ἴ$2-+ C’ ὅ$2 !"ὶ $ῶ+ !"&’ ἕ!"@$ά ἐ@$2+ ἡ 
>)ό+7@23, ἃ 5ί+'$"2 (15) 5+ώ)2<" ἐN ἐ<,'2)ί"3, +έ-3 C’ ἔ<,'2)-3 
-ὐ! ἔ@$2+· ,0ῆ&-3 5ὰ) 9)ό+-8 ,-2'ῖ $ὴ+ ἐ<,'2)ί"+·  
Here, Aristotle displays a 'sign' (sêmeion) supporting the importance of 
knowledge of particulars. A sign that knowledge of particulars is a necessary condi-
tion to have phronêsis is the fact that one cannot become phronimos when being 
                                                      
250 "What has been said" refers to the end of EN VI.7, lines 1141b14-23 (text 24). This is com-
monly admitted by most commentators. E.g. Burnet, Rackham , Gauthier, Broadie & Rowe. 
251 It seems pretty clear that by 'being sophos in such things' Aristotle has other mathematical 
disciplines in mind; in the lines following this passage, mathematics is opposed to other 
theoretical domains such as physics (1142a16-20); hence, the distinction should not be made 
between practical and theoretical thinking in general, but between mathematics and 
phronêsis. 
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young. And that phronêsis requires knowledge of the particulars is the cause of this 
fact. Aristotle's use of the sêmeion as an argument seems thus to emphasize an ob-
served fact which is explained by invoking the point about phronêsis he was just 
arguing for. This strengthens the plausibility of this claim, because it explains an 
observed fact.252 Now how does this argument work? Why can young people be-
come mathematicians but not phronimoi? Aristotle's argument is that phronêsis is of 
the particulars; one becomes familiar with particulars from experience (ex'empeiria), 
and being experienced takes time. Obviously, young people didn't have the time to 
get well acquainted with the particulars. Experience appears then as the state or 
method thanks to which one becomes acquainted with particulars. Besides, Aristo-
tle apparently conceives empeiria as a form of knowledge (gnôsis Meta. I.1 981a16), 
which is close to epistêmê and technê (Meta. 980b27-28).  
Then, in the following lines of EN VI.8, Aristotle seems to take into account 
a possible objection to this argument for the indispensability of knowledge of par-
ticulars. One could retort to his previous sign-argument that one cannot use the 
opposition of phronêsis with mathematics because mathematics is a theoretical sci-
ence and not all theoretical sciences are accessible to young people. Aristotle there-
fore wants to show that the contrast he is alluding to concerns mathematics only 
but not other kinds of theoretical science. He observes that a young person (pais) 
can become proficient in mathematics but not in other areas of knowledge, such as 
physics. 
53) "Then, we can also inquire why a child can become a mathemati-
cian, but not a sophos nor a physicist. Surely it is because the ob-
jects of mathematics are <known>253 through abstraction, whereas 
the principles of the others are <known> out of experience. And of 
the latter [i.e. the principles]254, young people have no conviction, 
                                                      
252 This sign argument is an instance of the kind of sign-argument Aristotle develops in the 
Rhetoric and which he calls non-necessary as bearing the relation of universal to particular: 
Rhetoric I.2 1357b17-21. 
253 I understand that Aristotle is speaking about the epistemological relation between a sub-
ject and the object of one type of science or the other. One could maybe substitute estin at 
1142a18 with ginetai gnôrima for the sake of parallelism with the previous passage (text 52). 
254 The pronominal group 'ta men' could refer either to the principles of empirical sciences, or 
more generally to the objects of such sciences. Translators sometimes leave the antecedent 
open (Rowe: "and in the one case the young only talk, rather than having anything they 
believe"; Inwood and Woolf 2013: "young people talk about the latter but do not really be-
lieve it"). I follow Ross and Crisp, who opt in favour of the principles. 
One could understand that since the principles of physics are not fully internalized, the rest 
of what young people believe of physics has no epistemic value. Hence young people 
would talk of objects of physics in general. It seems however that Aristotle is rather consid-
ering the principles of natural sciences rather than the objects of such sciences more general-
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but only say the words, whereas the definition of mathematical 
objects is clear." !" VI.8 1142a16-20 
ἐ,'ὶ !"ὶ $-ῦ$’ ἄ+ $23 @!έm"2$-, C2ὰ $ί Cὴ <"&7<"$2!ὸ3 <ὲ+ ,"ῖ3 
5έ+-2$’ ἄ+, @->ὸ3 C’ ἢ >8@2!ὸ3 -ὔ. ἢ ὅ$2 $ὰ <ὲ+ C2’ ἀ>"2)έ@'ώ3 
ἐ@$2+, $ῶ+ C’ "ἱ ἀ)9"ὶ ἐN ἐ<,'2)ί"3· !"ὶ $ὰ <ὲ+ -ὐ ,2@$'ύ-8@2+ 
(20) -ἱ +έ-2 ἀ00ὰ 0έ5-8@2+, $ῶ+ Cὲ $ὸ $ί ἐ@$2+ -ὐ! ἄC70-+. 
A child might become an expert mathematician, but not an expert in natural 
sciences (phusikos) and similar sciences. The reason for this is that being familiar 
with the principles of the objects of physics or other sciences is possible through ex-
perience only. The reference to principles acquired through experience shows that 
Aristotle refers to empirical sciences, i.e. sciences that have to do with the contin-
gent world, such as physics or meteorology (besides, 'physics' (phusikê epistêmê) 
includes all the sciences that have to do with the natural world, phusis, i.e. that part 
of reality which is subject to growth and decay). Aristotle then elaborates why 
young people cannot become sophoi in natural sciences. They have no conviction (ou 
pisteuousin) in the principles (ta men) of such sciences. Having conviction seems to 
go together with having experience. The young people have not acquired the prin-
ciples of physics because they have not had enough experience in these matters. If 
they engage in such sciences, they will rather repeat what they are told. Hence, 
even if it is true that young people can be experts in mathematics, they cannot be 
experts in empirical sciences. 
This addendum raises a problem: the reason why young people do not be-
come phronimoi turns out to be the same as the reason why they do not become 
physicists, namely invoking experience. On the one hand, Aristotle has argued that 
phronêsis is not accessible for young people because phronêsis is of the particulars 
and acquiring experience in the particulars takes time. On the other hand, acquiring 
the principles of physics is made through experience, and experience consists in 
collecting data about particulars. Then the specificity of phronêsis as implying 
knowledge of particulars is lost: in some way theoretical sciences also require 
knowledge of particulars. 
The mention of the principles of empirical sciences provides a way out of this 
difficulty. The point is that knowledge of particulars is not used in the same way in 
                                                                                                                                                        
ly. According to Aristotle's account in the APo conviction (pistis) in the objects of physics is 
obtained through deduction from the principles, not from empeiria (APo I.2 72a25-72b4). 
Younger people, when talking of objects of physics in general, would not talk mere talks, for 
they still would be able to make deductions. Moreover, that there is a parallel with the defi-
nition of mathematics (to ti estin) seems to show that here Aristotle is still speaking about 
the principles (ta men), not about the objects more generally. 
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empirical sciences and in phronêsis. Knowledge of particulars in the case of physics 
and the like is needed in order to acquire the principles of a science. The principles 
of physics are obtained by induction from the collection of observations and repu-
table opinions in empeiria. By contrast, knowledge of particulars is required in the 
standard exercise of phronêsis, namely in order to take virtuous decisions. But the 
requirement of empeiria in this context does not concern the grasp of principles.255 
There seems therefore to be two different functions of empeiria. On the theo-
retical side, concerning empirical sciences, empeiria is a step towards the acquisition 
of the principles. On the practical side, empeiria is rather useful in order to find out 
the best decision.256 The occurrence of empeiria in the context of practical thought 
does not constitute evidence for the intellectualist claim that there is a practical in-
tellection of moral principles. On the contrary, I shall argue that the point of em-
peiria is the capacity to relate new cases to other ones that the empeiros has already 
encountered. Transposed to the phronimos, this entails that the phronimos is able to 
connect the particular circumstances of an action to the appropriate moral ends. 
5.3.2 Experience in practice 
What kind of psychic state empeiria exactly is and what role it plays in Aris-
totle's epistemology have been much debated in the last twenty years.257 It seems 
clear that the psychological basis of empeiria is exclusively perceptual. Empeiria aris-
es from memory, which in turn is a collection of perception. Many memories of the 
same thing result in having experience (980b29-981a1; APo 100a5). There has been 
controversies on issues such as whether the content of empeiria includes particulars 
exclusively or also universals258, and whether animals are capable of empeiria, and if 
yes whether it is the same as human experience.259 What seems clear though is that 
empeiria has a propositional content. Empeiria involves a hupolêpsis and a hupolêpsis 
                                                      
255 Besides, the sign argument of passage (52) merely states that: 'that young people do not 
become phronimoi is a sign that phronêsis has to do with particulars'. Holding the competing 
claim that 'that young people do not become physicist is a sign that physics somehow in-
volves knowledge of the particulars' does not undermine the first argument. All in all, Aris-
totle's sign argument is not very strong. I reckon that the important point in this passage is 
rather the similarity with empirical sciences on the importance of empeiria and pistis. 
256 Some commentators deny that empeiria in ethics has any role to play in grasping the prin-
ciples: Burnyeat 1980: 73; Jimeñez in progress. 
257 See e.g. Frede 1996; Butler 2003; Gregoric & Grgic 2006; LaBarge 2006; Blackson 2006; 
Salmieri 2010; Bronstein 2012; Jimeñez in progress. 
258 Whether empeiria is about universals remains controversial. That the empeiros can produce 
universal beliefs is argued for by Gregoric and Grgic 2006: 16; LaBarge 2006; see also Frede 
1996: 160-162. In favour of a particularist view, see Charles 2002 and Bronstein 2012: 44). 
259 See Gregoric & Grgic 2006. 
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is a propositional judgement (Meta. I.1 981a7-9).260 Another decisive feature com-
mentators all seem to agree on is that empeiria is a recognitional ability, the ability to 
recognize a particular token as an instance of a certain type.261 This aspect will espe-
cially interest us here, for it will appear to be a fundamental feature of practical 
knowledge. 
In Meta. I.1, Aristotle introduces a contrast between human beings and other 
animals on an epistemological basis. Regarding the kind of cognitions they are ca-
pable of, animals are limited to perception and memory (981a27-b25). At best, some 
animals are able of phantasia and experience. Instead, human beings are capable of 
science (epistêmê) and craft (technê). Then, in order to account for this difference, 
Aristotle details the relation between experience, on the one hand, and science and 
craft, on the other. 
54) "And experience seems to be very similar to science and craft. Sci-
ence and craft come to men through experience. For, as Polus said, 
experience produced craft whereas inexperience produced luck. 
Craft obtains when many notions (ennoêmatôn) of experience be-
come one universal belief (katholou hupolêpsis) about things similar. 
For, on the one hand, to have a belief that when Callias was ill of 
this disease this did him good, and similarly for Socrates and for 
many others taken one by one, – this is a matter of experience; but, 
on the other hand, to have a belief that when they were ill of this 
disease, this has done good to all persons of such and such a quali-
ty (pasi tois toioisde), marked off according to one notion (eidos hen), 
e.g. to the phlegmatic or to the bilious people when burning with 
fever, – this is a matter of craft." Meta. I.1 981a1-12 
(981a) !"ὶ C-!'ῖ @9'Cὸ+ ἐ,2@$ή<ῃ !"ὶ $έ9+ῃ ὅ<-2-+ 'ἶ+"2 !"ὶ 
ἐ<,'2)ί", ἀ,-/"ί+'2 C’ ἐ,2@$ή<7 !"ὶ $έ9+7 C2ὰ $ῆ3 ἐ<,'2)ί"3 
$-ῖ3 ἀ+&)ώ,-23· ἡ <ὲ+ 5ὰ) ἐ<,'2)ί" $έ9+7+ ἐ,-ί7@'+, ὡ3 >7@ὶ 
ῶ0-3, ἡ (5) C’ ἀ,'2)ί" $ύ97+. 5ί5+'$"2 Cὲ $έ9+7 ὅ$"+ ἐ! 
,-00ῶ+ $ῆ3 ἐ<,'2)ί"3 ἐ++-7<ά$(+ <ί" !"&ό0-8 5έ+7$"2 ,')ὶ 
$ῶ+ ὁ<-ί(+ ὑ,ό07m23. $ὸ <ὲ+ 5ὰ) ἔ9'2+ ὑ,ό07m2+ ὅ$2 j"00ίᾳ 
!ά<+-+$2 $7+Cὶ $ὴ+ +ό@-+ $-Cὶ @8+ή+'5!' !"ὶ (!)ά$'2 !"ὶ 
!"&’ ἕ!"@$-+ -ὕ$( ,-00-ῖ3, ἐ<,'2)ί"3 ἐ@$ί+· (10) $ὸ C’ ὅ$2 ,ᾶ@2 
$-ῖ3 $-2-ῖ@C' !"$’ 'ἶC-3 ἓ+ ἀ>-)2@&'ῖ@2, !ά<+-8@2 $7+Cὶ $ὴ+ 
+ό@-+, @8+ή+'5!'+, -ἷ-+ $-ῖ3 >0'5<"$ώC'@2+ ἢ 9-0ώC'@2 [ἢ] 
,8)έ$$-8@2 !"ύ@ῳ, $έ9+73.  
                                                      
260 Another key term is ennoêma at Meta. I.1 981a6 (see text (54) below). It is a hapax in Aristo-
tle (Cambiano 2012: 16, n. 31). Cambiano understands ennoêma as meaning the same thing as 
noêma in DA III.8 432a11-12, namely a thought with a propositional content. 
261 Frede 1996: 163; Vasiliou 1996: 784; Everson 1997: 224-227; Gregoric & Grgic 2006; Bron-
stein 2012: 44-45. 
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The experienced person's cognitive capacities are not as developed as those 
of someone who possesses craft or science. Still, his abilities are quite remarkable. 
He can distinguish various types of things or states of affairs: he can tell whether 
this symptom is of a similar sort than that other symptoms. Thus, he is able to or-
ganize the data he has the experience of. He can make out groups under which par-
ticular instances can be gathered or not. What is the exact difference, then, between 
empeiria on the one hand and technê and epistêmê on the other? 
Aristotle connects these kinds of knowing with what he calls knowing the 
"that" and knowing the "why". 
55) "But we think that knowing and comprehending belong to craft 
rather than to experience, and we conceive that craftsmen are wis-
er than experienced people, which implies that wisdom (sophia) 
rather depends in all cases on knowledge. This is so because the 
former knows the cause, but the latter does not. For experienced 
people know the 'that', but they do not know why, whereas the 
others know the 'because', that is, the cause." Meta. I.1 981a24-30 
ἀ00’ ὅ<(3 $ό 5' 'ἰCέ+"2 !"ὶ $ὸ ἐ,"'2+ $ῇ (25) $έ9+ῃ $ῆ3 
ἐ<,'2)ί"3 ὑ,ά)9'2+ -ἰό<'&" <ᾶ00-+, !"ὶ @->($έ)-83 $-ὺ3 
$'9+ί$"3 $ῶ+ ἐ<,'ί)(+ ὑ,-0"</ά+-<'+, ὡ3 !"$ὰ $ὸ 'ἰCέ+"2 
<ᾶ00-+ ἀ!-0-8&-ῦ@"+ $ὴ+ @->ί"+ ,ᾶ@2· $-ῦ$- C’ ὅ$2 -ἱ <ὲ+ 
$ὴ+ "ἰ$ί"+ ἴ@"@2+ -ἱ C’ -ὔ. -ἱ <ὲ+ 5ὰ) ἔ<,'2)-2 $ὸ ὅ$2 <ὲ+ ἴ@"@2, 
C2ό$2 C’ -ὐ! ἴ@"@2+· -ἱ Cὲ $ὸ C2ό$2 (30) !"ὶ $ὴ+ "ἰ$ί"+ 
5+()ί`-8@2+. 
Aristotle distinguishes between two ways of knowing (eidenai) which he re-
lates to science and craft on the one hand, and to experience on the other. Science 
and craft correspond to "knowing the because" (to dioti gnôrizein), i.e. knowledge of 
the cause of why such and such a fact is the case. Experience corresponds to "know-
ing the that" (to hoti eidenai), which amounts to knowledge of the fact itself. The 
previous example about medicine in text (54) becomes clear if one applies this dis-
tinction. Knowing that Socrates suffering from fever benefited from this remedy is 
'knowing that'. That Callias benefited from the same remedy when exhibiting a 
similar symptom still is 'knowing that'. However, knowing that all people suffering 
from fever benefited from this remedy because they are bilious is knowing why. The 
universality of this latter kind of knowledge is connected with knowing the reason 
why.  
The crucial difference in my view is the following: In virtue of empeiria, I can 
collect observations that this patient suffering from this fever will benefit from this 
treatment. I can then come to a general account that patients suffering from this 
kind of fever will benefit from this kind of treatment. However, this account is open 
to error and inaccuracies. I can come to identify a similar symptom in a new patient 
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and apply the general rule, although it turns out that this treatment is not appropri-
ate in this case. The reason is that I do not have the cause of the symptom. By con-
trast, in the case of 'knowing why', similar symptoms are identified as the same 
disease in virtue of their cause. From this, Aristotle infers a notion of knowledge in 
a strong sense. It is because I know why S is P that I can truly assert that all S are P. 
Knowledge in a strong sense implies a 'truly universal' assumption (Frede 1996: 
160-161), i.e. instead of saying that some people benefited from this treatment, one 
will say: all people with symptom F benefited from this treatment. The reason why 
one can make such a universal assertion is that one has an explanation why this 
assertion is true: all people with symptom F benefited from this treatment, because 
they all are bilious. 
The acquisition of technê is similar to that of empeiria, even though they do 
not arise on the same level. Both originate from a multiplicity of cognition, yet of a 
different kind. Empeiria arises from many memories, whereas technê arises from 
many empeiriai. The unity of empeiria is the result of a conjunction of many items, 
whereas the unity of technê results from a plurality of empirical ennoêmata as one 
universal judgement. Empeiria is not yet the recognition of a single universal, and it 
does not involve the articulation of any single universal. Empeiria involves a plurali-
ty, whereas technê involves a totality (Cambiano 2012: 18). The series of similar em-
pirical notion is open and could be continued (Müller 1900: 56). Moreover, the con-
tent of empirical notions are singular propositions. The content of technê differs 
insofar as it is universally quantified (pasi tois toioisde) (Cambiano 2012) and refers 
to a class defined according to one eidos. In the case of empeiria, no such a unifying 
eidos has been discovered. 
However, drawing the contrast between knowledge in a strong sense and 
knowledge at the level of empeiria should not hide the remarkable achievement of 
the latter. Empeiria is sufficient to be acquainted with general notions. The experi-
enced person is able to recognize particular things or states of affairs as instances of 
general types, even though such types are not fully known by empeiria itself. Of 
course, this process of recognition is open to error, since the empeiros does not have 
knowledge of the cause.262 Nevertheless, empeiria represents a significant step on the 
way to full conceptual knowledge. 
Moreover, I contend that experience fosters a further capacity. In my view, 
thanks to experience, I am able to refine my general notions. Empeiria is an ability 
                                                      
262 Without full knowledge, an individual will not be able to define this type. He will even 
not be able to name it (See Gregoric & Grgic 2006: 17, who also refer to Politis 2004: 38). This 
type might be merely known in a kind of preconceptual way (and thus empeiria would be 
achievable by animals). 
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thanks to which I can order the multiplicity of data I am confronted with.263 The 
more occasions I have to face a situation of a certain type, the better acquainted I 
am with the multiplicity of facts and thus the better able I am to recognize similar 
features, group particulars into categories and refine the taxonomy of such catego-
ries. In the case of medicine, the young physician will little by little learn to distin-
guish various symptoms which seemed very similar at first sight. He will gain a 
nuanced notion of such symptoms and thereby a better idea of when to apply such 
and such a treatment. 
If one understands it in this way, empeiria becomes very interesting in a 
practical context. It becomes an ability to recognize particulars as instances of moral 
notions. 
5.3.3 The function of empeiria in practical behaviour 
If one applies this description of empeiria as a recognitional ability on a prac-
tical context, empeiria appears as an ability to recognize features of a situation as 
instances of certain types, more specifically as instances of moral notions such as 
the good, the just, the temperate, etc. (See Vasiliou 1996: 784). Thus, the empeiros 
will be able to make judgements about new cases using these notions and applying 
them to these new cases. 
The function of empeiria in a practical context is best seen in Aristotle's chap-
ters on the virtue of courage (especially EN III.6 and 8). It is moreover the only oc-
currence in the Ethics where Aristotle asserts that one can be experienced without 
being virtuous.264 
56) "In the primary sense, then, courageous will be said of the one 
who is fearless about a fine death, or about sudden situations that 
threaten death; and of this sort are mostly situations which occur 
in war. Moreover, the courageous person will also be fearless at 
sea as well as when he is ill, but not in the same way as the sea-
men. For, while some have given up hope of survival and are un-
able to endure such a death, seamen are full of hope because of 
their experience." EN III.6 1115a32-1115b4 
!8)ί(3 Cὴ 0έ5-2$’ ἂ+ ἀ+C)'ῖ-3 ὁ ,')ὶ $ὸ+ !"0ὸ+ &ά+"$-+ ἀC'ή3, 
!"ὶ ὅ@" &ά+"$-+ ἐ,2>έ)'2 ὑ,ό582" ὄ+$"· $-2"ῦ$" Cὲ <ά(35) 
02@$" $ὰ !"$ὰ ,ό0'<-+. -ὐ <ὴ+ ἀ00ὰ !"ὶ ἐ+ &"0ά$$ῃ (1115b) 
                                                      
263 On empeiria as an ability to order particulars, see Gregoric & Grgic 2006: 10; Miller 2014: 
130. 
264 There are similar occurrences in the parallel passages on courage of the EE but where the 
cognitive function of empeiria is less explicit; I owe the reference to the chapters on courage 
to Jimeñez (in progress). 
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!"ὶ ἐ+ +ό@-23 ἀC'ὴ3 ὁ ἀ+C)'ῖ-3, -ὐ9 -ὕ$( Cὲ ὡ3 -ἱ &"0ά$$2-2· -ἳ 
<ὲ+ 5ὰ) ἀ,'5+ώ!"@2 $ὴ+ @($7)ί"+ !"ὶ $ὸ+ &ά+"$-+ $ὸ+ 
$-2-ῦ$-+ C8@9')"ί+-8@2+, -ἳ Cὲ 'ὐέ0,2Cέ3 'ἰ@2 ,")ὰ $ὴ+ 
ἐ<,'2)ί"+. 
Aristotle contrasts genuinely courageous people with people who have ex-
perience in situations of deadly danger such as sailing. Seamen when in danger at 
sea do not give in to fear because they are able to see whether and how they will be 
able to survive. Their experience provides them with a view of how they will be 
able to achieve their goal. Aristotle states a similar point some lines below, this time 
about warfare: 
57) "It also seems that experience in each particular domain is cour-
age.265 [...] There are different people like this [i.e. who have expe-
rience] in different domains, and in the domain of warfare it is the 
soldiers. For it seems that in war there are many situations empty 
of risk, and soldiers in particular have been able to witness such 
situations. They appear courageous, then, because the others do 
not know what these situations are like." EN III.8 1116b3-8 
C-!'ῖ Cὲ !"ὶ ἡ ἐ<,'2)ί" ἡ ,')ὶ ἕ!"@$" ἀ+C)'ί" 'ἶ+"2· [...] (5) 
$-2-ῦ$-2 Cὲ ἄ00-2 <ὲ+ ἐ+ ἄ00-23, ἐ+ $-ῖ3 ,-0'<2!-ῖ3 C’ -ἱ 
@$)"$2ῶ$"2· C-!'ῖ 5ὰ) 'ἶ+"2 ,-00ὰ !'+ὰ $-ῦ ,-0έ<-8, ἃ 
<ά02@$" @8+'()ά!"@2+ -ὗ$-2· >"ί+-+$"2 Cὴ ἀ+C)'ῖ-2, ὅ$2 -ὐ! 
ἴ@"@2+ -ἱ ἄ00-2 -ἷά ἐ@$2+.  
Soldiers have had experience of different cases, some of which really were 
dangerous and others which were false alarms. Their experience provides them 
with a sense of when an apparent threat is indeed a threat and when it is not as 
dangerous as one had thought initially. Then Aristotle adds a further reason why 
experienced people appear courageous. This has to do this time with their experi-
ence in fighting: 
58) "Furthermore, <soldiers> are best able to inflict damage without 
suffering from it thanks to their experience, since they are able to 
use weapons and they have such weapons that are the most pow-
erful to inflict damage and to not suffer from it." 1116b9-12 
'ἶ$" ,-2ῆ@"2 !"ὶ <ὴ ,"&'ῖ+ <ά02@$" Cύ+"+$"2 ἐ! $ῆ3 (10) 
ἐ<,'2)ί"3, C8+ά<'+-2 9)ῆ@&"2 $-ῖ3 ὅ,0-23 !"ὶ $-2"ῦ$" ἔ9-+$'3 
                                                      
265 Translators often render hê empeiria hê peri hekasta as 'experience of particulars' or 'of par-
ticular facts' (Ross, Crisp). Here I follow Rowe and Irwin because Aristotle does not say hê 
empeiria hê peri ta kath'hekasta, which would be a more accurate phrase to refer to the partic-
ulars. I think that Aristotle here does not refer to the particulars in the technical sense I have 
constructed in chap. 4. Therefore I prefer avoiding confusion. 
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ὁ,-ῖ" ἂ+ 'ἴ7 !"ὶ ,)ὸ3 $ὸ ,-2ῆ@"2 !"ὶ ,)ὸ3 $ὸ <ὴ ,"&'ῖ+ 
!)ά$2@$"· 
Soldiers as experienced people also have an advantage over untrained peo-
ple in that they know their tools. They know on what weapons they can rely on. In 
other words, they are best able to identify what means will be best adapted for such 
or such a combat. 
From these few passages, two crucial features appear as proper to experi-
enced people. First, the empeiroi are able to identify a situation as being really in-
stantiating a practical matter or not. For instance, in warfare such or such a situa-
tion can really be dangerous or can merely be a false alarm. Similarly in other do-
mains of human activities: Such or such situation can really be unjust or not, or real-
ly shameful or not. Second, the experienced person is able to identify the best 
means towards success in action. Thanks to the knowledge of particular cases he 
has, he is best able to understand whether such or such a means is appropriate or 
not. As in the case of the physician, because he already had plenty of occasions to 
be confronted to several different diseases and to relate them to the appropriate 
remedies, he is better able to see whether such or such a remedy will be appropriate 
for such or such a disease (see EN V.9 1137a9-17 text (6)). 
Practical experience concerns not the acquisition and formulation of princi-
ples, but their application.266 The idea here is that when I acquire experience in ap-
plying moral rules, I also acquire a refined idea of how the principle applies and 
when. Take the example: 'harming animals is wrong'. If I apply this principle to the 
letter, without distinction, there are chances that I shall not survive very long in this 
world – even though it is an industrialized one. I might let any insect bite me; get 
chased by dogs, etc. I need to understand more accurately what it is to hurt animals 
(is chasing a bee away a case of hurting animals?), whether there are circumstances 
in which hurting animals is legitimate (e.g. in cases of self-defence, in case of infes-
tation of an area by a non-local species, etc.), maybe even whether it is legitimate to 
hurt or kill certain species of animals (animals without a developed nervous sys-
tem, some kind of especially vicious animals or cases of pest). In other words, when 
gaining experience with animals, I get a refined notion of the basic principle. The 
experienced man has such a subtle notion of the principle in his own domain of 
expertise. And so does the phronimos. 
                                                      
266 Acquiring moral ends depends on character, as I have argued above. Habituation as the 
formation of character and empeiria as the ability to apply concepts correctly to a particular 
situation are two distinct dispositions. See below. 
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The phronimos as an experienced person is able to relate a new moral case to 
others he has already experienced. This involves that he is able to relate moral cases 
to some rules of action or to certain values. He can tell whether or not a general rule 
applies to a particular case. This is how I understand that the phronimos is defined 
as being 'praktikos' in things good and bad for human beings (See EN VI.5 1140b4-6; 
20-21, text 12). The phronimos has come to a point when he is able to spot regulari-
ties in the practical realm. So, my view at EN VI.13 1144b4-14 on the naturally vir-
tuous (text 42) is that what the non-phronimos person lacks, even though naturally 
virtuous, is a 'sense of the particular', a 'moral sensibility' that consists in making 
the right distinctions between them as well as grouping them under the right types 
and tying them to the right moral value or principle. Knowing about particulars 
makes one praktikôteros because one knows better what is required for an individual 
or a subcategory of them. In other words, one knows better what is appropriate to 
them. Knowledge of particulars is of such kind that it can connect a certain subject 
with something directly appropriate to it. And such knowledge is made possible 
thanks to empeiria and the acquaintance with particular cases. Moreover, according 
to my interpretation of the kath'hekasta as the particular circumstances of a situation 
(§4.4.1), the object of such knowledge is not a single individual or state of affairs, 
but an overall situation which the agent connects to his idea of what he should do. 
What the agent requires in order to apply a moral rule correctly is not only one sin-
gle observation about the situation. Rather, he needs to come to an overall apprecia-
tion of the situation, according to several parameters. 
However, as was the case in the previous section about empeiria in general, 
cognition of particulars on the basis of empeiria in a practical context is open to mis-
takes, too. This indicates that empeiria comes in degrees. One can be more or less 
experienced. Empeiria arises progressively. The more experienced the agent is, the 
more reliable his judgement on particulars will be. Remember the example at 
§3.3.2.3 of the friend who mistakenly punishes his friend while thinking that he is 
doing him good. With some more experience, this person will have a refined notion 
of what being just is and will probably identify justice in a different way than by 
punishing his friend.267 Acquiring experience requires therefore to have collected 
quite a lot of observations as well as having somehow understood connections 
among observed facts. Hence, with regard to EN VI.8 1142a11-16 (text 52), one un-
derstands better why acquiring empeiria takes time. The subject needs to have col-
lected a large amount of data.  
                                                      
267 See also Hursthouse's example of the nice adolescent, who ends up harming people alt-
hough he is initially well-intentioned, because he lacks the appropriate grasp of an ethical 
concept in order to apply it well (Hursthouse 1991: 231). 
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Before concluding this chapter on the epistemological evaluation of practical 
knowledge, let me consider two issues related to my construction of empeiria. First, I 
have insisted a lot on the share of experience in practical thought. But does this po-
sition not tend to identify phronêsis with empeiria? This consequence would be coun-
ter-intuitive. Scholars usually regard phronêsis as being more than empeiria. In par-
ticular, since phronêsis is seen as something akin to knowledge or wisdom, it is 
sometimes interpreted as a more sophisticated notion of knowledge, for instance a 
kind of knowledge including a rational grasp of ethical principles. Secondly, it 
might seem dubious to hold that in moral matters my perception of particulars is 
free from any influence from my character. Rather, one could plausibly argue that 
the kind of character I have has an impact on the kind of circumstances I perceive. 
For instance, an agent who tends to feel attraction towards sweet things could be 
prone to perceive sweet things and to overlook other kinds of food. More generally, 
one could suspect that the process of acquiring empeiria is not distinguishable from 
the process of forging character, namely habituation. 
First, then, is there a difference between phronimos and empeiros? Obviously, 
it is possible to be empeiros without being phronimos. The experienced soldiers men-
tioned above are not virtuous. Moreover, at EE I.7 1217a4 Aristotle mentions the 
case of experienced people who get fooled (aliskesthai) by ignorant people or fraud. 
Getting fooled by such people is not something that one would expect from some-
one phronimos. Then how does phronêsis differ from empeiria? According to intellec-
tualists, what the phronimos has which the empeiros has not would be a capacity to 
provide a higher-order justification for his action (Sorabji 1981: 2016-207; Reeve 
2012: 150). The empeiros is not able to provide such a justification (see Meta. I.1 
981a5-12). The empeiros is able to prescribe poultry meat in a particular case of, say, 
Socrates suffering from phlegm, but he cannot provide the knowledge that 'light 
meat is good for health' in order to account for his prescription (even though such 
knowledge is not useful for praxis). 
However, I am not sure that one should attribute such a capacity of higher-
order justification to the phronimos without qualification. What distinguishes the 
phronimos from the experienced man lies in a different aspect. It is true that know-
ing causes also has practical significance: 
59) "Presumably, too, then, someone who wishes to make people bet-
ter, whether they are many or few, by his care should try to be-
come expert in legislation, if it is through laws that we would be-
come good. For, producing a noble disposition in anyone, just 
whoever is put before one, is not for the first chance comer. But if 
anyone can do it, it is the one who knows, as in the case of medi-
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cine and the other matters where some kind of care and practical 
wisdom are required." EN X.9 1180b23-28 
$ά9" Cὲ !"ὶ $ῷ /-80-<έ+ῳ C2’ ἐ,2<'0'ί"3 /'0$ί-83 ,-2'ῖ+, 'ἴ$' 
,-00-ὺ3 'ἴ$’ ὀ0ί5-83, +-<-&'$2!ῷ ,'2)"(25) $έ-+ 5'+έ@&"2, 'ἰ 
C2ὰ +ό<(+ ἀ5"&-ὶ 5'+-ί<'&’ ἄ+. ὅ+$2+" 5ὰ) -ὖ+ !"ὶ $ὸ+ 
,)-$'&έ+$" C2"&'ῖ+"2 !"0ῶ3 -ὐ! ἔ@$2 $-ῦ $89ό+$-3, ἀ00’ 'ἴ,') 
$2+ό3, $-ῦ 'ἰCό$-3, ὥ@,') ἐ,’ ἰ"$)2!ῆ3 !"ὶ $ῶ+ 0-2,ῶ+ ὧ+ ἔ@$2+ 
ἐ,2<έ0'2ά $23 !"ὶ >)ό+7@23. 
So Reeve (2012: 149):  
"It would be a serious mistake to suppose, therefore, that 
knowledge of explanatory universals is not an important part of 
practical wisdom at all, just because it is a less important one than 
the particularist part of it crucial in deliberation." 
Notwithstanding, my point is not that architectonic knowledge of universals 
is not important for practical wisdom, but rather that it is not relevant when it 
comes to assess epistemically one's decision to act. One ought to distinguish be-
tween two contexts. On the one hand, the phronimos is deliberating with action in 
view. On the other hand, he is in a context of discussion, argumentation or teach-
ing. My view is that knowledge of universals as knowing the cause is useful in a 
context of architectonic thinking (what I have called ethical science in chap. 2), but 
not of deliberation.268 Qua deliberator, the phronimos does not need any such higher-
order justification about what eudaimonia or the good consists in. In fact, Aristotle 
never (at least not that I know) opposes phronêsis with empeiria.269 Moreover, the 
above passage EN X.9 1180b23-28 makes the point that knowledge of ethical science 
is useful in a context of governing others and making them better, not in a context 
of decision-making. In Meta. I.1, empeiria is differentiated from technê in similar 
terms. Technê involves understanding the cause, yet with respect to action Aristotle 
affirms that empeiria does not differ from technê. He even adds that someone with 
experience will be better in action than someone with theory but without experi-
ence (Meta I.1 981a12-26). 
Rather, the difference between phronêsis and empeiria resides in my view in 
that empeiria does not immediately contribute to one's access to moral ends. As ar-
gued at §5.2, moral ends are not determined by reason, nor by empeiria. The person 
who is experienced only, without having had the right moral habituation, will not 
                                                      
268 See Achtenberg (2002: 76-95): Inquiring universal causes in ethics does not belong to eth-
ics, but rather to metaphysics, physics and psychology. 
269 Pace Sorabji 1981: 207, who mentions 1141b16-21, where phronêsis is precisely compared to 
empeiria. 
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value the right moral notions and will not value them as one should. This is patent 
in the case of experienced soldiers, again: 60) "But soldiers become cowards when the danger is extreme and 
they are inferior in number and equipment. For they are the first 
to run away, while the citizen elements stand and die, as hap-
pened at the temple of Hermes. For to the latter, running away is 
something shameful, and death is more desirable than saving one-
self in such way; whereas the soldiers from the very beginning 
were ready to face the dangers because they believed they had the 
advantage, and once having seen they do not, they run away; be-
cause they fear death more than the shameful."	  EN III.8 1116b15-
23	  
(15) -ἱ @$)"$2ῶ$"2 Cὲ C'20-ὶ 5ί+-+$"2, ὅ$"+ ὑ,')$'ί+ῃ ὁ 
!ί+C8+-3 !"ὶ 0'ί,(+$"2 $-ῖ3 ,0ή&'@2 !"ὶ $"ῖ3 ,")"@!'8"ῖ3· 
,)ῶ$-2 5ὰ) >'ύ5-8@2, $ὰ Cὲ ,-02$2!ὰ <έ+-+$" ἀ,-&+ή@!'2, 
ὅ,') !ἀ,ὶ $ῷ Ἑ)<"ίῳ @8+έ/7. $-ῖ3 <ὲ+ 5ὰ) "ἰ@9)ὸ+ $ὸ >'ύ5'2+ 
(20) !"ὶ ὁ &ά+"$-3 $ῆ3 $-2"ύ$73 @($7)ί"3 "ἱ)'$ώ$')-3· -ἳ Cὲ 
!"ὶ ἐN ἀ)9ῆ3 ἐ!2+Cύ+'8-+ ὡ3 !)'ί$$-83 ὄ+$'3, 5+ό+$'3 Cὲ 
>'ύ5-8@2, $ὸ+ &ά+"$-+ <ᾶ00-+ $-ῦ "ἰ@9)-ῦ >-/-ύ<'+-2·  
What the experienced soldier misses is a correct valuation of the moral end. 
He is able to identify it, for he was told what the purpose of his fighting is (e.g. pro-
tecting the city). He is also aware of the relevant circumstances of the situation, 
thanks to his experience in combat. However because of a non-virtuous character, 
he does not desire the end appropriately. Thus, because he does not value the vir-
tuous end enough, he does not act virtuously and instead prefers a different, non-
virtuous, course of action. My point is that knowledge of the cause does not help 
the experienced man in having a better view on moral values. The experienced man 
does not fully understand why the principle is significant because he does not have 
an internalized notion of it (supposition about the why’: hupolêpsis tou dia ti, EE II.10 
1226b21–5). He has not acquired it through habituation of character, or not well 
enough. His position to the principle is merely 'external', although he is then very 
well off when it comes to applying the principle. He holds it and admits it is true or 
desirable, but he does not genuinely desire it. Professional soldiers on the battle-
field are very knowledgeable about combat, but they don't have a strong notion of 
why they fight. They just fight because it is their job. 
This account of empeiria and of the difference with phronêsis involves that 
empeiria is a cognitive state distinct from habituation. Hereby, I tackle the second 
issue on empeiria. As I conceive it, habituation is a process of forging one's character 
that relies in learning to desire the correct things by learning to take pleasure in 
them. Thus, it pertains to the non-rational part of the soul. By contrast, empeiria im-
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plies a different process. It merely consists in gathering perceptual data, ordering 
them into categories, and identifying instances of the types made out of the order-
ing process. Acquiring experience does not concern the desiderative part of the 
soul. It is not even limited to the domain of moral psychology, since, as is clear 
from the Metaphysics, experience is a crucial step towards the acquisition of theoret-
ical science. 
One could object that perception of circumstances is not distinguishable 
from character. The kinds of circumstance I attend to are partly determined by the 
kind of person I am. In this sense, my experience is influenced by my character.270 I 
think one way to answer this objection is to affirm that only the end I consider is 
influenced by my character. In other words, character 'sets the stage' under which 
guise I attend to the situation. However, the particular achievement of recognizing 
individual features as instances of moral types is an independent one. If, when con-
fronted to a situation, I am attracted to pleasure of food, I shall tend to regard the 
overall situation with a focus on this end, i.e. enjoying good food. However, the 
task of identifying such or such objects as instances of chicken or sweet is not taint-
ed by character. Habituation and experience are two distinct processes that both 
contribute towards becoming fully virtuous, yet in their own respective way.271 
5.4 Conclusion 
What with the epistemic evaluation of practical thought, then? Aristotle's 
explicit account is that practical knowledge is achieved when one has 'knowledge' 
(gnôrizein) of both universals and of particulars. In this chapter, I have given my 
own interpretation of these kinds of knowledge. 
Concerning knowledge of universals, the central claim is that character 
gives the end. The good is in fact what appears to be good. According to this inter-
pretation, moral ends or principles are acquired through habituation. The content 
of the end is given by phantasia, which is a non-rational cognitive faculty, but there 
is no contribution of a higher, more sophisticated, cognitive faculty such as a nous 
of principles as in the theoretical case. It is true that moral ends might receive an 
explicit rational formulation as they can enter into a process of deliberation. How-
ever, the ultimate justification of these specific ends proper to a particular delibera-
                                                      
270 Some scholars have argued that habituation and empeiria are not distinct and that they are 
two aspects of the same process of learning to be good (Vasiliou 1996: 780; See also Tuozzo 
1991: 204-205). 
271 See Jimeñez in progress: 12-13, n. 8 on McDowell: The moral learner needs to acquire two 
distinct 'conceptual apparati', one through habituation and the other through empeiria. 
Chapter 5. The epistemic basis of practical knowledge 
 199 
tion does not pertain to reason, but to character. No ultimate justification of moral 
ends is possible. 
Concerning knowledge of particulars, I have argued that what matters is not 
justifying  whether such or such a particular belief is true, but rather accounting for 
why the agent is sensitive to this aspect of the situation rather than to that one. The 
agent starts from a very rough notion of the good, the 'defining end', which is given 
by character, and learns little by little to apply this notion to other cases and at the 
same time to refine this conception of the good. There is a need for moral notions to 
be probed over time, while repeating the same kinds of action several times. In oth-
er words, the grasp of principles is refined through one's experience of moral mat-
ters. The learner comes to a better notion of moral values and principles by getting 
to know when they apply and when there are exceptions, or when some value 
should be silenced on the face of a more important value. This can only be done 
through practice, and thanks to the contribution of perception.  
This interpretation assumes that no such thing as practical induction is re-
quired, because no firm knowledge of the good can be achieved. The agent merely 
gets to a better, finer and more flexible idea of what counts as good without being 
ever able to have nous of it, as opposed to the objects of theoretical epistêmê. The 
contribution of empeiria provides the agent with a rational grasp of moral notions.  
An important consequence of this chapter is that what I have called 
'knowledge' of universals and of particulars is in fact not knowledge in a strong 
sense. In the case of universals, I have argued that we cannot have a fully rational 
justification of moral universals. We rather have representations or beliefs of the 
good, of the just, and of such notions, but we cannot obtain a well justified under-
standing of what these notions are. In the case of particulars, the situation is similar. 
What provides 'knowledge' of particular is perception. Although Aristotle does not 
seem to worry about the epistemic status of perception, it is true that perception 
cannot constitute a fully reliable foundation for our knowledge of particulars. 
However, I have tried to show, especially in §5.3 on empeiria, that the crucial aspect 
concerning practical knowledge does reside in the relationship between one's cog-
nition of universals and of particulars. The experienced agent knows better how to 
relate perceptual data with his conception of moral notions. His refined conception 
of moral values enables him to see a closer connection between these values and the 
particulars he perceives. 
In order to get a better idea of all that, I wish to inquire into practical cases 
where things do not go as smoothly as in the case of the phronimos. This will pro-
vide an insight into what it is to genuinely know practically by contrast to cases in 
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which the agent does not know in such a strong sense. And this will also suggest in 
what sense the phronimos fully knows, by contrast to others. 
 CHAPTER 6 
6 Akrasia and other flaws of practical thought 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5, I offered an account of epistemic evaluation of practical 
thought. Practical thought can be formalized as an argument which constitutes the 
content of an episode of decision. This argument consists in a major premise which 
states a moral rule and in a minor premise which picks a crucial feature of the situa-
tion. A decision is evaluated morally if the major premise is morally correct, i.e. 
morally good, and if the minor premise offers an adequate way to apply the moral 
principle to the situation. Moreover, one can affirm that the agent really knows 
whether his decision is the right one or not if he is aware of the moral principle that 
he follows and if he has experience of how to apply it. Practical knowledge occurs, 
then, if the agent has a correct representation of the moral principle and if he ap-
plies it correctly to the situation, that is, if he spots a true instance of this principle. 
This account is centred on EN VI, in which Aristotle has in view the case of 
the ideal agent, namely the phronimos. However, not every agent is phronimos. One 
can fall short of displaying virtuous behaviour in a variety of ways. We have al-
ready encountered the cases of the vicious person (phaulos), who does not consider 
the correct principles of moral action, and that of the 'simple deliberator', as I have 
called him, who ends up performing a good action, but not through correct reason-
ing (see §3.3.2.3). In order to complete my account of the conditions for practical 
knowledge and the evaluation of practical thought, I want to turn now to non-
virtuous cases, i.e. to the various flaws of practical reason. Aristotle distinguishes at 
least three types of moral behaviour which are not virtuous: badness (kakia), lack of 
self-control (akrasia), and self-control (enkrateia). I have already mentioned badness 
(kakia) as a moral state which is opposed to virtue (§2.5 and §4.3.2).272 As virtue is a 
mean between excess and deficiency, badness denotes a state (hexis) which is either 
an excessive response towards a kind of object, or a response deficient towards the 
                                                      
272 At §4.3.2, the Greek term is mochthêria, not kakia (1151a15 – text 32). However, both terms 
do not differ significantly in terms of their function and Aristotle seems to consider them as 
synonymous (see 'vicious' in Irwin's glossary, Irwin 1985: 352). 
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same kind of object (EN 1106b33-34). Common definitions of akrasia and enkrateia 
are the behaviour of someone who acts according to one's appetite (epithumia) and 
against one's reason or one's wish (EE 1223a27-28; EN V.9 1136b5ff.; IX.4 1166b7-8) 
and the behaviour of someone who experiences strong appetites for something but 
still acts following his reason (EE 1223b12-13; EN 1111b14-15). Do these types of 
non-virtuous moral behaviour exhibit moral knowledge as I have described it? 
In the case of the vicious type, the answer is straightforward. Although his 
grasp of the moral end is epistemically not weaker than that of the phronimos, his 
account of the moral principle is wrong. Thus, his decision cannot be correct, i.e. 
practically true. The vicious person could come up with an incidentally correct de-
cision, yet one could not attribute to him the belief that he knows what he ought to 
do, because his moral justification would not contain a correct moral principle. The 
cases of the akratês and the enkratês are trickier. In fact, the question whether the 
akratês knows what he should do occupies a whole chapter in book VII of the Ni-
comachean Ethics. This question is raised by Aristotle at the beginning of the book 
together with a couple of other aporiai on non-virtuous character-types. Concerning 
enkratic behaviour, there is also a similar question whether one can attribute practi-
cal knowledge to the enkratês. The latter exhibits a kind of behaviour similar to that 
of the phronimos but for the disposition of his character. Still, since he ends up per-
forming a morally good action, one could still hold that he knows what he should 
do. 
Traditionally, commentators have drawn attention to akrasia alone. Ac-
counts of akrasia usually focus on the question whether the akratês is consciously 
aware of what he is doing or not. This is understandable insofar as Aristotle himself 
spends most of EN VII on akrasia and devotes a whole chapter on the question of 
the cognitive state of the akratês. I put the same emphasis on akrasia, though I even-
tually aim at giving an account for all three kinds of non-virtuous behaviour. Thus, 
I devote the second part of this chapter to an extensive reading of the highly dis-
puted chapter 3 of book VII. In this chapter, Aristotle develops an account of the 
cognitive state specific to the akratic agent.  
Akrasia has generally been understood as a failure of practical knowledge. 
The akratic agent somehow does not know some aspect of what would be the best 
thing to do. Yet, what exactly this aspect is has been an object of dispute. Since Al-
bert the Great and Aquinas, most commentators have held the view that the akratês 
is not aware of the particular object of his deliberation; in other words, he does not 
actively know the minor premise of a practical syllogism.273 However, a few com-
                                                      
273 See e.g. Ross 1949, 140; Bostock 2000: 130-131. 
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mentators have adopted a different view, according to which the akratês has com-
plete awareness of the situation he is in, but somehow fails to connect his notion of 
what he should do with the situation, and therefore is ignorant of the practical con-
clusion one would expect.274 
I follow the latter trend according to which the akratês is aware of what he 
does and that his action is not in agreement with what he should do. The main rea-
son for this is that the former interpretation, according to which the agent is not 
aware of the conclusion of what he should do, does not account for the fact that the 
akratês experiences a conflict between opposite desires. The view of akrasia I defend 
in this chapter is that what makes akratic behaviour possible in general is the way 
the agent connects his knowledge of moral rules with particular circumstances. 
Whereas in the case of the phronimos the agent ties his perception of particular cir-
cumstances with moral principles appropriately, in the akratic case the agent does 
not identify an instance of a moral principle correctly. This failure at relating an 
instance of moral behaviour to its type is thus the reason why the akratês person is 
unable to stick to the course of action he knows is best. 
The present chapter advances the idea that the epistemic evaluation of prac-
tical thought and decision depends on the way the contents of practical thought are 
related to each other. This account is given in the famous third chapter of EN VII, 
where Aristotle gives his most extended account of akrasia. In my view, the point of 
EN VII.3 is to work out the conditions in which practical reasoning is done proper-
ly, namely when a subject holds a practical conclusion to act in a certain way, which 
is backed up by an argument that supports the conclusion appropriately. Corre-
spondingly, the case of enkrateia is explained in that the enkratês agent, although 
prone to excessive appetite for pleasurable things, manages to connect appropriate-
ly his general ideas or principles of what one should do with his perception of the 
actual situation he is in. These results are in line with what I have developed in the 
earlier chapters of this work. 
In order to come to such conclusions, I first need to come back to the desid-
erative side of practical thought. I shall establish the point that all three kinds of 
non-virtuous moral behaviour, kakia, akrasia, and enkrateia, are similar concerning 
the desiderative side of the soul, for they all consist in an excessive reaction to-
wards pleasurable objects. The task will therefore be to account for their differences 
on the basis of the cognitive side of the soul. 
                                                      
274 Kenny 1966; Santas 1969; Charles 1984 and 2009; this view also appears in the Middle 
Ages with Walter Burley; see Charles 2009:42. 
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6.2 The 'pathetic' side of practical thought 
In book VII of the EN, Aristotle inquires into types of behaviour other than 
phronêsis which are relevant for moral evaluation. These are badness (kakia), lack of 
self-control (akrasia), self-control (enkrateia) (EN VII.1 1145a15-22).275 Badness is op-
posed to virtue, while akrasia is opposed to self-control. 
At the beginning of EN VII, Aristotle lists various reputable opinions (en-
doxa) on the various character types: the akratês tends to depart from his reasoning 
(ekstatikos tou logismou), while the enkratês sticks to it (emmenetikos) (1145b10-12); the 
akratês acts somehow moved by his emotional affections (pathê), while knowing 
(eidôs) that what he does is vile (phaulon). The enkratês by contrast knows that his 
desires are vile and thus does not follow them, but follows reason instead (1145b12-
14; see also 1111b13-15). Akrasia can thus be described roughly as the behaviour of 
someone who has a correct notion or idea of what he should do, but who experi-
ences at the same time a non-rational emotional state incompatible with this idea. 
He ends up performing an action in accordance with his non-rational desire, while 
knowing that what he is doing is bad. Enkrateia is the opposite state: experiencing 
desire but resisting to it and following the call of reason. Yet this first approxima-
tion of the various character types is not accurate enough. Among the opinions re-
ported, Aristotle mentions also those that merely conflate akrasia with self-
indulgence (akolasia) (1145b16-17). He also notes that sometimes people considered 
as phronimoi are also viewed as akrateis (1145b17-19). Aristotle needs therefore to 
clear the ambiguities surrounding these types of behaviour and to distinguish them 
from one another. In order to do so he raises a couple of aporiai that arise from the 
consideration of the various opinions on these character types. 
The first aporia raised by Aristotle is the question of how it sometimes hap-
pens that someone may act in a way which goes against what he thinks is the best 
thing to do (1145b21-1146a9). A second aporia questions the similarity between 
sôphrosunê and enkrateia in terms of the intensity of desire. On the one hand, the 
temperate person does not seem to have strong desires for base things, but on the 
other hand, the self-controlled person seems to resist intense desires, yet otherwise 
his resistance has nothing special (1146a9-16). The third aporia originates in the 
supposed description of enkrateia as the disposition to stand by one's opinion. Thus, 
if the opinion is bad, then enkrateia will be something bad (1146a16-21). The fourth 
                                                      
275 Aristotle also mentions two further kinds of behaviour: brutishness (thêriotês) and a sort 
of superhuman, either heroic or divine, excellence. However, both of these character-types 
exceed what is properly human. They are rare among humans and are not subject to moral 
evaluation (1145a22-33). Hence, they will not interest us here. 
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aporia deals with a sophistic argument that mindlessness (aphrosunê) combined with 
akrasia is in fact virtue. In such case, the agent will fail to stick to his opinion about 
what is good and thus do the contrary akratically. But since his opinion about the 
good is mistaken, he accordingly ends up doing what is in fact good (1146a21-31). 
The fifth aporia questions whether the self-indulgent person (akolastos) is better than 
the unself-controlled one (1146a31-b2), whereas the sixth and final aporia asks 
whether there is akrasia without qualification or akrasia is always proper to a do-
main of activity (1146b2-5). Hence, Aristotle's main task in the first part of EN VII is 
to clear up the various types of moral behaviour, to define them, and to determine 
the relations they bear to one another.276 
These aporiai have not all enjoyed the same attention. Most of the recent 
scholarship has focused on the first aporia dealt with at EN VII.3, perhaps because it 
is the most difficult chapter of the book, or perhaps simply because it is the first.277 
Likewise, the first aporia will occupy most of this chapter, while the other aporiai 
will receive less attention (I shall not linger at all on the second to fourth aporiai). 
However, I shall start my account of akrasia and other non-virtuous character types 
by ignoring EN VII.3 and jumping directly to the fifth and sixth aporiai. I consider 
chapters 4, 7 and 8 of EN VII indispensable for arriving at a correct definition of 
akrasia, enkrateia, and self-indulgence.  
6.2.1 Akrasia as a hexis 
At EN VII.4, Aristotle answers the sixth aporia and determines whether there 
is a sense of akrasia which is unqualified, or whether akrasia is always specific to a 
domain of action. This chapter is useful because it determines the kind of object 
akrasia and the other non-virtuous character types are about.  
Aristotle starts from something obvious (phaneron): the self-controlled man 
and the resistant, as well as the akratês and the soft man are in some way pursuing 
or avoiding various sorts of pleasure and pain.278 There are various kinds of pleas-
                                                      
276 The second part of book VII turns to another topic, that of pleasure (hêdonê), from chapter 
11 till the end of the book. For recent scholarship on the various aporiai of EN VII, see Natali 
2009, in which each chapter of book VII is the object of one study. 
277 For recent studies on akrasia, centred on EN VII.3, see Charles 2009; Moss 2008; Pickavé & 
Whiting 2008. 
278 1148a21-23: ὅ$2 <ὲ+ -ὖ+ ,')ὶ ἡC-+ὰ3 !"ὶ 0ύ,"3 'ἰ@ὶ+ -ἵ $’ ἐ5!)"$'ῖ3 !"ὶ !")$')2!-ὶ !"ὶ 
-ἱ ἀ!)"$'ῖ3 !"ὶ <"0"!-ί, >"+')ό+. Aristotle sometimes distinguishes between akrasia and 
softness (malakia) and between enkrateia and resistance (karteria). Akrasia and enkrateia are 
related to pleasure, that is, the akratês tends to pursue pleasures, whereas the enkratês is ca-
pable of refraining from them. Softness and resistance are related to pains. The soft man 
tends to avoid pains, while the resistant man can endure them. However, it seems that be-
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ant thing. Some are necessary, like food and sexual pleasures (ta aphrodisia), where-
as others are sought after for themselves (haireta kath'auta). These are e.g., winning, 
honour, or wealth. Aristotle then deduces that the various kinds of akrasia are rela-
tive to the various kinds of pleasure or pain (and so it goes for the other kinds of 
non-virtuous behaviour). One can lack self-control regarding money, regarding 
honours, regarding winning, etc. Nevertheless, Aristotle makes clear later in the 
chapter that we speak of akrasia without qualification only in the case of the lack of 
self-control which is concerned with necessary pleasures, i.e. in the case of pleasur-
able things related to food, drink, and sex, which are the domain of the intemperate 
person (1148a23-b4). The domain of akrasia haplôs is thus the same as that of self-
indulgence (akolasia), since the latter has been defined as a disposition to have appe-
tite for any pleasant thing, and this excessively (1107b4-6; 1119a1-3). This way of 
distinguishing between akrasia haplôs and akrasia in a qualified sense seems to be 
transferable salva veritate to enkrateia, resistance and softness. There will be self-
control haplôs, which is related to necessary pleasures, as well as self-control regard-
ing money, regarding honours, etc., and so on with softness and resistance.279 
A first determination of akrasia, then, is that it is a state of the soul which has 
necessary pleasures related to the body as its object. From now on, when speaking 
of akrasia I shall refer to the restricted notion of akrasia haplôs, namely the kind of 
lack of self-control which is concerned with necessary pleasures.280 I want now to 
specify what kind of state akrasia and the other similar states are. 
                                                                                                                                                        
side this terminological point there is no further substantial distinction between akrasia and 
malakia on the one hand and enkrateia and karteria on the other. In what follows, I leave mala-
kia and karteria aside and consider akrasia and enkrateia to include softness and resistance 
respectively. 
279 Aristotle's argument for calling akrasia about necessary pleasures akrasia haplôs seems to 
be grounded on linguistic usage of the time. Later on in EN VII.4, he offers a more elaborat-
ed division between kinds of pleasure (1148a22-b2) which explains better why akrasia re-
garding necessary pleasures is akrasia haplôs (see text 62). On these issues, see Lorenz 2009. 
280 Aristotle makes a further distinction within akrasia. On the one hand, there is akrasia as 
impulsiveness (propeteia); on the other, there is akrasia as weakness (asthenia) (EN VII.7 
1150a19-22; VII.8 1151a1-3). One specie of akrasia – the weak kind – is characterized by the 
fact that there is indeed deliberation, and that the agent has come to a result in his delibera-
tion, yet he does not stick to (ouk emmenousin) the conclusion of his deliberation. The other 
species does not involve deliberation. The agent acts 'under the influence' (hupo) of pathos. 
The reason why the agent does not act according to what he wishes to do is the same in 
both cases, namely the agent's affective state (pathos). Aristotle adds a value judgment re-
garding the comparative value of each of these kinds of agent. Impulsive akrateis are better 
than the weak ones for two reasons. First, they have not deliberated beforehand. This is a 
reproach towards the weak akrateis: since they have deliberated, they should be better able 
to see what they should do, but nevertheless do not stick to their judgment. Second, the 
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In the course of chapter 4, Aristotle gives a rather complete definition of 
akrasia haplôs at 1148a4-11, where the reference to desire for bodily pleasures is ex-
plicit:  
61) "Among kinds <of character> that are about bodily enjoyments, 
i.e. enjoyments that the temperate and the self-indulgent people 
are concerned with, the one which pursues (diôkôn) excessive 
pleasures not out of decision – and which avoids pains (physical 
hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and the like concerning touch and taste), 
but against decision and thought, this one is called akratês, and 
this without specifying that it is about this or that domain, like 
anger, but simply without qualification." EN VII.4 1148a4-11 
$ῶ+ Cὲ (5) ,')ὶ $ὰ3 @(<"$2!ὰ3 ἀ,-0"ύ@'23, ,')ὶ ἃ3 0έ5-<'+ 
$ὸ+ @ώ>)-+" !"ὶ ἀ!ό0"@$-+, ὁ <ὴ $ῷ ,)-"2)'ῖ@&"2 $ῶ+  ἡCέ(+ 
C2ώ!(+ $ὰ3 ὑ,')/-0ά3—!"ὶ $ῶ+ 08,7)ῶ+ >'ύ5(+, ,'ί+73 !"ὶ 
Cίm73 !"ὶ ἀ0έ"3 !"ὶ mύ9-83 !"ὶ ,ά+$(+ $ῶ+ ,')ὶ ἁ>ὴ+ !"ὶ 
5'ῦ@2+—ἀ00ὰ ,")ὰ $ὴ+ ,)-"ί)'@2+ !"ὶ $ὴ+ (10) C2ά+-2"+, 
ἀ!)"$ὴ3 0έ5'$"2, -ὐ !"$ὰ ,)ό@&'@2+, ὅ$2 ,')ὶ $άC', !"&ά,') 
ὀ)5ῆ3, ἀ00’ ἁ,0ῶ3 <ό+-+. 
The core element of akrasia then is the tendency to pursue pleasure and to 
avoid painful things related to bodily pleasures. We know from EN VI.2 that pursu-
ing pleasure and avoiding pain are aspects of desire: pursuing and avoiding are for 
desire what asserting and denying are for logos (1139a21-22) (text 11). In other 
words, pursuing pleasant things is a positive desire towards the object, whereas 
avoiding painful things is a negative desire away from the object. Hence, what is 
characteristic of the akratês is to feel a certain desire towards pleasurable things and 
avoidance towards painful things.281 By contrast, phronêsis at EN VI.5 was character-
ized by tending to look for what is 'practically true' (i.e. morally right) concerning 
things good and bad for humans. In this definition of akrasia there is no mention of 
looking for what lies beyond our immediate perception of what is pleasant or pain-
ful. It seems then that a characteristic feature of the akratês is to be responsive to 
pleasure in a way that the phronimos is not. Also, Aristotle is careful to add that the 
tendency for pleasure of the akratês goes contrary to decision and thought (proairesis 
kai dianoia). As he will make clearer later, a crucial feature of the akratês is that he 
does not act according to proairesis (1150a16-21; 1148a16-17; 1151a5-7). 
                                                                                                                                                        
impulsive kind is subject to more pathos than the weak kind. One may reproach someone 
even more if he has ceded to a passion that most people are able to withstand. By contrast, 
the pathos overwhelming the impulsive akratês is harder to resist: thus one might show more 
understanding to the people who have given in to it. This distinction will matter below 
when it comes to the interpretation of EN VII.3; see §6.3. 
281 What kind of desire? I'll be more specific about that in the next section §6.2.2. 
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Furthermore, the akratês feels desire towards pleasurable things and repul-
sion away from painful things excessively. This is expressed well in the case of quali-
fied akrasia. After having defined the akratês simpliciter at EN VII.4, Aristotle com-
pares his behaviour with that of other weak-willed people in other domains: 
62) "Since some appetites and pleasures are fine and excellent in kind 
(for some pleasures are naturally choiceworthy), some others are 
opposite to these, and others are in between, as we have distin-
guished earlier (for example, money and profit and victory and 
honour); and with respect to all such desires and pleasures and 
the intermediates people are not blamed just because they are af-
fected by them or have an appetite for them or like them but ra-
ther because they do so in a particular way, i.e. to excess. That is 
why we blame all those who, contrary to reason, are dominated 
by or pursue things fine and good by nature, like those who are 
devoted to honour more than they should be, or to their children 
and parents. Certainly, these things are good and those who are 
devoted to them are praised; but still even concerning these things 
excess is possible: if someone should fight even against the gods 
like Niobê or be like Satyros, nicknamed the Father-lover, who 
seemed, when it came to his father, to be excessive in his stupidi-
ty." EN VII.4 1148a22-b2 
ἐ,'ὶ Cὲ $ῶ+ ἐ,2&8<2ῶ+ !"ὶ $ῶ+ ἡC-+ῶ+ "ἳ <έ+ 'ἰ@2 <$ῶ+> $ῷ 
5έ+'2 !"0ῶ+ !"ὶ @,-8C"ί(+ ($ῶ+ 5ὰ) ἡCέ(+ ἔ+2" >ύ@'2 
"ἱ)'$ά), $ὰ C’ ἐ+"+$ί" $-ύ$(+, $ὰ Cὲ (25) <'$"Nύ, !"&ά,') 
C2'ί0-<'+ ,)ό$')-+, -ἷ-+ 9)ή<"$" !"ὶ !έ)C-3 !"ὶ +ί!7 !"ὶ $2<ή· 
,)ὸ3 ἅ,"+$" Cὲ !"ὶ $ὰ $-2"ῦ$" !"ὶ $ὰ <'$"Nὺ -ὐ $ῷ ,ά@9'2+ 
!"ὶ ἐ,2&8<'ῖ+ !"ὶ >20'ῖ+ mέ5-+$"2, ἀ00ὰ $ῷ ,ῶ3 !"ὶ 
ὑ,')/ά00'2+ (C2ὸ ὅ@-2 <ὲ+ ,")ὰ $ὸ+ 0ό5-+ ἢ !)"$-ῦ+$"2 ἢ 
C2ώ!-8@2 $ῶ+ >ύ@'2 $2 !"0ῶ+ (30) !"ὶ ἀ5"&ῶ+, -ἷ-+ -ἱ ,')ὶ 
$2<ὴ+ <ᾶ00-+ ἢ C'ῖ @,-8Cά`-+$'3 ἢ ,')ὶ $έ!+" !"ὶ 5-+'ῖ3· !"ὶ 
5ὰ) $"ῦ$" $ῶ+ ἀ5"&ῶ+, !"ὶ ἐ,"2+-ῦ+$"2 -ἱ ,')ὶ $"ῦ$" 
@,-8Cά`-+$'3· ἀ00’ ὅ<(3 ἔ@$2 $23 ὑ,')/-0ὴ !"ὶ ἐ+ $-ύ$-23, 'ἴ 
$23 ὥ@,') ἡ 2ό/7 <ά9-2$- !"ὶ ,)ὸ3 $-ὺ3 &'-ύ3, ἢ ὥ@,') 
ά$8)-3 ὁ >20-(1148b) ,ά$() ἐ,2!"0-ύ<'+-3 ,')ὶ $ὸ+ ,"$έ)"· 
0ί"+ 5ὰ) ἐCό!'2 <()"ί+'2+)·  
This passage concerns akrateis people in domains of things that are choice-
worthy by themselves, such as honour and wealth. To desire such things in them-
selves is not a bad thing. Yet, what Aristotle wants to show is that it is possible to 
experience excessive appetite for such things. For instance, Niobê was so proud of 
her children, claiming they made her equal with Letô, mother of Apollo and Arte-
mis, that she offended the gods. All her children where slaughtered by Apollo and 
Artemis. Niobê displayed excess in the pride she had in her children, and this is 
blameworthy, although without qualification being proud of one's children is a fine 
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thing.282 Thus, in various domains of pleasures, excessive desire for pleasure and 
avoidance of pain are possible. Also, one understands well why according to Aris-
totle qualified types of akrasia are named by reference to unqualified akrasia.  
Texts (61) and (62) suggest that akrasia and similar kinds of behaviour are 
dispositions (hexeis) in the technical sense of EN zz.5. There Aristotle has defined 
hexeis as a sort of character trait thanks to which one is well or badly disposed to 
respond to an affection (pathos) (EN II.5 1105b25-28; see text (15) at §2.6). In order to 
express this notion of disposition, Aristotle uses the grammatical construction eche-
in + adverbial form. It appears that he uses the same terminology of disposition for 
akrasia (1146b15; 1147a14-18; 1150a11-12, 18; 1152a35). The akratês is disposed exces-
sively towards pleasurable things. That is, the akratês will have an excessive re-
sponse to the pleasurable object and this excessive response takes the form of an 
intense desire. This is illustrated by the following metaphor:  
63) "For the akratês is similar to those that get drunk quickly, that is 
with little wine and less than most people." EN VII.8 1151a3-5 
ὅ<-2-3 5ὰ) ὁ ἀ!)"$ή3 ἐ@$2 $-ῖ3 $"9ὺ <'&8@!-<έ+-23 !"ὶ ὑ,’ 
ὀ0ί5-8 -ἴ+-8 !"ὶ ἐ0ά$$-+-3 ἢ ὡ3 -ἱ ,-00-ί. 
The akratês experiences a kind of affective state (pathos), which is due to his 
excessive response to a pleasurable object. This response takes the form of an epi-
sode of desire for this object. This result is important because it shows that the pri-
mary impulse in the behaviour of the akratês depends solely on his character and on 
how he has been habituated. This will matter later when I come to interpreting EN 
VII.3 and what happens on the cognitive side. 
Before turning to the cognitive state of akrasia (and of enkrateia as well), one 
ought to solve a difficulty. The description of akrasia just offered is not very differ-
ent from Aristotle's account of the self-indulgent and the self-controlled. Akolasia, as 
the vice related to the virtue of temperance, is precisely defined as a disposition to 
respond to bodily pleasures excessively.283 The enkratês is also subject to responding 
excessively to pleasure, even though he is able to withstand his desire. At EN VII.7 
1150a9-16 the enkratês is indeed described as someone who withstands appetite so 
intense that most people would not be able to resist (see also 1150b5-8; 1151b34-
1152a3). I shall tackle the contrast between akrasia and enkrateia at the end of this 
chapter. In what follow I shall focus on the difference between akrasia and akolasia. 
                                                      
282 The example of Satyros is less clear. Satyros seems to have been the son of a king and 
deified his father (Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 624-625). 
283 See EN II.7 1107b4-6; III.11, especially 1119a1-3. On temperance as a mean between excess 
and deficiency, see §§2.4 and 4.2. 
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6.2.2 Akrasia and akolasia 
Aristotle takes care to distinguish the akratês from the akolastos. A revealing 
passage comes right after Aristotle's definition of the akratês at EN VII.4. There Aris-
totle probably wants to clarify the notion of akrasia by contrasting it with akolasia, 
thereby providing the basis for an answer to the fifth aporia on whether akolasia is 
better than akrasia (the answer is eventually given later, at 1151a24-25). 
64) "These kinds of behaviour [i.e. akrasia, akolasia, enkrateia and 
sôphrosunê] are related to the same things, but they are not related 
to them in the same way. Some [i.e. self-indulgent and temperate] 
act on the basis of decision, whereas others [i.e. the akratês] do not 
act on the basis of decision. Hence, we call 'self-indulgent' the one 
who pursues excessive pleasures and avoids moderate pains with 
no appetite, or only with mild appetite, rather than the one who 
pursues excessive pleasure and avoids moderate pains because of 
intense appetite. For what would that one [i.e. the self-indulgent] 
do if in addition he had an energetic appetite and felt a powerful 
distress at not having the necessary pleasures?" EN VII.4 1148a16-
22 
-ἳ C’ 'ἰ@ὶ <ὲ+ ,')ὶ $"ὐ$ά, ἀ00’ -ὐ9 ὡ@"ύ$(3 'ἰ@ί+, ἀ00’ -ἳ <ὲ+ 
,)-"2)-ῦ+$"2 -ἳ C’ -ὐ ,)-"2)-ῦ+$"2. C2ὸ <ᾶ00-+ ἀ!ό0"@$-+ ἂ+ 
'ἴ,-2<'+ ὅ@$23 <ὴ ἐ,2&8<ῶ+ ἢ ἠ)έ<" C2ώ!'2 $ὰ3 ὑ,')/-0ὰ3 !"ὶ 
>'ύ5'2 <'$)ί"3 0ύ,"3, ἢ $-ῦ$-+ ὅ@$23 C2ὰ (20) $ὸ ἐ,2&8<'ῖ+ 
@>όC)"· $ί 5ὰ) ἂ+ ἐ!'ῖ+-3 ,-2ή@'2'+, 'ἰ ,)-@5έ+-2$- ἐ,2&8<ί" 
+'"+2!ὴ !"ὶ ,')ὶ $ὰ3 $ῶ+ ἀ+"5!"ί(+ ἐ+C'ί"3 0ύ,7 ἰ@98)ά; 
According to this passage, the akratês differs from the akolastos in two re-
spects. First, he does not act out of decision. Aristotle repeats this on several occa-
sions (EN zzz.2 1111b13-14; EN VII.3 1146b22-24; EN VII.8 1151a5–7). Secondly, the 
kind of desire involved in akratic behaviour seems to be different from that of the 
akolastos. The akratês is driven by epithumia. On the contrary, the akolastos does not 
experience epithumia, or only mildly (mê epithumôn ê êrema; see also 1150a27-31 cited 
below, text 66). A third point of contrast is put forward later in EN VII, namely that 
akolasia involves being persuaded (pepeisthai) of what he is doing, but akrasia does 
not. Consequently, the akratês is easy to persuade of the contrary while the akolastos 
is not (EN VII.8 1151a11-14). 
That the akratês does not act out of decision is puzzling when one considers 
other statements Aristotle makes about decision. First, (a) Aristotle defines decision 
as a state of which the content is determined by deliberation (EN III.3 1113a2–5). 
The present passage adds that (b) the akratês does not act out of decision; rather, he 
acts against his decision (e.g. EN III.2 1111b13-14, EN VII.8 1151a5–7). This would 
suggest that what the akratês sets out to do is not determined by deliberation. How-
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ever, it is commonly assumed that (c) an akratic agent, even when acting against his 
decision, does occasionally determine what to do by deliberation. 284 
The common answer to this problem is that (a) should be revised: decision is 
not simply determination by calculation or deliberation, but determination by de-
liberation in a way that reveals one’s moral character (see e.g. EN III.2 1111b5–6; 
1112a2; VI.2 1139a33–34). Decision properly understood is made on the basis of 
one's wish (boulêsis), and boulêsis, as the rational kind of desire, concerns one's con-
ception of the good. On the contrary, the akratês' quasi-decision is not made on the 
basis of a boulêsis, but on the basis of an epithumia.285 Hence, at 1142b18-19 the 
akratês' intention to act does not satisfy the technical sense of a proairesis. This also 
entails that the self-indulgent person makes a decision on the basis of wish and not 
on the basis of epithumia. 
This consequence would be consistent with the claim that the akolastos does 
not experience epithumia or only mildly, which is the second point of contrast be-
tween akrasia and akolasia. However, this second point is quite disturbing, because 
on other occasions Aristotle is explicit that the akolastos experiences epithumia. See 
for instance: 
65) "So the self-indulgent person, for his part, has an appetite (ep-
ithumei) for any pleasant things, or for the most pleasant, and he is 
driven by his appetite so as to choose these instead of anything 
else." EN III.11 1119a1-3; see also 1118a12-13, b12; 1119a32, b3-7 
Ὁ <ὲ+ -ὖ+ ἀ!ό0"@$-3 ἐ,2&8<'ῖ $ῶ+ ἡCέ(+ ,ά+$(+ ἢ $ῶ+ 
<ά02@$", !"ὶ ἄ5'$"2 ὑ,ὸ $ῆ3 ἐ,2&8<ί"3 ὥ@$' ἀ+$ὶ $ῶ+ ἄ00(+ 
$"ῦ&’ "ἱ)'ῖ@&"2· 
Now, these passages taken from Aristotle's chapters on temperance 
(sôphrosunê) are in direct contrast with EN VII. Furthermore, Aristotle raises twice 
                                                      
284 See Pearson 2012: 165-166 for a statement of the problem. The sole passage where Aristo-
tle says that the akratês has deliberated intentionally is EN VI.9 1142b19: "For the unself-
controlled, that is, the bad person, will achieve by calculation what he proposes as required" 
(ὁ 5ὰ) ἀ!)"$ὴ3 !"ὶ ὁ >"ῦ0-3 ὃ ,)-$ί&'$"2 C'ῖ+ ἐ! $-ῦ 0-52@<-ῦ $'ύN'$"2; see text 22). 
Since Anscombe (1965: 146), this passage has usually been understood in the following way: 
an akratic agent first determines what to do (cheating on his wife), even though he disap-
proves of it, and then deliberates how to do it. At §3.3.2.1, I have argued that we should not 
take akratês in a technical sense in this passage, but rather as a loose synonym for phaulos. 
However, I do not exclude that Aristotle might have acknowledged such a type of akratic 
behaviour. Hence, it is worth discussing the problem. 
285 See Heinaman 2009: 487: "The incontinent agent’s decision to pursue physical pleasure is 
not a choice since it results from deliberation on how to satisfy an appetite rather than a 
wish (EN III.2 1111b13–15, VI.4 1148a4–10, VII.8 1151a6–7)". 
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the rhetorical question of what it would be if the akolastos would moreover feel ep-
ithumia: 
66) "But everyone would think a person worse for doing something 
shameful without or with only gentle prompting from appetite 
than for doing it from intense appetite, and for punching someone 
when not angry (mê orgizomenos) than for doing it in anger; for 
what would he do if he were in one of these affective states? 
Hence the self-indulgent type is worse than the un-self-controlled 
one." EN VII.7 1150a27-31; Cf. 1148a20-22 
,"+$ὶ C’ ἂ+ CόN'2' 9'ί)(+ 'ἶ+"2, 'ἴ $23 <ὴ ἐ,2&8<ῶ+ ἢ ἠ)έ<" 
,)ά$$-2 $2 "ἰ@9)ό+, ἢ 'ἰ @>όC)" ἐ,2&8<ῶ+, !"ὶ 'ἰ <ὴ 
ὀ)52`ό<'+-3 $ύ,$-2 ἢ (30) 'ἰ ὀ)52`ό<'+-3· $ί 5ὰ) ἂ+ ἐ,-ί'2 ἐ+ 
,ά&'2 ὤ+; C2ὸ ὁ ἀ!ό0"@$-3 9'ί)(+ $-ῦ ἀ!)"$-ῦ3. 
This is not the only tension between the chapters on sôphrosunê and akrasia. 
For instance, Aristotle claims at EE 1231a24-25 that the kind of thing akrasia is about 
is not the same as the kind of thing which akolasia is about, although this is precise-
ly how he defines akrasia haplôs at EN VII.4, as we have just seen.286 Thus, one 
should not expect complete agreement between the different contexts.287 But what 
certainly holds in both contexts EN III.10-12/EE III.2 and EN VII is that the akolastos 
is disposed in such a way that he is attracted excessively by pleasurable things re-
lated to food, drink and sex. Now, the two contexts do not agree on what kind of 
desire this attraction for pleasurable things presupposes. I do not claim that Aristo-
tle is being totally consistent. Rather, I contend that there are elements in the text 
that suggest a satisfactory solution.  
In my view, the very discussion at EN III.11 on the nature of the object of 
self-indulgence can answer this worry. In this chapter, Aristotle is examining close-
ly what kind of appetite (epithumia) is proper to the akolastos. He draws a distinction 
between common appetites (koinai epithumiai), which are uniformly shared among 
human beings, and peculiar appetites (idioi), which are shared by some individuals 
only (1118b8-9). Aristotle calls the former 'natural' (phusikai), by which he under-
stands appetites for food, drink, and sex in an unqualified way, insofar as they are 
                                                      
286 "Nor in general do we speak of self-indulgence with regard to that in respect of which 
people are said to lack self-control. Those who lack self-control are neither self-indulgent 
nor temperate." (EE 1231a24-25: !"ὶ ὅ0(3 ,')ὶ ὅ@" <ὴ 0έ5-+$"2 ἐ5!)"$'ῖ3· -ἱ C’ ἀ!)"$'ῖ3 
-ὐ! 'ἰ@ὶ+ ἀ!ό0"@$-2 -ὐCὲ @ώ>)-+'3.)  
287 Commentators seem not to be worried by this tension. Gauthier & Jolif 1970, Corcilius 
2008a and Pearson 2012 do not mention it. Bobonich (2009: 142-143, n. 27) does not notice it 
when he speaks of the passage. 
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directed towards a natural need (b9-11).288 Peculiar kinds of epithumia, however, are 
more sophisticated and seem to be characterized by a more specific content: an ap-
petite for such or such food, or an appetite for homosexual intercourse (b12). Simi-
larly, the kind of mistake one can make concerning each kind of appetite is not the 
same. Natural appetites can go wrong by excess, e.g. overeating, whereas peculiar 
appetites can go wrong in many different ways: one can have appetites for the 
wrong things, or excessive appetite for something, or one can enjoy things in the 
wrong way (1118b15-25). 
Now, Aristotle associates self-indulgence with peculiar appetites rather than 
with natural appetites. Self-indulgent people enjoy things one should not do as well 
as things one should; even the latter they enjoy more than they should (1118b25). 
By contrast, when he describes the proper object of akrasia haplôs, Aristotle is not 
very specific and is content to discuss pleasurable things related to food, drink and 
sex, without any further details. That he calls them 'necessary' shows that here he is 
more concerned with pleasurable things in the sense of natural appetites than in the 
sense of peculiar appetites (1147b23-28). So the idea is this: what Aristotle calls ep-
ithumia in book VII of the EN corresponds to the epithumia for natural things of EN 
III.11. It is a strictly non-rational desire, a raw impulse that is opposed to reason. It 
is characterized by a non-specific content. By contrast, the kind of desire of the ako-
lastos is a more sophisticated kind of appetite with a more specific content. This 
kind of subtle appetite involves a share of cognition which is more specific. It might 
even involve reason, insofar as reason is subordinate to it. The akratês does not have 
such a specific object of appetite. He might just be tempted by, say, an extra glass of 
wine. By contrast, the akolastos has no desire for wine in general, but for a specific 
type of wine, e.g. an excessive amount of Chateau Petrus. Hence, Aristotle does not 
call this kind of appetite epithumia in book VII, although this kind of desire is in-
deed a kind of epithumia insofar as its typical objects are pleasurable things. 
So, the kind of desire in play in an episode of akratic behaviour is epithumia, 
or more precisely, a kind of low-order epithumia which is opposed to reason and 
does not involve a specific content for a bodily pleasure, as is the case in akolasia. 
The reason for this difference in the content of each kind of appetite is certainly due 
to the fact that in the case of the akolastos the determination of the object of his de-
                                                      
288 Aristotle remarks that one might have a need for sex just to feel better and refers to a 
passage in the Iliad: "My child, how long wilt thou devour thine heart with weeping and 
sorrowing, and wilt take no thought of food, neither of the couch? Good were it for thee 
even to have dalliance in a woman's embrace." (Iliad 24.129-130; trans. Perseus) Here 'bed' 
('ὐ+ή) stands therefore for the need for sex, but in a moderate way. 
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sire is univocal, whereas in the case of the akratês, it is divided. There is a discrep-
ancy between the object of his appetite and his notion of what he ought to do. 
The third point of contrast between akrasia and akolasia confirms this first 
approximation and fosters a more fundamental explanation of the contrast. Aristo-
tle affirms that the akolastos is persuaded of what he does, while the akratês is not: 
67) "And since one [i.e. the akratês] is such as to pursue bodily pleas-
ures that are excessive and contrary to the correct reason, but not 
because he is persuaded he should, while the other [i.e. the akolas-
tos] is so persuaded, because he precisely is of such sort as to pur-
sue them, the former is easy to persuade that he should change his 
behaviour, the latter not." EN VII.8 1151a11-14 
ἐ,'ὶ C’ ὃ <ὲ+ $-2-ῦ$-3 -ἷ-3 <ὴ C2ὰ $ὸ ,','ῖ@&"2 C2ώ!'2+ $ὰ3 
!"&’ ὑ,')/-0ὴ+ !"ὶ ,")ὰ $ὸ+ ὀ)&ὸ+ 0ό5-+ @(<"$2!ὰ3 ἡC-+ά3, 
ὃ Cὲ ,έ,'2@$"2 C2ὰ $ὸ $-2-ῦ$-3 'ἶ+"2 -ἷ-3 C2ώ!'2+ "ὐ$ά3, ἐ!'ῖ+-3 
<ὲ+ -ὖ+ 'ὐ<'$ά,'2@$-3, -ὗ$-3 Cὲ -ὔ· 
The akratês is disposed in such a way that he tends to pursue bodily pleas-
ures excessively, but he is not persuaded that he should do so. The akolastos is per-
suaded that he should pursue excessive bodily pleasures, and the reason for his 
being so persuaded is merely that he is the kind of individual who will pursue the-
se kinds of pleasure. In other words, the reason for him to be so persuaded is his 
very own type of character (hoios; i.e. because he is of such sort).289 
Aristotle then develops a long argument in order to explain the apparent 
differences between the akratês and the akolastos. In doing so, he provides a defini-
tive answer to the fifth aporia whether the self-indulgent (akolastos) is better than the 
unself-controlled person (1146a31-b2): 
68) "For virtue and vice respectively preserves the starting point and 
corrupt it. And in the case of actions, the starting point is that for 
the sake of which, just as in mathematics it is the hypotheses. Nei-
ther in that case [i.e. in mathematics] it is reason that teaches the 
starting points, nor it is here [i.e. in the case of actions]. Rather, it 
is virtue, either natural or habituated, which is responsible for cor-
rect belief about the starting point. Thus, the temperate is of such 
character, whereas the self-indulgent is its contrary. But there is 
one type of agent which departs from the correct reason because 
of his affective state. His affective state controls him insofar as he 
does not act according to the correct reason, but it does not control 
him insofar as he is of such a sort that he is persuaded that he 
should pursue such pleasures [i.e. bodily pleasures] without re-
                                                      
289 See also EE 1220a12, where Aristotle denotes someone's character by using the qualitative 
relative pronoun; See also Irwin's glossary 1985: 319. 
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straint. This agent is the unself-controlled. He is better than the 
self-indulgent, nor is he bad without qualification, for <in his 
case> the best is preserved, namely the starting point." EN VII.8 
1151a15-26 (partly cited in text 32) 
(15) ἡ 5ὰ) ἀ)'$ὴ !"ὶ <-9&7)ί" $ὴ+ ἀ)9ὴ+ ἣ <ὲ+ >&'ί)'2 ἣ Cὲ 
@ῴ`'2, ἐ+ Cὲ $"ῖ3 ,)άN'@2 $ὸ -ὗ ἕ+'!" ἀ)9ή, ὥ@,') ἐ+ $-ῖ3 
<"&7<"$2!-ῖ3 "ἱ ὑ,-&έ@'23· -ὔ$' Cὴ ἐ!'ῖ ὁ 0ό5-3 C2C"@!"02!ὸ3 
$ῶ+ ἀ)9ῶ+ -ὔ$' ἐ+$"ῦ&", ἀ00’ ἀ)'$ὴ ἢ >8@2!ὴ ἢ ἐ&2@$ὴ $-ῦ 
ὀ)&-C-N'ῖ+ ,')ὶ $ὴ+ ἀ)9ή+. @ώ>)(+ <ὲ+ -ὖ+ ὁ (20) $-2-ῦ$-3, 
ἀ!ό0"@$-3 C’ ὁ ἐ+"+$ί-3. ἔ@$2 Cέ $23 C2ὰ ,ά&-3 ἐ!@$"$2!ὸ3 
,")ὰ $ὸ+ ὀ)&ὸ+ 0ό5-+, ὃ+ ὥ@$' <ὲ+ <ὴ ,)ά$$'2+ !"$ὰ $ὸ+ 
ὀ)&ὸ+ 0ό5-+ !)"$'ῖ $ὸ ,ά&-3, ὥ@$' C’ 'ἶ+"2 $-2-ῦ$-+ -ἷ-+ 
,','ῖ@&"2 C2ώ!'2+ ἀ+έC7+ C'ῖ+ $ὰ3 $-2"ύ$"3 ἡC-+ὰ3 -ὐ !)"$'ῖ· 
-ὗ$ό3 ἐ@$2+ ὁ ἀ!)"$ή3, /'0$ί(+ <ὢ+> $-ῦ (25) ἀ!-0ά@$-8, -ὐCὲ 
>"ῦ0-3 ἁ,0ῶ3· @ῴ`'$"2 5ὰ) $ὸ /έ0$2@$-+, ἡ ἀ)9ή. 
First Aristotle comes back to a general principle of his moral psychology. 
What determines the starting point in moral action is not reason but character. 
More accurately, if character is good, i.e. virtuous, the starting point is preserved, 
and if it is bad, i.e. vicious (mochthêros), the starting point is corrupted (in the sense 
of perverted). The distinction between the temperate and the self-indulgent is made 
on this basis only. The temperate has good starting points, whereas the self-
indulgent has bad ones. Then comes the case of the akratês. The akratês is such that 
he diverges from the orthos logos because of his pathos. His pathos controls him 
(kratei) so that he does not act according to the orthos logos, but it does not control 
him so much that he becomes persuaded that he should pursue such pleasures 
without restraint (anedên). The akratês is better than the akolastos and is not bad 
without qualification, because the best part, i.e. the principle, remains safe. 
This passage offers an elaboration of the psychology of the akratês. The fact 
that the akratês is not persuaded in what he is doing (i.e. the bad course of action) is 
explained by invoking the principle at stake in moral action (archê). The archê is the 
moral principle which an agent follows as the purpose of his action, i.e. the end, as I 
have argued in §4.3. The akratês possesses the right moral principles, and the dis-
crepancy between his principles and his actions shows that he does not believe in 
what he does. This also implies that the akratês suffers from a genuine conflict of 
motives between what he ought to do and what he desires to do. By contrast, the 
akolastos does not have the right moral principles, but perverted ones. His actions 
are in accordance with such principles and he is thereby persuaded of what he 
does. This comparison between the akolastos and the akratês reveals that the latter 
does not have a bad starting point. In other words, he does not consider a perverted 
starting point as the end of his action. 
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Having a representation of one's end stands then at the basis of the contrast 
between the akolastos and the akratês. Since the akolastos has a representation of the 
end he is promoting, his desire for what he intends to do is more determined than 
that of the akratês.290 Because he considers such an end and wants it for its own sake, 
the akolastos is persuaded that he ought to pursue it. Lastly, considering the end of 
what he intends to do also involves that he decides what he does, because the con-
tent of his decision is directed towards this end. By contrast, the akratês is consider-
ing a different end, which is a good one. His action is not directed towards any de-
termined purpose, nor is his desire for this action. Also, he does not decide what he 
does, nor is he persuaded that what he does is what he ought to do, because the 
description of the action he does is not subordinated to any higher order end.  
This contrast between the akolastos and the akratês also involves that the kind 
of desire proper to the akolastos is a sort of hybrid desire between epithumia and 
wish. On the one hand, the akolastos has epithumia for what he does, because of the 
nature of the object of his intention. On the other hand, his desire corresponds ra-
ther to wish (boulêsis), because it includes a description of an end. This confirms 
that in the case of akolasia the agent's desire and cognition of what he wants to do 
are in agreement, whereas in the akratic case there is a discrepancy between the 
two components. To put it succinctly, in the case of akrasia, cognition is less en-
gaged in the desiderative part of the soul than in the case of akolasia.291 
In order to clarify this distinction between akrasia and akolasia, one must con-
front a difficulty for my interpretation. According to passage 1151a15-26 (text 68), 
the akratês has correct starting points. Since, in my view, the starting point is given 
by virtue or vice (i.e. character), then the akratês has a good character. This means 
that he has been well habituated. However, as I have argued, Aristotle also speaks 
of akrasia as a hexis for excessive pleasure, in the same way as akolasia. This involves 
bad habituation, whereas if the akratês has good starting points, he must have been 
well habituated. But then how is it that he is prone to excessive responses towards 
                                                      
290 Even though the akolastos does not necessarily seek such an evil end qua evil. He can 
simply look to promote a morally wrong end qua advantageous to himself, with no regard 
for the moral value of such an end, see p. 180. 
291 This interpretation of the distinction between two kinds of epithumia should be able to 
account for Aristotle's remark that if the akolastos had epithumia on top of everything else, 
who knows what he would be capable of. I have no well-justified solution for this puzzle. 
My suggestion is that when Aristotle considers epithumia in the context of akrasia he has in 
mind the kind of low-order appetite. This kind of epithumia is so violent that it can over-
come the prescriptions of reason. As he does not associate such a violent desire with ako-
lasia, the thought occurs to him of what it would be, what the akolastos would be capable of, 
if he were subject to such an irrational desire. 
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pleasurable things? Hence my interpretation of akrasia as an excessive hexis towards 
appetite might be committed to the compromise that the akratês' (and the enkratês') 
habituation has been partly good and partly bad. Sometimes the akratês has been 
introduced to the right starting points, but at other times he has not been habituat-
ed well enough to internalize them fully. However, this explanation sounds rather 
ad hoc and is not satisfactory. For it does not account for why sometimes perform-
ing a certain type of action has led to valuing morally good ends, and sometimes it 
has led to valuing wrong ends. 
Maybe the appeal to the contrast between natural virtue and full virtue 
could be useful here. Natural virtue is an innate propensity to act in a morally good 
way. For instance, natural justice is the inclination to share one's goods equally. By 
contrast, full virtue adds the ability to spot correctly and reliably moral notions in 
the situation (i.e. specifications of moral principles): 'this is an instance of justice'. 
The fully virtuous agent regarding justice will then be in a position to know when it 
is appropriate to share goods equally and when it is not, and what 'equally' consists 
in. Accounting for akolasia suggests that the same kind of moral development is 
possible in the wrong way. Somebody could be habituated in such a way that he 
gets to value the wrong moral ends, for instance if his parents or teachers insist on 
telling him that sharing is less advantageous than keeping everything for oneself. 
Thus, such a badly habituated agent would develop into a person who tends to act 
unjustly, and who values such actions for themselves, as the ends of his activity. 
If one transposes this picture into the domain of bodily pleasure, it looks as 
if the akratês is in a relation to the akolastos which is analogous to the relation be-
tween the naturally just and the fully unjust person. The akolastos differs from the 
akratês precisely in that the former had had a more complete moral development. 
Due to his bad habituation the akolastos has come to value wrong ends. By contrast, 
the akratês would be closer to the naturally virtuous. He would probably have start-
ed his moral development, but would be on his way to full virtue. Typical behav-
iour for such an individual would be that he has the propensity to value things that 
cause bodily pleasure, such as food and drink (and maybe sex, depending on his 
age). However, he would not have benefited from the right habituation, thanks to 
which he would come to feel this kind of desire appropriately, that is, moderately. 
Or at least, he would not have benefited fully from such a habituation. The conse-
quence of this would be that this agent would be on his way to valuing the right 
principles and the correct ends, contrary to the akolastos. Yet, because of his incom-
plete moral development, he would still be prone to feeling attraction for pleasura-
ble things. 
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To sum up, when one considers the desiderative part of the soul, akrasia is a 
disposition of character which tends to excessive appetite for necessary pleasures. I 
consider that enkrateia is not different in this respect. However, they both differ 
from akolasia. As I have shown, akrasia and akolasia do not involve the same kind of 
desire. This difference seems to be due to the cognitive aspect of such kinds of de-
sire. The akratês' appetite does not include a description of the end at stake. It ap-
pears to be a rather low-order and primitive kind of appetite, whereas the appetite 
of the akolastos has a more specific content, which includes a description of the end. 
The cognitive side of the akolastos is in agreement with his desire, or appetite. Cor-
respondingly, he decides what he does and is convinced of it. By contrast, akrasia 
involves a tension between the cognitive side of the soul of the akratic agent and 
the desiderative side. Akrasia differs from akolasia precisely in this respect, insofar as 
in the case of akolasia, the agent does not suffer from such a discrepancy between 
his desire and his cognition. Hence, he does not decide what he does and is not 
convinced of it. Note that this account also concerns enkrateia. The enkratês suffers 
from the same kind of discrepancy between desire and reason and so enkrateia does 
not differ from akrasia in this respect (more on the enkratês at §6.4.3).  
The akratic agent does not feel an episode of appetite whose content is defi-
nite. Such epithumia is not directed towards a higher order end. Rather, the akratês 
seems to entertain a notion of a correct end. Even though his action turns out ulti-
mately to be wrong, he is aware of what he should have done. He knows what was 
the right end to pursue. Why then did he not stick to the correct end? What hap-
pened to drive him to perform a wrong action? In order to answer this question, 
Aristotle turns to the cognitive side of akratic behaviour. He makes this worry ex-
plicit by raising the first aporia. In the next section, I treat the cognitive side of akra-
sia.  
6.3 The cognitive side of practical thought 
Aristotle's discussion on the cognitive side of akrasia turns almost exclusive-
ly on the first aporia. The first statement of the aporia goes as follows: 
69) "But one might raise the problem: how is it possible that someone 
when having a correct grasp acts akratically?" 292 EN VII.2 1145b21-
22 
                                                      
292 There are two ways of understanding the aporia. The first reading insists on the very pos-
sibility of akrasia by connecting the pôs to akrateuetai: how is it possible for someone to act 
akratically although he has a correct grasp of what he should do (Gauthier & Jolif, Kenny 
1966: 164; Inwood & Woolf). This is the reading I have favoured. The other possible inter-
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Ἀ,-)ή@'2' C’ ἄ+ $23 ,ῶ3 ὑ,-0"</ά+(+ ὀ)&ῶ3 ἀ!)"$'ύ'$"ί $23. 
Akrasia is indeed regarded by common opinion as performing an action 
knowingly (eidôs) following one's affective state, in spite of knowing that such an 
action is a bad thing to do (EN VII.1 1145b11-13). This phenomenon is problematic, 
for it is at odds with another reputable opinion, represented primarily by Socrates 
that "no one acts contrary to what is best while grasping that he is doing so, but 
only because of ignorance".293 So, according to Socrates – at least, Socrates as under-
stood by Aristotle – if I grasp correctly what is best to do, it is impossible that I act 
against what I have judged being best. Correspondingly, if I have acted not follow-
ing what is best to do, then either I don't know what is best to do or I have an incor-
rect grasp of it.  
Aristotle's answer to the first aporia will be that the akratês has a cognitive 
state different from knowledge, which is less strong than knowledge, but which 
still implies that he is aware of what he is doing and that his action goes contrary to 
the orthos logos. Such an answer is the object of the whole EN VII.3. The main steps 
of Aristotle's argument are the following. Aristotle first introduces various ways to 
                                                                                                                                                        
pretation has it that 'pôs' bears on 'hupolambanôn orthôs', thus reading "in what sense does a 
person have a correct grasp when he behaves akratically?" According to that reading, Aris-
totle grants that aporia is a fact and attempts then to account for speaking of the akratês as 
knowing and not knowing at the same time without contradiction by focusing on the cogni-
tive state of the akratês. This is a less natural reading than if pôs bears on 'someone acts 
akratically', yet many scholars accept it (Broadie and Rowe, Irwin, Crisp, Cooper 2009: 33). 
My view is that Inwood and Woolf's reading is the right one, although the interrogation 
Aristotle is ultimately aiming at is the one highlighted by Broadie. In other words, Aristotle 
restates an interrogation on the possibility of akrasia into an interrogation about the cogni-
tive state that characterizes it. That Aristotle is eventually interested in the cognitive state is 
shown in what follows text (69). First, the statement of the aporia is followed by a short in-
vestigation on the kind of epistemic state at work in akrasia (exploring the horns of the di-
lemma). Aristotle first seems to grant Socrates that nothing can overwhelm epistêmê (EN 
VII.2 1145b22-31). So, he investigates other possible states the akratês might entertain, name-
ly doxa and phronêsis (although it turns out that neither doxa nor phronêsis will do as the cog-
nitive state of the akratês, 1145b31-1146a9). Moreover, the first lines of chapter 3, which un-
doubtedly is the chapter devoted to solve the first aporia, attest that Aristotle is interested in 
the cognitive state of the akratês: "First, then, we must investigate whether or not an akratic 
agent acts knowingly, and if so in what sense it is knowledge" – )ῶ$-+ <ὲ+ -ὖ+ @!',$έ-+ 
,ό$')-+ 'ἰCό$'3 ἢ -ὔ, !"ὶ ,ῶ3 'ἰCό$'3· 1146b8-9). Reading the first statement of the first 
aporia as questioning the possibility of akrasia is not incompatible with the second reading 
questioning its cognitive state. Indeed, raising the issue of the cognitive state of the akratês 
goes along challenging the very possibility of akratic behaviour. If there would not be an-
other kind of epistemic state than epistêmê, it would be true that akrasia is impossible. 
293 EN VII.2 1145b26-27: -ὐ&έ+" 5ὰ) ὑ,-0"</ά+-+$" ,)ά$$'2+ ,")ὰ $ὸ /έ0$2@$-+, ἀ00ὰ 
C2’ ἄ5+-2"+; See Plato Prot. 354c-7e; Leg. 860c-e, 751c. 
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speak of knowledge in order to show that in some definite way it is possible to 
speak of someone who 'acts against his knowledge' (1146b31-1147a10). The result of 
this part is the development of the logical structure of the practical argument simi-
lar to that introduced in EN VI. Aristotle then offers a description of the cognitive 
state proper to the akratês by comparing it to that of different kinds of people: 
someone drunk, someone asleep, etc. (1147a10-24). Aristotle's claim is that the 
akratês is in such a cognitive state that he knows and at the same time does not 
know what he should do. Finally, he gives a second description of the akratês' cog-
nitive state on the basis of the first two steps (1147a24-35). He applies the practical 
argument on the kind of quasi-knowledge introduced in the second part in order to 
offer a rigorous description of the akratês' cognitive state. It is hard to see what this 
description is because Aristotle's argument is pretty compact. However, I offer a 
reconstruction of it. In my view, the akratês' cognitive state suffers from a deficient 
knowledge of particulars. This fault is due to the sensitivity of the akratês to appe-
tite, which impairs his view of what is going on. As a result, the akratês is incapable 
of adequately connecting his knowledge of the end with his awareness of the situa-
tion. 
This chapter has received much scholarship.294 The various interpretations 
of Aristotle's notion of akrasia are so much in conflict with one another that before I 
give my own interpretation of the akratês' cognitive state, I first want to settle the 
textual issues by giving a careful reading of the chapter. I shall then come back to 
the most significant passages in order to give my interpretation of the cognitive 
state of the akratês. 
6.3.1 Knowledge as an argument 
Aristotle tackles the question of the cognitive state of the akratês at 1146b24 
and following. In order to come to an account of the akratês' cognitive state, the first 
step is to recall the structure of the practical argument developed in EN VI. In order 
to do so, Aristotle explores various ways in which it is possible to say that someone 
acts contrary to how he knows he should act.  
His first move, at 1146b24-31, is to settle the question whether the cognitive 
state of the akratês can be related to specific states such as epistêmê or doxa. He dis-
cusses and refutes the position of those who explain akrasia by alleging that the 
state opposing desire for pleasurable things is not epistêmê but true doxa (a position 
first mentioned at 1145b31-35). Aristotle's argument relies on the fact that a doxa can 
                                                      
294 See e.g. Robinson 1955; Santas 1969; Hardie 1968; Dahl 1984, part II; Bostock 2000, chap. 
6; Moss 2008; Pickavé and Whiting 2008; Charles 2009. 
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be held with more or less confidence. He observes that some people have so much 
confidence in their doxa (although they are obviously wrong) that they will not act 
against it, exactly as in the case of epistêmê. Therefore, distinguishing between doxa 
and epistêmê in order to account for the cognitive state of the akratês is of no use. 
This shows that the state Aristotle is after cannot simply be the common notions of 
doxa or epistêmê. He needs to inquire further into the matter. 
Then, at 1146b31-35, Aristotle tackles epistêmê. He introduces a distinction 
between two meanings of knowing which puts him on the track to a sense of know-
ing compatible with akrasia. 
70) "But since we speak of knowing (epistasthai) in two ways – for 
knowing can be said either of the one who has knowledge without 
using it, or of the one who uses it – there will be, on the one hand, 
the one who has what one should not do but does not attend to it, 
and, on the other hand, the one who attends to it295. For this latter 
case seems strange, while if one does not attend to it, it is not 
strange." EN VII.3 1146b31-35 
ἀ00’ ἐ,'ὶ C29ῶ3 0έ5-<'+ $ὸ ἐ,ί@$"@&"2 (!"ὶ 5ὰ) ὁ ἔ9(+ <ὲ+ -ὐ 
9)ώ<'+-3 Cὲ $ῇ ἐ,2@$ή<ῃ !"ὶ ὁ 9)ώ<'+-3 0έ5'$"2 ἐ,ί@$"@&"2), 
C2-ί@'2 $ὸ ἔ9-+$" <ὲ+ <ὴ &'()-ῦ+$" Cὲ !"ὶ $ὸ &'()-ῦ+$" ἃ <ὴ 
C'ῖ ,)ά$$'2+ [$-ῦ ἔ9-+$" !"ὶ &'()-ῦ+$"]· (35) $-ῦ$- 5ὰ) C-!'ῖ 
C'2+ό+, ἀ00’ -ὐ! 'ἰ <ὴ &'()ῶ+. 
There are two ways of having epistêmê: having it while using it, and having 
it without using it. This distinction corresponds to the potential/actual distinction 
of the DA between knowledge one potentially has, and knowledge that one is actu-
ally using. Indeed, 'theôrein' is the term Aristotle uses when he contrasts actual use 
of intellectual cognition with potential use (DA II.1 412a10; 417a28-29; see also Meta. 
IX.6 1048a34-35; Phys. VIII.4 255a34, b2).296 Besides, Aristotle has already drawn 
such a distinction in the Eudemian treatment of voluntary action (EE 1225b11-12). 
Aristotle then reformulates this distinction by applying it to a practical or moral 
case. There are two ways of speaking of someone who knows what he should not do 
(ha mê dei prattein): either he has this knowledge of what he should not do without 
'attending' (theôrounta) to it, or he has it while attending to it. Aristotle remarks that 
only one case is strange (deinos): the case where the agent is indeed attending to 
what he should not do. Obviously, the strange case implies that the agent both has 
                                                      
295 Omitting $-ῦ ἔ9-+$" !"ὶ &'()-ῦ+$", along with the OCT. 
296 See also Bostock 2000: 126 and Charles 2009: 45, who refer to the same distinction in Pla-
to's Theaetetus as the source for Aristotle's distinction. 
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and attends to what he should not do but nevertheless acts contrary to his 
knowledge. 
In this passage, Aristotle has shown a simple case in which one might act 
against one's knowledge. This shows that it would not be strange at all for someone 
to act against one's knowledge if he 'knows' in this passive sense, i.e. when he is not 
paying attention. In general, I know how to spell the word 'Socrates', but in this 
case I have spelled it wrong because I was not paying attention. Yet, apparently this 
case of acting against one's knowledge is not what Aristotle is looking for. A signif-
icant feature of the akratês is that he acts knowingly. It would be strange then if 
akrasia were explained by a cognitive state which corresponds to absent-
mindedness.297 Hence, Aristotle continues his investigation. 
In the passage immediately following, Aristotle refines the case where it is 
possible to act against one's knowledge. 
71) "Further, since there are two modes of propositions, having both 
will not prevent acting against one's knowledge when using the 
universal one, but not the particular. For things we act on (prakta) 
are the particulars. But there is also a difference with the univer-
sal. One is about oneself [i.e. the subject]; the other is about the ob-
ject (pragma). E.g., 'dry food is healthy for every men', and 'one is 
oneself a man', or 'such and such is dry food'. But that 'this is 
such-and-such', either he does not have it or does not use it. Then, 
considering these ways of knowing, it makes such an important 
difference that knowing in one way seems not strange [i.e. when 
the agent is acting counter to his knowledge], but amazing in the 
other way." EN VII.3 1146b35-1147a10 
(35) ἔ$2 ἐ,'ὶ Cύ- (1147a) $)ό,-2 $ῶ+ ,)-$ά@'(+, ἔ9-+$" <ὲ+ 
ἀ<>-$έ)"3 -ὐCὲ+ !(0ύ'2 ,)ά$$'2+ ,")ὰ $ὴ+ ἐ,2@$ή<7+, 
9)ώ<'+-+ <έ+$-2 $ῇ !"&ό0-8 ἀ00ὰ <ὴ $ῇ !"$ὰ <έ)-3· ,)"!$ὰ 
                                                      
297 Some commentators deny that Aristotle is here alluding to the same contrast as the po-
tential/actual one because it seems to involve that the agent is not consciously aware of 
what he is doing, and this would go against the presumption that the akratês experiences a 
genuine conflict of motives. Instead, another way to make sense of the distinction is be-
tween merely having knowledge and acting on this knowledge (Broadie 1991: 292-297). 
However, this interpretation is not convincing. Aristotle's terminology is clear enough (see 
Bostock 2000: 126, Charles 2009: 45) and there is no need to attribute him a more tortuous 
reading when this straightforward one will do. Another way to deal with this worry would 
be to claim that when Aristotle speaks of having but not using knowledge he refers to the 
impetuous akratês, not to the weak akratês, i.e. the one who properly suffers from a genuine 
conflict of motives (Dahl 1984: 203). I do not agree with this later explanation. As I shall 
argue below, this passage is just a preparatory step towards the account of the cognitive 
state of the akratês. It does not deal with akrasia itself. Thus, the objection that here the con-
trast is not about the potential/actual distinction does not hold. 
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5ὰ) $ὰ !"&’ ἕ!"@$". C2">έ)'2 Cὲ !"ὶ $ὸ !"&ό0-8· $ὸ <ὲ+ 5ὰ) 
ἐ>’ ἑ"8$-ῦ (5) $ὸ C’ ἐ,ὶ $-ῦ ,)ά5<"$ό3 ἐ@$2+· -ἷ-+ ὅ$2 ,"+$ὶ 
ἀ+&)ώ,ῳ @8<>έ)'2 $ὰ N7)ά, !"ὶ ὅ$2 "ὐ$ὸ3 ἄ+&)(,-3, ἢ ὅ$2 
N7)ὸ+ $ὸ $-2ό+C'· ἀ00’ 'ἰ $όC' $-2ό+C', ἢ -ὐ! ἔ9'2 ἢ -ὐ! ἐ+')5'ῖ· 
!"$ά $' Cὴ $-ύ$-83 C2-ί@'2 $-ὺ3 $)ό,-83 ἀ<ή9"+-+ ὅ@-+, ὥ@$' 
C-!'ῖ+ -ὕ$( <ὲ+ 'ἰCέ+"2 <7Cὲ+ ἄ$-,-+, ἄ00(3 Cὲ (10) 
&"8<"@$ό+. 
Aristotle distinguishes between two 'modes' of propositions (duo tropoi tôn 
protaseôn): the universal and the particular.298 The syntax compels to consider that 
the agent is concerned with both the universal and the particular proposition at the 
same time. Aristotle does not consider one case when the agent is entertaining only 
a universal proposition and a distinct case when the agent is entertaining a particu-
lar one. Aristotle's point then is that it is possible to act against one's knowledge in 
the case when two conditions are met: (1) one has both the universal and the par-
ticular protaseis, and (2) one is using the universal but not the particular. Had the 
agent been attending to the particular proposition, he would not have acted against 
his knowledge. If he had, this would have been a strange, or even an amazing 
(thaumaston) case. Aristotle does not consider the case where the agent does not 
have (or does not use) the universal proposition; rather, he specifies that what var-
ies is the awareness one can have of the particular proposition (tode toionde). 
Aristotle then gives an example to clarify his point. He summons a universal 
principle: 'Dry food benefits all men'. He notes that two different kinds of universal 
can be distinguished, one concerning the subject (one is oneself a man), the other 
concerning the object (dry is such and such). Both these propositions are specifica-
tions of the original one. Charles notes that from these three the agent can infer the 
following propositions: 'Dry food benefits me', and 'Things of such and such quali-
ty benefit me' (Charles 2009: 47). By contrast, the reference to the particular proposi-
tion is very brief. This proposition should be of the form 'this is such and such' 
(probably implicating 'this thing here is of such quality as dry things are'). I under-
stand the occurrence of many universal propositions as Aristotle's explanation of 
what it is to have and to use the universal (echein kai energein). Using the universal 
proposition means that he can insert it into a set of propositions by making infer-
ences. The agent does not consider a single proposition without further thought, 
but is actively considering it, namely by thinking of it and of its implications. 
                                                      
298 'Modes' of propositions refer to the way propositions can be presented. They can be pre-
sented depending on their grammatical form or according to their function. In this case, the 
two kinds of proposition differ grammatically and according to their function in the argu-
ment (See Charles 2009: 47). 
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Aristotle's point here is that 'epistêmê' in this context consists of two types of 
propositions, a universal one and a particular one. What Aristotle is developing is a 
notion of knowledge as an argument. To know what one should do does not depend 
merely on grasping the truth of a proposition. Rather, it depends on making the 
right connections between the various beliefs one has about a subject matter. And 
Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of such beliefs that enter in an episode of 
knowledge, a universal and a particular one. This kind of knowledge can be evalu-
ated according to this framework. This structure is very similar to what I have de-
veloped in my analysis of EN VI.7 (§3.3.2.3). There I have argued that Aristotle sets 
up a logical device similar to a syllogism in order to have a framework for the eval-
uation of practical thought, an evaluation which can be moral or epistemic. Here 
Aristotle recalls the same device, having in view the evaluation of practical thought 
in the case of akrasia. Aristotle is therefore introducing a further way to evaluate 
practical thought. In the case of the phronimos, the agent is said to have both univer-
sal and particular knowledge. I have also argued that an agent may fall short of 
having practical knowledge in various ways. He might lack the correct universal 
proposition, as in the case of the vicious agent who entertains a principle which is 
morally wrong. He might also have the correct moral principle, while lacking an 
appropriate particular proposition which ties this principle adequately to the situa-
tion (for instance the case of the simple deliberator at 1142b17-26, §3.3.2.1). Here by 
contrast, the agent does not altogether lack either of these components. Rather, he 
does not fully have the particular component. 
One reason to see a reference to the structure of practical knowledge of EN 
VI.7 is the terminological proximity. Aristotle recalls that "what we act on (ta prakta) 
is the particular". This assertion is very close to EN VI.7 1141b14-23, where he ar-
gued that "one should also know the particulars, for phronêsis is practical (praktikê) 
and action (praxis) is about particulars" (1141b14-16, text 27). There Aristotle made 
the point that knowledge of particular is necessary for efficient action or for suc-
cessful action. The point Aristotle is making here is not exactly the same, but it re-
lies on the same logical structure. The explanation of an action will also depend on 
the way in which the agent is aware of the particulars. 
It is by the way puzzling that Aristotle keeps talking of epistêmê even though 
he has made clear in Book VI that epistêmê is not concerned with the practical. But it 
is clear from the context that one should not understand epistêmê in its technical 
Aristotelian sense. Here Aristotle is explicitly connecting epistêmê and other normal-
ly theoretical terms with praxis: He speaks of 'considering what one should not do' 
(to theôrounta ha mê dei prattein). A reason for the use of the term epistêmê could be 
that in this chapter Aristotle is answering the Socratic position about akrasia, and is 
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therefore using the same terminology as Socrates (or Plato in the Theaetetus). An-
other explanation could be that Aristotle has not come to a fixed terminology in 
order to account for the cognitive state of the akratês. We can see this at 1146b24-31, 
commented on above, when Aristotle is dealing with the contrast doxa/epistêmê. It 
makes no difference whether one attributes strong doxa or epistêmê to the akratês, 
since strong doxa behaves in the same way as epistêmê. In both cases, it seems that it 
is impossible to act akratically. Hence, Aristotle needs to account for the akratic cog-
nitive state in a different way. This is what he will do in the rest of EN VII.3. He is 
looking for a cognitive state which is weaker than epistêmê, and which is a kind of 
weak doxa. This would explain why in this chapter he uses epistêmê and doxa indif-
ferently. Aristotle looks for an approximation of such a state starting from epistêmê 
used in a generic way (1146b31-1147a24) and then connects this state to doxa 
(1147a24-b19).299 
The specification of the alternative at a7 'ouk echei ê ouk energei' could be tak-
en as a sign that here Aristotle already considers that there are two distinct types of 
akratês. A first case would be that the agent has the universal proposition, but does 
not have the particular one altogether (ouk echei), and acts against the principle 
specified in the universal one. There would be a second case in which the agent has 
the major premise and is using it, and also has the minor proposition but does not 
use it (ouk energei). Scholars have sometimes identified these two cases with the two 
different kinds of akratic agent, the weak and the impulsive akratês (see note 259).300 
                                                      
299 Charles understand epistêmê here to refer to "grasping some specific truth within a body 
of knowledge" (Charles 2009: 45-46). According to him, Aristotle is already conceiving 
'knowledge' as involving reasoning, i.e. an argumentative structure. This reading of epistêmê 
makes it possible to distinguish between 'knowing' in a simple sense as entertaining a single 
proposition (which Charles connects with eidenai) and 'knowing' in a strong sense as enter-
taining a proposition as part of a body of knowledge (epistêmê). Thus, an akratic agent might 
still eidenai that P, while he does not epistasthai that P (see Charles 2009: 48-49). However, 
this suggestion does not take in account the fact that here Aristotle is starting his inquiry 
from the Socratic point of view. Why would Aristotle have such a technical understanding 
of epistêmê from the outset? I take it rather that in this passage the meaning of epistêmê is 
simply 'knowing' in general as a generic name for any kind of cognitive state. Charles' mo-
tivation for such an interpretation is that in his view this passage is already about the 
akratês' knowledge. Thus, Charles wants to make the point on the basis of text (71) that the 
akratês acts knowingly at the very moment of action, which has been denied since Albert the 
Great. Still, if one considers that in this section Aristotle is not dealing with akrasia, nothing 
prompts us to adopt this view. The way the akratês has and does not have knowledge at the 
same time, i.e. the kind of knowledge that shows that the akratês is acting consciously, is 
introduced later at 1147a10ff. 
300 E.g., Robinson 1955: 263; Hardie 1968: 277; Bostock 2000: 129 holds that the account at 
1146b35-1147a10 is the same as that given at 1147a24-35. 
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The two kinds differ in that the latter has not deliberated and acts on his raw im-
pulsion, whereas the former has deliberated about what he should do but does not 
stick to the conclusion of his deliberation (EN VII.7 1150a19-28). The weak akratês 
would correspond to the agent who has but does not use the minor premise, while 
the impulsive akratês would be the one who lacks the minor proposition altogether. 
If one considers that at 1147a10 Aristotle is introducing something new, as I shall 
argue below, the impulsive akratês corresponds rather to having the particular 
proposition without using it, while the weak akratês is the one who has the particu-
lar proposition without really knowing it, i.e. without tying it to the principle. The 
agent who does not have the minor proposition altogether does not match any case 
of akrasia, and is not even relevant for action. Thus only one type of akratês, the im-
pulsive type, is acting unknowingly. This also preserves in part Aristotle's claims 
on the conflict of motives in the akratês' soul insofar as only the weak akratês is sub-
ject to such a conflict.301 
So, how far advanced are we in the determination of the akratic cognitive 
state? My assumption is that at 1146b31-1147a10 Aristotle is merely preparing the 
ground for his treatment of akrasia. He imports the framework of EN VI.7 in order 
to show under which conditions one might act against one's knowledge. However, 
this framework concerns practical thought as a whole and is not specific to akrasia. 
Interpreting 1146b31-1147a10 as a first account of akrasia saddles Aristotle with a 
disappointing conception because it does not account for the akratês internal conflict 
of motives. The contrast between having vs. having and using knowledge in terms 
of potential and actual knowledge cannot account for the akratic cognitive state. It 
would mean that the akratês is not consciously aware of what he is doing. The 
akratês would act as he does because he would not be paying attention to the par-
ticular circumstances of the situation. Moreover, in this passage, Aristotle does not 
go into the details of what kind of cognitive defect the akratês specifically is suffer-
ing from. He does not even mention the akratês. The first explicit occurrence of akra-
sia is at 1147a17. Rather, I contend that at 1147a10ff. Aristotle introduces a further 
way of knowing without knowing, and that his kind of half-knowledge is that of 
the akratês. 
                                                      
301 Charles has argued for an even more optimistic view about akrasia. According to him, 
even the impulsive akratês is conscious of the object of his action and what he is doing. He 
identifies passage 1146b35-1141a10 with a first account of akrasia, concerning impulsive 
akrasia (Charles 2009: 49). 
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6.3.2 Akratic knowledge revealed 
Practical knowledge depends on making the right connection between vari-
ous beliefs about a subject matter. In the previous section, I argued that Aristotle 
introduces different ways in which the agent might fall short of establishing these 
connections. At 1147a10-24, Aristotle introduces a further way of lacking full 
knowledge, expressed by the phrase 'somehow having and not having knowledge'. 
This way of having knowledge in my view is the one that the akratês also has.  
72) "Furthermore, there is another way to have knowledge for human 
beings than those just mentioned. For by having <knowledge> 
while not using it we see a distinct state which is like having and 
not having <knowledge>, like the man asleep, the madman or the 
drunk. But thus disposed are those affected by passions. Episodes 
of spirit and erotic desires and some other things of the same sort 
manifestly change even the body, and even drive some people 
mad. So obviously we must say of the akratês people that they are 
disposed in a similar way as they [i.e. passionate people] are." 
1147a10-18 
(10) ἔ$2 $ὸ ἔ9'2+ $ὴ+ ἐ,2@$ή<7+ ἄ00-+ $)ό,-+ $ῶ+ +ῦ+ 
ῥ7&έ+$(+ ὑ,ά)9'2 $-ῖ3 ἀ+&)ώ,-23· ἐ+ $ῷ 5ὰ) ἔ9'2+ <ὲ+ <ὴ 
9)ῆ@&"2 Cὲ C2">έ)-8@"+ ὁ)ῶ<'+ $ὴ+ ἕN2+, ὥ@$' !"ὶ ἔ9'2+ ,(3 
!"ὶ <ὴ ἔ9'2+, -ἷ-+ $ὸ+ !"&'ύC-+$" !"ὶ <"2+ό<'+-+ !"ὶ 
-ἰ+(<έ+-+. ἀ00ὰ <ὴ+ -ὕ$( C2"$ί&'+$"2 -ἵ 5' ἐ+ (15) $-ῖ3 
,ά&'@2+ ὄ+$'3· &8<-ὶ 5ὰ) !"ὶ ἐ,2&8<ί"2 ἀ>)-C2@ί(+ !"ὶ ἔ+2" 
$ῶ+ $-2-ύ$(+ ἐ,2Cή0(3 !"ὶ $ὸ @ῶ<" <'&2@$ᾶ@2+, ἐ+ί-23 Cὲ !"ὶ 
<"+ί"3 ,-2-ῦ@2+. Cῆ0-+ -ὖ+ ὅ$2 ὁ<-ί(3 ἔ9'2+ 0'!$έ-+ $-ὺ3 
ἀ!)"$'ῖ3 $-ύ$-23.  
Aristotle introduces a further way to have knowledge. In my view, the eti 
marks off a new step in the development which has not yet been treated.302 This 
new way of knowing seems to be a special case of the kinds of knowing which have 
been introduced so far, which Aristotle has called 'having knowledge without using 
it'. This seems to be shown by the preposition en at 1147a11: the new way of know-
ing is 'in' the category of having without using knowledge (en tô gar echein men 
chrêsthai). Aristotle tries to frame this new way of knowing by describing the behav-
iour of some kinds of person. Having knowledge without using it, which Aristotle 
calls 'somehow having and not having knowledge' (echein pôs kai mê echein), is the 
kind of awareness displayed by someone asleep or someone mad or someone 
                                                      
302 This is also Charles' reading (2009: 49), along with many translators: Ross, Irwin, Rowe, 
Crisp, and Inwood & Woolf. According to Dahl (1984: 203 with n. 27), however, this kind of 
knowledge corresponds to the previous description of having knowledge without using it. 
Aristotle would not be introducing a different way of having knowledge without having it. 
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drunk. He then groups in the same kind of cognitive state people who are affected 
by passions (en tois pathesin ontes), i.e. thumos or erotic appetites, and he ends up 
associating them with akratic people. The kind of cognitive state of the akratês 
would thus be a sort of half-knowing similar to that of people sleeping, mad or 
drunk. 
Aristotle then adds what could appear as the answer to a possible objection: 
73)  "The fact that <the akrateis> say arguments which flow from 
knowledge is not even a mark <that they are in their right mind>, 
for people under the influence of passions, too, can utter demon-
strations and verses of Empedocles, and beginners in learning can 
connect the arguments together, yet they know nothing. They 
must have made these second nature to themselves, but this re-
quires time. So we must suppose that the akratic people utter 
words the way actors do." EN VII.3 1147a18-24 
$ὸ Cὲ 0έ5'2+ $-ὺ3 0ό5-83 $-ὺ3 ἀ,ὸ $ῆ3 ἐ,2@$ή<73 -ὐCὲ+ 
@7<'ῖ-+· !"ὶ 5ὰ) -ἱ ἐ+ $-ῖ3 ,ά(20) &'@2 $-ύ$-23 ὄ+$'3 ἀ,-C'ίN'23 
!"ὶ ἔ,7 0έ5-8@2+ Ἐ<,'C-!0έ-83, !"ὶ -ἱ ,)ῶ$-+ <"&ό+$'3 
@8+'ί)-8@2 <ὲ+ $-ὺ3 0ό5-83, ἴ@"@2 C’ -ὔ,(· C'ῖ 5ὰ) @8<>8ῆ+"2, 
$-ῦ$- Cὲ 9)ό+-8 C'ῖ$"2· ὥ@$' !"&ά,') $-ὺ3 ὑ,-!)2+-<έ+-83, 
-ὕ$(3 ὑ,-07,$έ-+ 0έ5'2+ !"ὶ $-ὺ3 ἀ!)"$'8-<έ+-83.  
The objection seems to be that in some cases akratic people do indeed show 
something like knowledge in a strong sense (epistêmê) in spite of being in their con-
dition, because they are able to speak the kind of reasoning proper to various areas 
of knowledge or science. Aristotle compares them to people subject to passion who 
can nevertheless perform demonstrations or recite verses of Empedocles, or to 
young students who can remember arguments and repeat them. Aristotle answers 
that this appearance is deceptive because even though they seem to be able of such 
performances, they do not in fact know. The reason is that genuinely knowing such 
things requires having made such demonstrations or arguments one's own and this 
takes a lot of time. Aristotle seems then to assimilate the apparent knowledge of 
akratês people and of other kinds of people with mindless recitation, with uttering 
words without really understanding their meaning. Eventually, he compares the 
situation of akratic people to that of actors, implying that they are like people recit-
ing a text that they have learned by heart without much understanding of its mean-
ing. 
One might feel somewhat uneasy with this passage. Indeed, it groups peo-
ple together who exhibit quite different kinds of behaviour. People such as the man 
asleep, the madman or the drunk are put in the same group as people subject to 
passions and akratic people, and even young students and actors. Against this, one 
could attribute to each of these kinds of people a different way of knowing. Appar-
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ently, one cannot say that people asleep or mad know in the same way as people 
subject to their passions. One could say convincingly that the latter know 'better' 
than the former, not even mentioning young students who seem to have come to a 
certain degree of expertise of their subject matter even if they do not understand 
every implication of it.  
I contend that here Aristotle is not that clear about the kind of awareness re-
quired for each kind of people: being asleep is a simple case of knowing potentially 
(and even of knowing according to first potentiality if one applies the distinction 
between first and second actuality of DA 417a21-b2), whereas the young student's 
lack of knowledge seems quite different. Aristotle's point here is merely that there 
is a different way of having and not having knowledge than that of knowing in 
potentiality. However, he has not determined what this kind of knowledge precise-
ly consists in yet (he will do this in the next section of EN VII.3). A sign of this is the 
mention of the mad person and of the drunk one. Concerning the mad person, Aris-
totle does not specify what kind of madness he is referring to, whether a deep in-
fatuation or straightforward insanity. The phrase that thumos and erotic epithumia 
can "even drive some people mad" (eniois de kai manias poiousin 1147a 16-17) sug-
gests that madness allows of degrees. According to one's level of madness, one 
could then tend to associate someone who is deeply infatuated with the case of the 
young student, while one would rather group someone who is totally beside him-
self with the person asleep. The same holds for being drunk. Charles argues that 
Aristotle's choice of word is not arbitrary and that by oinômenos, he means someone 
lightly drunk, 'tipsy drunk' (Charles 2009: 50). But one could also very well consid-
er the case of someone dead drunk (methuon), who would be closer to the man 
asleep (cognitively, but also physically...). 
In my view, the crucial point of 1147a10-24 is that there are people like the 
drunk, the young student, or even to some extent the sleeper (think of cases of sleep 
talking), who show marks of knowledge but who fall short of having genuine 
knowledge because they do not really understand what they say. People affected 
by passions do not really attend to the logoi they are saying. Beginners do not really 
understand the demonstrations they make, because really making such demonstra-
tions one's own takes time. Even actors do not really believe in what they say.  
The kind of knowledge alluded to is always a chain of propositions, in other 
words, an argument (logos). What people in passion cannot do is attend closely to 
their logoi, whether they are demonstrations or verses of Empedocles. In both cases, 
these are not bare propositions, but complex logoi. This confirms that 'acting against 
one's knowledge' involves a complex piece of knowledge, and that Aristotle is go-
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ing to use this when he finally attempts a description of the cognitive state of the 
akratês. 
Hence, the akratês will similarly hold various propositions, either universal 
or particular, but not in a strong way. This passage is the first explicit reference to 
the akratês. Thus, in this passage, Aristotle develops the kind of knowledge of 
akratês people. It is 'having and not having' knowledge. This means that the person 
who shows such knowledge is – at the very least – potentially knowing that P (the 
sleeper, the dead drunk). He is aware of what he is saying (like the young student 
or the tipsy-drunk), but in any case he does not understand what he is saying.303 
6.3.3 The physical account 
So far in EN VII.3, Aristotle has been interested in different cognitive states 
and in how it is possible to have knowledge partially and to act against it. At 
1147a10-24 he also offered a description of the kind of cognitive state the akratês is 
in. But then the tone changes. Aristotle announces an account from a 'physical' 
point of view (phusikôs). 
What characterizes this 'physical' approach is first of all a terminology more 
proper to Aristotle's psychology. The universal protasis is called a doxa, whereas 
what provides the particular protasis is sense-perception (aisthêsis). Next, there is an 
occurrence of epithumia in the account of akratic behaviour (1147a33). Apparently, 
then, the physical point of view (phusikôs) is an account that connects knowledge to 
psychological notions as they appear in the De Anima. Indeed, the DA is a part of 
Aristotle's treatises on natural science (phusikê epistêmê). Moreover, the term phus-
ikôs refers to a kind of account which appeals to an explanatory principle (or cause, 
aition 1147a25), which should be specific or appropriate to the subject matter. 
Commentators agree that this principle is the cause of movement in rational ani-
mals.304 Pickavé and Whiting have observed in addition that one sometimes find 
'physical explanations' in other areas of Aristotle's thought than the natural scienc-
es. The point of the explanation would then be not the area of knowledge con-
cerned, but the degree of appropriateness of the principle. Sometimes, an explana-
                                                      
303 See Dahl 1984: 210 for a similar interpretation of the kind of knowledge displayed by the 
akratês. 
304 Bostock 2000: 127; Pickavé & Whiting 2008: 347-348; Charles 2009: 51-52. From the men-
tion of the physical point of view, Pickavé and Whiting see a sign that one should fill in the 
feminine pronouns hê at 1147a24ff. with doxa instead of protasis (see note 287). However, it 
seems to me that even without this, the change towards a more naturalist tone is sufficiently 
perceptible. 
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tion can be too 'logical' because it is too abstract, and sometimes the explanation is 
too specific (see Pickavé & Whiting 2008: 347-348).305 
In my view, Aristotle is here developing his technical account of the cogni-
tive state of the akratês. He makes use of the practical argument and applies it to the 
kind of 'knowing without knowing' he has sketched in the previous lines of EN 
VII.3. Correspondingly, the former section of EN VII.3 stands in opposition to this 
physical account as the 'logical' account, which omits the mention of an appropriate 
explanatory principle. 
In the physical account, Aristotle first presents a standard case of practical 
reasoning: 
74) "Further, one can also look at the cause in the way of natural phi-
losophy. One <proposition> is a universal opinion306; the other is 
about the particulars, which are themselves given by sense-
perception. When one <proposition>307 comes about from these, 
then necessarily the soul there speaks the conclusion, while in the 
productive case it acts immediately. For instance, if 'one should 
eat everything sweet', and 'this is sweet' is one of the particulars, 
necessarily someone who is able and not prevented will perform 
this at the same time." EN VII.3 1147a24-31 
ἔ$2 !"ὶ ὧC' >8@2!ῶ3 ἄ+ $23 ἐ,2/0έm'2' (25) $ὴ+ "ἰ$ί"+. ἣ <ὲ+ 
5ὰ) !"&ό0-8 CόN", ἡ C’ ἑ$έ)" ,')ὶ $ῶ+ !"&’ ἕ!"@$ά ἐ@$2+, ὧ+ 
"ἴ@&7@23 ἤC7 !8)ί"· ὅ$"+ Cὲ <ί" 5έ+7$"2 ἐN "ὐ$ῶ+, ἀ+ά5!7 $ὸ 
@8<,')"+&ὲ+ ἔ+&" <ὲ+ >ά+"2 $ὴ+ m89ή+, ἐ+ Cὲ $"ῖ3 ,-27$2!"ῖ3 
,)ά$$'2+ 'ὐ&ύ3· -ἷ-+, 'ἰ ,"+$ὸ3 508!έ-3 5'ύ'@&"2 C'ῖ, $-8$ὶ Cὲ 
508!ὺ ὡ3 (30) ἕ+ $2 $ῶ+ !"&’ ἕ!"@$-+, ἀ+ά5!7 $ὸ+ C8+ά<'+-+ 
!"ὶ <ὴ !(08ό<'+-+ ἅ<" $-ῦ$- !"ὶ ,)ά$$'2+.  
The details of the text are difficult. I assume as a basic methodological prin-
ciple that Aristotle has remained sketchy in his text and that one should not expect 
                                                      
305 What cause is Aristotle speaking of? My contention is that the cause he is alluding to here 
is non-rational desire (epithumia), as indicated in §6.2. 
306 I read the pronoun hê as referring to an implicit protasis, as favoured by Burnet 1900: 302, 
and Gauthier & Jolif 1970: 610, instead of 'the opinion on the one hand is universal'. See note 
288. 
307 Literally, there is one thing (feminine) that comes from two other things (feminine). Here 
and in the rest of 1147a24-35, we find many feminine pronouns with no clear reference. I 
follow Charles in seeing references to protasis. The last feminine noun relevant for this con-
text was protasis at 1147a1. Indeed, there in the first case when Aristotle speaks of the practi-
cal argument, protasis is always implied. It would be natural to expect the same in the pre-
sent context, where Aristotle applies the practical argument to his moral psychology (see 
Charles 2009: 55-56). This is also consistent with my reading of 1143a35 at §5.2.2.2. Against 
this reading some commentators supplement mia with doxa (Ross , Irwin, see Bostock 2000, 
128, n. 17; Pickavé & Whiting 2008: 350ff.). 
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too much from the terminology. This will be helpful in arriving at a natural reading 
of the rest of the passage. Here, the example offers a basic understanding of the 
passage. The case seems to be this: a subject considers a universal proposition de-
scribing a type of action; he also considers a particular proposition which instanti-
ates what is described by the universal proposition. And the result of this kind of 
reasoning is an action (prattein) the content of which consists in the application of 
the universal proposition to the particular one. One can summarize this content in 
the form of an argument: 
One should taste every sweet thing. 
This is sweet. 
Therefore, I taste this (where 'I taste this' is allegedly the action of 
tasting the particular sweet). 
Aristotle then considers a different case: 
75) "When a first universal proposition prevents from tasting, while 
another one has it that every sweet thing is pleasant; this is sweet 
(and this one [i.e. 'every sweet thing is pleasant'] is active), and 
there happens to be appetite, the first <universal premise> says to 
avoid this thing, whereas appetite acts. For both parts <of the 
soul> are able to cause motion.308" 1147a31-35 
ὅ$"+ -ὖ+ ἡ <ὲ+ !"&ό0-8 ἐ+ῇ !(0ύ-8@" 5'ύ'@&"2, ἣ Cέ, ὅ$2 ,ᾶ+ 
508!ὺ ἡCύ, $-8$ὶ Cὲ 508!ύ ("ὕ$7 Cὲ ἐ+')5'ῖ), $ύ9ῃ C’ ἐ,2&8<ί" 
ἐ+-ῦ@", ἣ <ὲ+ -ὖ+ 0έ5'2 >'ύ5'2+ $-ῦ$-, ἡ C’ ἐ,2&8<ί" ἄ5'2· (35) 
!2+'ῖ+ 5ὰ) ἕ!"@$-+ Cύ+"$"2 $ῶ+ <-)ί(+· 
In this situation, there are two universal propositions that are in conflict 
with one another. The one proposition states that one should refrain from tasting 
sweet things (the object is suggested by the context given by the preceding exam-
ple), whereas the other states that all sweet things are pleasant.309 The two proposi-
tions conflict insofar as we are usually prone to desire pleasant things, which en-
tails that if sweet things are pleasant, we desire to taste sweet things, which is what 
                                                      
308 The last claim of this passage (!2+'ῖ+ 5ὰ) ἕ!"@$-+ Cύ+"$"2 $ῶ+ <-)ί(+) can be read in 
two ways. Either it means, as Irwin and Ross have it: "For it (i.e. desire) can move each of 
the parts [of the body]", or it means: "For both parts [of the soul] are able to cause motion". I 
favour the latter translation, as do Kenny 1979: 159, Wiggins 1978-1979: 260, Charles 1984: 
130; Bostock 2000: 129 n. 20; Pickavé & Whiting 2008: 349, n. 36; and Charles 2009: 59-60, 
who offers a convincing argumentation in favour of it. 
309 That these two feminine pronouns denote propositions (protaseis) follows from the string 
of feminine pronouns from the previous passage (text 74). That the second of these proposi-
tions is a universal one is clear from the opposition with the first one, and matches with the 
given example 'every sweet thing is pleasant'. For a fuller defence of this reading, see §6.4.2. 
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the first proposition forbids. So the situation seems to be this: when the agent is 
presented with a sweet thing, the following happens: the agent considers a proposi-
tion which tells him to avoid the actual sweet thing, but at the same time, he feels 
an appetite (epithumia) for that thing. The result is that appetite prevails (hê ep-
ithumia agei), and the agent ends up getting the sweet. 
This, then, is the akratic case: confronted with a sweet, the agent entertains 
both the proposition that he should not go for the sweet and the proposition that 
sweet things are pleasant (hence, desirable), and he ends up following the latter. 
This indeed corresponds to Aristotle's description of akrasia (see the endoxa on akra-
sia: 1145b10-12; 1145b12-14; see as well the presumed definition of akrasia 1148a4-
11). The agent finds himself in a practical (if not moral) dilemma, and this dilemma 
is solved by following irrational desire. Note that in this context Aristotle does not 
even evoke why the agent ends up choosing the sweet.310  
Before offering my interpretation of the two passages, I want first to resolve 
some textual difficulties. I shall first discuss text (74), and then, in §6.4.1, I shall of-
fer an interpretation of its function in the argumentative progression of the chapter. 
Finally, in §6.4.2, I shall turn to text (75) and give a proper interpretation of the ac-
count of akrasia of EN VII.3. 
At 1147a24ff. Aristotle explains what happens when both protaseis are put 
together: on the one hand (entha men), the soul asserts the conclusion, while "in a 
productive case" it acts immediately. Scholars have often linked this phrase with 
the account in De Motu Animalium chapter 7, where Aristotle compares practical 
reasoning with theoretical reasoning (701a8-13) (Burnet 1900; Gauthier & Jolif 1970; 
Bostock 2000: 128, n. 15; Pickavé & Whiting 2008: 351). When two propositions are 
put together, in the theoretical case, a proposition obtains, whereas in the practical 
case, an action occurs. Lines a27-28 have therefore often been taken as a contrast 
between practical and theoretical reason. This interpretation assumes that the entha 
men refers to the theoretical case and that the 'en tais poiêtikais' refers to the practical 
case.311 Similarly, in De Motu 701a23 Aristotle speaks of 'productive premises' (hai 
protaseis hai poiêtikai). Thus, Aristotle would be contrasting, on the one hand, a theo-
retical syllogism, in which a conclusion, i.e. a proposition, follows from a universal 
                                                      
310 This situation does even apply most properly to the weak akratês, who is distinct from the 
impulsive akratês. Indeed, the latter has not deliberated prior to act. Consequently, it seems 
that he does not have a notion of what he should do according to the correct logos at the 
moment of action. By contrast, the one who is confronted with a moral dilemma at the mo-
ment of action is the weak akratês. 
311 That poiêtikais refers to praxis is not a problem. Aristotle often uses poiein in book VII in 
order to express action: e.g. 1148a20; 1150a30. 
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and a particular premise, and, on the other hand, a practical kind of syllogism, in 
which from a universal and a particular premise an action follows. This interpreta-
tion also suggests that the conclusion of the argument on the practical side is an 
action. The contrast between theoretical and practical thought would be that, in the 
former case, the outcome of a piece of reasoning is a conclusion, that is, a proposi-
tion, whereas in the latter, the outcome is an action. Indeed, at MA 7 Aristotle ex-
plicitly says that the conclusion of an instance of practical reasoning is an action.312 
This line of interpretation also holds that what Aristotle refers to in the practical 
case are not propositions but mental states (epithumia and doxa). 
This line of interpretation suffers from different problems. First, if one holds 
that at EN VII.3 Aristotle is opposing a theoretical piece of reasoning and a practical 
one, this means that the theoretical argument is composed of a universal and a par-
ticular premise. However, Aristotle nowhere defines theoretical arguments as hav-
ing a particular minor premise. Another problem concerns the interpretation of mia 
at 1147a26. If the conclusion in the practical case is an action, then it entails that mia 
has two different referents: a proposition in the theoretical case (or even a doxa, 
since many proponents of this interpretation hold that the feminine pronouns refer 
to doxa rather than protasis) and a praxis in the practical one (this is indeed Bostock's 
interpretation Bostock 2000: 128, n. 17). 
A general thought against this interpretation is that if Aristotle were speak-
ing here about the contrast between theoretical and practical reason, it would be 
difficult to understand exactly what his point is. Why would he turn from a search 
for the cognitive state of the akratês to a contrast between practical and theoretical 
thought? Some interpreters argue that at EN VII.3 Aristotle uses the practical syllo-
gism for the same purpose as at MA 7, namely stating the sufficient conditions for 
the causation of action (Cooper 1975: 54-55; Nussbaum 1978: 174-175; Corcilius 
2008a: 286-287). The contrast with the theoretical syllogism would serve to illustrate 
the kind of necessity which characterizes the causation of action. Similarly to the 
theoretical syllogism, in which the conclusion in the practical case follows neces-
sarily from two premises, the practical case would hold that the action follows nec-
essarily from the agent's mental states. If the appropriate mental states are present, 
namely a doxastic component and a desiderative one, then the action follows neces-
sarily.313 
If one holds that the point of EN VII.3 is the same as that of MA 7, it is hard 
to fit the passage into the context. Proponents of this interpretation must assert that 
                                                      
312 MA 7 701a11-13: ἐ+$"ῦ&" C’ ἐ! $ῶ+ Cύ- ,)-$ά@'(+ $ὸ @8<,έ)"@<" 5ί+'$"2 ἡ ,)ᾶN23. 
313 Corcilius calls this 'nomological necessity' (Corcilius 2008b: 176) 
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Aristotle somehow wants to explain how akratic action is caused. But this is not 
Aristotle's purpose in this chapter, as the context makes clear. Aristotle is looking 
for the cognitive state of the akratês. Allegedly, then, he would at some point in the 
argument switch to a different issue, namely what the sufficient conditions for the 
causation of action are. But in the first account of 1147a24-31, Aristotle does not 
mention desire, which is strange in an account that is supposed to yield the suffi-
cient conditions for action. This interpretation does not explain why Aristotle then 
turns to the akratic case. Besides, if the point of the passage were to explain the cau-
sation of akratic action, this account would be a poor one, for there is no further 
comment on the efficient cause of the action (the epithumia). In the akratic case, the 
conditions for action are the same as in the normal case (since action occurs): 
thought and desire. What changes is the cognitive state of the akratês. He considers 
two different principles, one of which active, while the other is not.314 
An alternative interpretation understands en tais poiêtikais as 'when action is 
possible', i.e. when nothing prevents the action. This interpretation is based on the 
assumption that once one has reached a decision to act, one might still refrain from 
acting because of various reasons.315 The contrast brought by the entha men does not 
then refer to the case of the theoretical syllogism; rather, it refers to the 'logical' ac-
count preceding the physical account of the second case.316 In theoretical activities 
such as making demonstrations, what happens when two premises are considered 
together is the inference of a conclusion. In practical cases, the situation is similar. 
In deliberation, several propositions are considered and lead to a conclusion in the 
form of a decision. But a further thing happens: an action is performed on the basis 
                                                      
314 I do not go as far as to claim that EN VII.3 has absolutely nothing to do with MA 7. Such a 
claim would be bold. Rather, I contend that Aristotle uses the same conceptual device for 
two different purposes, and those different applications entail characteristics of the practical 
argument in each context that are not compatible together. More on this below. 
315 Kenny 1966: 177, 1979: 157, n. 2; McDowell 2009: 63; Charles 2009: 53, n. 21. Kenny and 
McDowell go further by spotting of an opposition between practical and productive reason 
in the contrast entha men ... en de tais poiêtikais at 1147a28. Kenny assumes that the opposition 
Aristotle wants to denote is that between a 'poietic' case where one acts immediately and a 
practical case where it is possible first to assert the conclusion and then to act on this con-
clusion or not. Charles has broadly speaking the same understanding of poiêtikos, but he 
rejects Kenny's identification of entha men with the practical as opposed to the poietical. 
316 Charles 2009: 52, who speaks of a 'theoretical' case, i.e. when the subjects under consider-
ation are engaged in theoretical activities such as studying or reciting verses, but not in 
practical activities. 
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of the conclusion.317 The en tais poiêtikais clause would then be a logical equivalent 
for the ceteris paribus clause in the example: "someone who is able and not prevent-
ed" (ton dunamenon kai mê kôluomenon 1147a30-31). When the agent has reached a 
practical conclusion (i.e. a decision), if he is able to act and is not prevented from 
doing so, then he will act.318 
This interpretation then does not see an opposition between a theoretical 
syllogism, the conclusion of which is a proposition, and with a practical syllogism, 
on the other, the outcome of which is an action. Rather, the point of Aristotle in text 
(74) is that at the outcome of an instance of practical reasoning two things happen: 
the agent asserts the conclusion, i.e. the decision to act, and, if nothing prevents 
him, the agent acts immediately. Thus, the conclusion of a practical argument is a 
proposition, not an action. There is a conclusion as an intermediary step between 
the premises and the action.319 
My reading of 1147a24-31 implies that in this passage there is no account of 
the conditions for the causation of action. Aristotle merely applies his notion of 
practical thought as an argument about the psychology of the agent. This structure 
of practical thought is the same as that of the first case at 1146b35-1147a10, where 
Aristotle was looking for a relevant sense of 'acting against one's knowledge of 
what one should do'. Only here he applies this structure to the mental states of the 
agent. The propositions in play are the contents of doxai and perception. 
Now, the task is to connect the description of akrasia at 1147a31-35 (text 75) 
with the elements given by Aristotle in the chapter so far. We must see how his 
description of akratic knowledge as 'knowing without knowing' is expressed here. 
We must see if we can identify an instance of a state of knowledge where the agent 
has knowledge but does not use it. In order to do so, I turn to the logical account of 
1146b35-1147a10 one more time in order to provide a complete interpretation of it. 
This case can be read together with 1147a24-31 as the 'normal case'. Then, I'll pro-
vide a second, complete, reading of 1147a24-35, where I shall highlight the akratic 
case introduced at 1147a31-35. 
                                                      
317 Also I wonder if the burden on the particle entha is not too heavy. Could entha simply 
mean 'there on the one hand', just as a contrast with poietical cases where action occurs? 
Thus, entha would not refer to anything external to the passage. 
318 Thus, the referent of en tais poiêtikais could be dianoiais: in cases of thought that are able to 
produce action. It would be the same referent as with the 'en tais praktikais' of 1143b1, ac-
cording to my reading of the passage (§5.2.2.2 text 46). 
319 For a full defence of this claim, see Charles 2009: 54-55. 
Chapter 6. Akrasia and other flaws of practical thought 
 237 
6.4 Akratic knowledge 
6.4.1 The normal case 
If one turns back to 1146b35-1147a10, the following interpretation is possi-
ble. The example Aristotle is considering in this passage, in spite of being unclear, 
resembles an argument composed of the following premises: 'dry food is healthy 
for human beings', 'dry is such and such', 'I am a man', plus an extra particular 
premise 'this is such and such'. One can reasonably expect a conclusion like 'I 
should eat this thing', although Aristotle does not mention it. Indeed, one can build 
up the following argument: 
'Dry food benefits all human beings.' 
'Dry is of such and such quality.' 
'I am a man.' 
'This here is of such and such quality.' 
Therefore, 'I should eat this thing' 
The argument is not strictly valid, for the conclusion does not follow neces-
sarily from the premises. One would need to add some premises such as 'one ought 
to eat food that benefits one', or 'I ought to eat things of such and such quality'. One 
would also have to account for the transition between values and norms (i.e. the 
transition between 'this is beneficial to me' and 'I should eat this'). Nevertheless, 
intuitively, this is the kind of conclusion one would tend to hold when considering 
the premises. Aristotle seems then to presuppose that the kind of knowledge at 
stake here has as its immediate content a proposition which is inferred from a cou-
ple of premises.  
In my view, Aristotle's point here is that if the agent does not consider atten-
tively the particular proposition, it is not surprising that the agent acts contrary to 
his knowledge (knowledge in this case having as its content something like 'I ought 
to eat this, because of argument XYZ). This seems to imply the converse principle 
that if the agent is considering attentively each parts of the argument, then it would 
be amazing if he acted contrary to his knowledge. My contention here is that Aris-
totle is giving an outline of a notion of practical necessity on the model of the logi-
cal necessity at work in the theoretical syllogism. If the agent is considering atten-
tively this argument when confronted with a sample of dry food, then he ought to 
act in going for the sample. It would be irrational of him not to go for it. Or at least, 
in case some external obstacle prevents him from acting at once, he ought to believe 
the supposed conclusion of this argument. This kind of practical necessity is not as 
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strong as the necessity in play in an instance of theoretical reasoning. Yet, as I try to 
explain it below, it is an important feature of practical rationality.320 
One discerns this function of the practical argument better if one attends to 
the normal case of the 'physical account' at 1147a24-31 (text 74). The agent is con-
sidering two propositions: 'one should eat everything sweet' and 'this thing here is 
sweet'. The expected conclusion then is 'I should eat this'. The argument again is 
not strictly valid. One would want to supply extra premises in the same way as 
Aristotle has done at 1146b35-1147a10. Yet, this is the conclusion that we would 
reasonably expect to follow from such premises. This would give us the following 
argument: 
One should eat everything sweet 
Sweet is such and such 
I am a man 
This thing here is such and such 
Therefore: I should eat this. 
In my view, what matters here is that according to Aristotle, when an agent 
is engaged in a piece of practical reasoning that states that in such and such circum-
stances he ought to do such and such, the agent has all the reasons he needs to act; 
not acting – or acting in a different way – would therefore be irrational. If S believes 
that one should taste every sweet thing, and this is sweet, then it would be irration-
al not to taste this. There is a tight connection between the agent holding such and 
such propositions and the agent performing the action. Aristotle seems to think that 
once the agent has come to the conclusion, he is compelled to act as the conclusion 
prescribes. One can put this idea of practical necessity and practical inference more 
generally in the following way. 
S believes that if F then he should > 
S believes that this x is F 
Therefore, S ought to believe that he should > 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, S does >. 
The connection between the premises and the conclusion is explanatory, not 
causal. Stating the premises does not establish the sufficient conditions for the cau-
sation of action. Rather, holding the major and minor premises is a sufficient justifi-
cation to explain why the agent has performed the action. 
                                                      
320 The notion of practical necessity hints at deontic logic. Although it would be a mistake to 
see in these lines of EN VII.3 an Aristotelian account of deontic logic, I believe that Aristotle 
has basic insights that could be developed in this direction. On the relation between the 
practical syllogism and deontic logic, see Gourinat 2004. 
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I believe that the use of syllogistic terminology in this passage is explained 
by the attractiveness of the notion of necessity. Aristotle makes use of his notion of 
logical necessity as it appears in the theoretical syllogism and applies it to practical 
reasoning. He does this in order to show the strength of the connection between, on 
the one hand, holding a couple of premises and, on the other, being led to act in 
conformity with what these premises indicate. In his account of the theoretical syl-
logism, Aristotle also uses a notion of necessity in order to account for the logical 
relation between the premises and the conclusion. In a valid syllogism, the conclu-
sion follows necessarily from the premises (See APr. I.1 24b18-22; Top. I.1 100a25-30; 
Meta. V.5 1015b6-9). Similarly, if a practical argument is valid, the conclusion fol-
lows necessarily from the conclusion. This is expressed by the occurrence of anankê 
at 1147a27.  
But in the practical case, something more happens: if action is possible, then 
the agent acts immediately. As already mentioned, I understand the phrase en de 
tais poiêtikais prattein euthus as adding a ceteris paribus clause. What is crucial, how-
ever, is that the clause does not specify whether it concerns only external prevent-
ing factors or also includes factors internal to the soul. External impediments would 
intervene between the conclusion and the execution of the action. In spite of his 
determination, an agent might be prevented from acting because of any occurring 
contingency (e.g., a power failure occurs in a volleyball game on a match point ser-
vice). However, an internal factor will disrupt the route from the premises to the 
conclusion. If a disturbance in the soul occurs, it might prevent the agent from com-
ing to the right conclusion, or from holding the conclusion adequately. Charles ar-
gues convincingly that the ceteris paribus clause does not exclude internal factors.321 
Yet, what is crucial is that although Aristotle leaves open the possibility of an im-
pediment to action due to an internal factor, this does not prevent the agent from 
holding the correct conclusion. While the conclusion follows necessarily from the 
premises, the agent does not act accordingly, because of an internal disturbance. 
The account of akrasia which follows the normal case aims precisely at identifying 
this disturbing factor. 
The reference to action is not here for the sake of stating the sufficient condi-
tions of the causation of action. If it were, it would be incomplete, as I have already 
argued, for there is no reference to any desire. The reason why Aristotle does not 
limit his account to a prescriptive conclusion lies elsewhere. Holding a conclusion 
in itself does not insure that one is in the right cognitive state to perform this action. 
As I have suggested, there might be factors internal to the agent's psyche that pre-
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vent him from following the prescription of the conclusion. The context of EN VII.3 
is thus different from that of MA 7. 
The accounts of MA 7 and EN VII.3 look so similar, in my view, because Ar-
istotle is attracted by the notion of necessity present in both contexts. In both con-
texts, Aristotle contrasts practical and theoretical reason (though not explicitly in 
the EN). The notion of logical necessity has been defined clearly. Aristotle develops 
a notion of practical necessity by analogy to this model and applies it in both con-
texts. However, the role of practical necessity is not the same in both treatises. Aris-
totle seems to use a core property of the practical argument in order to account for 
two distinct features proper to each context. In the De Motu, Aristotle gives suffi-
cient conditions for the causation of action, whereas in the Ethics, he wants to give 
conditions for the explanation of a moral action (or for the decision). Another way to 
put it is that in MA 7 Aristotle is interested in the external relation between proposi-
tional attitudes (what Corcilius calls efficient-causal relation), but in the EN VII he is 
interested in the internal relation between propositions. 
However, the terminological proximity between the two passages should 
not mislead us about Aristotle's intention in EN VII. That his accounts of the practi-
cal syllogism at MA 7 and EN VII.3 are so succinct shows that either he was not 
interested in spending more time on this notion, or he was planning to tackle the 
subject for its own sake in another treatise.322 All in all, he does not have a unified 
notion of the practical syllogism. All he wants to do is to point out the kind of ne-
cessity at work in practical reason, which is displayed in two different ways. As 
Natali points out:  
"But just as a plant or an animal species, when transplanted to a 
new environment, undergoes modifications that adapt it to its 
new situation, and differentiate it from the original model, so too 
the practical syllogism is an adaptation of the scheme of the 
syllogism to different tasks and needs." Natali 2001: 99 
Thus, I reckon that the notion of practical necessity is also in play in the first 
'logical' statement of the structure at 1146b31-1147a10. The logical account, howev-
er, states a deficiency in cognitive terms. This would therefore provide a case where 
practical necessity is precisely absent. 
In the logical case, Aristotle adds a further point. There is a case in which 
the agent will not act (or not act as expected), in spite of the agent somehow 'know-
ing' what he ought to do. This case, as Aristotle puts it, is when the agent has 
                                                      
322 However, a quick look at the ancient list of works by Aristotle in Diogenes Laërtius does 
not reveal whether Aristotle ever wrote such a treatise. 
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knowledge of the particulars but does not use it. In other words, he is not attending 
actively to the particular proposition. When confronted with a sample of dry food, 
the agent considers an argument like 'dry food is healthy for human beings, dry is 
such and such', 'I am a man'. But in this case, there still is something that the agent 
is missing, and thus the justification for acting in such or such way is incomplete. 
The conditions of practical necessity are not met. The agent does not act as expected 
because he does not hold the relevant premises actively. 
Now, I contend that Aristotle injects this structure at 1147a31-35 into the 
case of the akratês. As in the absent-minded agent who does not attend to the par-
ticular premise actively, the akratês suffers from a cognitive defect that prevents him 
from holding the conclusion according to practical necessity. So it remains to ex-
plain how the cognitive state of the akratês is weakened. 
6.4.2 The akratic case 
With this notion of practical necessity in mind, we are ready to confront the 
central account of akrasia one more time. I quote passage 1147a31-35 again for the 
sake of convenience: 
76) "When a first universal proposition forbids tasting, while another 
one has it that every sweet thing is pleasant; this is sweet (and this 
one [i.e. 'every sweet thing is pleasant'] is active), and there hap-
pens to be appetite, the first <universal premise> says to avoid 
this thing, whereas appetite acts. For both parts <of the soul> are 
able to cause motion. " EN VII.3 1147a31-35 (same as text 75) 
ὅ$"+ -ὖ+ ἡ <ὲ+ !"&ό0-8 ἐ+ῇ !(0ύ-8@" 5'ύ'@&"2, ἣ Cέ, ὅ$2 ,ᾶ+ 
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In this case, there are two propositions (protaseis) entertained by the agent. 
The first one says "one should avoid all sweet things", the second "every sweet 
thing is pleasant". The tension between these two beliefs is patent, as I have ex-
plained earlier. The agent also considers the particular proposition that 'this thing is 
sweet'. Aristotle then adds a series of assertions: the latter universal proposition 
mentioned (hautê de) is active (energei); there is appetite (epithumia) present; the for-
mer universal proposition (hê men) still maintains its point 'avoid this'; and eventu-
ally appetite acts (agei). When Aristotle says that 'appetite acts', one ought naturally 
to understand this as saying that the agent goes for the sweet. Since we are dealing 
with a case of akrasia, the outcome is not surprising. 
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That the proposition said to be active is the one stating that 'every sweet 
thing is pleasant' is clear because the nearest referent for hautê is the hê de at 1147a32 
(see Grant , Stewart, and Gauthier and Jolif 1970). I call it the 'epithumetic premise', 
for it states the same thing as what the epithumia at 1147a33 pursues. Against this, 
Charles argues that the hautê refers to the minor premise 'this is sweet'. On his in-
terpretation, one needs this minor premise to be active (Charles 2009: 58, n. 28). 
Against Charles' reading, one can argue that if the particular proposition is active, 
then the text is heavily underdetermined. Either it means that the akratic agent is 
considering both arguments – against eating the sweet and in favour of it – with the 
same strength, but then it is not clear why one argument wins over the other; or it 
means that the particular proposition is connected with one universal premise, but 
not with the other, and Aristotle does not offer any explanation why this is the case. 
By contrast, my reading does not entail those further issues, and is thereby more 
economical. 
One of Charles' arguments is that if the epithumetic universal premise is ac-
tive, then the other universal premise is not. But in his view, we need this other 
universal premise, the 'rational one', to be active as well. I want to show that by 
'being active' (energei) Aristotle means in fact a notion which is not binary. It is pos-
sible to be active, but also to be less active, without being merely potential. Thus, 
that the rational universal premise is passive does not follow from the epithumetic 
universal premise being active. This notion of 'being active' (energein) has been al-
ready sketched out earlier (see 1146b35-1147a10). In my view, then, being active 
does not just mean 'being actually considered', but 'considering a proposition to-
gether with its implications'. 
Another one of Charles' argument relies on the assumption that pheugein 
touto is the conclusion of the practical argument. Thus, if one is to have the conclu-
sion consciously, one needs an active minor premise. By contrast, I argue that the 
assertion 'avoiding this' (pheugein touto) should be connected with the universal 
principle that forbids tasting. This seems to be the most natural reading. One could 
contest this on the ground that the proposition 'avoid this' is particular. However, 
we should understand 'pheugein touto' as what is asserted by the universal premise, 
in the sense that pheugein touto is inferred from the universal premise. Aristotle is 
merely summing up the argument 'one ought to avoid every thing sweet'; 'this is 
sweet'; 'I should avoid this'. In a sense, the universal principle itself 'says' "avoid 
this". My interpretation of 'being active' supports this reading. If the epithumetic 
universal premise is active, this means that the agent considers other propositions 
which are implied by this premise. 
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Now, given my reading of text (76), the situation is this: the agent finds him-
self in a practical dilemma. Two distinct arguments are offered to him. Either he 
goes for the sweet, because 'every sweet thing is pleasant, and this is sweet', or he 
avoids the sweet, because 'one ought to avoid every sweet thing, and this is sweet'. 
Also, the agent is experiencing an appetite (epithumia) for the sweet thing. That the 
agent is prone to experience such a desire is not surprising given my account of 
akrasia as a disposition to feel appetite, as developed in §6.2.1. The akratês is precise-
ly disposed to respond to a pleasurable object in this way. Hence, although the first 
universal belief urges the agent to avoid the sweet, the appetite acts. Aristotle adds 
that the akratic agent has the conclusion 'avoid this'. It seems that the same happens 
as in the previous, normal, case: the agent has the universal premise 'one ought to 
avoid every sweet thing'; he has the particular premise 'this is sweet', and he has 
the conclusion 'avoid this', which he doubtlessly has drawn from the former prem-
ises. (Once again, the akratês in question here seems to be the weak akratês rather 
than the impulsive one.) So why does the agent not act according to the principle 
that forbids eating sweet things? In other words, why does the epithumetic princi-
ple wins over?  
Invoking the desiderative state of the agent is of limited help here, since it 
does not explain why appetite is stronger than reason. Besides, in the enkratic case, 
the exact opposite happens. In spite of strong epithumia, reason prevails. I believe 
that the answer lies in the cognitive state of the akratês. He has the minor premise, 
but he does not connect it appropriately to the moral principle.323 It is true that Aris-
totle does not elaborate this kind of connection. However, I argue that this cogni-
tive relation can be reconstructed from the material that precedes, at 1146b35-
1147a10 and at 1147a10-24. 
The only clue in the text is that the epithumetic universal proposition is ac-
tive (energei). I have shown in the 'logical' exposition of the normal case that 'being 
active' for the universal proposition is correlated with being derived into more spe-
cific universal propositions. If one applies this correlation here as well, the result is 
that the agent entertains a universal proposition together with its implications and 
therefore it is easier for the agent to connect this proposition with the particular 
one. By contrast, the forbidding universal proposition is not active, at least not in 
this sense. That it is not active does not mean that it is only potential, as in the case 
of the absent-minded agent of 1146b35-1147a10. If it were the case, the agent would 
                                                      
323 For similar interpretations, see Charles 1984, ch. 3, sect. B; Dahl 1984, ch. 11, see esp. p. 
208ff. This kind of interpretation is outlined by Bostock, who ultimately rejects it (Bostock's 
"second interpretation"; Bostock 2000: 131-132). 
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not be able to infer the conclusion pheugein touto.324 Rather, the akratic agent is in a 
cognitive state similar to the young learner or the drunk mathematician. He has the 
particular premise and acts on it as well, at least to the extent that he is able to infer 
the logically correct conclusion. However, he does not act on it enough so that he 
does not consider the universal proposition together with its implications. 
Consider the example of the sweet. The akratic agent holds both premises 
that one ought to avoid sweet things and that this is sweet. He therefore also holds 
the conclusion 'I should avoid this'. However, what he lacks is a more complete 
understanding of why he ought to avoid this very thing here. He lacks extra con-
siderations which would guide his deliberation better, such as 'sweet things are bad 
for teeth', 'my teeth are in bad shape', 'I just had a coke', etc. Since the rational uni-
versal premise 'one ought to avoid this' is not active, the agent does not derive from 
it the additional considerations that would help guide his deliberation. Thus, the 
akratês does not see why he ought to stand back from that very sweet, except be-
cause of the very general rule he considers. His conclusion is not properly motivat-
ed. In other words, the conclusion 'does not follow necessarily', that is, according to 
practical necessity.  
This interpretation also accounts for the structure of passage 1147a24-35. 
First, Aristotle shows how practical necessity works. If an agent holds a couple of 
propositions actively, then, ceteris paribus, the conclusion follows necessarily, accord-
ing to practical necessity. In other words, the agent is compelled to act according to 
what his reasoning prescribes. It is easier to abide by this prescription if one has 
guiding rules of applications such as 'sweet is such and such' and 'I am a man'. The 
argument has a stronger compelling force. Aristotle then introduces the akratic 
case, which is not a case of practical necessity. The akratic agent holds the same 
propositions as in the normal case. However, his appetite disrupts the logical con-
nection between the premises and the conclusion. The conclusion does follow from 
the premises, but not necessarily. The agent is not compelled to act according to 
what reason prescribes. 
Now I want to show that this interpretation of akrasia is compatible with the 
notion of practical thought I have developed in this work. A way of elaborating this 
description of akratic behaviour is suggested at the end of EN VII, where Aristotle 
asserts that unlike the phronimos, the akratês is not 'praktikos': 
77) "Moreover, one is practically wise (phronimos) not only in virtue of 
knowledge, but also in virtue of being able to act. And the unself-
controlled is not able to act." EN VII.10 1152a8-9 
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aware of the correct conclusion at the moment of action. 
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In chapter 4, I have offered a technical interpretation of 'being praktikos'. Be-
ing praktikos is a skill the phronimos agent has in virtue of his knowledge of particu-
lars. At EN VI.13 1144b4-14 (§4.4.2, text 42), Aristotle has opposed the fully virtuous 
agent to the agent who is only naturally virtuous. The latter has not achieved full 
virtue (aretê haplôs) because he lacks phronêsis. As I have argued, Aristotle shows 
that possessing phronêsis enables the fully virtuous person to apply adequately the 
moral principles he considers in action. By contrast, the naturally virtuous agent, 
even though he has a correct notion of such or such moral principle, is not able to 
apply it adequately in a situation because he lacks knowledge of the relevant fea-
tures of the situation. He does not attend to the features which would enable him to 
apply the principle correctly, but rather attends to other features which distract him 
from a correct application. The claim of my §4.4.2 is that particular knowledge pro-
vides one with knowledge that is appropriate to the situation. Once I am in posses-
sion of this piece of knowledge, I am better able to infer a virtuous decision (i.e. 
what I should do). If I am not actively aware of this particular state of affairs, I 
might not act according to what would be reasonable to do. If I am not actively 
aware that this is heavy, i.e. heavy water, given that I am very thirsty, I might go 
and drink it, although heavy water is actually harmful. If I am not actively aware 
that fried turkey is not a sample of healthy poultry, I shall eat it, although when 
considering this fact actively I would restrain myself. This is not the case with uni-
versals, for knowledge of universals does not make one more or less praktikos. It is 
possible to entertain one's knowledge of a universal state of affairs without being 
compelled to act in any particular way. If we take 'praktikos' in this technical sense, 
the passage shows that Aristotle attributes the same fault to the akratês.  
At this point it seems useful to recall the distinction between impulsive and 
weak akrasia. Only the weak akratês has deliberated before his action. The impulsive 
akratês is carried away by the violence of his passion. The impulsive akratês has the 
rational universal premise, because after he has done his deed, he feels remorse, yet 
it seems that he does not attend to particulars actively. His passion obliterates mo-
mentarily his notion of what is the case and how to connect the particulars with the 
moral notion of what to do. By contrast, the weak akratês is aware of the particulars 
and has come to the correct conclusion. He is the proper subject of EN VII.3 
1147a31-35. 
What happens in the case of the weak akratês is similar to the case of the 
'simple deliberator' introduced earlier (§3.3.2). The simple deliberator does not have 
an adequate understanding of moral notions, such as justice. This means that he 
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does not spot appropriately instances of being just or of being unjust. He might 
therefore come to the conclusion that he should punish his friend on the ground 
that punishing one's friends is just (and it sometimes is, as in the phrase 'hard, but 
fair'), in spite of the situation in which the friend hasn't committed any fault. Like-
wise, the akratês agent does not have an appropriate notion of the properties he per-
ceives in the situation. He does not have an appropriate notion of the pleasant, 
namely when it is good and when it is bad. He knows in general that one ought to 
avoid sweet things, but he does not have further guiding rules to help him to de-
termine when it is acceptable to eat a sweet and when it is not. 
What distinguishes the simple deliberator from the weak akratês is that Aris-
totle does not specify the cause of why the simple deliberator is mistaken. Actually, 
the simple deliberator could be akratic (in spite of the text, as I have argued). Some 
cases of simple deliberation are weak akrasia, while some cases are simply errors of 
judgement. Similarly, not all cases of weak akrasia are cases of simple deliberation. 
But in the case of the akratês, Aristotle provides the efficient cause of akratic behav-
iour, namely epithumia. In other words, that an agent at a specific time t behaves 
akratically is caused by a particular episode of epithumia. Appetite is responsible for 
two things. First, it causes the agent's cognitive state to weaken; then, it is also the 
efficient cause of the action. When Aristotle speaks of the cause (aitian) at 1147a24, 
he means the cause of the weakening of the cognitive state. 
Because of his excessive appetite for an object present in his immediate sur-
roundings, the akratês is unable to focus on the correct features of the situation 
which would enable him to stand by his moral principle. The question, then, is why 
the akratês succumbs to the drive of appetite, whereas the enkratês holds firm. I 
think Aristotle does not answer the question explicitly. But my interpretation of 
practical thought does answer it. 
6.4.3 Akrasia vs. enkrateia 
Ultimately, a full account of practical thought ought to include self-control 
(enkrateia). What essentially distinguishes the self-controlled person (enkratês) from 
the akratês lies in their respective behaviour. The akratês departs from what he 
thinks he should do and ends up acting contrary to it, whereas the enkratês sticks to 
what he thinks he should do, thereby acting in accordance to it. What then explains 
this difference? 
As already noted, akrasia and enkrateia seem very similar in terms of their 
psychology: both agents have a notion of what one should do, and both experience 
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a desire which is bad and is against one's notion of what one ought to do (1145b10-
14).325  
One cannot explain the difference between the two kinds of behaviour by 
referring to a difference in the intensity of desire, according to which the akratês 
would be prone to more intense desires than the enkratês. On the contrary, it even 
seems that the enkratês might sometimes be subject to more intense appetites than 
the akratês. At the beginning of VII.7, the akratês and the enkratês (along with the soft 
and the resistant types) are described as follows: 
78) "As for pleasures, pains, appetites and avoidances through touch 
and taste, [i.e. those things we have previously determined self-
indulgence and temperance to be about], it is possible to be so 
disposed as to give in even to those that most people master; and 
it is possible to master even those that most people give in to. Of 
these types, the ones relating to pleasures are un-self-controlled 
and self-controlled respectively, while those relating to pains are 
soft and resistant. In-between is the disposition of most people, 
even if most people do incline towards the worse ones." EN VII.7 
1150a9-16; see also 1150a32-b14 
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The akratês is so disposed that he gives in to appetites for pleasure easily, 
that is, more easily than most people, whereas the enkratês is able to resist pleasures 
and appetites that most people are not able to resist. Also, people conceive the 
enkratês as someone who is prone to appetites that are strong and bad; otherwise 
being able to resist them, as the enkratês is, would not be a fine thing (1146a9-16). 
Thus, the behaviour of the enkratês cannot be accounted for by his character. He 
tends to respond instinctively to pleasurable or painful objects in the same way as 
the akratês or even the akolastos. Could it be a difference in the quality of desire, 
somewhat like the difference between the akratês and the akolastos, where the latter 
has a more sophisticated kind of desire? Here, the enkratês would differ from the 
akratês in that his appetites are somehow qualitatively different from those of the 
akratês. However, I do not think this is the case. The epithumia seems to be the same 
in both the akratês and the enkratês. The enkratês is subject to the same discrepancy 
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between his reason and his desire. The enkratês cannot have a description of the end 
of his epithumia available. This would make a vicious person of him. 
Rather, the enkratês seems to differ from the akratês regarding his cognitive 
state. This is suggested at EN IX.8: "Also, enkratês and akratês are said in virtue of 
our intellect having control or not."326 The most obvious difference between the 
enkratês and the akratês is that in the former his intellect is ruling (kratein), whereas 
in the latter it is not. The resistance of the enkratês would then be due solely to ra-
tional factors (notwithstanding the desire which possibly accompanies one's practi-
cal opinion, as suggested at EN VI.2). This assumption would be confirmed by the 
fact that Aristotle devotes quite a lot of effort to accounting for the akratês' peculiar 
cognitive state, whereas he does not do so for the enkratês. This difference of treat-
ment would show that there is a major contrast in their respective cognitive states, 
and maybe also that the cognitive state of the enkratês does not differ so much from 
that of the phronimos. 
In virtue of what is the rational part of the soul able to rule over appetite in 
the enkratic case but not in the akratic one? In the akratic case, appetite disturbs the 
agent's perception of the situation. The akratês does not focus on the relevant fea-
tures of the situation. He is certainly aware of the situation in general and of the 
most salient features, since he is able to come to the right conclusion in his delibera-
tion. Yet his deliberation is not sufficiently supported by other considerations about 
the circumstances (the conclusion does not follow 'necessarily'). The akratês cannot 
connect efficiently his notion of the moral principle he wishes to promote (the end) 
with the relevant features of the situation. In other words, the akratês is not praktik-
os, because he cannot refine his notion of the end into proposition that is directly 
applicable to the situation. We can understand this defect in the akratês as a lack of 
conviction in what he should do (i.e. the conclusion of the practical argument). He 
does not hold this conclusion with sufficient strength because he does not have the 
appropriate additional justification of why he should follow the conclusion. 
On the contrary, the enkratês' conviction would not be so undermined. His 
cognitive state is apparently less affected by pathos than that of the akratês. His rea-
sons for acting are sufficiently strong to resist the appeal of appetite and to stand by 
the orthos logos. There are two passages that suggest that the enkratês has a rational 
justification strong enough for sticking to his decision. 
In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle states a clear connection between rational 
persuasion and enkratic behaviour. In a passage at EE II.8, Aristotle evokes a con-
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troversy whether the akratês and the enkratês act voluntarily (hekôn) or not (akôn). 
This passage treats an aspect of the Eudemian inquiry on the involuntary by force, 
and has no Nicomachean equivalent. Concerning the akratês, Aristotle argues that 
insofar as the akratês enjoys following his appetites, he acts voluntarily (1224a36-38). 
He then turns to the enkratês. Does the enkratês act voluntarily or by force? On the 
one hand, one can consider him as acting by constraint, since he forces himself not 
to follow what he has appetite for; on the other hand, one can consider that he acts 
voluntarily, since he follows his reason (1224a32-36). Indeed, in the EE, Aristotle 
defines the hekousion as what is done in accordance with thought: en tô dianooume-
non pôs prattein einai to hekousion (1224a7-8). This is the option chosen by Aristotle: 
79) "But persuasion (peithô) is opposed to force and necessity (anankê). 
The enkratês goes towards what he is persuaded of, that is, he pro-
ceeds not by force but voluntarily. Appetite leads without per-
suading, for it does not take part in reason." EE II.8 1224a31-b1 
ἡ  
Cὲ ,'2&ὼ $ῇ /ίᾳ !"ὶ ἀ+ά5!ῃ ἀ+$2$ί&'$"2. ὁ C’ ἐ5!)"$ὴ3 (1224b) 
ἐ>’ ἃ ,έ,'2@$"2 ἄ5'2, !"ὶ ,-)'ύ'$"2 -ὐ /ίᾳ, ἀ00’ ἑ!ώ+. ἡ Cὲ 
ἐ,2&8<ί" -ὐ ,'ί@"@" ἄ5'2· -ὐ 5ὰ) <'$έ9'2 0ό5-8. 
In order to show that the enkratês does not act under constraint, Aristotle 
adds a reference to persuasion (peithô) to the argument. Persuasion, along with the 
hekousion, is set in opposition to force (bia) and necessity (anankê) (1224a14). The 
enkratês agent is said to act voluntarily in virtue of being persuaded of what he 
does. The crucial presupposition here is implicit, but it is made clear by the last 
sentence of the passage. Aristotle contrasts the case of the enkratês to that of when 
appetites rule the agent. Appetite does not lead by persuasion, because appetite is 
not a rational kind of desire. That is to say, Aristotle connects persuasion closely 
with reason (logos). The enkratês agent acts voluntarily because he acts out of persua-
sion, and being persuaded in this context is a rational state.  
The other piece of evidence in favour of rational justification for the enkratês 
goes as follows: 80) "There are people who do stick to their opinion, whom we call 
stubborn, and who are hard to persuade, that is, it is not easy to 
change their mind (ouk eumetapeistoi). These have something simi-
lar to the enkratês, just as the wasteful person does to the open-
handed and the bold to the courageous327; however, they are dif-
                                                      
327 asôtos and elephtherios are the terms used to denote respectively the excess and the virtue 
concerning small expenses. thrasus is the term Aristotle uses to call the excessive character 
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ferent in many respects. For the enkratês does not change because 
of affection or appetite, since on occasion he will be easy to per-
suade. But the stubborn ones do not change by way of reason 
(hupo logou), since they do have appetites and many of them are 
led by pleasures." EN VII.9 1151b4-12	  
'ἰ@ὶ Cέ $2+'3 -ἳ (5) ἐ<<'+'$2!-ὶ $ῇ CόNῃ 'ἰ@ί+, -ὓ3 !"0-ῦ@2+ 
ἰ@98)-5+ώ<-+"3, -ἱ Cύ@,'2@$-2 !"ὶ -ὐ! 'ὐ<'$ά,'2@$-2· -ἳ 
ὅ<-2-+ <έ+ $2 ἔ9-8@2 $ῷ ἐ5!)"$'ῖ, ὥ@,') ὁ ἄ@($-3 $ῷ 
ἐ0'8&')ίῳ !"ὶ ὁ &)"@ὺ3 $ῷ &"))"0έῳ, 'ἰ@ὶ C’ ἕ$')-2 !"$ὰ 
,-00ά. ὃ <ὲ+ 5ὰ) C2ὰ ,ά&-3 !"ὶ ἐ,2&8<ί"+ -ὐ <'$"/ά00'2 [ὁ 
ἐ5!)"$ή3], ἐ,'ὶ (10) 'ὔ,'2@$-3, ὅ$"+ $ύ9ῃ, ἔ@$"2 ὁ ἐ5!)"$ή3· -ἳ 
Cὲ -ὐ9 ὑ,ὸ 0ό5-8, ἐ,'ὶ ἐ,2&8<ί"3 5' 0"</ά+-8@2, !"ὶ ἄ5-+$"2 
,-00-ὶ ὑ,ὸ $ῶ+ ἡC-+ῶ+. 
The enkratês and the stubborn man are similar in that they hold firm to their 
opinion and are not easy to convince of something else. Their difference lies in the 
cause of their persuasion. The stubborn differs from the enkratês insofar as he holds 
firm to an opinion due to irrational impulses such as appetites for pleasurable 
things. The enkratês by contrast does not surrender to such impulses but holds firm 
to his opinion. However, on other occasions (hotan tuchê) the enkratês is easy to con-
vince. The text seems to presuppose that the persuasion of the enkratês is caused by 
reasoning. The case of the enkratês seems to be the converse of the stubborn one. 
One will not convince the stubborn person to change his mind by arguments, since 
his persuasion depends on epithumia. Conversely, the enkratês does not change his 
mind because of epithumia. The cause of his persuasion seems then to be logos. 
Moreover, according to Aristotle, rational persuasion depends on an argument (see 
Rhet. I.2 1356a1-21). (Note that this kind of rational persuasion must be opposed to 
the persuasion of the akolastos, which is due to his character; see 1151a11-14, text 
67). 
These two texts show that the enkratês holds his belief with a certain convic-
tion and that such conviction is responsible for the enkratês sticking to his decision 
(emmenein). Aristotle then also suggests that the persuasion proper to the enkratês is 
rational, i.e. caused by a piece of reasoning. Hence, the enkratês has a sufficiently 
good justification for his decision that he withstands the call of appetite and sticks 
to what he thinks is best to do. 
The resolution of the enkratês would not be altered by his desiderative im-
pulses. This requires an explanation, for if the desiderative aspect of his soul is dis-
                                                                                                                                                        
corresponding to the means of courage (andreia). Here tharaleos should then be taken as syn-
onymous for andreios. 
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posed in the same way as that of the akratês, he ought to suffer from the same im-
pairment concerning his knowledge of particulars. 
My claim is that the enkratês can overcome his desiderative impulse thanks 
to his empeiria. Experience would be the key feature distinguishing the akratês from 
the enkratês. In chap. 5, I introduced experience as a capacity to recognize features 
of a situation as instances of universal types, more specifically moral types. The 
experienced person is able to tie the moral notions that he is considering as an end 
to the relevant features of the situation. In doing so, he obtains a refined idea of 
these notions. Conversely, he is able to identify reliably certain features as instances 
of the moral types he is considering. The example of the experienced soldier con-
sidered in §5.3.3 illustrates well this capacity. The experienced soldier is fearless 
when facing danger because his experience provides him with a better knowledge 
of how dangerous the situation really is (see EN III.6 1115a32-1115b4 (text 56) and 
EN III.8 1116b3-15 (57)). Similarly, the enkratês, thanks to his experience, is able to 
better assess the situation in which he is confronted with pleasurable things.  
Does this mean that the enkratês is just an experienced person? The enkratês 
would be the kind of character in the domain of temperance equivalent to the expe-
rienced soldier in the domain of courage. However, Aristotle adds that when the 
experienced soldier faces extreme danger, he turns cowardly and is the first to run 
away (EN III.8 1116b15-23 (text 60)). By contrast, the enkratês is able to resist even 
the most intense appetite. It is worth specifying that in EN III Aristotle has not yet 
discussed the cognitive and the desiderative parts of the soul. He does not specify 
in virtue of what the experienced soldier is unable to resist great danger. My guess 
is that in addition to being experienced, the agent must have been well habituated 
in order to have a correct grasp of the end. The enkratês has that grasp, whereas the 
trained soldier has not. He fights only because he is paid for, not for the sake of a 
greater cause. 
However, this does not undermine my claim about empeiria. Without expe-
rience, the enkratês would not be able to resist his desire and would act akratically. 
The reason why he is able to resist his desire is that his experience provides him 
with an ability to assess correctly the circumstances of the situation.  
Correspondingly, this means that the enkratês agent has a sort of double 
view on a particular situation. On the one hand, he is sensitive to features arousing 
excessive appetites for a course of action that would be incompatible with the orthos 
logos. On the other hand, he will keep a clear view on aspects of the situation that 
he can relate to his notion of the orthos logos. This sort of double sensitivity to a situ-
ation is plausible if one assumes that empeiria does not develop together with char-
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acter and that both traits of the agent involve distinct characteristics, as I have ar-
gued at §5.3.3. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has been quite long. It required an extensive reading of EN VII, 
in particular of EN VII.3, because of the difficulty of the text and of the accompany-
ing controversies. I am now in a position to reaffirm the main point. 
Akrasia, as well as enkrateia, are behavioural dispositions which depend pri-
marily on the desiderative part of the soul. They can be generically described as 
dispositions for excessive appetite for non-necessary pleasures. In both cases, appe-
tite disturbs the agent's overall assessment of the situation. Although he is able to 
understand what is the best thing to do and what he should do in the circumstanc-
es, he is also attracted to other aspects of the situation which are incompatible with 
the best thing to do. However, they essentially differ in that the enkratês is resistant 
to appetite. Although he suffers from acute epithumia for pleasurable things, his 
conclusion about what ought to be done remains firm. By contrast, the akratês does 
not have this confidence in what he ought to do and he succumbs to appetite. The 
reason for this discrepancy is that the enkratês has better experience of practical 
matters than the akratês. I have defined experience as the capacity to recognize fea-
tures of a situation as instances of moral types (cf. §5.3.3, p. 191). The enkratês is thus 
better at recognizing instances of moral notions in the situations than the akratês. In 
other words, he has a better grasp of moral notions and is better at telling when 
such or such notion applies to the situation or not. 
The consequence of this cognitive trait in the enkratês is a stronger conviction 
in what appears to him as good to do. Since he can evaluate the various circum-
stances better than the akratês, he has more reasons to believe that he ought to do 
such and such. By contrast, the akratês does not have as much confidence. His con-
viction in the practical conclusion he has come to is not supported by extra consid-
erations. This explains why in the akratic case appetite wins over. 
This conclusions on akrasia and enkrateia supports my interpretation of prac-
tical thought and practical knowledge. The practical argument as a tool to evaluat-
ing the epistemic strength of a decision provides a sensible interpretation of akrasia 
and enkrateia. 
 CHAPTER 7 
7 Conclusion 
7.1 Recapitulation of the main results 
The main claim of this work is that Aristotle is committed to a strong notion 
of practical knowledge. In other words, when an agent makes a decision, it is pos-
sible under certain conditions that he genuinely knows what he should do. This 
kind of knowledge is characteristic of a virtuous agent. By contrast, an akratic agent 
does not possess such knowledge of what he should do.  
My reading of the first part of EN VI shows that Aristotle has indeed a no-
tion of practical knowledge as knowledge in decision (chap. 2). Aristotle has a sense 
of phronêsis which means practical knowledge as a disposition to make virtuous 
decisions. Correspondingly, practical knowledge as a cognitive state can be under-
stood as the knowledge that an agent entertains when making a decision. Practical 
knowledge is in fact the excellent actualization of practical thought. A decision is 
the normal outcome of the process of practical thinking. When practical thinking is 
excellent, the result is an excellent decision, and one can say of the deciding agent 
that he knows what he should do. Thus, the challenge in this work was to deter-
mine how one can speak of 'excellent' practical thought. 
I have argued that the second part of EN VI includes a discussion about the 
epistemology of phronêsis. The crucial passage is EN VI.7 1141b14-23, where Aristo-
tle writes that phronêsis depends on knowledge of both universals and particulars. 
In chapter 3, I have argued that practical thought and practical knowledge can be 
evaluated in terms of the practical syllogism. The use of the practical syllogism is 
legitimate if its purpose is to provide an evaluation of practical thought. Aristotle 
conceives implicitly practical thought in a way similar to theoretical rationality. As 
the traditional syllogism is a tool for the evaluation of theoretical thought and for 
determining the conditions of scientific knowledge (epistêmê), the practical syllo-
gism can and should be reconstructed from EN VI in order to provide a tool for the 
evaluation of practical thought and for determining the conditions of practical 
knowledge. However, the practical syllogism should not be interpreted as describ-
ing the form of practical thinking. The main form of practical thought, namely de-
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liberation, does not have a deductive structure. Also, the practical syllogism in the 
context of the Ethics should not be used in order to account for the causation of ac-
tion, even though this is what Aristotle actually does in a different context, namely 
in his physical treatises of the De Anima and of the De Motu Animalium. 
Practical thought can be evaluated using the practical syllogism. However, I 
have distinguished between moral evaluation, i.e. whether a decision is morally 
good, and epistemic evaluation, i.e. whether a decision is known as being the right 
one. The practical syllogism serves as a guide for both kinds of evaluation. Regard-
ing moral evaluation, the major premise as well as the minor premise must be cor-
rect. The major premise describes the moral end pursued by the agent and this end 
must be virtuous. The minor premise contains a description of the features which 
connects the agent's intention to the situation. It states the condition of success of 
the agent's intention. If the agent does not spot the relevant feature of the situation, 
he will not perform a virtuous action, even if he is well intended. He might perform 
a good action only by accident, or he might fail to apply the moral principle that he 
was considering. 
Concerning epistemic evaluation, I have shown in chap. 5 that practical 
knowledge is achieved when the agent has a virtuous character and when he has 
sufficient experience in practical matters. Virtuous character ensures that the agent 
obtains a morally good major premise in the course of his deliberation. From a non-
rational feeling of what is good, the agent comes to express a rational proposition of 
what one should do or what is good. The specific content of this prescriptive prop-
osition is provided by the present situation. However, the general orientation of the 
specification process is given by one's character. Experience in moral matters ena-
bles one to spot the relevant features of a situation and to identify them correctly as 
instances of moral notions. Experience works on the basis of perception and con-
sists in ordering and classifying particulars in groups. The more experienced one is, 
the finer distinctions one can make about particulars. 
Practical knowledge consists in the strong connection between the premises 
and the conclusion. The agent must be able to connect the relevant features of the 
situation as adequately as possible with the general end he is pursuing. On the one 
hand, he must come to the most specific description of a moral notion, i.e. what one 
should do, or what is good or beneficial. On the other hand, he must spot features 
of the situation which are the closest to these moral notions. Remember the exam-
ple of chapter 4 of the friend in need who accidentally meets his creditors on the 
market place (p. 151). One of his creditor friends is a strict believer that one ought 
to punish injustice, whereas the other has a more nuanced view about this rule. The 
former believes that his debtor ought to be punished if he does not honour his debt, 
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whereas the latter understands that the situation requires them not to punish but to 
help the friend in need. He arrives at a more refined moral rule than the punishing 
friend. He does not just believe, as does the punishing friend, that 'one should pun-
ish one's friend when they have done a bad deed'. He believes in addition that 'one 
should forgive one's friend if they are in such a position that they are not able to 
avoid doing a bad action'. Moreover, the understanding friend does not merely 
consider the particular fact that 'this friend has not honoured his debt'. He has a 
wider set of beliefs about the circumstances of the situation. He knows as well that 
'this friend has not eaten for three days', and that 'this friend has a wife and three 
children'. There is more proximity between the general consideration of what the 
agent ought to do and his beliefs about what is the case. Thanks to this, his argu-
ment of why he ought to do a particular action (e.g. inviting his friend at his house 
and talk over the situation) is more accurate. The premises fit better together. The 
more accurate the argument supporting one's conclusion, the stronger one's belief 
about what one should do. 
This aspect of the accuracy of a practical argument is at work in chapter 6, 
where I gave an account of akrasia and enkrateia. The akratic and enkratic agents 
have similar psychological profiles. In both the akratic and enkratic cases, the agent 
faces a motivational conflict between a wish for a good course of action and an irra-
tional desire for a pleasurable one. However, on the cognitive side, the enkratês 
shows greater experience in practical matters than the akratês. Thanks to his experi-
ence, he is better at recognizing features of the situation that are concerned by the 
moral principle he considers. He can account more accurately for the relation be-
tween moral universals and the particular circumstances of the situation. From this 
experience, he is able to build up a strong justification of why he ought to stick to 
his moral principle and not give in to pleasure. By contrast, the akratês is not able to 
spot the relevant circumstances in this way and to connect them with his moral 
principle. Although he comes up with reasons why he ought to abide by his moral 
principle, these reasons are not strong enough. So he eventually opts for the object 
of his appetite. 
In the introduction, I have restricted the object of this inquiry to moral ac-
tions. This entails that productive actions or actions in general are not concerned by 
my account of practical knowledge, at least not primarily. Now it appears possible 
to extend my account of practical knowledge to these actions so that decisions 
about such actions can be evaluated epistemically according to the same model. 
The definition of practical knowledge I give does not depend on a strong moral 
notion of the good and of other normative concepts. An everyday action could be 
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evaluated in the same way, even though for Aristotle the model of action is moral 
action performed for its own sake. 
Now that the reconstruction of practical knowledge from the Aristotelian 
corpus is complete, I wish to discuss this notion from a more general point of view. 
7.2 The plausibility of practical knowledge 
The practical/theoretical distinction about knowledge seems to be im-
portant, because there are phenomena in the world that a purely theoretical notion 
of knowledge cannot account for. For instance, theoretical knowledge cannot ac-
count for what makes our actions successful. The success of our actions seems to 
depend on the knowledge we have in the fields of these actions, but not any kind of 
knowledge. I can be very knowledgeable about planes and about plane piloting, 
being aware of matters on atmospheric pressures, of physical principles of how a 
wing shape can generate lift, etc. but still be unable to actually fly a plane. There is 
a need for procedures in order to implement some knowledge in a practical situa-
tion. Evaluation of success depends therefore on practical knowledge rather than 
on theoretical knowledge. Moreover, successful actions seem to have a large share 
in one's own personal satisfaction, larger than the kind of satisfaction that theoreti-
cal knowledge can provide. Proficiency in a certain body of knowledge may of 
course give me a certain intellectual satisfaction, but it seems pale in comparison 
with practical achievements such as obtaining one's driving license, winning a 
sport competition, writing up one's PhD dissertation, etc. These observations have 
led to common beliefs in education or sciences that knowledge or theoretical intel-
ligence does not warrant superiority or authority, that practice should prevail over 
theory, or, at a more existential level, that the meaning of life or of the human con-
dition is not exhausted by science.328 
However, it is disputable that there is such a thing as practical knowledge. 
One could put the plausibility of practical knowledge in doubt because it is not 
possible to predict reliably what the best thing to do is. There are at least three rea-
sons that prevents us from foreseeing what one should do. First, it seems reasona-
ble to admit that it is not possible to be perfectly informed. One cannot exclude that 
an agent might be unaware of a crucial aspect of the situation. He might therefore 
make a decision with unwanted or regrettable consequences, because of his igno-
                                                      
328 This emphasis on the practical side of life goes against the famous Aristotelian claim that 
happiness (eudaimonia) consists mainly in the activity of contemplating eternal truths, which 
pertains to theoretical activities (EN X.7 1177a12-1178a8). However, at this stage of the dis-
sertation, I aim at accounting for the autonomy of practical knowledge rather than subsum-
ing it under theoretical knowledge. For literature on the relation between practical and the-
oretical knowledge, see e.g. Kraut 1991; Natali 2001 chap. 4; Richardson Lear 2004. 
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rance of this crucial aspect. Such a situation is that of Queen Merope who orders to 
kill the stranger in front of her, while being unaware that this person is in fact her 
son (see p. 138). A reasonable agent must therefore assume that he might be igno-
rant of some crucial fact in his deliberation. From this, one can infer that knowing 
what one should do in a strong sense is impossible. 
Also, the agent might be facing a moral dilemma, in which he has to choose 
between two incompatible courses of action. In such situations, it seems impossible 
to determine what the best thing to do is. The agent's decision is inevitably tainted 
with hesitation, because he cannot predict what course of action is the best to go 
for. The action he opts for will be accompanied by uncertainty and regrets that the 
alternative course of action was perhaps a better option. 
An extra reason to put the plausibility of practical knowledge into question 
lies in the following requirement for practical knowledge: An action resulting from 
a decision with practical knowledge is a virtuous action. However, the best thing to 
do depends on how things turn out and the agent cannot possibly predict reliably 
what is going to happen. Even in an ideal case in which the agent is perfectly in-
formed and in which there is no doubt as to which moral value he should promote, 
an unexpected event might occur while the agent is implementing his decision. In 
this case, the intended action will not be successful. The result of the situation is not 
what was intended by the agent. In such a case, one cannot attribute practical 
knowledge to the agent, because there is no virtuous action which follows his deci-
sion. This case is similar to the first one. Similarly to the first situation, the agent has 
to admit that he might be ignorant of what is going to happen. Again, this conces-
sion ruins the expectation regarding the possibility of knowing what one should 
do. 
In fact, any situation is concerned by these problems. In spite of the various 
strategies for minimizing risks in decision-making, one never really knows what 
one should do. One's choice appears as the object of mere guess rather than of 
knowledge. These issues for the plausibility of practical knowledge are real and it 
would be counter-intuitive to argue for the possibility of practical knowledge in 
cases of moral dilemmas or cases of ignorance of the crucial circumstances. In order 
to preserve the significance of practical knowledge one has to make an important 
qualification to this notion.  
Aristotle's conception of practical knowledge does not amount to predicting 
what the best action is. It is not a method or guideline for decision-making. Rather, 
it is the description of the agent's decision in epistemic terms. Of course, it is possi-
ble to elaborate such a method from this description of decision, but this is not what 
Aristotle does. The remarks against the plausibility of practical knowledge entail 
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that practical knowledge is possible only if certain conditions are met. First, the 
agent must be aware of all the significant circumstances of the situation, or at least 
of the most significant ones. Practical knowledge is possible only insofar as the 
agent is not missing a crucial piece of information about the situation. Second, there 
must be no external event that prevents the agent from implementing the intended 
action. Third, the present situation cannot be a situation of dilemma. These condi-
tions introduce external limitations on practical knowledge, on which the agent has 
no power.329 Still, they also entail that the agent is responsible for determining 
whether a situation is problematic or not, whether it is possible to clear out the dif-
ficulties or not. 
Provided that the external conditions are met, it is possible for an agent to 
achieve practical knowledge about what to do. What counts as practical knowledge 
in a strong sense is the kind of knowledge exemplified in decision when the latter is 
justified by reasons. By contrast, holding a prescriptive proposition without such 
reasons is mere belief. For instance, if I hold that I ought to vote against the re-
strictions on Swiss immigration policy, I have practical knowledge if this belief is 
accompanied with a correct moral justification and if this justification is epistemi-
cally strong. If I hold this belief only because I believe simply that foreigners are 
good people, I do not have practical knowledge. Although my justification is mor-
ally good, it is not a strong one. But if I hold this belief on the additional grounds 
that foreigners constitute a valuable working force for Switzerland, and that the 
State and society are able to cope with possible undesirable effects of immigration, 
then my belief has a stronger justification and is thereby closer to practical 
knowledge.330 Practical knowledge in decision can be considered as knowledge in a 
strong sense in virtue of being part of a rational structure of justification. In this 
                                                      
329 These conditions show that practical knowledge is not possible in every situation. In 
some situations, there are problematic circumstances in which the agent cannot come to a 
firm decision regarding what he should do. In a situation of genuine moral dilemma, there 
is no way that the agent arrives at a decision where he knows what he should do. Consider 
the example of the young man and his mother in Sartre's speech "L'existentialisme est un 
humanisme" (1946). During WWII, this young man is hesitant between staying by his moth-
er and conforting her and leaving France to join the Free French Forces. In such a situation, 
the agent cannot come to a satisfying solution, but has to choose one course of action over 
the other. He cannot know what he should do. 
330 Of course, in this example, one can easily imagine someone with a justification for the 
opposite claim, viz. in favour of restrictions on immigration policy, which is as strong as my 
justification. Maybe this example belongs to the category of situation which are unsolvable. 
The task of the wise citizen would then be to deliberate about the situation in order to come 
to a satisfying conclusion as close to practical knowledge as possible. The truth is that in 
such political issues, some people vote on better grounds than others. 
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respect, it is similar to epistêmê. What constitutes epistêmê is the relation between the 
conclusion and the premises of an apodeixis. In the same vein, practical knowledge 
depends on the relation between the major and the minor premises and the conclu-
sion of a practical syllogism. 
Consequently, I suggest the following definition of practical knowledge: 
I know that I should do >, ceteris paribus, iff 
1) > is actually the right thing to do  
2) I believe that (1) is true 
3) I am strongly justified in believing that (1) is true 
The ceteris paribus clause takes the external conditions mentioned above in 
consideration. Practical knowledge can be achieved only insofar as the agent is in a 
situation which allows a reliable decision process. 
Then, clause (1) is a condition of success. It states that what the agent in-
tends to do is actually the right thing to do. I mean 'right' in a prudential as well as 
in a moral way: > must be a successful as well as morally good action. In other 
words, practical knowledge results in virtuous action, necessarily. The agent must 
be right regarding what he thinks is the right thing to do. Even if he is strongly 
convinced of the rightness of his conclusion, it might happen that the intended ac-
tion ends up having harmful consequences. In that case, one cannot attribute prac-
tical knowledge to the agent. 
Concerning clause (2), it is worth mentioning that the agent only believes the 
truth of clause (1). Clause (2) does not require that the agent knows it. Knowing the 
truth of the success of one's future action would amount to indubitable prediction. 
However, as already argued, this kind of prediction is impossible because of the 
contingency of the domain of actions. That what I intend to do brings about a mor-
ally good state of affairs is a proposition about the future and this kind of proposi-
tion is neither true nor false. Consequently, I cannot know such a proposition.  
Clause (3) refers to the appropriate justification provided by the practical 
syllogism. Here is an account of what an appropriate justification of decision is. 
Knowledge of particulars depends on my experience of moral matters, i.e. whether 
I spot the relevant features of the situation. Knowledge of universals depends on 
whether I have adequate concepts of moral values. Moreover, I must be able to 
connect the features of the situation appropriately to my concepts of moral values. 
It has appeared that this kind of justification allows of degrees. I can be more or less 
justified in deciding to >. The strength of the justification depends on both compo-
nents of practical thought, knowledge of universals and of particulars. The particu-
lars under consideration must be relevant to the situation, that is, they should ena-
ble the agent to determine whether his moral principle applies or not. Strong justifi-
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cation occurs when the proposition describing the relevant particular is close to the 
proposition describing the universal principle. In other words, the agent is able to 
deduce the conclusion from both propositions without having to supply many ex-
tra steps. 
These aspects give rise to at least two issues. First, it seems plausible to ad-
mit that the relevant features of the situation depend on which moral end I pursue. 
If agent 1 pursues courage as the good, and if agent 2 pursues the accumulation of 
riches, the same situation will not appear in the same way to each agent. Agent 1 
will be struck by features different from those that agent 2 attends to. This would 
entail a circular account of the development of practical knowledge. I have ad-
dressed this issue in chapter 5 already. There I have argued that forging character 
and acquiring experience of particular facts are two distinct processes which do not 
merge (p. 197). One's experience in practical matters, i.e. sensibility to the relevant 
features of a situation, can be acquired independently from one's development of 
one's character. Consequently, the ability to connect features of a situation with 
one's notion of what one should do is not conditioned by this notion.  
The second issue concerns the notion of adequate concept of a moral value. 
Having an adequate concept of a moral value seems to amount to knowledge of the 
good as a rational cognitive state. However, I have argued that moral ends are de-
termined by character, which is a non-rational disposition. This last issue leads to 
the question of the reflexivity of practical knowledge. Does practical knowledge 
imply that one knows that one knows what one should do? Does the agent need to be 
aware of the special epistemic strength of his belief? Reflexivity is a property usual-
ly attributed to knowledge: when one knows, one also knows that one knows.331 
However, in chapters 4 and 5, I have argued that what determines one's knowledge 
of universals is not a rational capacity, but that it is character, and that non-rational 
representation (phantasia) provides its content. If this interpretation is correct, I can-
not have a fully rational justification of why I pursue such or such moral value. At 
some point, this justification ends up referring to a non-rational hunch of what is 
the good. This entails that practical knowledge is not reflexive. The phronimos per-
son does not have a privileged access to the good. One should therefore abandon 
reflexivity. 
To conclude this work, I want to go back to the issue of the foundation of 
moral principles, brought about by getting rid of reflexivity. That the grasp of mor-
al principles depends ultimately on character, which is a non-rational disposition, 
                                                      
331 This feature is at the basis of internalist conceptions of knowledge (Engel 2007: 33-34). 
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seems to imply that the rational foundation of ethics as well as practical knowledge 
in a strong sense are impossible.  
7.3 The point of practical knowledge 
How does one's character contribute to the foundation of practical 
knowledge? My general answer has been that habituation of character is sufficient 
for a reliable moral response of the virtuous man. The moral orientation of my re-
sponses depends on the habituation of the non-rational part of the soul. A grasp of 
the major premise is possible on the basis of character alone, since the capacity of 
non-rational representation Aristotle calls phantasia is sufficient for the cognition of 
moral values. The moral notions I manipulate in my deliberations are provided by 
my phantasia of the good. As soon as I consider them in deliberation, they enter a 
network of propositions which are connected to one another rationally. At this 
point, my representation of the good is expressed rationally. Nevertheless, the cog-
nitive basis for this representation of the good is non-rational. 
However, my phantasia of the good can be wrong. Motivations to act in ani-
mals, including humans, are caused by desire and the object of desire is primarily 
not the good, but the pleasant. I tend to desire what is pleasant. I also tend to iden-
tify what is pleasant with what is good. In this case, what warrants that my phanta-
sia of the pleasant coincide with the real good, i.e. that I have a phantasia of the real 
good? Is a representation of the good enough to ensure that I am not liable to error 
of judgement? How can one avoid the possibility of error? Rationalists have it that 
the truthful grasp of the end is warranted by reason. Without a genuine rational 
grasp of the good, it seems that I can be deceived by appearances.  
A crucial element of answer to this problem is found in Aristotle's account 
of the criterion of good action. Aristotle affirms on various occasions that the virtu-
ous man, or phronimos, is the measure of the correctness of an action. The virtuous 
man is the rule and measure for discriminating the real good (kanôn kai metron EN 
III.4 1113a33; see also EN II.6 1106b36-1107a2; VI.12 1144a34; IX.4 1166a12; X.5 
1176a15-19). Aristotle holds that in the case of the virtuous man, his phantasia of the 
good coincides with the real good. The object of his wish appears good to him, and 
turns out to be really good (See my interpretation of EN III.4 at §5.2.3). This claim 
relies on the fact that Aristotle speaks of the object of boulêsis as being in truth the 
good (kat'alêtheian 1113a23-24). 
What explains the moral superiority of the virtuous person, then? A look at 
a passage of EE II.10, which is the Eudemian equivalent of EN III.4, completes the 
above account. Aristotle seems to have a naturalist explanation of the cognitive 
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superiority of the phronimos. According to EE II.10 1227a28-30, the good is the natu-
ral object of boulêsis: 
81) "Similarly, wish, too, is by nature for the good, but against nature 
it is also for the bad. And by nature one wishes for the good, but 
against nature and by perversion one can also wish for the bad." 
EE II.10 1227a28-30 
ὁ<-ί(3 Cὲ !"ὶ ἡ /-ύ07@23 >ύ@'2 <ὲ+ $-ῦ ἀ5"&-ῦ ἐ@$ί, ,")ὰ 
>ύ@2+ Cὲ !"ὶ $-ῦ !"!-ῦ, !"ὶ /-ύ0'$"2 (30) >ύ@'2 <ὲ+ $ὸ ἀ5"&ό+, 
,")ὰ >ύ@2+ Cὲ !"ὶ C2"@$)->ὴ+ !"ὶ $ὸ !"!ό+. 
The natural object of wish is the real good. It might happen that someone 
wishes for something bad, yet this would be against nature, because of the perver-
sion of his character.332 Thus, someone who grows up according to the human es-
sence naturally wishes for the good (see Woods 1992: 149). If I have not been per-
verted, the object of my wish is the good. The virtuous person is the one who actu-
alizes human essence at its best, so what appears to him as good is the real good.333 
Again, the kind of cognition responsible for his representation of the good does not 
need to be rational. There is no need for a kind of strong knowledge of the good 
that would distinguish the virtuous man from other people. 
If the authority of the virtuous man's phantasia of the good is ultimately 
grounded in nature, it means that the notion of the good can be explained in natu-
ral terms. However, such straightforward naturalist position is open to the fallacy 
that no moral concept can be reduced to non-moral ones (Moore 1903). This has 
been pointed at by many commentators concerning Aristotle's definition of eudai-
monia (see Heinaman 1995: 2-3 for references).  
It is possible that Aristotle accepted naturalism and that he was not sensitive 
to the natural fallacy argument. More probably, however, he was aware that the 
equation of eudaimonia with virtuous activity (in a moral sense) did not hold. He 
was probably aware that the notion of moral virtue in a moral sense could not be 
derived from the notion of the excellent activity of human being's natural function. 
In fact, Aristotle does not provide a strictly natural foundation for his definition of 
                                                      
332 The context is not the same here than in EN III.4. In the Nicomachean version of the pas-
sage, Aristotle wants to answer the question whether the object of wish is the good or the 
apparent good. In the Eudemian case Aristotle wants to answer the question how it is pos-
sible to wish for something bad. 
333 Aristotle seems to have a similar naturalist conception of knowledge in general. At Rhet. 
I.1 1355a15-17, he writes: "At the same time, human beings are by nature sufficiently dis-
posed towards truth and most of the time do attain truth." (ἅ<" Cὲ !"ὶ -ἱ ἄ+&)(,-2 ,)ὸ3 
$ὸ ἀ07&ὲ3 ,'>ύ!"@2+ ἱ!"+ῶ3 !"ὶ $ὰ ,0'ί( $859ά+-8@2 $ῆ3 ἀ07&'ί"3). 
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happiness. There is a gap between saying that happiness consists in the excellent 
exercise of reason and that 'excellent' here means virtuous according to the various 
moral virtues detailed in books III and IV of the EN, and book III of the EE 
(Chappell 2005: 248-249, citing McDowell).334 A similar comment can be made con-
cerning the virtuous man as best achieving the essence of human beings. The activi-
ty of the virtuous includes political activities. He lives in a Greek city, has relations 
with other citizens, makes contracts with them, etc. This means that the human es-
sence is not just confined to natural functions, but includes non-natural ones as 
well.335 
An important aspect of my account of practical knowledge is that it involves 
the contribution of a social community. The young learner does not acquire a sense 
of the good and the bad on his own. What is developed naturally in the first place, 
is an ability to desire pleasant things, not things which are good or bad. By nature, 
he has no cognition of objects as being morally good or bad. He cognizes them as 
merely pleasant or painful. A sense of being good or bad is acquired later when he 
is first told that such or such an action is good or bad. Correct habituation consists 
in getting pleasure from what is good and what is bad. Unless the young learner is 
guided by his peers, he will remain at the level of pleasure and pain and will not 
achieve the higher task of distinguishing between what is immediately pleasant 
and what is not immediately beneficial but nonetheless good. In other words, the 
young learner acquires a sense of the good and the bad thanks to the community he 
lives in, that is, thanks to the encouragement or disapproval of mature moral agents 
around him, like his parents or teachers. 
This does not entail that the foundation of morality through character col-
lapses into moral relativism. I rather think that as long as the surroundings of the 
young learner is sane, his character will not be perverted. Similarly, as long as he is 
not impeded in his exercise of thought, the young learner will develop his intelli-
gence normally. The average notion of the good shared by the community is a reli-
able approximation of the real good.336 
                                                      
334 Aristotle just does not feel compelled to answer a moral sceptic argument. Indeed, it 
might be true that the well-functioning of human beings does not analytically entail happi-
ness as flourishing. However, this also holds for other candidates to the good life at the time 
of Aristotle. You cannot derive analytically from a description of the human function that 
the good life consists in a life of pleasure or a life of pursuing honours. These alternative 
definitions of happiness also commit the naturalist fallacy (Broadie 2007: 117-118).  
335 Maybe the famous description 'Man is by nature a political animal' also expresses this 
feature. (>ύ@'2 ,-02$2!ὸ+ ὁ ἄ+&)(,-3 1097b11; see also 1169b18–19). 
336 The position I am closest to is the one called 'response-dependent', according to which 
moral facts are not dependent on our agreements, but rather on our non-rational responses 
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More importantly, the contribution of the community is to secure the grasp 
of moral values. The young learner acquires a sense of the good and the bad by 
confronting his preconceptions to the judgement of his peers. These are occasions 
for the young learner to probe his representations of moral values and to learn 
through a process of trial and error. Once the agent has become a fully grown up 
moral agent, he has acquired the ability to judge moral actions by himself. Yet, the 
process of trial and error does not stop here. The grown up moral agent goes on 
learning about moral values. His successes and failures contribute to refine his con-
ception of these notions. At some point, he has acquired sufficient experience (em-
peiria) in order to avoid mistakes in decision. 
The point of practical knowledge is thus not the foundation of moral princi-
ples. Rather, it is the appropriateness of justification, i.e. the way the agent can con-
nect the situation with his idea of the good and express it rationally. Moreover, 
practical thought based on justification enables communication among human be-
ings about morals and the evaluation of the correctness of the moral views of oth-
ers. 
                                                                                                                                                        
(emotions, desires). The fact that a given group of people will react in a similar way to a 
situation demanding a moral response shows that moral facts exist and that one can speak 
of them truly or falsely. This position has been developed by McDowell 1985 and 1995. In 
the latter contribution, McDowell attributes this position to Aristotle. For useful qualifica-
tions of this attribution to Aristotle, see Charles 1995. 
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 Glossary 
Cognition: A cognition, or cognitive state, is a mental event with a representational 
content. The term denotes all kinds of grasping of information by the mind. There 
are three distinct kinds of cognitive states in Aristotle: perception (aisthêsis), repre-
sentation (phantasia), and intellect (nous) or thought (dianoia). 
 
Disposition (hexis): A disposition is a tendency to actualize a certain capacity in a 
definite way. 
 
Opinion (doxa), doxastic: An opinion (doxa) is a cognitive state with a propositional 
content. In this work, I oppose doxastic states to phantastic ones on the ground that 
the former have a propositional content, while the latter have not. 
 
Epistemic strength: I call 'epistemic strength' the degree of conviction with which a 
subject endorse a proposition. Knowledge entails a strong degree of conviction, 
whereas belief, or opinion, entails a weaker degree of conviction. A decision which 
is the result of practical knowledge is held with epistemic strength. 
 
Evaluation: An evaluation is the act of attributing a value to something. A proposi-
tion is evaluative if its content refers to a value. There are various kinds of evalua-
tion, depending on the kinds of value one considers. Moral evaluation attributes 
moral values to something (being good, being bad, etc.), whereas epistemic evalua-
tion attributes a degree of epistemic strength to something. 
 
Explanation: An explanation is the act of giving reasons in order to justify some-
thing. For instance, if I explain why I have carried out action !, I give the reasons 
why I have done !. An explanation can be sufficient or not depending on whether 
or not I have justified my action. 
 
Intellect (nous): In Aristotle's psychology, the intellect is the capacity proper for 
rational cognitive states. In its broadest sense, the intellect is the capacity for 
thought in general. In this sense, it also includes states such as doxa or hupolêpsis. In 
a more narrow and technical sense, the intellect is the state which grasps the first 
principles of a science. 
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Justification: A justification is the act of giving sufficient reasons for doing some-
thing. A justification can be moral or epistemic. Moral justification gives sufficient 
reasons for a moral action, whereas epistemic justification gives sufficient reasons 
for believing something. Epistemic justification is closely connected to evaluation: I 
evaluate the epistemic strength of a claim by inquiring into its justification. 
 
Knowledge: Knowledge is the disposition to know something. Knowing something 
(having a piece of knowledge) is a cognitive state with a propositional content, 
which necessarily describes something true. This is what I call knowing in a strong 
sense. Knowing in a weak sense amounts to grasping information about the world, 
without worrying about the truth of the information. 
 
Moral: Something is 'moral' if it is morally appraisable, that is, if it can be evaluated 
in terms of being good or bad. 
 
Normative: Something is normative if it can be evaluated according to any given 
norm or measure. It is opposed to being descriptive. An action, or proposition, can 
be normative, if it can be evaluated in terms of good or bad, right or wrong, pleas-
ant or unpleasant, beneficial or harmful etc. 
 
Practical argument or practical syllogism: A practical argument is the formal rep-
resentation of a process of deliberation. It summarizes the crucial points of this 
piece of deliberation. The tradition has called this kind of argument 'practical syllo-
gism' by reference to Aristotle's doctrine of the syllogism in his logical works. The 
practical argument aims at the justification of one's actions. It also makes possible 
the epistemic evaluation of one's decision to act. 
 
Prescription, prescriptive: A prescription is an assertion which orders or compels 
someone to do something. A rule or a law is a prescription. A prescriptive proposi-
tion contains an 'ought' clause. 
 
Representation (phantasia), phantastic: Representation (phantasia) is a cognitive 
state that has no propositional content, but an appearance, or an image. It differs 
from opinion in that respect, since opinion has a propositional content. Representa-
tion also differs from perception in that its object is not necessarily present physi-
cally when it is cognized. A phantastic state is a state with a representational con-
tent and is thereby opposed to a doxastic state. 
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Rational: A rational state is a state which is held on the basis of appropriate rea-
sons. 
 
Thought (dianoia): Thought is the cognitive process of connecting propositional 
contents together. Thought is a typically rational process. 
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